Post Cold War Change and the Security Threats of the 21st Century - Essay Example

Western Intelligence Service Post Cold War Change and the Security Threats of the 21st Century Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism are major threats to the safety and security of every nation in the world. Western countries like the United States and the United Kingdom are the main target of these threats and therefore a good and reliable intelligence service is vital. The Western intelligence service was in the forefront of the Cold War and now the first line of defence against the new and sophisticated enemy of the 21st century. However, some people believed that the intelligence service is not competent enough to challenge these threats since their old technique and capabilities is inferior to hi-tech terrorism. “Any successful effort to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must have a good intelligence”.1 Successes in uncovering threats during the cold war were largely attributed to the superior technical data gathering and analysis of the western intelligence service. However, intelligence works today are immensely diverse and much more complicated than the typical signal and communication intelligence techniques used during the cold war. Technology is easy to obtain and available to anyone including the enemies of the states and global terrorist. Modelling of nuclear explosives is now possible at home through personal computers, and manufacturing of biological or chemical weapons can be anywhere using off-the-shelf components. In addition, global fibre optics communication, high-level encryption, and the Internet are making intelligence works similarly strenuous and extremely complex. 1 Lodal, Jan, 2001, Chapter 6, page 110., The Price of Dominance: The New Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Challenge to American Leadership, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, ISBN-0-87609-274-1 The capability of Western Intelligence Service to exposed and thwart these threats are crucial to our security, and therefore, we must be familiar with the progress, changes, and advancement of our intelligence agencies after the cold war. This paper will present a brief history of the Western Intelligence Service (WIS) and its performance during and after the Cold War. It will examine various types of intelligence works and how it was use to prevent disastrous enemy attacks. The intelligence services transition from more than four decades of Cold War intelligence collection to 21st century hi-tech counter-terrorism. The intelligence service need for reorganization and development, and analysis of their present capabilities and structure. The lessons learned by United States from Pearl Harbour led to the creation of a centralized intelligence mechanism in 1947, and recognizing the importance of intelligence for national security, western countries intelligence community was born. Although western intelligence services performance over the last four decades of the Cold War were not all notable2, and in fact, with numerous failures and embarrassment, the intelligence services somehow managed to get us through in peace (Murray 2002, p.278). For instance, the U.S. intelligence discovery of the Russians 1962 secret deployment of medium and intermediate ballistic range missiles in Cuba help prevent an eminent and a tragic nuclear war. Intelligence works during the Cold War, which were mainly focused on the Soviets, were primarily dependent on Human (Humint) and Signal Intelligence (Sigint). Although not as 2 This was taken from the fact that the intelligence community failed to predict the downfall of the Soviet Union, Murray 2002, pages 278. glamorous and oftentimes ridiculed by their less technical counterpart, Signal Intelligence played a very momentous role before and throughout the Cold War. Sigint, a form of technical intelligence gathering under the NSA (National Security Agency) or GCHQ for U.K., is responsible for interception, analysis, and parametric exploitation of enemy communication. More importantly, they are also responsible for monitoring the Soviets airfield activities in East Germany and various radar systems around the world, for missile detection and targeting, troop’s movements, military facilities, naval and air navigations throughout the Cold War. Sigint by its “eavesdropping” nature and positive inherent qualities is apparently the most effective intelligence and data-gathering tool. However, Sigint was considered a sensitive issue by most government and its existence was termed extremely “beyond the pale”3 in the pages of our history. For instance, the activities of GCHQ (Government Communication Headquarters) of the United Kingdom, the Canadian Communication Security Establishment (CSE), was kept classified for many years, and only at the end of the Cold War, a small but considerable fraction of the enormous GCHQ including the U.S. NSA archives was released (Aid and Wiebes 2001, p. 67-68). The post-Cold War intelligence information gathering activities shows diminutive change and remains extant until now. However, remarkable restructuring in terms of organization and reorientation of intelligence operations are evident in western intelligent services. Humint and Sigint aside from strengthening their capabilities and operational techniques are refocusing their intelligence activities to multiple targets. Although the United States still maintains the most sophisticated intelligence infrastructure in the world, spending around 10 billion dollars for 3 In the summer of 1945, the Joint Intelligence committee do not want to include signal intelligence in the writing of the history of WWII. (Aid and Wiebes 2001 on page 67) Sigint operations alone, the success of intelligence operations are still dependent on coordinated effort of the Western Intelligence community (Ball 1992, p.1-2). The Western Intelligence Services new task on the New World Disorder is to monitor, analyze, and attempt to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism at home and in the regions of increasing tension and conflicts such as the Middle East. It is perceptible, that to battle sophisticated terrorist conspiracies, a highly coordinated and superior counter-terrorism capability is indispensable (Wilkinson 2000, p.109). Terrorism, which was given a marginal concern during the 1970’s to the 1980’s, has become the dominant problem. The bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1993, signalled the rise of new brand terrorism. These are terrorist attacks that do not have the sponsorship of a country, no political gains, but only to kill more Americans as possible. In 1998, aware of the clear and present danger, the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet proclaimed terrorism as the highest priority for the western intelligence community and it became the highest priority for the nation after the September 11, 2001 attack (Sims and Gerber 2005, p.5). The Intelligence community, particularly the U.S., were widely accused of not dealing with the concerns of the post Cold War Era in its early years. The allegation was further justified by accusing the CIA of miscalculating the developments in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The real problem here is not the ability to adopt or to deal with the new crisis, but the fact that the end of the Cold War does not guarantee the desertion of threats from the Soviets or the “danger in the world beyond our borders” (Haass 1997, p.7). Critics of the intelligence community seems to overlook the fissionable4 materials, advanced weaponry, the stresses in the Russian military, and Soviet Intelligence that are still intact and operational. 4 Fissionable materials produce energy for nuclear power and could start nuclear weapons explosion. The western intelligence community is simply cannot afford to ignore these facts and therefore the usual persistent monitoring and intelligence gathering would continue (Carmel 1999, p.176). However, this does not mean they are not doing anything about terrorism and the exploits of Saddam Hussein. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community published a list of countries5 as early as 1995, half of it in the Middle East, confirmed to have or developing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. The U.S. Intelligence community under the September 2002 National Security Strategy agenda of the Bush administration officially became the first line of defence from the terrorist and hostility from other states. The transformation includes modernizing intelligence information gathering to keep pace with the nature of newer threats. Right and proper integration of intelligence to the defence and law enforcement systems and improve coordination with allies and friendly states. Investing on future intelligence capabilities and ensure that none of the existing capabilities will be compromise. More importantly, the underpinning of intelligence warning and information analysis in providing integrated threat assessment for national and homeland security (Loveman 2001, p.29). In Europe, the post Cold War Security Service Act of 1989 and UK Intelligence Service Act of 1994 authorized the British intelligence services to work under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Their joint national headquarter was established in 1995 at Millbank, London. Their duty generally involves internal security such as severe crimes, radical separatism, terrorism and spying within the UK boundaries. To enhance the intelligence service further, JIC formed the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre as subordinate organization for the 5 The Weapons Proliferation Threat published March 1995 by the CIA at Washington D.C Security Service. The funding for the three intelligence and security services (SIS, GCHQ, and the Security Service) was at around ₤893 million in 2002 to 2003. SIS or MI6, which was a separate service 1922, is now acting on the statutory basis controlled by the Foreign Secretary following the guidelines of Intelligence Service Act of 1994 (NIM 2001). Initiatives in the intelligence community are mainly focus in reorganization and modernizing intelligence capabilities. The reason for the massive reorientation is the rise of completely new range of issues dissimilar from the Cold War Era that calls for collection and analysis of government and non-government organizations predominantly in the Muslim world. The intelligence community have no choice but to reorient it collection platforms to handle the growing intelligence needs. For instance, intelligence during the Cold War were just a matter of simple reportage and only read by few individuals; diplomatic negotiators, military officers preoccupied with budget and war planning, and government decision makers. Today, fighting a war is through satellite imagery, real-time intelligence, and computer simulation. Military commanders in the battlefield require satellite images of terrain, enemy facilities, and accurate coordinates of their targets thus any delay in the collection of this vital information is detrimental to the mission (Sims and Gerber 2005, p.9). Another reason for the change is the lack of coordination between intelligence agencies that often cause more harm than good and deprived the service of a good advantage over the terrorist. A good example is the divided counter-terrorism effort of the FBI and CIA. There was a report that both of them are dealing with the same foreign intelligence and security service on the very same issue. This clearly indicates the lack of discipline and understanding of the suitable, efficient, and effectual lanes in intelligence works. They could have save significant time and resources by simply trying coordination instead of individual collection (Sims and Gerber 2005, p.91). This is the very same reason why the three separate intelligence service of the United Kingdom are now under one roof, and the resilient logic behind the empowerment of the CIA’s Director General to lead the foreign intelligence activities (Loveman 2001, p.29). To determine the preparedness of the Intelligence Community to challenge the security threats of the 21st century is only possible by evaluating the events after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. Since intelligence works before 911 was obviously a failure and a huge embarrassment to the community, we might as well measure their accomplishment during the last six years. Many believed intelligence fails because of bad politics, inferior leadership, bureaucratic incompetence, and the lack of accountability. The 911 incident is a sad testimony of how worthless our intelligence leadership is and how bad politics can destroy three thousand innocent lives. The problem with the intelligence community is not information gathering or high technology as it is continually upgraded since 20026. The real crisis here is the absence of eligible people in position to assess the plans and activities of the terrorist. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld confirmed this during an interview when he was asked about “streamlining and improvement of intelligence flow in government”. He answered with caution and said,” depending on a single viewpoint is probably not a good idea”7. Later on at the congressional committee, the 911-incident investigation was cramped from the start by poor leadership. The problem is simply not the process of information collection but the incompetence of the people who are supposed to make the final decisions. It is therefore clear, that after reorganization, the ability to thwart future terrorist attacks is possible (Gertz 2002, p.118). 6 this is part of the Sept. 2002 National Security Agenda of the Bush Administration (Loveman 2001 on page 29) 7this was Rumsfeld’s statement indirectly admitting his false assessment of the Al-Qaeda threat. Assessing how well and ready the Intelligence community is in handling the security threats of the 21st century, the result would be 100%. The success of Afghanistan and Iraq invasion, and the absence of major and successful terrorist attack in U.S. soil in the last six years is partly good intelligence. The July 7, 2005 bombing of a double decker bus in London (BBC News 2005) is not a good sign of improvement, but the aborted bomb plot targeting multiple airplanes passing through Heathrow Airport on August 10, 2006 (HA News 2006) is praiseworthy and a huge accomplishment. Judging from the reported frequency and the number of aborted major terrorist attacks in both U.S. and London since 2001, the changes in the intelligence leadership and persistent modernization is indeed effective. The end of the Cold War brought new challenges to the Intelligence community. Faced with new threats and global terrorism, the Western Intelligence Service was forced to reorganize and improve their intelligence capabilities. As the states first line of defence, the Western governments are giving full support and large funding for the intelligence community. There is no reason why we should doubt their intelligence collection skill. Their failures in the past were largely attributed to incompetent leadership and bad politics, and it has nothing to do with their proficiency, commitment, and precision in the field. Today, reorganized with new competent leadership, equipped with advanced technology, and with well-defined responsibilities and objectives, the intelligence community is now ready to meet the challenges of the 21st century threats and counter-terrorism. 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