Atomic Bombs: Bernsteins Analysis of United States Actions - Term Paper Example

Name Instructor Course Date Atomic Bombs: Bernstein’s Analysis of United States Actions Whereas the world is awash with stories of wars and battles predating the infamous world wars, none of these has attracted contested debates as the events that characterize the Second World War. Prior to its end, the United States of America was reluctant to join citing neutrality and inherent costs that the war presented. In addition to these, the country did not feel as much threatened and only waiting for the most opportune time to wage enter the war. However, the then president’s decision to engage Japan in a war and the subsequent use of atomic bombs continue to marvel many. It should be noted that the Soviet Union was Japan’s most dreaded enemy. Perhaps Japan’s perception and attitude toward the United States prompted their attack on Pearl Harbor and probably influenced America’s decision to drop atomic bombs in Japan and the ultimate end of the war. Revelations on the events that preceded the United State’s actions point that there was a host of alternatives that the war planners could have employed in order to avert a possible Japanese attack and also to force the pacific nation to surrender without dropping the atomic bombs in its two cities. It is apparent that the policy makers failed to analyze the impacts of the bombs, feared the Japanese would not relent in their military campaign and that the United States believed that the bombs would be employed in an elaborate bombing strategy that would deny the Soviet Union any chance to claim Japan in a post war occupation. Bernstein (45) asserts that the war could have ended even without the United States dropping Atomic bombs in Japan. Central in his argument and analysis is the fact that President Harry Truman and his advisors were hell bent on waging a full scale war in Japan and that the administration and the influential military officials were driven by egoistic and nationalistic motives. Most importantly, the writer suggests that even after evaluating the impacts of different alternatives, they believed they had to use the atomic bomb on Japan. For instance, he quotes the president’s cynical diary entry where Truman, commenting on the Soviet’s announcement to join the war that he is in possession a dynamite that will add to the woes of the “Fini Japs”(52). This discussion explores the various alternatives that Bernstein posits the United States would have explored and still ensured the Japanese’ surrender and consequently avoided the mass murders of non-combatants in the last days of the Second World War. It is evident that the decision to drop the two bombs on the Japanese cities was informed by the fact that the rules of war had changed considerably during the Second World War. Bernstein implores that had the Americans viewed the use of the atomic bomb as an immoral act in warfare, they would have grasped the far-reaching post war impacts that their use carried (48). In his argument, the Americans failed exhaust the following alternatives. Alternative one: Non-combatant demonstration The idea of a non combatant demonstration was mooted in various defense meetings with the hope of forewarning the Japanese of a full scale attack on its interests in Japan. According to Bernstein (49), this Americans intended to issue a warning along with a demonstration of the possible effects of the bomb. However, there was uncertainty of the bomb’s success and the personal opinions of the then war secretary Stimson who believed that it was necessary to deploy the bomb as the most appropriate warning to Japan of impending consequences should they refuse to surrender. This alternative was dropped after the Trinity test. It is important to note that the Japanese could not have heeded to the warnings and the United States’ condition that they pegged on this alternative. It is noted that the American population had likened the Japanese Emperor Hirohito to Hitler and preferred war crimes on him (51). Consequently, a non-combatant demonstration would not please Americans. It is notable that there was a division in Japan’s leadership ranks; however, they only dreaded the entry of Soviet Union into the war. Pointedly, this alternative would have not deterred the Japanese militarists’ pursuit of honor (72). Alternative two: Unconditional surrender and Guarantee of the emperor The desire to protect the emperor was a fundamental factor in Japan unwillingness to surrender (65). Bernstein rubbishes this notion observing that Japan’s leadership structure was greatly divided before June in 1945. Despite this division, they were skeptical of the Soviets’ entry int5o the war on the United States side. It is observable that this alternative would not bear fruits given the Soviet Union’s belief that Japan was neither honest nor committed to their proposed peace proposals (51). Whereas the Japanese appeared non-committal, it is apparent that the United States knew that the entry of the Soviet into the war had no significant consequence. The Japanese needed an assurance of their pride and honor that the fighters had staged. This they only envisioned would come from the Soviets who harbored ill motives. The failed coup after the United States dropped the atomic bombs asserts the potential of this alternative. Following the emperor’s directives, the Japanese war minister Anami called for a peaceful end to the war. Days later, the abortive coup that would have seen the war drag further was averted (75). Alternative three: Pursuit of Japanese Peace Feelers Bernstein notes that in the heat of the war, Japanese diplomats engaged in concerted aimed at striking lasting solutions to the possible war between the two states. The identifiable fact is that the Japanese demanded the retention of the emperor and the country’s presence in Korea and Fermosa. On his part, the then United States Switzerland ambassador Allen Dulles noted that the America understood that the retention of the imperial office was fundamental in securing Japan’s fast surrender (54). These talks collapsed as result of Japan’s reluctance. However, the United States administration failed to use this window. The success of this alternative was entirely based on negotiations with Emperor Hirohito through his envoys. Whereas there were indications of Japan’s non-commitment to peace, it is worth noting that the United States did not favor such peace talks. As Bernstein notes, the Japanese naval officer Captain Nashihara observed that Dulles was ready to hold talks but later retracted in order to diffuse of peaceful negotiation (55). America did ignore the possibilities of a peaceful solution to the war. Ironically, the proponents that felt a softer approach to the Japanese invasion were silent even after being informed of the peaceful solutions. For instance, McCloy and Stimson, who were apparently in need of solid evidence to support their belief that softer terms were appropriate, did not use Dulles report in the following meetings where invasion of Japan was discussed(56). Alternative four: Awaiting soviet entry A better section of America’s top leadership organs believed the entry of Soviet Union would have little impact on Japan’s ultimate surrender. On the other hand, it was commonly held that the entry would add pressure on Japan and make them surrender. According to Truman, the Soviets would only make the war harder and trickier because they would have to deal with multiple enemies. Indeed, the alternative could force the country to surrender. Relying on the magnitude of the American bombings, the United States did not want to allow the Soviets to carry the accolades and the spoils of war. Additionally, the common belief was that the United States should land in Japan prior to Soviets offensive. It should be noted that Truman’s handlers planned to carry out a series of bombings after securing Kyushu and setting other military bases (59). However, dropping the atomic bombs was not ignored in the combined efforts. Alternative five: Siege without the atomic bomb The initial strategy the United had opted for before decision to drop the atomic bombs was to bombard Japan’s strategic facilities and cut off communication in a bid to cripple the country’s economy. In what the military described as a terror bombing process, the intention was to maim Japan’s mining and manufacturing industries as well as blockade the passage of her naval forces. Bernstein observes that top military personnel were in agreement that the strategy was most appropriate given the fact that the U.S military had captured Okinawa (63). Pointedly, this was the most probable alternative the United States government had in its plot to attack Japan. It should be noted that most of the leaders realized that the effects of the atomic bombs on the Japanese civilians ware enormous. It is worth noting that after the successful capture of Okinawa, increased bombing of Japanese strategic targets would have delivered immediate results in ensuring the surrender of the Japanese. Conclusion It is undeniably true that the Second World War was fought on completely different rules negating the ethics of war. It is in this war that countries in combat were intent on inflicting more civilian damage than has ever been witnessed in the history of any war. Unlike the in the First World War, attacks on civilian and non-combatants formed the basis most nations’ winning strategy. Politics and national pride compounded this desire and drove the warring nations into adopting extreme measures and strategies. Bernstein’s analysis of the possibilities of the United States exploring alternatives to the atomic bomb reveals the bare fact that the war was fought with inherent motives. In fact, there existed possible avenues that could see Japan surrender without having to face the wrath of atomic bombs. On the other hand, it is admissible that fears and speculation that marked the campaigns contributed to the decision. From the facts presented and an analysis of the discussions, it is apparent that Japan could have been forced to surrender. However, the United States was intent on displaying their might and the ability to grant grave and long term punishment on its perceived enemies including non combatants. Works Cited Bernstein, Barton. Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known near Disasters, and Modern Memory. Read More