China's Accession to the Western Hemisphere - Research Paper Example

China’s Accession to the Western Hemisphere: An Analysis Introduction China, the world’s most populous nation, came under communist rule in 1949. In the preceding decades, China had been racked by political turmoil. The collapse of the imperial Manchu dynasty in 1911 instigated the rise of regional warlords and of reformist and revolutionary movements. In 1919, after the United States failed to support China, its World War I ally, at negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles, a group of students gathered in Beijing to protest. These demonstrations, known as the May Fourth Movement, set off a wave of nationalism and criticism of Western imperialism (Garver 1982, p. 15). At the same time, the successful October Revolution of 1917 in Russia began to exert a growing influence among Chinese intellectuals, sweeping many idealistic youths into the mainstream of revolutionary Marxism. In 1921, largely on the initiative of two Beijing University professors, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in Shanghai. One of Li’s young disciples was Mao Zedong, the son of a prosperous peasant (Foot 1995, p. 12). Upon defeating the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai Shek, Mao reigned as the supreme authority in Communist China from 1949 until his death in 1976. Once in office, Mao signed a friendship treaty with the USSR and remained loyal to the Soviet Union until after Stalin’s death, accepting Soviet doctrine and numerous Soviet advisers (Harding 1992, p. 32). However, Mao soon parted company with these advisers. Upset at Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization, which he branded revisionism and a capitulation to capitalism, Mao became convinced that China needed to build its unique version of communism. In the early 1960s China struck out in an independent and often anti-Soviet direction in foreign policy (Johnson, 1971, p. 4). The goal of this paper is to determine and analyze the events leading to the dissolution of Sino-Soviet partnership and the rise of China in the global political scene. The analysis would inevitably involve China and Soviet relationship with the United States. Through historical accounts, this paper seeks to provide an understanding of international diplomacy and how it is determining the state of the global community. Sino Soviet Split The deep fissure in the Communist world, which the headlines refer to as the Chinese-Soviet split, was clearly the most important international development of 1963 (Foot 1995, p.21). It changed the entire character of the Cold War as the world had known it for almost two decades after the end of World War II. It made possible the limited nuclear test-ban treaty approved by the foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in August 1963. Most important, this historic development and its first consequences created a new opportunity for the United States to establish normalize relations with a nation having the world’s largest population (Dulles 1972, p. 32). Origins The existence of frequent and deep animosity between Russia and China is well attested by the history of their relations over the centuries. As far back as the 1650's Russians and subjects of the Chinese Empire engaged in an intermittent border war over the Amur River valley in the Far East, a war that finally ended in 1689 when the Treaty of Nerchinsk denied that valley to Russia. By the Treaty of Aigun in 1858, the Treaty of Peking in 1860, and the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1881, Russia obtained substantial areas of Chinese territory (Dallek 1998, p. 5). During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 Russian troops occupied Manchuria, and bitter fighting between Russians and Chinese caused many casualties. Just before World War I there was extreme Chinese bitterness against Russia for detaching Outer Mongolia from China and establishing a Russian protectorate over that vast area. As late as 1929, Russian and Chinese troops fought a bitter border war over control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad in Manchuria (Wang 1997, p. 10-11). This struggle gave proof that Communist Russia resembled Czarist Russia in its attitude toward China. It must be granted, however, that in the first few years after Communist China was established in 1949, these two large neighbours evinced a new era of friendship and cooperation. Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung entered a treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance in early 1950. The Soviet Union agreed to surrender many of the old Russian imperialist gains in China, notably the railroads in Manchuria. The Soviet Union extended a $300 million loan to Communist China. Russian supplies of planes, guns, petroleum, and other essentials played a key role in supporting the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. During much of the 1950's, moreover, half or more of China's trade was with Russia (Chen 2001, p. 13). Thousands of Russian specialists and millions of dollars' worth of Russian machinery went to China to aid that country's ambitious industrialization program. At critical moments in world history during the 1950's the Soviet Union and Communist China repeatedly asserted their solidarity and warned that a war against one would be a war against both (Dulles 1972, p. 23). In retrospect, however, it is clear that there were tensions between Moscow and Peking even in the first half of the 1950's. It is now known that China strongly resented the fact that Soviet military supplies delivered during the Korean War were sent under credit terms that established a substantial Chinese debt to Russia, rather than as gifts (Foot 1995, p. 25). Moreover, until 1957 the Soviet Union consistently failed to share its atomic weapons and technology with China (Jones 2001, p. 16) Bitter Rivalry According to Chen (2001) the present Chinese-Soviet conflict began in February 1956 at the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. What provoked it were the two major speeches Nikita Khrushchev delivered before that assembly. In the first, delivered in public, he attempted to set down a new line for the world Communist movement. He reversed the old Leninist dogma that war between Communism and capitalism is inevitable and argued instead that such a war was not "fatally inevitable." He raised the prospect that Communism might win the world through peaceful competition in which the "superiority" of the Soviet system would be established by economic, scientific, and other achievements. Moreover, in this speech Khrushchev abandoned the old Leninist emphasis on armed revolution in each country as the means of overthrowing capitalism. He suggested that there were important opportunities for the conquest of power through utilization of the democratic and parliamentary institutions of some countries. These were primarily shifts of emphasis, since Khrushchev rejected neither the possibility of world war nor the appropriateness of armed seizure of power in many countries, yet they were significant changes and reflected realization of the terrors and danger of the atomic weapons era (p. 33-34) The second Khrushchev speech was his famous "secret" speech in which the Soviet leader denounced the late Joseph Stalin as a paranoid tyrant and murderer. He accused Stalin of having been responsible for the execution of many thousands of innocent and faithful Communists, of having endangered the existence of the Soviet Union by his incompetence as a military leader and by his refusal to heed warnings of the impending German attack in June 1941, and of having created a cult of his own personality in which history was rewritten to give Stalin alone credit for all Soviet achievements (p. 36). These historic speeches offended the Chinese on several counts. Khrushchev's enunciation of new Communist doctrine was clearly an attempt to assert his right singlehandedly to determine the political line of world Communism. It was an attempt to continue the monopoly leadership of the Communist movement that Stalin had enjoyed from the late 1920's to the time of his death in 1953. The Chinese, who regarded Mao Tse-tung as the outstanding doctrinal thinker and theoretician of world Communism, could hardly look with favour upon such presumption. Moreover, Khrushchev's attack on Stalin caused confusion in China—as elsewhere in the Communist world—where Stalin had been lavishly praised as a great and almost infallible leader. In addition, Khrushchev's revelations about the abuses that had occurred under Stalin's dictatorship implicitly raised the question of abuses that might be occurring in China under Mao's very similar type of rule (Merrill & Paterson 2005, p. 48). China expressed their misgivings quietly and even hailed the Soviet advances in intercontinental ballistic missiles and the launching of the Soviet artificial satellite Sputnik. Mao Zedong publicly praised them as leaders of Communism in 1957. Nonetheless, the Chinese expected that, in return of their friendly gestures, the Russians would agree to help China become a nuclear power and promise to turn over a Soviet atomic bomb to China. The following year, 1958, difficulties arose over implementation of the atomic aid agreement. The Russians wanted to administer by themselves Chinese nuclear weapons which Peking viewed as a Soviet attempt to gain military mastery of China (Jones 2008 p. 26-30). Moscow abrogated its atomic aid agreement with China in 1959 partly because of the disagreements with oversight but mostly because it was trying to establish diplomatic ties with the US which culminated in the US visit of Khrushchev’s. In that same year, a group of high military officers, believed to have been backed by the Soviets, attempted to overthrow Mao in a Communist Party Central Committee meeting (Cohan & Rusk 1980, p. 18). The Soviets further strained its relationship with China when it expressed neutrality in China-India border dispute thus implicitly denying that a Communist nation must always be supported by other Communist nations in its disputes with a non-Communist country. Against this background, the Chinese viewed the rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union as, in effect, a Soviet-American alliance against China (Dobson & Marsh 2001, p. 16-18). Then in May 1960, a United States U-2 reconnaissance plane was downed over Siberia leading to the breakdown of diplomacy between the US and Russia. The Chinese hailed President Eisenhower as a "teacher by negative example," implying that Premier Khrushchev was a dunce who had believed that Eisenhower stood for peace and had had to learn the contrary the hard way. Khrushchev, furious over the implied remarks, withdrew all their technicians from China in the summer of 1960, began reducing their shipments of goods to China and refused to extend the Chinese new credits or to help Peking meet the serious economic difficulties created by poor harvests that year (Garvey 1997, p. 46). A new, major issue rose in October 1962 with the United States' discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Soviet Union's decision to withdraw the missiles and its agreement to permit international inspection in Cuba drew sharp criticism from Peking. The Chinese accused Khrushchev of being needlessly adventurous in installing the missiles and of showing cowardly capitulation in withdrawing them under American pressure. Moscow replied with charges, still thinly veiled, that the Chinese were seeking to provoke a Soviet-American thermonuclear war (Jones 2008, p. 20). The final explosion, which ended all pretence of alliance and amity, took place in June and July of 1963. A Chinese letter sent June 14, 1963, put forward a new program, or line, for the world Communist movement, one directly contradictory to Moscow's. The letter also assailed Khrushchev's claim that the Soviet Union was in a position to begin building ideal Communism and to achieve it by the early 1980's. A Russian letter of reply sent July 13, 1963, openly accused the Chinese of seeking to incite a thermonuclear war that would kill hundreds of millions of people and of being racists who were seeking to replace the Marxist class struggle by an alliance of non-white people against the whites. This began a furious exchange of charges and counter charges that continued for months (Chen 2001, p. 46-48). At the same time, the Russians made a historic change in policy and agreed to sign the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space, a treaty they had rejected earlier. The Chinese responded by charging that this treaty represented a Soviet betrayal and signified a Soviet-American alliance aimed at giving these two nuclear powers a monopoly and a dominant position in world affairs. The Chinese revealed their intention to achieve production of their own nuclear weapons regardless of cost (Jones 2001, p. 49-50). Consequences Taking the arguments of both sides at face value, the main issues seem ideological and tactical. The Chinese Communists demand maximum militancy in the drive for world Communism. They urge armed revolution wherever possible and demand that Communists pay special attention to revolutionary activity in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They are willing to pursue a risky policy because they do not believe the United States will use its nuclear weapons except under the gravest imaginable provocation. But all this falls far short of demanding thermonuclear war or being scornful of the human sacrifices such conflict would mean. The Russians, on the other hand, emphasize the vastness of American nuclear power, the tremendous human and other sacrifices thermonuclear war would bring, and the consequent need to emphasize economic competition and other non-military means of Communist expansion (Hardy 1992, p. 53-54). It is important to note that in this ideological debate, the differences are really matters of emphasis. The Chinese would be glad to see countries become Communist-ruled without war; the Russians are willing to take terrible risks, as their missile adventure in Cuba in 1962 proved. In a real sense, if each side's statements are taken literally there is little difference between them, since each nation accepts in whole or in part—though neither may emphasize it—the primary tactic or strategy of the other. If it is difficult to see a real basis for the present hatred resulting from the supposed ideological differences, it is not difficult to understand the differences in national interest between them. The Chinese are furious with the Soviet Union for its refusal to help them become a nuclear power, for its failure to aid them during China's severe economic difficulties in the early 1960's, for its insistence that the Soviet political line be accepted by all Communists, for its refusal to back China's demands in the border dispute with India, and for its rejection of any idea of helping Peking capture Taiwan. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, fears that a strong China will seek to seize Soviet territory in Siberia as well as to oust Moscow from its historic role as capital of the world Communist movement. The possibility that when the Chinese have nuclear weapons they may use them against the Soviet Union also appears prominent in Soviet thinking (Borg and Waldo 1980, p. 72-76). On this basis it may be concluded that in the Chinese-Soviet dispute there exists a triumph of nationalism over ideology. The Soviet Union and Communist China are pushing their individual national interests regardless of the great damage to the world Communist movement, which, at the end of 1963, was very badly split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions (Dulles 1972, p. 43). What does all this mean for the United States? One clear implication is that the old American view of the world scene as one dominated exclusively by the battle between Communism and democracy no longer is valid. That battle is now only one area of conflict; other areas are provided by the clashes of national interest, whether between Russia and China, India and China, India and Pakistan, or others (Garver 1997, p. 82). This reappraisal of the international political scene points to new possibilities for reducing Cold War tensions. The nuclear test-ban treaty has already improved Soviet-American relations, and both countries demonstrate interest in further negotiation. If Russia and China are pursuing national interests primarily, then there would be reason to explore means of improving relations between the United States and Communist China as well. The president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce revealed American interest in improving relations between the United States and Communist China when he urged Washington to permit at least limited trade between the two nations. Many West Coast businessmen have argued the economic and other advantages in normalizing Chinese-American relations (Nixon 1978, p. 78-80). The spectre of a vast monolithic Communism embracing one third of humanity and standing in united, implacable opposition to the United States has been lifted. With the emergence of open civil war in world Communism, those charged with the security of the United States have won new opportunity and new reason for optimism about the future (Harding 1992, p. 39). Cold War: From Bipolar to Tripolar US-Soviet Relations The Cold War is a term often used to describe the post-World War II struggle between the United States and its allies and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies. During the Cold War period, which lasted from the mid-1940s until the end of the 1980s, international politics were heavily shaped by the intense rivalry between these two great blocs of power and the political ideologies they represented: democracy and capitalism in the case of the United States and its allies, and Communism in the case of the Soviet bloc (Foot 1995, p. 47). The principal allies of the United States during the Cold War included Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and Canada. On the Soviet side were many of the countries of Eastern Europe—including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Romania—and, during parts of the Cold War, Cuba and China (Dobson and Marsh 2001, p. 28). Despite of the involvement of other nations, however, the early and middle stages of Cold War mostly involved the US and the USSR. With the Sino-Soviet split, China became a prominent power in international relations. China’s Tripolar Role in the Cold War In the early 1970s the tenor of the Cold War changed. During the first administration of U.S. president Richard Nixon, the United States and the USSR sought to put their relationship on a different footing. While neither side abandoned its basic positions, the two superpowers tried to take the first steps toward controlling the costly nuclear arms race and finding areas for mutually advantageous economic and scientific collaboration. Détente, as this policy came to be called, was still slowly proceeding much to the chagrin of the United States (Harding 1992, p. 19). The detente collapsed in the second half of the 1970s, when the American-Soviet competition in the Third World intensified once again, this time during the civil war in Angola and the Somali-Ethiopian war over the Ogadēn region (Garver 1997, p. 41). The US sought to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to improve terms with China to undermine USSR influence in the process, recognizing the country as a major player in global politics. The US rapprochement with China would transform a Cold War international system made up of two opposing ideological blocs into a tripolar one in which great-power foreign policy US-Communist China relation was strenuous at best. In 1950, Communist China’s Red army attacked American-led United Nations forces in Korea. Thereafter, a key tenet of U.S. Cold War strategy was to “contain” Communist China by means of bilateral alliances and military bases in East Asia, and to isolate it by severing trade, travel, and diplomatic contacts and refusing to recognize the communist regime. The next twenty years were characterized by American opposition to UN membership for mainland China, three crises in the Taiwan Straits, offensive rhetoric, threats of nuclear attack, and the fighting of a proxy war in Vietnam (Merrill and Paterson 2005, p. 39-40.). Washington and Beijing were brought together by a shifting balance of power, which saw the former’s military superiority reduced in relation to Moscow and the latter no longer an ally but a significantly weaker adversary facing a possible war with the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet relationship was characterized from the start by ideological tension, which developed as the two states competed for leadership in the international communist movement. This conflict was evident not only in the fierce disagreements about issues such as the communist evolutionary struggle and relations with the United States, but also in Moscow’s declining support for its ally. By the late 1960s, the conflict had developed military dimensions, with troop build-ups on the Sino- Soviet border (Jones 2001, p. 45-47). The Chinese decision for rapprochement with the United States was motivated by two sets of reasons. First, at the national security level, Beijing needed the U.S. opening to deter a Soviet attack. China’s strategic position in relation to its militarily superior neighbour worsened dramatically in 1968, when Soviet forces invaded Czechoslovakia and the Kremlin used the Brezhnev Doctrine to justify its use of force to defend socialism in neighbouring communist states. Soviet escalation of border clashes in 1969 and hints of an attack on Chinese nuclear installations convinced Beijing that Moscow harboured imperialist intentions toward a China weakened by the Cultural Revolution. Second, at the international level, Beijing wanted to pre-empt a superpower collusion intended to contain China in the context of the developing Soviet-American detente (Merrill and Paterson 2005, p. 56-57). At the same time, China’s strategic position vis-a-vis the United States was also changing: the 1969 Nixon Doctrine portended a relative American withdrawal from the region after Vietnam, which would reduce the scope of immediate Sino-American conflict. This rendered the United States a potential ally with whom China could cooperate as a balance against the primary Soviet threat. This Chinese manoeuvre reflected the flexible alliances of classic realist politics; indeed, China is recognized as one of the most explicitly and consistently realpolitik of regimes (Chen 1980, p. 82). The American desire for rapprochement can similarly be placed within a realist framework. The late 1960s saw the United States in a weakening position vis-a-vis its superpower rival: the Vietnam conflict had sapped American military, political, economic, and psychological strength, allowing relative Soviet ascendance, notably in the form of a closing of the “missile gap”. China’s weakness was an opportunity for the United States to turn the Sino-Soviet split to its advantage by enlisting China in an implicitly anti-Soviet alignment (Nixon 1978, p. 92-93). 3.0. Nixon’s Visit to Beijing When Richard Milhous Nixon was elected to the US presidency in November 1968, few could have forecast that, within the space of four years, this Republican erstwhile anti-communist crusader, who cut his political teeth in the McCarthy era, would have achieved anything like the rapprochement between the United States and China that actually occurred. Nonetheless, after more than two decades of strained relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, United States president Richard Nixon travelled to China in February 1972 and met with China’s Communist leader Mao Zedong and state premier Zhou Enlai (Harding 1992, p. 36-38). The visit dramatically opened an era of new ties between the two nations. 3.1 Visit to China Very few people in the administration believed at the outset that there was any imminent likelihood of achieving a better relationship with the communist regime in Beijing. Even President Nixon, then president, recorded his own thoughts during meetings held on 20 and 21 January 1969. While repeating his view, first expressed in an article in Foreign Affairs in October 1967, that ‘we do not want 800,000,000 people living in angry isolation. We want contact’ (Nixon 1978, 12). There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The two sides also agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial (Harding, 1992, p. 59). 3.2 Reaction to the Visit The reactions of America’s allies to the news varied. Broadly speaking, those of the Europeans were favourable, while those of the Asian and Pacific countries varied from cautious approval through surprise to concern and dismay. Understandably, the reaction from Taiwan was the most hostile precisely because this undermined Taiwan’s position in the world as the representative of the Chinese people (Merrill and Paterson 2005, p. 85) Soviet reaction to the Sino-US improvement of diplomatic ties was mostly acts of cultural desecration as it had already stopped economic assistance. In 1972 and 1973, the Soviets erased the Chinese names of territories namely Iman, Tetyukhe and Suchan from the Soviet Far East maps. Instead, they named them Dalnerechensk, Dalnegorsk and Partizansk. Any discussions of pre-1860 Chinese presence in the lands acquired by Russia through the Treaty of Aigun and the Convention of Peking became a politically incorrect, taboo subject. All museum exhibits showcasing Chinese culture were removed from public view. The Jurchen-script text supported by a stone tortoise, a cultural treasure from the Jin Dynasty Stele, was covered in cement from its Khabarovsk Museum display (Merrill and Paterson 2005, p. 89). From then on, the Soviets and Chinese became rivals and competed for communist loyalty from Ethiopia, Somalia, Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique (Harding 1992, p. 20). Triangular Diplomatic Relationship Nixon and Kissinger claim to have pursued, in which the United States would simultaneously improve relations with both the Soviet Union and China. By creating a “triangular relationship,” they attempted to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict. By maintaining better relations with Beijing and Moscow than they did with each other, the United States would be able exert leverage both ways and to gain advantage on a wider range of issues. In this classical realist concert model, the United States acts as a “balancer” in order to maintain equilibrium in the system through parallel detente with each of the two communist powers. The aim would be to regain the pivotal hegemonic position that Washington had enjoyed in the international system after the Second World War, but which had been undermined by the Vietnam War (Nixon 1978, p. 47). Lowell Dittmer has characterized the resulting condition as a “romantic triangle,” as distinct from the “stable marriage” situation that would result from the United States supporting either of the other two countries against the other (Chen 2001, p. 78). Conclusion The Chinese civilization had long been recognized as one of the greatest in the world but it has largely remained in isolation particularly from the Western hemisphere. With the rise of Communism in the country, China became a prominent regional player in Asia which was boosted with its close connection with USSR who gave it expertise and funds to stimulate its economy. Under the guidance of Mae Zedong, Mainland China slowly became a power to contend with not only for the United States but with the USSR as well. China’s rise to global prominence and its role in a tripolar political world could not have been possible without the diplomacy of Nixon and Kissinger. Two nations, with two ideologies supposed to be in perpetual conflict, have forged a friendship that would survive even today. This highlights one of the key characteristics of foreign policy in that it transcends ideological thinking and ventures more toward nationalistic tendencies. 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