The United States was Justified in the Use of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to End World War II - Thesis Example

The United s was justified in the use of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II BY YOU YOUR SCHOOL INFO HERE Introduction The decision to utilize atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9, 1945 was to put a rapid end to World War II after the defeat of the German Nazi regime. On July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Declaration was issued by UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill, U.S. President Harry Truman and Chinese Nationalist Government representative Chiang Kai-Shek. This declaration promised that if Japan did not surrender immediately, Japan would experience “prompt and utter destruction” (U.S. Department of State 2014, p.1). Despite the uncompromising threat of decimation, Japan refused to withdraw from further aggression. There were significant justifications for making the decision to use atomic assaults on Japan which was also uncompromising in its refusals for engaging in unconditional surrender. First, the economic costs of a lingering war were estimated to be substantial for the United States and its ally nations. Additionally, the Japanese culture was significantly loyal to Emperor Hirohito who reigned as the nation’s leader during the time period when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked. Furthermore, Japan was in the process of developing their own atomic weapons which, if allowed to continue this development program, could have endangered more nations under the governance of a fanatical and fervent Japanese ruler. Finally, citizen sentiment regarding the war was largely favorable toward using significant destructive force against Japan in an effort to end the war, an important aspect considering that government is elected to represent the interests of the people. In every detail, the United States was absolutely justified in using atomic attacks in Japan in order to end a very costly war. The Economic Toll of the War The existing war strategy and campaign being carried out by U.S. military leaders throughout World War II would have led to an additional 500,000 lives being lost if the war were to continue to its ultimate conclusion (Lincoln 1945). Concurrently, Grew (1945) iterated that failure to make America’s intentions clear would result in prolonging the way and cost a high volume of lives. It was estimated that the current strategy of the United States would have required more ground-based attacks carried out by military servicemen, thus exposing hundreds of thousands to risk of death and injury. With an estimated timeframe of an additional 18 months of war if Japan did not surrender promptly, World War II would have likely continued into 1947 without using prompt and destructive force for a Japan that refused unconditional surrender. General George A. Lincoln estimated that the government would be economically exhausted with another 18 months of lingering war against Japan and hence would the nation would be unable to provide any additional economic support to its allies in the process of recovering infrastructure and community in the rebuilding process (Lincoln). The U.S. government indicates that World War II cost the country $296 billion between 1941 and 1945, which is equivalent to approximately $4.1 trillion today (Daggett 2010). At an average cost of the war, per year, at 74 billion dollars, the costs of an additional 18 months of war, in today’s terms, would have been a staggering $1.5 trillion. Hence, coupled with the overwhelming economic costs of a continuing war and the volume of lives that were estimated to be lost, using aggressive and rapid atomic force ensured that these costs were not absorbed. These figures are not inclusive of the costs that other Allied nations would have to also endure as a result of a lingering war extending over an estimated 18 month period, hence the decision ensured economic stability for Allied nations as well. National Pride and Loyalty for Japanese Government Leadership Japan, during the 1940s, was a highly collectivist culture in which group membership is fundamental for building a sense of social status and identity. In collectivist cultures, loyalty toward group members is a paramount social belief and loss of face (reputation) is deeply humiliating and unacceptable (Cheung, et al. 2008). Emperor Hirohito, much like Adolf Hitler, was a master of using propaganda and marketing in order to gain the support of the Japanese people. During his tenure as emperor throughout World War II, the level of loyalty for Hirohito bordered on obsessive and fanatical. Unconditional and immediate surrender would have deconstructed years of national pride development and identity as a powerful force in the war, something that Japanese militants and citizens found reprehensible. However, McCloy (1945) believed that any language stating the emperor would be preserved in a surrender agreement was contentious and disadvantageous to the American government. When the emperor publicly refused to surrender and continued to assert to the Japanese people that they would ultimately be victorious, support for the emperor continued to escalate. As a result, military and general society was adamant that they should remain loyal to Hirohito’s leadership and refused to engage in any type of cease fire. The level of allegiance and faithfulness that military members and the general public maintained in Hirohito’s leadership was akin to godliness and divinity. When individuals become fanatics, psychological studies have shown that violent behaviors can multiply substantially and individuals can seek out extremist methods to employ their fanatical agendas (Haynal, Molnar and de Puymege 1987). Japan had already illustrated extremist behaviors, using kamikaze pilots who were willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to utilize their aircraft as deadly weapons of war and destruction. Hence, growing loyalty, fanaticism and deluded beliefs that the country could emerge victorious in this difficult war made it viable to global society to ensure that Japanese extremism did not impose further harm and threat for an ongoing war. Japan’s Efforts at Developing their own Atomic Weaponry During World War II, Japan was actively involved in conducting testing and research to develop the nation’s own atomic technologies. As far back as 1939, Japan maintained sufficient knowledge of nuclear fission and was growing concerned that the United States and other world powers were working on development of destructive atomic devices. By 1942, Japan had assembled the Committee on Research in the Application of Nuclear Physics which was led by Dr. Yoshio Nishina who was affiliated with Albert Einstein. By February of 1945, the nation had been able to process uranium using recently built cyclotrons and was growing more proficient in developing the appropriate resources needed to develop the country’s own atomic bombs. Fortunately, the committee concluded that while the development of an atomic bomb was theoretically feasible, it was highly unlikely that the United States would be able to develop an effective prototype to use against Japan. As a result, the country focused more intently on developing radar technologies and the process of enriching uranium slowed substantially. However, the United States and the country’s allies recognized that Japan was advancing in nuclear technologies and, in the face of fanaticism and extremism, this posed a substantial threat to the security of the United States and allied nations. The goals of the United States and those of Japan were incongruent. Where the U.S. sought peace and a rapid end to the war to begin the rebuilding and recovery processes in the country and in allied nations, Japan was consumed with the notion of obtaining victory at virtually any cost. As a result, using atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima was a decision to ensure that Japan was unable to utilize its knowledge in atomic technologies and prevent a fanatical military and leadership regime from carrying out further violent aggressions through the utilization of atomic force. By illustrating absolute technological superiority, the U.S. was able to rapidly end the war and potentially safeguard the lives of millions of global citizens that could have been debilitated by Japanese nuclear aggression. The Views of Constituency In democratic societies, it is the obligation of the government to act based on the sentiment and demands of its constituents. Dower (1986) describes the results of a Fortune Magazine poll from December 1945 which indicated that 23 percent of Americans actually wished that Truman had utilized even more atomic bombs in an effort to obliterate Japan. This shows a significant volume of hatred against Japan and showed the sentiment of the people during this time period. Additionally, a June 1945 poll indicated that 90 percent of American citizen respondents were absolutely against seeking diplomatic resolution between the U.S. and Japan and wanted the government to use any means by which to coerce an immediate and unconditional surrender (Pyle 1996). Americans had sacrificed considerably much in an effort to support war efforts, including engaging in rationing and sacrificing family in order to provide manufacturing support for war product construction. The general social sentiment at the time was weariness and infuriation that the war had endured for so long and, holistically, maintained a general sentiment that violent and immediate destruction on Japanese soil was the most favorable method of ending the long war. As a result, being representatives that are put into office to ensure the needs of the people are considered and incorporated into military strategy, Truman satisfied the people of the United States and performed the government’s obligations of securing their requirements as a competent national leader. The role of the Soviet Union in Truman’s Decision to use Atomic Bombs The Soviet Union was not at all instrumental in providing support for the use of atomic bombs on Japanese soil. In fact, right at the war’s end, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and began invading its territories. In 1945, the Soviet Union captured a Japanese research facility that was processing uranium for atomic technology development and was becoming a strategic threat to the United States through the capture of Japanese-held territories. There was growing concern with the U.S. government that the Soviet Union might attempt to co-govern a defeated Japan when the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria. Hence, the utilization of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was further meant to send a message to the Soviets that the United States was now a dominant and powerful force in Europe and Asia in an effort to remove Soviet presence from Japan and shock the nation into ending its military aggressiveness. Conclusion Based on all research, the United States was absolutely justified in using atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The decision ensured that there was no further economic burden on the U.S. and its allies in continuing an already-long war, safeguarded the lives of military members that would have been dramatically impacted with another 18 months of extended war, satisfied the social sentiment of the time, prevented further Soviet aggressions, and also ensured that Japan was unable to utilize its growing knowledge in nuclear fission to cause harm to the rest of the world. Though there are some members of global society that criticized Harry Truman for using this forceful tactic to ensure the unconditional surrender of Japan, there is a high probability that Japan would have maintained its fanatical and obsessive desire to emerge victorious as a means of guaranteeing further hostility and destruction as a wartime agent. Even though the probability of Japan being successful in an elongated war lasting into 1947 (as predicted) was virtually nil, loyalty and collectivism toward the Japanese state and its government leadership posed a substantial threat to the rest of the world. The decision to use atomic bombs on Japanese soil was the most sufficient and shrewd methodology of ending World War II and allowing nations to attempt to recover and rebuild in a global society that was both war weary and concerned about Japanese extremism. If the United States had not been as aggressive in using deadly and destructive force, it is likely that Japan would have continued to employ its agenda of securing victory at virtually any cost, forcing Allied nations to continue to ask their people to sacrifice as a means of ensuring proper resource availability and allocation to defeat this potent and passionate force. Truman’s decision to use atomic force was, in every degree, the proper and well-justified decision for ending this deadly and costly war. Bibliography Cheung, F., S. Cheung, J. Zhang, K. Leung, F. Leong and K. Yeh. 2008. “Relevance for openness as a personality dimension in Chinese culture”. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 39(1): 261-295. Daggett, Stephen. 2010. Costs of Major U.S. Wars, Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22926.pdf Dower, John W. 1986. War without Mercy. New York: Pantheon Books. Grew, J. (1945). Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew to the President, Analysis of Memorandum presented by Mr. Hoover. Retrieved April 20, 2014 from http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/17.pdf Haynal, A., M. Molnar and G. de Puymege. 1987. Fanaticism: A Historical and Psychoanalytical Study. New York: Schoken Books. Lincoln, George A. 1945. Memorandum for General Hull. http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/13.pdf McCloy, J.J. (1945). Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to Colonel Stimson, June 29, 1945, Top Secret. Retrieved April 20, 2014 from http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/25.pdf Pyle, Kenneth B. 1996. The Making of Modern Japan. Lexington: Heath. U.S. Department of State. 2014. Milestones: 1937-1945 – The Potsdam Conference 1945. http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/potsdam-conf Read More