Faults in U.S. Intelligence Operations Carried over from Persian Gulf War I to Persian Gulf War II - Assignment Example

Were Faults in U.S. Intelligence Operations Carried over from Persian Gulf War I (1991) to Persian Gulf War II (2003)? The two Persian Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003 are seen as the most successful wars that the U.S. has fought during the past two decades. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 began as a result of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 2, 1990, unleashing powerful bombardments on the tiny country1. It was the first major war fought after the end of the cold war. The war only took seven months to be won when the U.S. and its allies intervened by making counter attacks on Iraq to abandon what the U.S. and the United Nation considered unlawful invasion of a sovereign country2. The war was successful due to the fact that no much resource was used during the war and only estimated 300-Allied soldiers lost their lives. Twelve years down the line, the U.S. and its allies again initiated another war with Saddam Hussein in 2003 with a view to toppling his regime. The reason for Iraq’s invasion according to the then U.S. president George Walker Bush, and the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair was that their intention was to disarm Saddam of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and stop Saddam from supporting terrorist as well as liberate the people of Iraq3. The war ended after several months of fighting with the culture of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad Iraq. Despite the success in the two wars, the U.S. intelligence services have been faulted for not doing its work as expected4. This was mainly manifested during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. After discovering the faults, the U.S. intelligence service took several initiatives aimed at rectifying the faults to avoid a repeat of such errors in subsequent operation. Despite these attempts, the question that one may ask is whether the US intelligence operation made similar faults during the Persian Gulf War of 2003? The objective of this paper is to analyze whether the faults in US intelligence operations were carried over from the Persian Gulf War of 1991 to the Persian Gulf War of 2003. Intelligence department plays a major role with regard to provision of vital information that may help country strategize in time and combat any security threat5. Provision of timely and accurate information is important because it may help a country prepare in terms of defense and put in place the necessary resource needed to prevent any security threat. This has been a major concern for the United States government since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, some of the intelligence services have failed the government of U.S. with regard to provision of vital information regarding uncertainties and early warning. This was witnessed during the Persian Gulf War of 199, when the I MEF failed to provide strategic warning during months Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 19906. It is argued that the U.S. intelligence observed that Saddam Hussein was not likely to initiate warfare any time soon. In fact, the intelligence service repeated this even few months before Iraq’s invasion. The faulted argument provided by the I MEF was that Iraq having just come out of war with Iran needed several years to convalesce from the economic and military devastation of the war. This information was found to be misleading when few months after the report; Saddam Hussein’s arsenals entered Kuwait initiating lethal bombardments killing many innocent Kuwait nationals. It is argued that were it that the U.S. intelligence operation had done their assignments well, they could have noticed the eminent war that was looming and provided information, which could have helped the U.S. and the United Nations prevent the war. This kind of faults seen with the U.S. intelligence operation during the Persian Gulf War of 1991 with regard to provision of misleading information was carried over to the Persian Gulf War of 20037. This is because as war loomed, the U.S. Intelligence Community was given the responsibility of informing policymakers the information they had regarding Iraq’s biological, chemical and nuclear weapon programs. After carrying out an assessment, which began in October 2002, the intelligence community concluded that Iraq through the leadership of Saddam Hussein was still pursuing its program of developing weapons of mass destruction8. The report also went ahead to alleged that Saddam had reconstituted its nuclear weapon program and was at the verge of assembling a device in the next decade. In addition, the report by the intelligence operation reported that Iraq had developed biological weapons and mobile facilities for manufacturing biological warfare (BW) agents. Moreover, the report also showed that Saddam had developed chemical weapons and that Iraq had chemical weapon stockpiles estimated at 500 metric tons and was also manufacturing unmanned aerial tanks and vehicles intended to transport biological warfare agents. This is what motivated US into waging war with Iraq. But were these allegations true? No, as it became clear after the US forces search intensively without success for the alleged weapons of mass destruction as earlier reported by the U.S. Intelligence Community. Extensive post-war investigations carried out by Iraq Survey Group (ISG) also found no evidence that Saddam had attempted to reconstitute nuclear weapon enrichment after the Persian Gulf War of 19919. Research by ISG also concluded that the U.S. intelligence community was wrong by reporting that Saddam had managed to develop biological warfare stockpiles or facilities for manufacture of biological weapons10. ISG also found no evidence linking Saddam Hussein or resuming manufacture of chemical warfare stockpiles after the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The only area that the U.S. Intelligence Community was found right was their report regarding devilment of missiles with high ranges exceeding limits set by the United Nations. This was indeed a slap on the face on the U.S. intelligence operation, showing their lack of ability to provide accurate information as it did during the 1991 Persian Gulf War with Iraq. The other fault noted with the U.S. intelligence Community is the manner in which it depicted Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. According to Major Myatt and Keys, it was erroneous and flawed for the US Intelligence Community to portray Iraq as being “ten feet tall” when it was not11. He argues that this kind of depiction cost them as it demoralized and neglected individual foot soldiers. They went ahead to state that this erroneous information made their soldiers shy of going into war than they should have been. The major general also complained that the I MEF failed to provide him with frontline battle intelligence to back up his combat operations. These faults were also carried to the 2003 Persian Gulf War as the Intelligence Community provided a lot of misleading information regarding Iraq’s weapon capability, which ultimately demoralized U.S. troops while going into war12. Some general commanders also complained that their troops were falling prey at the hands of Iraq troops due to failure by the Intelligence Community to provide them with frontline battle intelligence. This is probably the reason as to why many US soldiers lost their lives during the 2003 war in Iraq. In conclusion, from the analysis, it beyond doubt that most of the faults committed by the U.S. intelligence operation during the Persian Gulf war of 1991 were carried to the Persian gulf war of 2003. This demonstrates the need for the U.S. intelligence service to be improved to avoid such faults in future. This can be achieved by linking the intelligence system with combat system. Bibliography Best, Richard A. Intelligence Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Diane Publishing Co., 2010. Coia, Raymond. A Critical Analysis of the I MEF Intelligence Performance in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. May 22, 1995. Accessed 13 August, 2012 http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/coia.htm Diamond, John M. The CIA and the Culture of Failure: US Intelligence from the end of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq. London: Stanford University Press, 2008. Finlan, Alastair. The Gulf War of 1991. New York, NY: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2008. Pfiffner, James P., & Phythian, Mark. Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives. Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2008. Select Committee on Intelligence United States. Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar intelligence Assessments on Iraq. July 7, 2004. Pp. 1-508. Seliktar, Ofira. The Politics of Intelligence and American Wars with Iraq. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Silberman, Laurence H. & Robb, Charles S. The Commission on the Intelligence capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to the President of the United States. Washington, DC, March 5, 2005. Read More