The Grand Strategy of a Spanish King - Essay Example

The Grand Strategy of a Spanish King: Is it an Illusion? As Richard Betts eloquently argued, “Strategies must be based on the circumstances as they appeared at the time, not with hindsight” [1]; due to the fact that recreating those situations is extremely complex, only a handful of citizens or scholars think about it. As a result, prevalent illusions about strategy arise. Results seldom follow preparations. Recognized goals are usually not the actual ones [2] Real strategists are normally deficient of insight or time to conduct sufficient investigation [3]. Strategy’s objects have their own strategies. Sharing this similar stance is Carl Von Clausewitz, also known as the ‘Master Strategist’ [4]. According to him, “The means and forms which Strategy uses are in fact so extremely simple, so well-known by their constant repetition, that it only appears ridiculous to sound common sense when it hears critics so frequently speaking of them with high-flown emphasis” [5]. Basically, Clausewitz and Betts are arguing that to the estimate of an unknown and known number, specifically an individual’s own determination and that of the adversary, involve yet other forces. These are the completely unpredictable, such as illnesses, accidents, weather, conflicts and frustrations. In simple terms, all the forces that may be referred to as destiny or luck, apparently impinge on strategy. However, as Clausewitz elaborates, war does not fall into random, sightless action. An estimation of chances reveals that all those unpredictable occurrences are just as frequently to the demise or benefit of one party as they are to the other [6]. It is apparent that theoretical understanding does not meet its requirements. In contrast, both character and mental abilities are required for this creative, practical, free activity, informed by experience and trained clearly by military schools [7]. The objective of this essay is to analyze and discuss Spain’s strategy for success in the Early Modern Period under the rule of King Philip II. More particularly, this essay will apply the theories of scholars, such as Betts and Clausewitz, to the task for finding out whether the so-called ‘Grand Strategy’ of Spain failed due to a lack of luck or genius of King Philip II. If it is to be recognized that Philip II did really possess a Grand Strategy, then it has also to be known that Philip II failed to accomplish majority of his policy objectives. Was this failure due to Philip II’s lack of luck or genius? The Spanish king sacrificed resources, status, and human lives to try to realize his goals. He unquestionably abandoned his major responsibility, Spain, more unstable than when he assumed office and he was unsuccessful in encouraging absolute obedience [8]. All of these circumstances may lead to the assumption that Philip II’s failure was largely due to the limitations of his leadership ability. However, not all of these were due to his incapability; this is where luck comes in. The religious scandals of the sixteenth century considerably limited his freedom to plan and his capability to negotiate. In spite of being complimented as the ‘largest brain in the World, [9]’ historians, such as Parker (1998), firmly argue that it would have taken a super genius to deal with all the problems that burdened Philip II [10]. In a nutshell, several of his problems were common: for the most part of the time in power the succession to the Philip II was remotely assured and, at a period when it was widely believed that the King symbolized the land and vice versa, there would have been disastrous reforms if Philip had passed away without a legitimate successor [11]. The ambitions and hopes of an empire and a nation all rested on the shoulders of a single person. Fairly as a response to such mortality the population began to see a strong link between their monarch powers and features that transcend mortality. According to Hughes (1993), success, primarily, establishes the status or image of a good leader [12]. How much of this is actually gained is extremely difficult to identify. However, eventually the genius has good luck [13]. The total number of major successes of Philip II may have made him more liberal than the ordinary person in recognizing the role of luck or fate in his accomplishments. This he openly did at the risk of having his successes mocked, but not without notably stating that luck supports the prepared intellect [14]. This accidental but unusual bond between luck and genius did not elude the circumstances of Philip II; he was a man of grand reputation who had been endowed with luck and intelligence. The Grand Strategy of Philip II failed due to the absence of secrecy, which suggested that Elizabeth was given the opportunity to build an appropriate defense strategy for defense; due to the failure of Parma to join the armada; due to strategic and technological difference of the armadas; and due to that blight of all legendary commanders, luck [15]. Whether in business, profession, war, the intellect that requires sureness as a requirement for embarking upon the next step will be an ill-tempered or hesitant but in the end barren intellect. Luck and the unforeseen endows the richest context to exercise the intellect. Philip II realized that he had to depend on the own resources of Spain and hope to depend on divine intervention but he carried on in achieving his idealistic objectives. Simply because Spain had endured a dishonoring defeat against weak political power and fate, it did not suggest that predicaments elsewhere in Spain vanished. Civil protests in Spain over distribution of resources and taxation brought disgruntlement to the very heart of the kingdom and disarray in France and the Netherlands endangered the stability and safety of the kingdom [16]. As Philip II aged, he grew increasingly exhausted. He was always bed-ridden and ill until he finally succumbed to death [17]. Essentially, much relies on the general contexts wherein both sides stand with deference toward each other. Hence, if one has planned to threaten and surpass the other through his absolute moral ascendancy, he will be better capable of exercising surprise and awe and will obtain excellent outcomes even where he should in fact have faced a serious adversity. Endnotes [1] Colin Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 142. [2] ibid, p. 142. [3] B.H. Hart, Strategy (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1954) [4] T. Ghyczy, B.V. Oetinger, & C. Bassford, Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist (New York: Wiley, 2001) [5] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War: The Complete Edition (New York, Brownstone Books, 2009), p. 93. [6] ibid, p. 93. [7] T. Ghyczy, B.V. Oetinger, & C. Bassford, Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist (New York: Wiley, 2001) [8] G. Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998) [9] G. Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 88. [10] ibid, p. 88 [11] G. Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). [12] as cited in T. Ghyczy, B.V. Oetinger, & C. Bassford, Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist (New York: Wiley, 2001) [13] ibid [14] G. Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). [15] ibid [16] G. Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). [17] G. Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). References Betts, R.K. 2000. Is Strategy an Illusion? International Security 25(2): 5-50. Clausewitz, C. 2009. On War: The Complete Edition. New York: Brownstone Books. Ghyczy, T., B.V. Oetinger, & C. Bassford. 2001. Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist. New York: Wiley. Gray, C.S. 2010. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hart, B.H. 1954. Strategy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Parker, G. 1998. The Grand Strategy of Philip II. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Read More