20th-Century Nationalism in the Middle East - Term Paper Example

20th Century Nationalism in the Middle East

In over four centuries, the Arabic world was dominated by the Ottoman Empire. This era of the Ottoman rule was characterized by constant decline. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Eastern Arab world was perceivably degenerating, instead of surging forward in development. However, in the later stages of the Ottoman rule histography, there was a significant phase of development which came in the form of Arab Nationalism. In light of this revelation, this paper seeks to discuss the theme of development with respect to Arab nationalism in the Arabic world timeline.

One can scarcely talk of Arabic history without mentioning Albert Hourani, who lived from 1915 to 1993. He was widely known for his views on the Ottoman rule during the 1940’s. Arab nationalism was rivaled by Turkish nationalism which advocated for conversion of non-Turks into Turks. This Turkish nationalism was driven by the Turkish military upon seizure of power. They suppressed or terminated those in opposition to their ideologies. This Turkish nationalism was instrumental in obliterating the Ottoman national movement. Instead, it paved way for a newer system, the Arab nationalism.

According to Abou-El-Haj, the nationalists do not comprehend the Arab history and its unity, which may be a pointer towards distortion of facts. Arab history, culture, and heritage are based on the Ottoman rule which had existed for four centuries. Nationalists historians should know that "the inspiration for the idea of the common identity of the Arab peoples and their common heritage is rooted in the preceding four centuries of Ottoman rule.". In what is seen as a seconding opinion to that of Abou-El- Haj, Youssef Choueri indicates that in to understand the history of the Arabs, one must be subjected to the Ottoman ideal that existed before. Unless the Ottoman option is restored in the Arab World, the restoration can no longer be the familiar drawn-out decline, but as a response to European penetration and domination.” According to Philip Khoury, the French rule that aimed at dominating the Arab world was largely unsuccessful. This is because its structure of governance and nature of authority was unfamiliar to it subjects who had been accustomed to the Ottoman rule in no less than four centuries. In addition, the French mandate system was unstable and lacked the moral authority as that of Sultan-Caliph of the Ottoman Empire, which held staunch religious traditions.

Albert Hourani’s view on the Ottoman rule finds favor in Ehud Toledano, who is aware of the 19th-century Ottoman character as seen in Egypt. He acknowledges the fact that the subsiding of Ottoman history came at a cost of distortion of terms and consequently, their relation to the past. George Antonius (891-1942) was a Christian with an Arab origin. It is interesting to speculate if he would have remained reserved in his thoughts on the Ottoman empire, or would have been influenced to change stance with the elapse of time. one of his works, The Arab Awakening, published in 1938, was widely reviewed in the context of Arab nationalism, even two decades after publication. Antonius attributes the onset of Arab nationalism to the period within the first 50 years of the 19th century. As he puts it, this era had been preceded by an era when "centuries of [Ottoman] decadence and misrule had debilitated the collective spirit of the Arab world and loosened its former cohesion."The first signs of the breakaway

were noted in liberal Arabs who, through exposure to Christianity and Muslim culture, began to develop a consciousness that defied Turkish oppressive era. George Antonius indeed investigated the progressive emergence of Arab Nationalism, since the mid 19th century, into the 1st world war and through the Arab revolt of 1916 onwards.

Arab nationalism was propagated by the failure of the Ottoman government and the oblivious qualities of the Turkish nationalism. Just as the Balkan national movements had dented the Ottoman empire in the mid 19th century, Arab nationalism was quickly filling in the void created by discontent with the two forces. This development is seconded by the fact that in the late 19th century, similar attempts to drawn old systems of rule had already sufficed. Egyptian, Lebanese and Syrian intellectuals were fighting to restore a long-lost Arab culture. Le Réveil de la Nation arabe, a book published by a Syrian Catholic in 1905, attempted to champion for Arab independence from the Turkish rule. Many groups and societies came into existence later on, which similarly advocated for Arab independence. They included the al-Fattat or the Young Arab society based in Paris, the Arab-Turkish condominium, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Ottoman Administrative Decentralisation Party, Beirut Reform Society, and the al-Ahd (the Covenant), a secret society membered by Arab Army officers. A revolution championing for the autonomy of the Arab community was quickly rising, even as prominent Arab intellectuals and public figures wrote on the political and cultural plights of the Arab people. These intellectuals included people like the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh, and Abd-al Rahman al Kawakibi, from Aleppo. Notable areas of operation included Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Beirut, and Libya. The peak of the push for Arab decentralization came in June 1913 when an Arab Congress in Paris discussed mechanisms of decentralization. Demands brought to the table included that of recognizing Arabic as the main language and establishment of local military services. The congress was attended by the Ottoman Decentralisation Party and the al-Fatat society. The demand put forward were supposedly identical to those used by Albanians in their quest for the wider berth of freedom.

All these efforts point towards Arab revolution. However, it could be considered a partisan move by those championing for the said reforms. For example, Najib Azuri is suspected to have been advocating for a french agenda in Syria and Lebanon, since these places had already been invaded by Christian Maronites who wanted a bigger chunk of Lebanon. Najib Azuri could not be identified as a key figure in influencing his community. Al-Kawakibi, a Muslim intellect, likewise seems to have been pushing for greater protection of Arab interests while still under the Ottoman empire, as well as, the Islam reforms. What is remarkable about these societies is that they operated under no recognition from both the Ottoman and French intelligence organizations. They conducted their activities quietly. The members of the Paris congress might have held lesser targets for the Arab world, only requiring protection of local interests which went as far as within families and clans. Autonomy or outright Arab independence did not seem the kind of ideology they had at the time. their local interests instead, were only threatened by centralization of policies as spelled by CUP.

As Karl K. Karbir notes, the major factor that helped shape the Arab histography was the first world war. It was instrumental in determining the direction of Arab history in the 1920s and 1930s. the Arabs in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, and Palestine particularly held common resentment to the European rule imposed on them. They could, therefore, relate to each other through the sufferings they were subjected to. These Arabs of the fertile crescent had considered it a victory to unchain themselves from the Ottoman imperialism. Instead of being free, they had found themselves engraved in another form of imperialism; the European rule.

During Abdulhamid's rule, there was an attempt to revive the ideological and functional existence of the Ottoman rule. This was done through recruiting of Arabs into the Ottoman central elite, after which they would become complete members of the ruling class. Being recognized under such a status gave them the possibility to serve in higher ranks in the army and even in central management. This revival largely capitalized on the foundation of Muslim faith and Islamic caliphal connections at the time. in the event of European invasion, the crop of Arab people, being the product of attempted revival championed for a course to gain an identity. They were sponsored by colonial regimes to make their voice heard. This social group was caught in the dilemma of defending its old Ottoman regime, having initially betrayed it. their actions provided historic shape up in the period of the 1st world war. Theirs was a move that set the pace for scholarship of the interwar period. Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj says that “In condemning the Ottoman regime and all things Turkish, the scholarship helped this group gloss over its role as part of the Ottoman elite..."

In the study of Arab nationalism and history, Antonius helps bring out the writings of those who preceded him in the early existence of the movements as depicted by Asad Daghir, Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, Amin Said, and Sati-al-Husri. Antonius work, The Arab Awakening, was reviewed by Sylvia G. Haim who acknowledged that he correctly depicted the Turkish rule on Arabic world. Haim, however, stops short of that, rebuking the notion that Muhammed Ali, through the Wahhabi movement was interested in pushing for a collective Arab world movement, though it did not succeed. According to Haim, Muhammed Ali was putting his personal interest first by aiming at building his own empire.

Antonius’ ability to detect the awakening of the Arab consciousness is, however, received praise from Haim. Antonius correctly traced the consciousness by the literary revival in Syria for the period between 1847-1868. Antonius exemplary findings also record the society called al-Jamiyya al-Suriyya, which had diverse Arab personalities as members, though not exceeding 150 in number. It is also Antonius who pointed out the literary achievements of Al-Bustani. Within Al-Bustani’s setting was the motto stating "Patriotism in an article of faith, a sentiment hitherto unknown in the Arab world.". the author of the political review held the belief that Antonius had indeed held on to the motto.

According to Antonius, Syrian intercommunal turbulences as provided by political and international factors led young Arabs into finding ways to champion for their own freedom from the Turkish reigns. The events of 1860 in Syria helped cultivate a sense of patriotism to their own culture and unimposed political system. In effect, a movement came into the formation; one that was inspired by Arab way of life. It was founded on the ideology of inclusiveness and nationalism, as opposed to former structures which promoted sectarianism in the society. What started as a small movement soon became big, spreading into wider localities. The Arab movement came to form the basis of a revolution championed by Arabs, for Arabs. Though it remained inactive and incapacitated in a period of about 40 years, it continued to make a foundation for itself in the hope of transforming into a movement that would mark a kind of renaissance under the backing of a renascent literature.

According to Haim, in the region past 1860, Syria did not witness any brotherhood ideologies. The 1860 upheavals, she says, helped cement components of sectarian polarisation. This because the Christian Maronites were granted immunity from interference from sectors such as the Druze and Muslims.

The disparities between Haim and Antonius on the Paris congress shows the kind of interpretation the two had. For one, Antonius claims the members of the Congress had the community’s interests at heart. They had appeared to disown the Ottoman Empire on the account of the ills they had committed over a long period of time. they thus presented advice that was aimed at mitigating these ills, given that the Ottoman Empire was only an heir to them. From Haim’s perspective, the Congress was graced by attendants who camouflaged their true intentions. In the following years, the same people now became staunch supporters of the French rule in Syria. They even went as far as refuting and opposing the Arab nationalist movement that came into existence in the later years.

Haim’s subsequent works point out that genuine Arab nationalism was realized in the 1930s, having been conceptualized first in the West. It also had to be intertwined with Islam in order to survive. Apart from Haim’s criticism on The Awakening, another major critic was Zeine N. Zeine. Zeine revisited the origins of Arab nationalism, tracing it back from a period of direct Ottoman administration. He disowns the idea of secular and liberal national awakening as suggested by Antonius. Further on, he refutes claims of the awakening being as a result of an imperial Ottoman’s rule or even the resistance of the Turkish rule. This does not hold even considering the events relating to the anti-Turkish sentiment on Mount Lebanon.

In an extension of Zeine’s challenge to Antonius’ claims, education could not have a possibly made major impact on the Arab awakening. Even though it may be true that political and democratic influence from the west, as spread by the availability of foreign schools played a part in awakening, the whole idea in itself is an exaggeration. According to Antonius, the missionaries’ intent was to spread Christianity and convert Muslims towards this faith. This would be further aided by their schools which were largely Christian. The education imposed in this institutions had little impact on the local politics or nationalism because some missionaries harbored deep patriotic feelings towards mother countries. The main achievement of these schools was to induct literacy on a small group of students, in the form of reading and writing.

Zeine thinks that Antonius’ attribution of a small group of elites in Beirut leading the awakening is wrong. He terms this consideration a wild exaggeration with no historical basis. Zeine also refuses to accept that this group was the force behind the national movement that fostered for an awakening. Though Antonius extracted his arguments from a Lebanese doctor, Faris Nimr Pasha, Zeine states that never had there been an idea of nationalism amongst the people of the near east. The structures at that time were purely economic and religious. Each group was interested in pursuing its agenda; the Christians targeted political reforms and perhaps independence, while the Muslim Arabs sought to revitalize the fading purity of Islam and Muslim Institution. This was to be done within the Ottoman empire which had to be restructured and made relevant again. In light of Zeine’s claims, it was possible that Turkish interference and the promotion of secularism by CUP inspired Arab nationalism into existence. This nationalism was supported by Christians of Mount Lebanon and forcefully catalyzed by the policies introduced by some Muslim leaders and Young Turks. They had failed to look beyond the immediate situation.

The role of Islam in the Arab awakening cannot be underestimated. According to A. L. Tibawi, Islam was instrumental in bringing about political consciousness. In so doing, Tibawi dismisses the role of missionaries and their influence on a small minority group who purportedly led the revolution. Tibawi instead identifies Muslim schools as the driving force in Arab political consciousness, even through modernization under the Muslim state. In the period before the emergence of the Young Turks, no other definitive religious force existed in Syria other than the Islamic movement. It surpassed the influences made by foreign religions such as Christianity, going beyond regional, racial or national bounds.

This idea is seconded by Hourani’s work titled Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. It is through analysis of ideas put across by Tahtawi, Khair al-Din, Bustani, Jamal al-Din al-Afgani, and Muhammad Abduh of the late 19th century, that Hourani recognizes their contribution towards political consciousness. These modernizers’ ideas helped cultivate this consciousness in the Araab world. Hauroni claims that Arab modernization was a counter move to contain the imperialists’ steady interferences, strengthening internal Islamic unity in the process. However, even under the new influence of Islamic modernism, the Ottoman state was still recognized. Arabic Thought in the Liberal is seen to slightly magnify the rule by Abdülhamid. At the same time, it is structured to show the efforts of Christian Arab nationalism before the interference of the Young Turks. In doing so, Hourani disposes of Antonius’ assumption of the vital role played by Christians in the nationalist movement in the wake of nationalism. Instead, Hourani states that the Lebanese Christian movement had no signs of being the main contender in the events leading to the formation of a nationalist movement. Further on, he delves into the changes surrounding the Ottoman society with the ending of the 19th century. New forces characterized by production, trade and new methods of communication all contribute to the making of a new system of civilization. On top of these factors is the increasing presence of European power over the Arab world. the emergence of Arabism, according to Hourani “had by no means driven out other ideologies, those of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism, nor had it replaced, throughout society, something far older, the acceptance of the rule of just Muslim sultan." In conceding this fact on the history of Arab nationalism, he is seen to have rhymed with C. Ernest Dawn’s propositions on the topic.

According to Dawn, Arabism is defined as Arab nationalism, or rather proto-nationalism as Hobsbawm once put it. In letting us understand his point of view, he contrasts, Arabism from Ottomanism which was geared towards defending the Ottoman Empire. Dawn’s analysis on Arab nationalism is a sharp diversion from the ideas presented along by the other scholars on the topic. In another contrast between Arabism and Ottomanism, Dawn claims that Ottomanism was a system that aimed at achieving a single nation even in the face of unreconciliable diverse cultures among the people. The latter identifies Arabs as a unique people with varying traits, virtues, and rights. The joining factor between Ottomanism ad Arabism was the threat of European progress on the Arab population. The two arose out of this mutual problem, even if they had glaring disparities when contrasted in exclusion of European invasion.

Dawn started writing on Arab history and resultant nationalism in 1958. In studying Arabism, he identified Islamic modernization as a major factor in influencing its outcome. His predecessors on the issue such as Rifaah Rafi al-Tahtawi, Rahmatullah al-Hindi, Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, and Muhammad Abduh had already proposed a return to true Islam even in the face of Islamic modernization. These group of people attributed the perceive European dominion over Arab world to a declining religious nature of Ottoman Empire. According to them, the Arab nation would sustain European invasion only through incorporating Islam with civilization. A notable distraction to the Ottomanism was a Christian element led by Ibrahim al-Yaziji. Restructuring and revitalizing the Arab stature would require the riddance of this group and its leader, who brought negative fanatism and criticism to the Arab culture. It is however noted that Ibrahim al-Yaziji was unable to influence huge following, raising no need to get rid of his ideology of secular Arabism. In effect, the Ottoman ideology and reign persisted through to 1914.

Entering the Young Turk period, Arab nationalism, as Dawn notes, drew social conflicts within the ranks of the Syrian elite.he discovered that the Arab nationalists and their Ottomanist counterparts were entangled in a war of superiority. One of the factors prompting conflicts was the competition for office. Arab elites with interests on Ottoman state were considered Ottomanists while the Arabs without any particular interest on the state were termed Arabists. Dawn further states that the Arabists could not directly implicate the CUP since their policies had been in existence even before the formation of the CUP in 1908. Moreover, according to the constitution of 1876, the official recognized language was Turkish, more so in administration. The Turkish language was, therefore, a required qualification for entry into civil service.

Dawn’s unopposed account of events comes to a stop when his views are countered by Rashid Khalidi. Apart from acknowledging the presence of elite groups competing for status, he mentions the arising middle-class community made up of merchants, intellectuals, lower-level bureaucrats and army officers. As Khalidi states, these people played a vital role in the formation of Arab nationalism he dents Dawn’s findings by stating that he only specialized in Damascus to draw his conclusions, while there existed many alternative and complimentary localities such as Jerusalem and Beirut. Excluding them from the lense denies the opportunity to appreciate the infrastructure upon which popular Arabism developed.

A collective review of the debate on Arab history draws interesting insights, especially on the account of the participants writing about it. For example, Antonius describes his claims to which Haim challenges some quarters. Then comes Zeine, who entirely revises the debate by touching on Islamic modernizers. His work is accepted by Haim subsequently. Zeine’s work is likewise seconded by Tibawi and Hourani, who in turn conceded to Dawn’s views. Dawn particularly focuses on countering Turkish nationalism on the threshold of emerging Arab nationalism. The social composition of the Arab nationalism is tackled by Khalidi, who delivers his views from a multi-dimensional angle.

M. Şükrü Hanioğlu tries to reflect on the role of CUP in his research. Through his work, Osmanli Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük, 1889-1902, the CUP is portrayed as a nationalist group that existed even before the 1908 revolution. Turkish nationalism had not been on CUP’s radar, not even before the Balkan conflict. Further, N. Batzaria stated that the constitution had only been used to leverage the Turks in state positions. According to Hanioglu, CUP Turks were entirely different, and they viewed Arabs as betrayers and inferiors, abandoning the empire to form different groups. Hanioglu states that “…after 1908 a conflict developed between Arab nationalists, who came to think the Turks as oppressors, and the Young Turks, who thought Turks were the superior race in the middle east and had the right to govern the Arabs." In 1904, Yusuf Akçura (1876-1933) published Üç Tarz-î Siyaset (Three kinds of policy), which helped understand the Ottoman empire from the three policies of Ottomanism, Panislamism, and Pan-Turkism. He endorsed the Pan-Turksim policy, terming it as the most suitable. According to Akçura, Ottoman had been rejected, and Panislamism would be met with much opposition. These ideologies were however in hibernation until 1908. Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) also rejected Ottomanism, opting to harmonize Islamic elements in the Turkish nation.

The young Turks believed in Turkish supremacy and that other groups ought to submit to Turks. When the Arab perception on this issue is hence stated, together with accusations on CUP, the history of Arab struggle becomes apparent. From Mahmoud Haddad’s perspective, Arab nationalism was a result of Turkish Nationalism opposition and also Pan-Turkism. Political nationalism is poised to rage on even as newer studies are revealed in future.

In conclusion, it is evident that four centuries of Ottoman oppression rule evolved into an era of Arab nationalism. Through Antonius’ work, the Arab histography can be traced since its beginning to present day. Even as he emphasized the Turkish imperialism within which Arab nationalism also sprouted, it should be noted that his views on Christian Lebanese role on nationalism were a case of exaggeration. Turkification, together with Young Turks’ centralization policies are what greatly influenced Arab nationalism. Political Turkism might have been a strange concept to the eastern Arabs, perhaps explaining why they formed an ideology based on nationalism based on the former four centuries of the Ottoman Emire, while not considering Turkish forces. In the eyes of the Maghrib, the Ottoman Empire represented a state against western colonization and all its implications. In the Mashriq, however, this argument would not hold, being replaced by the adaptability of people’s memories to console their plights.