Iran-Iraq Conflict - Research Paper Example

Iran/Iraq War (1980-1988) Introduction On September 22,1980,Iraqi army crossed Irani borders in Khuzistan Province and launched strikes against all Iranian airfields within their reach. On August 20,1988,after almost eight years of this brutal conflict and one year of reluctance and evasiveness, Iraqi government accepted the United Nation’s cease-fire proposal. Finally, the longest war between two traditionally hostile foes came to an end with no improvement in anyone’s stance. The war proved futile and expensive for both and neither achieved its objectives(Sick 230). Background to war/conflicting roots Iran-Iraq conflict had deep roots in the history of middle Eastern region. There were some historical and some immediate factors that gave rise to the war. Background of conflict between the two countries shows the contemporary issues are inherited from past. The history of competition and rivalry dates back to Ottoman Turkish empire(1517-1918) and Persian empire under Safavids(1501-1722).Disputes between them revolved around geographical boundaries and interference in internal affairs, conducted by sectarian and ethnic minorities across the common border. Though the context of disputes changed but nature of conflict remained the same throughout. Until early nineteenth century, migratory tribes in frontier areas militated against fixed borders and after that conflict continued under European Imperial powers. After 1920s,Iran and Iraq were nominally independent and circumstances were different but animosities continued unaltered, at first under direct British influence and after 1985 as genuinely independent countries (Hiro 7). Major Contributing factors Since 1960s,serious confrontations between Iran and Iraq were going on. Initially, it involved support for subversive movements and territorial conflicts, later it revolved around the disposition of Shatt-al-Arab waterway. This waterway has been a bone of contention between the two countries since the Ottoman Empire due to the fact that it is a critical route for transportation. Under Shah’s regime, with United States diplomatic support and military aid, Iran rules the region and made unlawful encroachments in many other regimes of Gulf(Levy and Froelich 128). In 1969 Iran declared void a 1937 treaty giving Iraq virtually full control over the Shatt-al-Arab, and two years later seized from Arab emirs three small islands(Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs)near the Strait of Hormuz.At Algiers in 1975,Iraq agrees to redefine the Shatt boundary by the thalweg principle, ceding half of the waterway to Iran, in return for an end to the shah’s support of Iraqi Kurdish insurgents who had engaged Baghdad in a protracted and costly rebellion. (Levy and Froelich 128) Levy and Froelich further explain that conservative Arab nations resented Shah’s expansionist rule. Iran’s guardianship was accepted in exchange of his nonintervention in their regimes. Despite increasing internal opposition, these Arab leaders supported Shah. In 1978, Iraq discharge Ayatollah Khomeini from 13-year exile on Shah’s appeal. After Shah’s fall, Arab leaders were anxious about unfolding Iranian revolution. Khomeini regime made considerable efforts towards mitigating Arab world fears by stressing on Islamic brotherhood and ensured nonintervention policy in internal affairs of their regimes. Unlike Shah, he ensured mutual respect for territorial integrity and expressed his willingness to abandon the role of Iran as gendarme of Gulf in addition to non-recognition of Israel. However, the statements from Iranian clerics about reviving territorial claims on Bahrain and islands occupied in 1971 reignited the situation and made Arab leaders skeptical about new regime. In spring 1979, relation between the Iraq and Iran started to deteriorate due to revival of minority movements in both countries and they supported such movements is each other’s regime. Iran supported Iraqi Shiites against Baath regime which was Sunni-dominated. It led Iraq to clamp down Shiite activities; Saddam ordered to accuse Persian fundamentalists and to destroy Khomeini’s former residence was destroyed. Khomeini’s representatives were deported and arrested prominent Shiite leader. Despite the efforts to reestablish cordial relationship from Baghdad and Bazargan, in the end of 1979 Shiite turbulence in upper Gulf prompted Iraq to disapprove Tehran’s agitation of Arab Shiites. Saddam threatened Khomeini regime and demanded the release of Gulf islands from Iranian control and moderation for agitated minorities (128). Official dialogues between the two countries soon ended, however, following repeated attacks by revolutionary guards of Iraqi consulates and its embassy in Tehran. The replacement of the Bazargan government in November by a Revolutionary Council, dominated by clerical factions, solidified the Islamic Republican Party’s (IRP) hold on Iran. The new president, Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, and Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotb-zadeh became increasingly dependent on the newly ascendant clerics of the IRP. Tehran intensified radio broadcast aimed at the Shiites of the Arab Gulf states, decrying their “corrupt” or “Zionist” regimes and demanding their overthrow and replacement by fundamentalist-oriented Islamic republics. (Levy and Froelich 129) According to Levy and Froelich, the above campaign was beefed up by famous demonstrations in Shiite communities, repeated incidents of violence, bombings and assassination attempts on Iraqi officials, for instance, attack on Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz in April 1980. Al-Dawa, an Iranian sponsored Shiite opposition group is responsible for the activities mentioned. On the other hand, Iraq countered it with propaganda attacks directed at Iranian Arabs. Furthermore Baghdad cracked down on Shiite activities by expulsion ,arrests and executions on a massive level. Iran accused Iraq for taking control of Iranian embassy in London and assassination attempt on Iranian Prime Minister Ghotbzadeh (129). Summer 1980 brought the point of escalating hostility when violence started abruptly on border. After attack on Iraqi villages in September, Iraq put forth a demand for recognition of Iraqi “rights: and territorial boundaries. The demand included an end to Iranian sponsored agitation and border violence, Iranian abandonment of the disputed area in Kermanshah province and reconsidering 1975 agreement. On September 17,Saddam declared that Iran had disregarded 1975 Algiers agreement and Iraq considered the treaty as invalid. Iran disapproved this at once but Iraq initiated air attacks against Iranian airfields on September 22.These airstrikes were accompanied by massive ground outrage into Khuzestan, the oil producing province of Iran(Levy and Froelich 129).“The Iraqi military thrust was accompanied by the following conditions for cessation of hostilities: recognition of Iraqi rights and territorial sovereignty, agreement on good neighborly relations with all Arab Gulf states, noninterference in their internal affairs, and an end to all aggressive activities”. (qtd. in Levy and Froelich 129) Moreover, Iraq didn’t demanded Gulf Islands but claimed entire Shatt-al-Arab. By October Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq had realized its goals militarily and made a call for cease-fire and dialogue. Iran refused any dialogue before complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces. War continued and reached a deadlock in terms of fight in early 1981.At the end of the same year Iranian counteroffensives made the withdrawal possible. By March 1982,Iran had a clear edge with Iraq withdrawing and Iran carrying war into Southern Iraq(Levy and Froelich 130). According to Robert, until 1984,both fought on different fronts without much progress. During 1984, Iraq found a way to break the stalemate of war. Saddam increased the human cost of continuous fight by using chemical weapons. Iraq purchased armaments and constructed widespread strengthening in order to direct Iranian assaults in preplanned killing zones. Iraq moved ahead with bombings on civilian population and tried to include other nations in strikes against Iran. Meanwhile, other Arab nations tried to initiate peace talks in vein. Iran also tried to respond to the use to chemical weapons and reported to attempt developing nuclear weapon. In 1988, from April to August four battles were fought with chemical weapons from Iraq. The war lasted nearly eight years and ended when Iran accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 which led to 20 August 1988 cease-fire. There are variety of unresolved issues including exchanged of information about killed or missing people (globalsecurity.org). Superpower involvement in war/Prolonged war The Iran-Iraq war started when the superpowers’ global rivalry in the Third World was in the ascendancy following their disillusionment with détente and the coming to the White House of a radical Right president, Ronald Reagan, in 1981.By the end of the war in 1988, and certainly by the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union, though still existing in name, was very much on the way out as a superpower. (Tarock 211) According to Tarock, superpowers’ intervention in Third World had several different forms and factors. It varied from region to region and based on military, political, economic or a combination of all three. This paper studies superpowers’ intervention with respect to Iran-Iraq war. Middle East, due to its energy resources and strategic location became the focus of rivalry between United States and Soviet Union in the period between 1945 and 1990.This competition took them to direct confrontation many times but they pulled back and focused on other means rather than war. The Gulf War I coincided with the end of détente in the late 1970s.By then the Carter administration had come to the conclusion that détente had advantaged, especially in the Third World, the Soviet Union more than the United States... This determination (to regain America’s pre-détente standing) was further strengthened when President Reagan entered the White House. By then the Soviet Union too had second thoughts about détente believing that it had advantage Washington more than Moscow. It was in that reinvigorated East-West global competition that the Iran-Iraq conflict erupted in September 1980. (Tarock 213) The most frequently cited factors giving rise to such a bitter conflict are; Saddam Hussein’s ambition of becoming the leader of Arab like Nasser of Egypt, historical enmity of Persian and Arabs, rivalry between Shiites and Sunnis, ideological difference between Muslim revivalists and secularist, Persian tendency towards expansionism and their claim of racial superiority over Arab nation. These factors are relevant to war but at the same time hold secondary position. It is only the presence of superpowers’ global rivalry and involvement in the conflict that made it a full scale war. It would never have lasted so long nor would it have had the power to impose such destruction. Moreover, the nature of superpower rivalry made their contribution inevitable for them. Neither Iraq nor Iran would have been able to fight for eight years without supply and re-supply of destructive weapons. In fact, the war ended after superpowers decided to stop the supply of weapons to Iran and tilt towards Iraq. More than weapon supply, they provided complete political support to Iraq and Iran which was not less critical in any sense. This scenario resulted in a situation which pushed belligerents in war until they achieve war objectives and prolonged the war (Tarock 214) Outcomes of the war The war weakened the two strongest nations of Middle East on a huge scale and war proved to be a futile exercise. Neither made significant achievement in terms of gaining its war objectives. After ceasefire, the status-quo maintained and Iraq had to recognize Iran’s right to a part of Shatt-al-Arab. This prosaic outcome proved to be very expensive in terms of both man-power and money. Iran and Iraq had to pay terrible price for one of the bloodiest conflict of twentieth century. Exact number of casualties is not known, but half a million people are likely to be died and hundreds of thousands suffered incapacitating wounds. It shattered the treasuries of both sides, costing millions of dollars, infrastructural damage and other losses. Iraq incurred huge debts to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia(Baylis et al.10). Other Gulf States and War According to Tal,Gulf has two major groups of states. First group led by Saudi Arabia as largest oil exporter and opinion leader includes Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. They complete supported Iraq’s invasion as they were skeptical about Khomeini revolution and its success in Gulf. The unrest was due to Shiite minorities in all Gulf states who could have joined hands with Khomeini in order to change the region. Saudi Arab had its own reservation on ideological and communitarian grounds. Khomeini appointed his representatives in other Gulf countries to propagate his political and religious teachings and also started media propaganda against conservative regimes. These are some of the factors which urged this group’s support for Iraq. The other group includes United Arab Emirates and Oman who remained neutral. This group had good economic and diplomatic relationship with Iraq and Iran, therefore, they tried to mediate without any luck. However, similar to other Gulf states, these states were also uncomfortable with Khomeini revolution(Globalsecurity.org) Economic Implications of the War At the time of war, both the countries could not have been different and further apart in terms of economy and militarily. Iran’s military was demoralized and divided and economy was destroying. On the other hand, Iraq was enjoying the booming period. The most damaging impact of war on Iran is proved to be the failure to reserve Shah’s policies as Islamic Republic. The revolution predicted Iran’s dependency on oil reserves, a more diverse economy, increase in exports other than oil, reduction in dependency on trade with West, development in agriculture and last but not the least an end to rural/urban migration. None of the objectives was achieved due to war and it proved the most damaging thing for Iranian economy (Mofid 27). According to Mofid, total cost of war for Iraq was estimated to be $450 billion which is equal to more or less eight years of Iraq’s GDP at that point of time(66).The war destroyed infrastructure of about $230 billion(Alnasrawi 87). The Iran-Iraq conflict proved to be a devastating blow for Iraqi economy. It destroyed most of Iraqi capital stock, diminished foreign assets and exchange reserves and reduced oil production and export. The war and the subsequent sanctions ruined Iraq’s economy. The UN imposed most severe sanctions since 1991 which caused oil production average 1.4mbpd during 1991-2002.Revenue shortfall since war was more or less $150 billion as Iraq could have produced 3mbpd in this period. According to the available statistics, Iraqi GDP would have averaged $25 billion in the 1990s.It refer to the idea that sanctions reduced Iraq’s oil reserves by about six years’ GDP while total cost to Iraqi economy is even bigger. Overall, conflict and sanctions during Saddam regime cost Iraq of two decades of GDP in lost capital and financial resources. In modern history, there is no parallel to such a huge scale economic devastation (Nordhaus 4). Conclusion Iran-Iraq conflict is one of the most destructive and futile since World War II. It has potentially fundamental significance for the stability in the region. In addition to traditional rivalry between Iraq and Iran, Arab-Israeli conflict, petroleum lifeline for western world and other interests of superpowers in the age of emerging regional powers, revolutionary change and fading influence of superpowers shaped this war(Levy and Froelich 127).Iranian revolution set the stage for Iraq’s invasion in Iran and subsequent intervention of superpowers prolonged it. The conflict couldn’t result in gains of any side rather it inflicted debilitating wounds on economic and humanitarian grounds. Work Cited Alnasrawi,A.,The Economy of Iraq:Oil,Wars,Destruction of Developments and Prospects,1950-2010.Westport,CT:Greenwood Publishing Group.,1994.Print. Baylis et al., Conflict without victory: The Iran-Iraq War. Strategy in the Contemporary Word 2e.Oxford University Press.2007.Web.10 February 2010. Hiro, Dilip. The Longest war: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. USA: Routledge Champan & Hall, Inc., 1991.Print. Levy,J.S.,& Froelich,M.,Causes of Iran-Iraq War.ed.Brown,J.& Snyder,W.P.New York: National Strategy Information Center,Inc,1985.Print. Mofid, K., The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War. Routledge: London., 1990.Print. Nordhaus,D.The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq. National Bureau of Economic Research,Dec. 2002.Web.10 February 2010. Robert,E.S.,Globalsecurity.org. Marine Corps Command and Staff College,1 April 1985.Web.11 February 2010. Sick, Gray. “Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War.”Middle East Journal 43.2(1989):230-245.Jstore.Web.10 February 2010. Tarock, A.The Superpowers’ involvement in the Iran-Iraq War. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998.Print. Tal,M.F., Globalsecurity.org.Jordan Armed Forces,1990.Web.11 February 2010. Read More