International Policy Of Suleiman The Magnificent and Charles V Empires - Essay Example

International Policy Of Suleiman The Magnificent and Charles V Empires The answer to this question is not a straightforward one, as in general politics between super powers tend not to be straightforward matters. Charles V and Suleman both ruled over vast empires with considerable resources and a complex network of allegiances. A full on war that would send the might of both empires into battle was logistically and financially impossible and would have in all probability destroyed both parties, had they attempted this. However, smaller wars outside their core areas were fought repeatedly, and alliances between other European powers were sought according to what was opportune, depending on the situation and the interests involved in the conflict. Suleman the Magnificent (or the Lawgiver as he was known in his own empire) and the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, also known as King Charles I of Spain were two of the most powerful rulers in historical times. Charles V’s reign spanned the beginning of the Renaissance in Europe, a time when monarchs were still absolute rulers over their realms. Charles ruled from 1516 to 1556 when he abdicated in favour of his younger brother, due to ill health. Charles ruled over the first truly global empire: he was King of Spain, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of Germany, established the ruling house of Habsburg in Austria, held territories in Asia and Africa as well as the newly conquered Inca and Aztec Nations in South America. It was said that in his empire “the sun does not set” – a truly remarkable achievement. Suleman was born in 1494 and was the absolute ruler of the Ottoman Empire from 1520-1566 – the Ottoman dynasty was of Turkish ethnicity – which had grown in importance since the 14th century. Territories ruled by the Ottoman rulers included, among others, land and ports formerly belonging to the State of Venice, Syria, Egypt, Mecca and Medina (and with that the centres of the Islamic faith), the Iraq and Yemen. This list is not complete but shows the power of the Ottoman sultans to rule over many different peoples, ethnic groups and faiths. The respective powers and influence of Suleman and Charles V beg the question why these two rulers never engaged in a direct war for supremacy within Europe, if not the larger part of the then known world. To arrive at an answer we need to cast our minds back to the political map of Europe in the early to mid 16th century. Far from being the mostly and increasingly united political arena that Europe represents at the beginning of the 21st century, Europe had influential blocks of power who were jostling for dominance and territorial gain. Spain and the Holy Roman Empire with its ruling Habsburg dynasty were one such block, Russia was increasingly powerful and was ruled by Ivan the Terrible from 1547 to 1584, France was ruled by Francis I from 1515 to 1547 and, last not least, Tudor England was governed by Henry VIII as absolute monarch from 1509 to 1547. The absolute monarchs of these respective dynasties vied for power and influence and sought to increase their territories and wealth either by engaging in warfare or by forming strategic alliances. In an absolute monarchy, a reason for war is not necessarily a question of national interest or points of ethics, it is rather a demonstration of strength and the desire to enlarge the realm of the ruler. Alliances are formed and re-formed frequently according to what situation is the most advantageous to the desired outcome. Francis I had been defeated in the elections for the new Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, with Charles V emerging as the new Emperor – this victory as largely due to the financing skills of the German Fugger banking family. Both monarchs engaged in a war immediately after the election in 1519 (Merriman, p 122). In the Ottoman Empire, Suleman’s father had conquered Egypt two years before in 1517 and had confirmed favourable trading rights with France that had existed before his conquest. Therefore, barely two years into his reign, Francis had already two reasons to stay on friendly terms with Suleman, although the French nation was curiously unsuited as an ally of the Islamic Empire. France had played a major role in the Crusades and the title of the French king was ‘Le Roi Trės Chrêtien’ – ‘the most Christian king’. An additional concern for non-Habsburg powers in Europe was the increasing political influence of the Habsburg dynasty after Charles V’s brother, Ferdinand, took the crown of Austria, following the death of the Bohemian and Hungarian king. In 1525 Francis I was defeated by Charles V’s troops at the battle of Pavia. This put an end to France’s claim to Italian territories and Francis was taken prisoner and held at Madrid. In this situation both his mother, acting as regent of France, and Francis sent delegates to Suleman to ask him for support against the Habsburg empire. The support was granted but in the following year Francis signed a peace treaty with Charles, changing the situation in Francis’ favour. Smaller European nations were concerned with the growing power of the Habsburgs and sought an ally in Francis to arrive at a more evenly distributed balance of power. In 1529 Suleman laid siege to Vienna but was defeated by Ferdinand’s army – he did not repeat an attempt to conquer Austria after this failed campaign. Between 1534 and 1537 Imperial soldiers clashed with a former pirate captain who had been appointed as Governor of the Mediterranean territories held by the Ottoman Empire – he was known as Barbarossa in Western Europe. Charles’ army managed to capture Tunis but ultimately Suleman advanced towards Apulia in Southern Italy after his victorious campaign in Baghdad/Iraq. Francis, who had promised to support Suleman, failed to come to the aid of his troops (Merriman, 206 pp). Barbarossa (Hayreddin Pasha) defeated Charles V’s fleet in 1538, at the Battle of Preveza, the most direct clash between both empires. This decisive battle led to Ottoman control of the Eastern Mediterranean for over 30 years. In 1542, Francis I again asked for Suleman’s assistance in the Western Mediterranean and offered the town of Toulon as a base for his navy. The entente between Francis and Suleman ended when Charles and Francis signed a peace treaty to end their conflicts. Neither empire was influential enough to decimate the other so a full on war between Charles and Suleman would have been devastating and logistically impossible. It is quite plausible, for instance, that the Ottoman army did not reach further than Vienna (a remarkable feat given the huge logistical problems with the technology available at that time) because it became too difficult to maintain information, food supplies and transport at such a great distance from the centre of power and supplies. Both rulers found that with the expansion of their respective empires, it became more difficult to keep all provinces they controlled at peace and frequent interventions became necessary to maintain the status quo. Charles V’s influence in the German States began to weaken with the Christian Protestant faith founded by Martin Luther. Germany was soon engulfed in a veritable fire storm of religious hatred and violence that required Charles V’s attention as a number of German princes and their territories had converted to Protestantism, culminating at first in the Peasants’ Revolt from 1524 to 1526 and leading to the formation of the Schmalkaldic League which was outlawed by Charles in 1546. Although there was never a full scale war between Suleman and Charles, several campaigns were fought that brought their two armies head to head. The siege of Vienna, the Italian campaigns and the Mediterranean campaign in particular brought both empires up at opposite sides, mainly to defend or gain access to trade and coastal lands and trading ports, or to claim additional territories. Both sides proved a match to one another, and temporary gains were by and large re-balanced by subsequent campaigns. The struggle for influence in Europe could not be won outright and the cost of warfare nearly crippled Charles V’s finances despite all his vast resources. In the end, it was not for lack of ambition and righteous conviction on both sides that a full-scale war was avoided: Suleman famously addressed king Francis in his hour of need, that ‘… of all God’s chosen people, I who am the Sultan of Sultans, the sovereign of sovereigns, the dispenser of crowns to the monarchs on the face of the earth, the shadow of God on earth …’ (Merriman). Charles V, on the other hand, or rather his entourage, saw him as the ‘imperator mundi’ or emperor of the entire world and his motto ‘Plus Ultra’, i.e. ‘farther’ certainly underlines this attitude (Tracy). However, wars are not decided by honour but most of the time by much more mundane matters: logistics; resources, in particular the necessary finances to support a war and the necessary number of fighting soldiers loyal to the cause; and technology are the key elements. Leaders who get their strategy and calculations wrong pay the price: history is full of examples of leaders who were led themselves by exaggerated ambitions, and I will mention Hannibal and Napoleon Bonaparte as representatives for them. Both Charles and Suleman gained considerable experience during their long reigns to realise what is achievable and what is prudent, and ultimately decided (or were forced) to shore up and secure their vast empires rather than gaining another. Looking at the size of both empires, that was an incredible achievement in itself. (1588 words) Bibliography Merriman, Roger B., Suleiman the Magnificent 1520-1566, Lundberg Press, 2008 Tracy, James D., Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002 "Battle of Pavia." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2009. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 01 Dec. 2009 . Ganss, Henry. "Martin Luther." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 9. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910. 2 Dec. 2009 http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09438b.htm>. Read More