To summarise, the Japanese were kicking at an open door, to an extent that, even, today, is the subject of what amounts to a cover-up. We will deal first with the failings of the Americans, not only at Pearl Harbor, but in the Philippines as well - suffice it to say that a successful defense against the Japanese assault was perfectly feasible given the American forces in place, and weather conditions ‘on the day’. The failings of the British Commonwealth command appear to have been the most serious, as the basic scheme of the Japanese assault on Malaya had been determined as early as 1937 and the correct course of action (a pre-emptive strike on Thailand and French Indo-China - ‘Operation Matador’) determined.
Although citing specific sources is difficult, not only was the Japanese code JN25 an ‘open book’, but the Japanese Army code was also at least partially compromised. Given time, place, and strategy, even such an obsolete aircraft as the Vickers Wildebeeste (an early 1930s biplane torpedo bomber of particularly comic appearance) becomes a deadly weapon system. The Dutch (Netherlands East Indies - NEI) experience is rather different. The NEI military suffered a series of mutinies in the early 1930s, the most notable of which was the ‘De Zeven Provincien’ mutiny, which resulted in what amounts to a pitched battle between the mutineers and NEI Government forces (who won).
These mutinies appeared together to have ‘torn the backbone out’ of the NEI military. This appears to have resulted in the Dutch forces, despite their preparations and effective signals intelligence operation, collapsing just as badly as the British and Americans when the time came.
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