Was the Attack on Pearl Harbor Inevitable or Compromised Possible - Essay Example

Based on the primary sources in Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War, was the attack on Pearl Harbor inevitable or was compromise possible? An examination of the devastating attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor, it is practical to state that concessions could have been implemented in order to avert the destruction attack that took place in the harbor on 7 December of 1941. Destruction attack is the principal word in the sentence. The term can imply a catastrophe or a misfortune the way it has been used to describe the events of the morning of Pearl Harbor (Iriye and Akira 80). In the context, destruction attack by Japan explicitly implies destiny of fate (meaning ultimately unavoidable and inescapable). The United States was somehow destined to suffer the destructive attack on her Harbor. After consideration of both primary and secondary resources of information on Pearl Harbor attack by Japan and the Imminent Pacific War, it is reasonable to suggest whether the violent attack was inevitable or avoidable, whether a concessive position could have been reached by both parties or not. Since the United States and Japan each had diverse sets of concerns and priorities concerning foreign and domestic policies and each of the two countries had presumed ideologies regarding each other, Japan with her naval forces inevitably launched a strategic attack on Pearl Harbor. There is no valid argument that can justify a way that the conflict could have been solved diplomatically without the attack. Priorities A significant reason Japan would ultimately attack United States without compromising was the difference in priorities between the two powers. United States and Japan had conflicting domestic and foreign policies, and this would result in a clash of the two powerful nations. The United States’ policies concerning foreign affairs comprised a set of objectives to defend her Allied friend countries from aggressors, the aim of the foreign policy was to supplement preservation of the desired goals of her domestic policy. President Roosevelt backed the policy of isolationism of the United States at the beginning of the Europe War, because of the Great Depression, he later retreated that peace-loving nations needed to unite cooperatively to quarantine aggressors in order to enjoy freedom and peace. Isolation and neutrality proved to be an impossible stand in terms of foreign policy. The United States opposed Hitler aggression on European countries, to help avoid the fall of Britain and the Soviet Union. The states also opposed the Japanese assault on China and other European-colonized Asian countries. The other foreign policy that America upheld was self-defense. The ability to defend herself if provoked by another country. While the United States policy focus was emphasizing on peace as a way of shaping its priorities, Japan’s foreign policies priorities were molded and determined by the will to power and conquest. Domestically, Japan formulated policies to accumulate more funds for tackling their foreign challenges (Iriye and Akira 80). They influenced citizens to substitute foods that were more expensive to cheaper food staffs. The plan was to tax their citizens and save more money through the economic policies of self-sufficiency. The issues that surrounded the negotiations before Pearl Harbor attack were largely focused on Japan’s activities in South East Asia. Among them included Japan’s occupation of French Indochina and other European colonized islands in the Pacific, the Japanese invasion of China was a focal point of the negotiations ((Hoyt and Edwin Palmer 44). The United States demanded the withdrawal of Japan from China. The issues presented by Japan on the negotiation platform were based on United States’ imposed oil embargo on them that threated to suffocate Japan’s economy. Japan wanted the withdrawal of the embargo to allow shipment of oil to Japan. On Japan’s perspective the success of the negotiation solely depended on this embargo removal otherwise war could not be averted. Assumptions During the negotiation process the United States representatives held the position that Japans intentions were entirely focused on total domination of the Pacific area economically, politically, socially and even militarily with the objective of harming and isolating European interest in the region (Iriye and Akira 80). This notion implied that the American negotiators viewed Japan as aligning themselves with Hitler in the impending conflict of world war two. On the other hand, Japan had assumptions that the United States interest and emphasis on neutrality expressed by their diplomatic approaches to the conflict meant that the US would not commit militarily to the conflict because of their preoccupation with the War in Europe. The assumption proved fatal when the US retaliated with the first ever detonation of two atomic bombs dropped on two cities of Japan Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the negotiations, the Japanese had Plan A and Plan B in response to the American stand. According to the plans, the Japanese did not change of their demands in relation to proposals include the negotiations. The United States negotiators responded to Japanese conclusions from the Imperial Conference by asserting that they were not certain if anything could be done to facilitate a satisfactory agreement. The assertion by the States Foreign Service officer of Japan implied that no matter how much compromise that each would make, the coming Pacific war was inevitable because of difference in priorities (Kenney and George 56). Plan B, conversely, proved significant to the United States since it established clearly that postponing the war was a viable option that could give further negotiations a chance or perhaps even create an opportunity for a last instance deal. The plan prompted questions of whether United States could trust Japan enough to issue back their frozen assets in the states. Could Japan be trusted to refrain from Dutch and British colonies in the Pacific especially in Asia? All this questions and the existence of the Tripartite Alliance enabled further doubt on the trustworthiness of Japan. Because of the Japanese pursuance of the new order in Asia, the United States could not trust Japan to honor any reached agreement. Though it was clear to the United States negotiators that Japan desired peace as much as they advocated for power. The assumption made by American negotiators and President Roosevelt was that Japan could not trustable because of its close ties and alliances with Italy and Germany. The US, therefore, proposed a Modus Vivendi. The agreement did not last for long because it was discarded after disapproval by Winston Churchill and other European leaders. The next proposal was by Cordell Hull for an agreement obliging all countries in the conflict to practice territorial integrity (Kenney and George 56). The assumption at the point was based on American superiority over Japan, that Japan would not consider war as an alternative against America. Geopolitics Geopolitics played a critical role in the conflict. For Japan to achieve their objectives they had to make a decision on either going to north and attacking Siberia to harm the Stalinist regime, violating the neutrality treaty or venture south to exploit the resources necessary for its domestic industries. The United States was also against Japan’s occupation of China. Japan’s decision to venture south proved to be one of the instigating factors in the conflict. The issue inspired a conflict with the European nations that had colonies in the south Asia. The US’s focus at the time was in Europe because of the Hitler’s threat. The Japan’s conquest prompted America to impose sanctions on Japan and freeze all its assets based in the United States. According to Japan, this act was perceivable as a declaration of war on Japan (Iriye and Akira 70). These geopolitical activities – japan exploration of European colonized territory and united states retaliation to protect its European allies interest can be presumed to be the significant stimulants that instigated the chain of events that later led to the pearl harbor attack. Responsibilities Both United States and Japan can be considered responsible for the failure of international relations of the two countries, despite the several differences in their priorities and goals, the two nations shared objectives: they both wanted to exert significant power in the Pacific and both countries backed their allied nations. The United States hard-lined on supporting its friendly European countries against aggression and Japan’s quest to explore and conquer South Asian European colonies for industrial raw material. The hard-line positions expressed by both countries, with each unwilling to forgo any of its requests of negotiations eventually led to a standoff position (Iriye and Akira 86). Thus, the responsibility of the attack can be exerted on both sides of the conflict. Even so, much of the responsibility lies with the Japanese for pulling out of the negotiations without informing the other party and carrying out a preemptive when the United States still were for negotiations. Work Cited Iriye, Akira. Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays. Boston [u.a.: Bedford/St. Martins, 1999. Print. Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. Pearl Harbor Attack. Sterling Publishing Company, Inc., 2008. Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War. AIR FORCE HISTORICAL STUDIES OFFICE WASHINGTON DC, 1997. Read More