The Political and Social Causes of the 1979 Revolution - Essay Example

Persian History Islamic Era: Question 11. Discuss the political and social causes of the 1979 Revolution Name Tutor Institution Course Date Persian History Islamic Era: Question 11. Discuss the political and social causes of the 1979 Revolution Introduction The 1979 revolution, also known as Islamic Revolution or Iranian revolution, refers to the occurrences entailing the depose of the Pahlavi Dynasty under Mohammad Shah Pahlavi rule and its ultimate reinstatement with a national republic under Ayatollah Khomeini. It was a nationalist, Shia Islamic and populist rebellion that reinstated the dictatorial monarchy with the theocracy based upon guardianship of Islamic jurists. The Iranian revolution was intended to liberate Iran from neocolonialism. Regardless of steady economic growth, there was immense opposition against Mohammad Shah and the manner in which he utilized the secret police or Savak to control the nation. The rebellion was partly a conservative reaction against westernization and secularization attempts of the western-supported Shah as well as a response to social injustices and limitations of the Iran’s ancient regime (Amuzgar, 2004). Mohammmad Shah was perceived by several Iranians as a puppet of the non-Muslim western power; the United States whose cultural practices was tainting the culture of Iran. The regime of Shah was viewed as brutal, extravagant, corrupt, and oppressive. In addition, it suffered from fundamental functional failures since it had an excessively ambitious economic program that resulted to economic shortages and inflation. The duration leading to Islamic revolution in Iran was a period of major reform and upheaval. The pro-western Shah had great determination of dragging the nation into the twentieth century but there was rising dissent and turmoil among people. Shah’s program of white revolution of modernization was supported by wealthy, educated urban society but was not successful among the nation’s predominantly countryside populace and the move towards a secular society annoyed traditional religious Muslims (Amuzgar, 2004). Dimensions of the Iranian Islamic revolution Increasing social dissatisfaction in 1970 in the country, which culminated in the Iranian Islamic revolution at the last part of the decade, had numerous crucial dimensions. Even though petroleum revenue persisted to be the key source of revenue for Iran in 1970s, world financial instability along with instabilities in Western oil use fatally threatened the economy of the country, which had been undergoing rapid expansion as from early 1950s and had still been directed in huge portion toward high cost programs and projects. A decade of bizarre economic growth, huge government spending as well as a boom in the prices of oil resulted to high inflation rates and stagnation of the purchasing power and living standards of the Iranian citizens (Amuzgar, 2004). In addition to the increasing economic problems, socio-political suppression by the Mohammad Shah Pahlavi’s regime also mounted in 1970s. There were minimal outlets for political participation and opposition parties like the national front (which was a wobbly coalition of clerics, noncommunist left wing parties, and nationals) and pro-soviet Tudeh also known as the masses party were outlawed or marginalized. Political and social protest was often received with surveillance, harassment, censorship and torture and unlawful detention were common (Amuzgar, 2004). According to Hoveyda (2003) several Iranians argued that because Iran’s pithy experiment with communist politics and parliamentary democracy had not succeeded, the nation had to return to its native culture. The 1953 rebellion, which was backed by the United States central intelligence agency, against Mohammad Mossaddeq, a candid nationalism advocate who nearly became successful in overthrowing Shah, mainly annoyed Iranian scholars. For the very first time in over fifty years, secular intellectuals, majority of intrigued by the populist plea of Ayatolllah Khomeini, who was a former philosophy professor in Qom and who had been sent in 1964 because of harshly speaking against the latest reform program by Shah, discarded their plan of lessening the power and authority of Shiite ulama or religious scholars and believed that with the assistance of ulama, it was possible to overthrow Shah (Hoveyda, 2003). Under this atmosphere, followers of the Tudeh party, the national front and their numerous splinter groups joined hands with the ulama to broadly oppose the regime of Shah. While still in exile, Khomeini went on preaching on the wickedness of the Shah’s rule, accusing him of irreligion along with subservience to overseas powers. Several tapes as well as print copies of speeches made by Khomeini were smuggled into Iran in 1970s as a mounting number of working-poor and unemployed Iranians, mostly novel migrants from the rural regions, who were disheartened by the cultural void of contemporary Iran, went to ulama for assistance. The dependence of Shah on United States along with his close attachments with Israel, which were then engaged in persistent aggressions with the overpoweringly Arab states and the ill considered economic policies of their regimes, functioned to stimulate the energy of rebellious rhetoric with people (Keddie, 2003). Superficially, with a rapidly expanding economy along with a swiftly renovating infrastructure, all things were in their place in Iran. Nevertheless, in less than a generation, the country had transformed from a conservative, rural and traditional society to an urban, modern and industrial society. The feeling that the government, either via incompetence or corruption had not succeeded in delivering its promises was apparent in the demonstration against Shah Rule in 1978 and 1979 (Keddie, 2003). The revolution In January 1978, enraged by what they regarded to be insulting remarks against Khomeini in a Tehran newspaper, several youthful madrassa or religious school students went to the streets to hold demonstrations Afghani (2009) argues that they were then followed by several other Iranian youths, mostly the unemployed youths who had recently migrated from the rural regions of Iran. They were all protesting against the excesses of the Shah regime. The shah, shocked by the abrupt resentment against his rule, he vacillated amid repression and concession, presuming that the protests were a portion of a global conspiracy against his regime. Several individuals were murdered by governmental forces, a thing that further sparked the violence. Iran was a Shiite nation in which martyrdom played a vital function in religious expression. Deaths were trails by demonstrations in commemoration of the customary forty day milestone of mourning in the Shiite tradition. Further deaths happened during the protests. Therefore, regardless of government efforts to stop the protests, a series of violence started whereby every death fuelled additional protest both from the religious right and secular left (Mackey, 2005). While in exile in Iraq and later in France, Khomeini coordinated the upsurge of opposition, demanding the abdication of Shah. In January 1979, Shah along with his family ran away from the country. The regency council that was formed to run Iran during the absence of Shah proved incapable to function well, and Shahpur Bakhtiar, who was a prime minister hurriedly appointed by Shah before he left the country, was not able to effect compromise both with his previous national front associates or Khomeini. Masses of people held demonstrations in Tehran, confirming the broad plea of Khomeini. Khomeini arrived in the country on February 1 amid wild cheer to take over Shah’s rule. Ten days after the arrival of Khomeini, Bakhtiar flew the country to hide, ultimately finding deportation in France (Harmon, 2004). Aftermath of the Islamic revolution On 1st April, following awesome support of a nationwide referendum, Iran was declared an Islamic republic by Khomeini. Elements in the clergy rapidly moved to rule out their previous left wing, nationalists as well as intellectual partners from any powerful position within the novel regime. In addition, a reinstatement to the traditional, conservative values was put into effect. The 1967 family protection Act, which was considerably revised in 1975 and offered further rights and guarantees to married women, was declared null and void. The mosque based revolutionary bands which were referred to as Komitehs or Persian committees, patrolled Iranian streets and enforced codes of behavior and dressing. In addition, they dispatched unplanned justice to the alleged rivals of the Islamic revolution (Ansari, 2007). According to Roy (2000), in most periods of the 1979, the revolutionary guards which was an unofficial religious militia established by Khomeini to preclude another central intelligence agency supported coup as was the case during Mosaddeq rule engaged in an identical activity, intended at repressing and intimidating political groups which were not under the rule of the then ruling revolutionary council as well as its allied Islamic Republican Party. Both the Revolutionary Council and the Islamic Republican Party were clerical organizations dependable to Khomeini. The clerics and militias worked effortlessly to repress the influence of the western culture, and facing violence and persecutions, majority of the western educated intellectuals fled Iran. This anti western attitude ultimately displayed itself in November 1979 abduction of captives at the United States embassy by a crowd of Iranian demonstrators who were demanding the expatriation of Mohammad Shah who was receiving medical treatment in United States. The protestors wrongly believed that the central intelligence agency was in Iran and was plotting to reinstate Shah to his former regime (Zabih, 2000). Zabih (2000) notes that via the takeover of the United States embassy, supporters of Khomeini could allege to be anti-imperialist just like the political left wing. This eventually empowered them to repress majority of the rule’s moderate opponents and left wing. The assembly of experts, awesomely dominated by the clergy assented a novel constitution in December 1979. The novel constitution generated a religious government that was based upon Khomeini’s idea of the governance of jurist and provided immense authority to the leader or rahbar, with the initial rahbar being Khomeini himself. Moderators or moderate opponents such Mehdi Bazargan who was the interim prime minister and Abolhasan Bani-Sadr who was the republic’s initial president, who were against holding of the United States hostages were gradually compelled from power by the conservatives in the government who doubted their revolutionary fervor(Graham, 2007). Social causes of the Islamic revolution When Mohammad Shah Pahlavi took power from his father in 1941, he viewed the country as a medieval, backward nation that had not transformed for several centuries. Persia, also known as Iran, had at a particular period been the greatest empire in the world more than two thousand years ago. Within the twentieth century, Persia was a nation of small scale peasant cultivators, who had taken up Arabic ways of life causing them to lose their Persian identity. Several people were annoyed by the manner in which Shah tried to disrupt with Iranian Culture and peoples’ way of life, especially amid the conformist Islamic leaders or ulamas that had significant power. Shah despised these religious leaders because he viewed them as obstacles to westernization and progress (Ami, 2008). Shah forbid conventional Islamic dress and gave an order that Iranian females were required to go to public places without a veil. Zanganeh (2006) argues that if they refused to remove their veils, the secret police or savak would remove them by force. This act annoyed religious Iranians because the viewed the veil as a sign of Muslim reticence. Females were given the freedom to vote, and they were enrolled both in colleges and schools in huge numbers. The Shah government took charge of educating youthful Iranians through constructing government learning institutions which solely focus upon science and math as opposed to study of the Koran. Several youthful Iranians started putting on western clothing and also listening to western music. Shan altered the Persian language through flushing out of numerous Arabic words. In addition, he changed the calendar, from Islamic calendar that was based upon the life of the Mohammad to the Persian calendar that was based upon the ancient kingdom (Zanganeh, 2006). These transformations were too immense for the Islamic religious leaders who believed that Shah intended to abolish Islamic religion. Ami (2008) notes that majority of these leaders put the blame on the American influences which distorted the morality of the Iranian people. Khomeini, who was a religious teacher, brutally spoke against the actions of Shah. He gained respect and fame across the country for his fearless attacks on Shah and blamed him for distorting the Iranian Islamic values. These criticisms made Khomeini to get into trouble with Shah and by this time he had become an Ayatolllah or a leader of Shia Islamic branch. Since Shah could not get rid of him, Khomeini was deported to neighboring Iraq. However, while in exile in Iraq and later in France, Khomeini continued spreading his messages against Shah oppressive regime through cassette tapes which was smuggled into Iran and then circulated amid his supporters (Ami, 2008). Political causes of the Islamic Revolution The personalized nature of Shah’s government When Mohammad Shah took the power from his father on 16th September 1941, his desire was to go on with the reform policies that his father had left behind, although a fight for the control of government soon emerged between Shah and an older politician and nationalistic Mohammad Mosaddeq. Regardless of his promise to function as a constitutional monarch, who was required to defer to the authority of parliamentary government, Shah increasingly engaged himself in the affairs of the government and opposed prime ministers. He was more concerned about assessing the army and making sure that it stayed under royal power as the major power base of the monarchy. In 1944, an assassination trial on Shah contributed to pro-Soviet’s Tudeh party and led to the prohibition of this party and increase of the constitutional powers of the Shah (Afghani, 2009). These measures aggravated Islamic religious leaders, who had the fear of losing their conventional authority and power, condemn the Shah regime which subsequently resulted to civil turmoil. Milani (2002) argues that the expanding uncertainty of the Shah’s regime led to more aggravation amid the intellectuals who were seeking democratic transformations. They highly criticized Shah for his subservience to United States and for the infringement of the constitution that placed restrictions on the royal power and also offered for the representative government. Mohammad Shah viewed himself as the heir to the ancient Iran’s kings and in 1971, Shah held and held a profligate celebration of two thousand five hundred years of the Persian monarchy. He reinstated the Islamic calendar with the imperial calendar in 1976, which started with the establishment of Persian Empire over twenty five centuries before. These deeds were seen as being anti Islamic and they led to religious opposition (Milani, 2002). The Shah regime marginalized and repressed its challengers with the assistance of Iran’s security along with the intelligence organization, savak. Depending on money obtained from oil, which highly increased in the late periods of 1773, Shah changed after his objective of developing the country as a powerful regional power devoted to economic development and social reform. Nevertheless, he went on sidestepping democratic arrangements, staying unresponsive to civic opinion and rebuffed to permit significant political liberties. By the middle of 1970, Shah ruled amidst prevalent dissatisfaction caused by the ongoing supressiveness of his rule, socioeconomic transformations that were only beneficial to the upper class at the expense of the middle and lower class, as well as the expanding gap amid the ruling class and the estranged population (Abrahamian, 2008). Islamic leaders, particularly the exile Khomeini, were capable of focusing this dissatisfaction with a populist philosophy connected to the principles of Islam and called for the removal of the Shah from power. Abrahamian (2008) notes that as the rule of Shah became more and more authoritarian, corruption plagued Iranian political scheme and as policies restrained religious expression, Iranian nationals moved toward transforming the Shah regime via revolution. The secular regime of Shah used the secret police or savak to impose conformity with governmental directives. Nationalists groups concerned with the westernization of the Iranian society steadily expanded support against Shah Rule and sought after political transformation. The White Revolution Reforms During regional unrest and Cold War, Shah ascertained himself as a crucial partner of the West. He domestically campaigned for reform policies, leading to the 1963 reform program referred to as the White Revolution Abrahamian (2008) notes that Shah reversed the nationalization of Mosaddeq and with the help of the United States he went ahead to undertake a nationwide development program referred to as the white revolution. It entailed the building of an expanded rail, air and road network, numerous irrigation projects and dams, elimination of diseases like malaria, support and encouragement of industrial growth and development and land reform. It also entailed eradication of illiteracy and provided women the right to vote (Abrahamian, 2008). The white revolution reforms increased Shah’s domestic support, yet he faced persistent political criticism from opponents who believed that the reforms did not move fast enough and also religious disapproval from individuals who felt that westernization was negating to Islam. Shah was also opposed due to his autocratic rule, uneven distribution of the oil revenues, corruption within his government, compelled westernization along with the activities of the secret police or savak in repressing opposition and dissent to his regime (Milani, 2002). Abrahamian (2006) argues that the negative aspects of the rule of Shah became obviously highlighted when Iran started to reap more income from its export of petroleum in early 1973. Intensive dissatisfaction amid the lower class, bazaar merchants, Shiite clergy and students resulted to protests against Shah in favor of Ayatollah Khomeini who was a Shiite religious leader. The Shah regime fell down following the pervasive rebellion in 1978 to 1979, with the Pahlavi dynasty being succeeded by the Islamic government under the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini (Abrahamian, 2006). Conclusion The 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution had a considerable impact on the Iranian society. As Iranian nationals became increasingly dissatisfied and frustrated with the Shah’s government decisions, a movement started in support of a rebellion against the Shah regime. The monarchy under the rule of Mohammad Shah had not succeeded in implementing the promised political and economic reforms and the country was faced with economic problems regardless of the huge revenues from oil exports. Led by Ayatollah Khomeini, who was a religious figure under exile, the population of Iran supported a rebellion to overthrow Shah due to authoritarian rule, economic issues, corruption and policies that restricted religious expression. When Khomeini who was a supreme leader returned to Iran to take over the Shah regime, a theocracy was developed and novel statutes implemented. The secular government was replaced with a theocracy which was under the rule of Islamic religious leaders. Khomeini advised Iranian nationals to endorse the novel political system which placed the greatest power and authority in a religious leader under the jurist guardianship principle. 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