Kennedys Strategic Ability in Preventing the Cuban Nuclear War - Coursework Example

To what extent was President Kennedys strategic ability essential in preventing the Cuban missile crisis from breaking into a nuclear war?" Plan of investigation In the many years that have gone by, analysts have tried to justify the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba as a way that the country used to protect itself against attack from America (Kornblau). It was trying to prevent what has happened to some countries in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia which have been invaded by United States troops from time to time. The study hence seeks to explore the fundamental yet often unnoticed choices among the categories and assumptions that challenge our thinking about problems like the Cuban missile crisis. This will be done through an in-depth analysis of President Kennedy’s speech where he addresses issues that have deeper implications of each of the options presented as solutions to the problems at hand. These memorable quotes will be researched from various information archives including various libraries and electronic sources to generate a clear depiction of the historical debate. Summary of Evidence John F. Kennedy is widely known to have stated that “The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer – often indeed, to the decider himself”, a concept that was significantly used by political scientist Graham T. Allison in his book ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (Kornblau). The case of the Cuban missile crisis was used as a base for future decisions that were made by the government. And from the viewpoint of the president’s speech, Allison was able to construct three ways in which analysts can examine various events and governmental decisions that are undertaken. Allison posed three questions; why did the Soviet Union decide to place offensive missiles in Cuba? Why did the United States respond to the missile deployment with a blockade? Why did the Soviet Union withdraw the missiles? (Kornblau). In September 1982, Time Magazine gave a brief depiction of President Kennedy’s Speech in 1963; “Nuclear Powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy-or of a collective death wish for the world. 1 President Kennedy’s speech according to Smoke and Alexander’s paradoxical ideas were noted to be exemplary of deterrence whereby the President created the setting by announcing, by incurring the obligation and then waiting for the world to respond. He did not compel the world to revoke the missiles that were in Cuba but instead speaking only of the likely consequences that would be experienced as a result of countries possessing these weapons of mass destruction. 2 President Kennedy in a bid to end the apparent crisis drafted a letter to the Soviet Union stating a few things that he would like the Soviet Union to undertake and a few others that he in turn would complete. He addressed Cuba stating that if they would agree to remove the weapons from their country under the direct supervision of the United Nations then he would also give assurances against the invasion of Cuba. He was not sure whether the deal would be accepted but it made history when the Soviet Union accepted the deal and brought an end to the weapons crisis that the United States was facing. Evaluation of Sources Graham Allison is a well known political scientist and professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. He is well known for his contributions to the bureaucratic analysis of decision making especially during times of crisis in the United States having analyzed some of the most important decisions that leaders in the country had taken. The well known author of the book Essence of Decision that explains the Cuban Missile crisis in 1971 developed two new theoretical paradigms – the organizational process model and the bureaucratic model that has enabled an in-depth understanding of foreign policy decision making (Graham Allison). There are certain levels of bias that may originate from the nationality of the author being that most of the leaders that are analyzed are from his home country. Leslie Gelb, author of Power Rules: How common sense can rescue American policy was a well known diplomatic correspondent at the New York Times. He was the director of policy planning and arms control for international security affairs at the department of defense having vast field experience before developing the book (Leslie Gelb). Bias in the use of this source may occur from the fact that the author had a certain level of background on American foreign policy; this may have affected the author’s judgments of the parties concerned especially if they were working against the American policy. Analysis There are three models that were developed by Allison and Zelikow that attempted to explain the Cuban missile crisis. The three models are organizational behavior, rational actor and the governmental politics models. The models highlight the key decisions that were made by the Soviet Union and the United States during the crisis. The models structures are derived from the events that took place in the thirteen days of October, 1962. The models help in understanding how President Kennedy played a key role in preventing the Cuban crisis from becoming a nuclear war. The Rational Actor Model (RAM) This is the first model and it analyses foreign policy actions. The model gives an understanding of how policy actions are taken by countries considering the other countries as rational unitary actors. The RAM assumes the actions taken by a country towards another country are strategic, intended and value maximizing. Action is described as the goal the government was pursuing when it performed the action and how reasonable the action was in regard to the nation’s objective (Kornblau 2). There is a reason for every action and that’s how people end up making decisions. The Cuban missile crisis raises several questions like; why did the Soviet Union decide to place offensive missiles in the Cuban territory? Why did the U.S. respond to the action taken by Soviet Union with a naval quarantine around Cuba? Why did the Soviet Union in response withdraw the missiles? The action taken by the Soviet Union in the first question may have been triggered by Cuba’s own defense; Cold War politics that were a common phenomenon at that time; an attempt to match up with the United States in missile power; or the long desire to remove the Western influence in Berlin. The Berlin and missile power reasons seem reasonable but could not explain the entire Soviet’s action at that period. This is the reason why most of the State’s actions cannot be explained using the rational analysis. The U.S. did not want to provoke any military response and that is why it acted by blocking the area around Cuba. The decision taken by the Kennedy’s administration was the best way of sending the right message to the Soviets without provoking war according to Kornblau (3). The Soviet Union’s decision to withdraw the missiles from Cuba was triggered by the reality that Cuba would be attacked and the possibility of a nuclear war occurring. An attack on Cuba was a possible second quarantine plan of the United States. The RAM model fails to answer exhaustively the Soviet actions and it instead raises more questions than answers (Kornblau 4). Organizational Behavior Methodology The organizational behavior methodology is another method applied in understanding foreign policies actions. The model states that governments and countries are not rational unitary actors but vast corporations of loosely associated organizations each with its own life. The government actions are not based on logical choices that have been made by one central decision maker. The actions are as a result of outputs of the organizations, each working on the basis of their standard patterns of behavior. The model represents the actual decisions made by the government; most of the government actions are carried out by organizations [army, CIA or navy and others], and the options left to the government are limited to the current organizational capacity and the ability. Kennedy’s administration ordered a spy plane to take pictures of Cuba. This could not have happened if the US lacked the equipments to perform a spying operation. Therefore, the organizational capacity and ability will determine the action taken by a country or a government and, (c) the organizational actions are informed and limited by the standard operating procedures, what has been done before and culture. Soviet knew very well that the United States had the equipments and capabilities of performing a spy operation on the activities in Cuba. Thus, attempting to hide their missile sites in Cuba could not make any sense. The only option left was to terminate their missile activities in Cuba (Kornblau 4). The model clearly explains why Soviet could not have hidden or went on with construction of offensive missiles. The United States decisions and outcomes were greatly affected by the operational capacities and behaviors. Government Politics Model According to government politics model, policies are influenced by politics. Personal desires, viewpoints and opinions develop the policy actions and the decisions on the course of action are entirely different from what they had chosen. However, the influence of politics in foreign policy decision making is limited than in domestic policies. It mostly involves a small team of advisors brought together by the president to help him in decision making. The small team of advisors comprises of the organizational heads and cabinet members (Kornblau 5). The model was well utilized by the United States in coming up with the decisions of the Cuban missile crisis. The decisions were made by the Kennedy’s inner circle team of advisors (Executive Committee of the National Security Council also known as ExComm) specifically brought together because of the issue. There was a lot of political influence in the decisions that the United States made. The first evidence is the pressure from the Republicans for the Kennedy administration to act against Cuba. The second evidence is the bringing together of the Excomm to help Kennedy in making decisions (John F Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum). For Khrushchev, he was the dominant decision maker and the foreign policy experience had no influence. The decisions were mostly made from incorrect information make up and constant change of mind (Kornblau 6). Conclusion The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was an eye opener to the world of how careless actions can result in detrimental consequences. The crisis has been analyzed by three models that try to bring out the factors that played a critical role in ending the crisis thus averting the risks of a nuclear war. Kennedy played a big role and his strategic abilities were essential in preventing a Cuban missile crisis from breaking into a missile attack. Although Khrushchev did not have any foreign policy experience, his decision to withdraw the offensive missile activities in Cuba was crucial in ending the crisis. This means that both parties had an impact on the outcome of the crisis. Works Cited Allison Graham. n.d. Web. 20 December, 2010.  Gelb, Leslie. “20 Years after Missile Crisis, Riddles Remain.” The New York Times 23 Oct. 1982: Print. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. The World on the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, n.d. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. Kornblau, Melissa. Rev. of Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, ed.2 Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. 1999. 1-11. Print. Leslie Gelb. n.d. Web. 20 December, 2010. Read More