Battle of Bull Run - Research Paper Example

of the of the Concerned October 27, 2009 Battle of Bull Run The bombardment of Fort Sumter located in the Charleston Harbor an its ensuing surrender left no doubt as to the fact that the civil war was just at the brink of being let loose.i President Lincoln issued an appeal for the assortment of roughly seventy-five thousand volunteers to challenge the inevitable Southern insurrection. In their unrestrained zeal, the masses responded overwhelmingly in the sense that the number of volunteers who offered their services was far more then what was pragmatically required. The troops hailing from the Western states were stationed at Cairo, Illinois, while those hailing from the Eastern states were assorted at Washington. Still, the thing that needs to be understood about the nature of successful war campaigns is that an excess of patriotism and enthusiasm seldom manages to replace a thorough experience, training and preparation. The reality of the situation was that the Union troops primarily comprised of greenhorn volunteers, sans any previous military experience or any prolonged and meticulous professional training. Considering the dearth of discipline and organization in the hastily gathered Union army, it could certainly not be called a professional army in the true sense of the word. However, the mere presence of the awe inspiring, uniformed heads proved to be more then enough to foment the popular passion as to yearn for an impetuous march on the enemy. Certainly, political wisdom is always a direct function of the popular sentiment. President Lincoln, irrespective of his rational intentions and good advices, choose to give way to the popular demand for an immediate campaign against the Southii. It was not that he was not aware of the fact that his troops were yet not battle worthy. Still he seemed to rely tremendously on the commensurate inexperience and immaturity of the Confederate troops. The Battle of Bull Run was not only the first noticeable military campaign of the American Civil War, but was also an event that had far-reaching and tremendous ramifications. The overall impact of the battle was not only exclusively military, but also had ideological, political and tactical off shots. Truly speaking, the Battle of Bull Run was a shocking revelation for the North. The north was not only jolted by its defeat, but also by now thoroughly understood that the unfolding civil war called for much better and protracted effort and preparations to engage with some degree of success in this possibly prolonged conflict. Even for the South, the aftermath of the battle was not particularly heartening and motivating. They had also understood by now, that irrespective of the rhetoric and tall claims of their top leadership, they were going in for something that may prove to be deathly, gory and taxing. The role of the European Press deserves a special mention in this context in the sense that it left no stone unturned to publish propitious accounts of the Southern preparedness and an inevitable crushing of the Union army in the future campaigns. The Confederacy was quick to benefit from this salubrious propaganda by managing to sell bonds in the European markets leading to an accrual of instant cash to finance and support their war efforts. The battle, which necessarily happened to be the most gargantuan campaign that had been undertaken in North America till date played a decisive role in predicting the prolongation of the Civil War. This first noteworthy land conflict in the Civil War was staged near the Bull Run Creek situated near the town of Manassas in Virginia, on 21 July 1861.iii The Confederate army was under the direct command of Brig. Gen. PGT Beauregard, their moral immensely boosted by their leaders’ earlier success at Fort Sumter. Beauregard headed a force of twenty thousand men, which focused on protecting a rail link that connected them to Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston’s force of twelve thousand men pitched against eighteen thousand Federal troops under the command of Robert Patterson, a battle hardy officer and a hero of the 1812 campaigns. Beauregard aligned his men around the Bull Run stream, with the important fords and the only stone bridge being defended by Henry Hill and his men. Beauregard had reasons to believe that the Federal army will attack him from the right, the side where he chooses to concentrate his troops. In the meantime, on the eve of 18 July, Johnston received the orders to relocate his troops deployed at Shenandoah Valley, to join Beauregard’s men located sixty miles apart at Manassas. The fact that deserves special mention is that it was the first time the Confederates used railroad to transport and redeploy their troops in a tactical scenario. Succumbing to the intense popular demand to capture Richmond, nearly thirty thousand men under the command of Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell were launched from Centreville to hit on the left flank of the Confederate troops, so as to solve the twin purpose of severing the armies of Johnston and Beauregard and to loosen the defenses placed by Beauregard along the Bull Run Creek. As expected, the ill-trained Federal army began to run into debilitating logistical problems right from the start. Confused and miss-communicated commands thwarted any proper and pragmatic execution of the Federal plans. The Union Army decided to hit the stone bridge on 21 July. Finding his left flank in a precarious situation, Beauregard mobilized his troops behind Henry Hill, to support the incursions being made by the Confederate Captain Nathan Shanks. The whole afternoon witnessed the repeated salvos of the Federal troops upon Henry House Hill, attacking and retreating in wave like patterns. The Federals painstakingly carried on these attacks on Henry Hill for the next two hours. However, this did not result in any desirable or a decisive outcome for neither the Federals, nor the Confederates. It was in this very campaign that Brig. Gen. Jackson accrued the nickname ‘Stonewall’ for his grit and tenacity, which immortalized him forever. By 4:00 in the evening, the Federal right came under attack from the reinforcements sent by Beauregard, under the command of Col. Jubal A. Early and Brig. Gen. E Kirby Smith. Under these fresh attacks, the left flank of the Federal army began to shrink and warp. Considering the fact that though the Federal troops far outnumbered the Confederate soldiers, the irony of the situation was that a majority of then being inexperienced and ill trained began to withdraw in haste, which gave way to a situation of panic and desperation in the Federal ranks. The soldiers were simply not prepared to hold on in the thick of a bitterly fought campaign. Soon, it became next to impossible for the Federal officers to hold the bellowing tide of retreat to rally the soldiers back to a situation of superiority. The army began to retreat in haste and did not stop until it retreated as far back to Washington, D.C. Though seemingly victorious, the Confederate army was not bereft of any confusion. In fact, irrespective of the haphazard retreat of the Union troops, the Confederate army was by this time so disarrayed and confused that it failed to inflict any massive damage on the retreating Union troops. Though it is reality that the Union troops and civilians genuinely feared that the Confederate troops may march up to Washington, D.C., with practically nothing existing on the way to stop or impede them. However and perhaps luckily, these fears never materialized. The losses faced by both the sides in the battle were considered massive and large at that time. The Union army lost 2,896 men, while the Confederates lost 1,982 meniv. However, when one considers the headcount in the following war campaigns, these losses oft seem to be bearable and not so disproportionate. There were several reasons responsible for the Union’s defeat in the Battle of Bull Runv. There definitely existed an attitude of delay, indecision and obstinacy in the Union ranks, which confused the ground troops and made the officers arrange and scatter their troops in an ungainly and unwieldy manner. The Federal officers were certainly not able to exploit the full potential of their army and to gain any tactical advantage out of their superiority in terms of numbers. A large proportion of the Federal army was merely left on the ground standing like chessboard pawns, without serving and real or pragmatic purpose. The fact that more then twenty thousand of the Federal volunteers stood idle at Washington, and Scoot mindlessly stood obstinate before the entreaties to dispatch them to the battleground, resorting to the claims that there were more then enough troops deployed on the battleground. The Federal officers certainly lacked a sense of purpose, commitment and a clear sense of vision. The Confederates continually remained in touch with their friends and colleagues serving in the Union army, thereby giving them a discrete advantage in terms of intelligence and inside information. This not only allowed the Confederates to blunt every Federal strategy, but no serious effort was made by the Federal administrators to check the possible intelligence leaks. The very act of President Lincoln to quell the Confederate uprising by using a force of amateurish volunteers was childlike and immature. There is no denying the fact that there existed many committed and dedicated soldiers in the Federal ranks. Still, it is a reality that many of the volunteers were there owing to unemployment or other pressing reasons and their commitment to the cause was wavering and weak. Many of them seriously believed that there was going to be no real war and perhaps the Confederate opposition was too weak and will give up in a matter of days. Until the Battle of Bull Run, the Union considered the Confederate dissension to be a manageable law and order problem that could be quelled by an assortment of the ragtag militia in a matter of days. However, the ensuing circumstances proved beyond doubt that nothing was far from reality and the Civil War was going to be a real war, to be won by sweat and blood. This very misunderstanding of the Confederate threat is depicted in the act of the Union to let the early prisoners of war go scot-free on taking an oath of allegiance to the Union constitution, an act that smacked of foolish overconfidence and a pathetic lack of farsightedness. The Confederacy was certainly able to better manage and place its troops in the thick of the battle and suffered from less confusion and indecision as compared to the Federal ranks. Perhaps, the Confederate allegiance to its cause was more strong and sincere, at least during the on set of the Civil War. Undeniably, the Battle of Bull Run left the Federal leadership and masses with a lot to ponder about and improve on. Strange but true, it could safely be said that losses incurred by the Union in the Battle of Bull Run proved to be a blessing in disguise. The adroitness and professionalism of the Confederate troops in the battle made the Union take serious steps to recruit, train and equip their troops in a more professional and tactical manner. The realization of the fact that the Confederate uprising was going to be a real and prolonged threat sensitized the top leadership and the masses to the gravity of the situation and reinforced and bolstered their commitment and sincerity to the Union cause. The entire industrial machinery and infrastructure in the Union was mobilized to meet the War needs and requirements. Total Words: 2,000 Read More