The World War One - Article Example

World War One 2007 World War One The First World War was one of the most important turning points in the history of modern civilisation. The enormousmilitary conflict dramatically changed the face of Europe producing seven new states (Czechoslovakia, Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Yugoslavia), ended the epoch of huge empires such as Austro-Hungary and Ottoman Empire and brought serious changes to the colonial territories in Africa and Asia. The war also provided a brilliant example of the danger involved in the uncontrolled use of modern devastating weapons for resolving contradictions that initially had non-military nature. Unfortunately, the current political developments across the globe suggest that this example remains topical even these days and should be strictly considered by modern policymakers: the Second World War convincingly demonstrated that even the most costly lessons often turn useless. The Bismarckian Alliance system The seeds of the First World War had been sawn several decades before the conflict actually occurred. After a decade of using the military power to unify Germany and finally establish the second Reich in 1871, Otto von Bismarck applied his energies to win the time needed for the country to recover and gain power. The only way to achieve that goal was to neutralize at any cost the potential enemies that might threaten the country’s new found position as a major European power. Therefore, Bismarck’s foreign policy was coloured by the shades of peace over the next two decades and resulted in the famous Bismarckian Alliance system. Bismarck had three major goals establishing a complex system of European alliances: (1) to create a peaceful German facade; (2) to create defensive alliances; (3) isolate the potential enemies. Consequently, after Europe recognised Germany as a nation during the Berlin Congress in 1878 Bismarck focused on keeping France which he perceived as the most dangerous threat to Germany in isolation. It is commonly believed that this task became the cornerstone of Bismarck’s international policy from 1871 to 1894. Simultaneously the Chancellor took every possible effort to uphold peaceful co-existence with the other two major conservative European powers, Russian and Austria-Hungary by assuring them Germany did not represent any threat (Carr, 1987). The first crucial step toward creation of the new balance of powers in Europe occurred during the Berlin Congress of 1978 when Bismarck took advantage of the opportunity to act a peace mediator between the Russian Empire, Austria, and Great Britain. The role allowed Bismarck to maintain the peace between major European powers, establish closer ties with Austria, prevent the Russian Empire from gaining too much power out of its win in the Balkan War, and promote the image of Germany as an effective international peacemaker (Pflanze, 1990). The Chancellor immediately capitalised on such an impressive success: a defensive military Dual Alliance with Austria against the Russian Empire was established in 1879 and after five years of intensive political manoeuvring Bismarck signed the defensive Reinsurance Treaty with the Russian Empire in 1885. Bismarck supported the colonial interests of France in Africa and Asia being perfectly aware that Great Britain would sooner or later become concerned about the French threat to its traditional colonial supremacy. Consequently, France and Britain got involved in a series of conflicts over the colonies: the countries had neither time nor resources to seriously influence the political developments on the territory of Europe and threaten Germany. Bismarck further limited the influence of France by convincing Italia to join the Dual Alliance in 1882; the new configuration became known as the Triple Alliance (Carr, 1987). Only Bismarck retirement revealed the true amount of complexity associated with the Bismarckian model of alliances. Thus, Germany participated in defensive alliances with Austria and Italy against France, the Russian Empire, and partially Great Britain. The Russian Empire in its turn had a secret defence treaty with Germany while France took advantage of German support in their colonial endeavours despite the fact that isolating France and gaining political advantage over other European powers was the key task of German foreign policy. However, such unbelievable complexity and deceptiveness did not prevent the Bismarck’s Alliance system from being successful in achieving the Chancellor’s major goal: providing the new German Empire with time necessary to strengthen its positions both domestically and internationally. The Rival Blocs The Bismarckian System effectively made peaceful relations with Austria and to some degree Russia; Although the Bismarckian system was military in its nature, the variety of alliances created in Europe during the two decades of his chancellorship pursued mostly defensive goals with Bismarck’s policy cautious enough to prevent their transformation into offensive. However, the retirement of the Chancellor dramatically changed the situation. Kaiser William II rejected the core principles of his predecessor in favour of further reinforcement of Germany’s positions as the leading European and World power. Expansion of German colonial possessions, increase of the country’s naval presence and German support of the Austria’s expansion in the Balkan Peninsula replaced the Bismarckian policy of peace (McKay, Hill & Buckler, 2005). The turn in foreign policy, coupled with the questionable diplomatic gift of William II could not but lead to serious changes in the Bismarckian Alliance system. Great Britain which did not make any formal alliance but remained friendly toward Germany due to absence of colonial conflicts during the Bismarckian era immediately changed its attitude to more cautious and even hostile: the naval construction plans openly promoted by William II threatened the traditional British supremacy on the sea. The German support of Austria’s expansion in the Balkans made the Russian Empire historically interested in the peninsula suggested an alliance between France and Russia. Therefore, while the alliance between Germany and Austria supported by Italia grew stronger the period from 1890 to 1907 was also marked by gradual alienation of Great Britain, the Russian Empire, and France from Germany, which formed the foundation of the future rival bloc of anti-German alliance subsequently known as the Allied Powers (McKay, Hill & Buckler, 2005). Although the imprudent and aggressive policy carried out by William II did play a significant role in the escalation of tension in Europe it would probably be misleading to perceive it as solely responsible for it: the seeds of the discord were hidden in the allegedly peaceful system of Bismarckian alliances. Firstly, the alliances made by the Chancellor were often kept secret and based on deceit and multilateral diplomatic intrigues producing substantial, though then hidden, distrust and suspicion among the European states. Evidently, the system which relied on such unsteady foundation was initially pregnant with failure. Secondly, the peaceful nature of the alliances was only a screen meant to disguise the apparently military nature of the Bismarckian system. Sooner or later that screen would inevitably fall despite any efforts because peace is impossible to establish on a war-footing. The policy of William II only catalysed the fall which was supposed to happen anyway: by 1910 the initially peaceful (defensive) alliances revealed their actual military nature. Thus, the defensive alliance of Germany and Austria turned openly aggressive in the aftermath of the Bosnian crisis in 1909 when German promised military support to the potential Austrian invasion in Serbia (Fromkin, 2004). Over almost a decade from 1905 to 1914, the escalated tension in Europe resulted in a series of conflicts involving European states from both rival alliances and the first wave of the phenomenon which later became universally recognised as the Arms Race. During only four years after Great Britain, France and the Russian Empire formed the alliance known as the Triple Entente in 1907 Germany managed to build 9 battleships, a step that immediately drew an adequate response from the rivals, namely Great Britain, which build 18 similar ships. Other member of the Triple Entente also significantly reinforced their military potential during that period (Fairbanks, 1985). Consequently, by 1914 all major European states were fully ready for a full scale military conflict. The Origins of the War The Great War of 1914 to 1918 was a desperate attempt to cut the Gordian knot of extremely serious collisions that had been accumulating in Europe since the middle of the 18th century and repeatedly manifested in local territorial conflicts between the nations, clashes over the colonies, trade wars and struggle for military supremacy. However, none of those local and relatively small conflicts could fully resolve the collisions: they only temporarily alleviated the symptoms while the root causes persisted. Each state pursued its own goals entering the war and these goals became absolutely evident during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 – 1920. Thus, Germany wanted to expand her colonies, in particular in the Middle East, and secure the leading position in Europe and in the whole world; Austro-Hungary hoped to establish full control over the Balkan Peninsula which would provide the Empire with exclusive control over marine transport in the Adriatic Sea. On the other hand, Great Britain attempted to undermine or eliminate the influence of Germany and the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East in order to remain the most influential power in the region. France had the clear objective to undermine the influence of Germany in Europe in order to restore control over the region of Alsace-Lorraine and Saar coal mines. The Russian empire wanted to restore and further reinforce its influence in the Balkan Peninsula controlled by the Ottoman Empire which allied with Germany. The Ottoman Empire hoped to uphold its control over the Balkans and expand its influence in Crimea and Iran. And finally, Italy dreamed about its dominance in the Mediterranean Sea and strengthening the influence in Southern Europe (McKay, Hill & Buckler, 2005). Such impressive variety of goals provides a good insight into the nature of most essential preconditions that led to the World War I. Firstly, emergence of Germany as a powerful European state. The Bismarckian Alliance system, coupled with the exceptional diplomatic talent of the Chancellor temporary ‘freezed’ the consequences of this important event but sooner or later they had to come into play which happened in the late 19th – early 20th century. The Arms Race, militarism (Hoover & Hatfield, 1992) and the disrupted balance of powers (Fromkin, 2004) commonly listed among the causes of the war seem to be the consequences of this primary event. The second set of essential causes seems to be economic in nature. Even cursory analysis of the economic situation in the states involved in the World War I on both sides reveals one interesting finding. Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy represented a new generation of capitalist states characterised by intensive economic development and absence of serious colonial possessions. By contrast, the economies of Great Britain, France and the Russian Empire were overcooled without any signs of rapid development and the states had large colonies in different parts of the world. Therefore, the Triple Alliance was extremely interested in finding new economic resources outside Europe in order to support the economic development while the Triple Entente member tried to avoid any repartition of their colonies (Mombauer, 2002). And finally, the growth of nationalist sentiment in European states in general and Germany in particular could also be a contributing factor in the outburst of hostilities. The Pan-Slavic movement in the Balkans posed a threat to Austria-Hungary; a similar situation was observed in the declining Ottoman Empire. The splash of national consciousness in France forced the government to demand return of Alsace-Lorraine annexed by Germany following the Franco-Prussian War. Germany in its turn wanted to unite the Central Europe under the German rule (Joll, 1992). Evidently, the conflict had multiple causality, and it is almost impossible to identify nowadays which of the factors played the key role in the outbreak of war (Mombauer, 2002). The global nature of the conflict provides sufficient evidence that the complexity of its causes was overwhelming. The Outbreak of the War The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Saraevo, Serbia was used by Austria-Hungary as a pretext to declare war against Serbia on the 28th of July 1914. In response, the Russian Empire ordered full mobilization. Although the German government planned to attack France in the first turn (according to the famous Schlieffen Plan) it could not afford the Russian Empire to mobilise while Austrian forces invaded Serbia. Therefore, on the 1st of August Germany declared war against the Russian Empire while the war against France was declared only two days later. The advance of German troops through the territory of neutral Belgium force Great Britain get involved in the war too. The Ottoman Empire entered the World War in the late October when its troops invaded the Russian territory. Despite its partial alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary Italy entered the war only in 1915 but on the side of the Allied Powers. And finally, the United States became the last state to get involved in the World War in 1917 (McKay, Hill & Buckler, 2005). The course of World War I is well documented. The major events occurred along the Western Front along a huge line of trenches and fortifications (running from the North Sea to Switzerland) built by both rival blocs and in the Eastern Front. The Western fortifications were separated by an area known as the neutral territory or no man’s land. Under such circumstances both sides appeared in the stalemate situation: an effective tactics to break through the line of fortifications and trenches was absent (Strachan, 2006). Both sides made desperate attempts to break the stalemate using various means. Thus, the British invented the tank, and the Germans used illegal chlorine gas to open a 4 mile opening in the line of the Allied fortifications (Strachan, 2006). However, the success was only temporary as the Canadian forces rallied back to close the opening after the famous Second Battle of Ypres. The Allied forces also repeatedly failed to overwhelm the solid German line of fortifications, and the western campaign continued to be a stalemate, with millions of British, French, Canadian, Australian, German and other soldiers dying in the mud separated by only several meters but unable to break through. In the east, the line between the rivals was not as fixed and fortified as in the west due to plain landscape and poor transportation infrastructure. The colonial territories and especially the Middle East also became a scene for large scale military operations as well as the Italian Front (McKay, Hill & Buckler, 2005). The hostilities took place on land, sea and even in the air, something that had never happened before (Strachan, 2006). The stalemate trench-bound campaign continued up to the middle of 1918 when the military and economic resources of Germany were almost exhausted. Even despite the fact that the Russian Empire withdrew from the hostilities in 1917 the Allies started to gain momentum. The famous counterattack known as the Hundred Days Offensive launched on the 8th of August 1918 and involved 120 thousand British, French, Australian and Canadian troops supported by 414 tanks. The Battle of Amiens advanced the Allied forces 7 miles into the territory controlled by German troops. The Second Battle of the Somme involving almost 130,000 US soldiers supported by the British troops started on the 21st of August and helped the Allies further develop their success: in the beginning of September German troops found themselves on the Hindenburg Line which was exactly the position of Germans before the outbreak of war (McKay, Hill & Buckler, 2005). That was the turning point of the war: the pressure of the Allied forces provoked rebels in the German army and finally resulted in the declaration of the Weimar Republic which practically put the end to further German resistance. The fall of Germany soon led to the collapse of the Central Powers alliance and the ceasefire agreement came into effect on the 11th of November, 1918 which meant the actual end of war (Stevenson, 2004). Although the estimates for the numbers of dead and wounded during the course of war vary significantly even the most optimistic figures are impressive. Approximately 19 million people, almost 10 million militaries and about 9 million civilians died and more than 20 million were wounded. The Allies lost 5 million soldiers with the number of militaries lost by the Central Powers was 20 percent less: 4 million (Mitchell, 1997). Outcomes Although the ceasefire was in effect since November 1918 the formal peace treaty was signed only seven months later during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 – 1920 which summed up the results of the most devastating conflict at that time. The Conference brought together the most influential people in the world whom determined the development of Europe and Americas for years to come. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States, the Prime Ministers of France, Italy, Australia and Canada, the Queen of Romania, and many other national leaders spent almost six months debating the outcomes of World War I as well as economic and political implications of that conflict for each country involved. The overall outcomes of the Conference have been usually labelled as failure which again demonstrates the extreme complexity of factors involved and the difference in goals the countries had entering the war. Although the common goal of the leaders involved in the Paris negotiations was apparently to restore peace and stability in Europe, the Conference immediately exposed serious disagreement between the Allies concerning how to threat Germany. The views were highly contradictory with the Big Three leaders balancing between the long-term political benefits of their countries, varying interests of their partners, and the public opinions of their nations. French Prime Minister Clemenceau perceived Germany as a potential threat to stability and peace in Europe, and a threat to security of his country. Therefore, France claimed that Germany was obliged to “…cover the costs of restoration of invaded territories and repayment of war debts [and that] a long period of stiff repayments … would have the added advantage of keeping Germany financially and economically weak” (Henig, 1995: 20). Such claim clearly demonstrated the reasonable fear of France that light penalties would result in rapid recovering and further strengthening of Germany. The Fourteen points of President Wilson reflected his highly idealist and pacifist views on the political developments in Europe: perhaps that is why Wilson failed to convince the Allies accept his moderate position on the economic obligations of Germany. On the other hand, Britain was extremely concerned with the revival and further development of international trade which constituted the cornerstone of the country’s economic potency (Egerton, 1978). Lloyd George understood that Germany ruined by excessively hard economic claims of France and other Allies would seriously undermine marketability of British goods in the European market: “While the British government saw 66 million potential German customers, the French government trembled at the prospect of 66 million German soldiers and possible invaders” (Henig, 1995: 70). The British representatives also viewed Germany as a potential “barrier-fortress against the Russians” (Henig, 1995: 8-9) and reasonably considered that only country with healthy economy tied by strongly trade-based relationships could effectively fulfil such mission. Evidently, while none of the major players had his interests fully satisfied, the economic provisions of the Treaty of Versailles came closer to satisfying the requirements of British delegation. An exact monetary figure Germany was obliged to pay to the Allies never appeared in the Treaty, and despite the claims of Britain and Germany that the terms of reparations were still too harsh, the truth was “the Treaty of Versailles had left [Germany] largely intact, with a population almost double that of France, and with no powerful east European neighbours” (Henig, 1995: 52). The territorial issues –within and outside the European continent – also sparked intensive debate between the Allies. Georges Clemenceau demanded that the regions of Rhineland and Saar should come under exclusive French control citing security reasons. Lloyd George expressed fear that such solution might soon lead to another serious conflict between resurging Germany and France (Kitchen, 2000). Again, the British standpoint seemed to dominate when the Allied Powers compromised to keep the Rhineland region under international control of the Allied troops for 15 years only. The compromise was extremely painful for France considering the huge economic and human potential of Rhineland. Britain also took control over some German colonies in Africa, namely German East Africa and a part of the German Cameroon (MacMillan, 2001). The right to administer Palestine and Mesopotamia, which subsequently materialised in the creation of Iraq, also played in Britain’s hands at that time. The three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire were put together despite lack of religious and ethnic homogeneity to constitute a nation. Such step helped Britain keep France from reinforcing her influence in the Middle East, protect the new air routes to India, and ensure access to practically unlimited deposits of oil (Kitchen, 2000). Although the new state would subsequently become arguably the most troublesome territory in the Middle East, in the beginning of 20th century British control over the region was perceived as a clear advantage. Perhaps the major factor that contributed to the relative success of Britain during the Paris negotiations was Lloyd George’ initially balanced, as compared with positions of other participants standpoint. Besides, the ability of the Prime Minister of Britain to balance between the public opinion, which heavily disfavoured Germany, and strategic interests of the country was also impressive. The outcome of these two factors being involved was that the Treaty of Versailles represented a compromise between revengeful and demanding attitude of Clemenceau and pacifist positions of Wilson. However, despite the perceived success of Lloyd George’s efforts at the Peace conference, the Versailles Settlement did not bring any substantial positive long-term effects to Britain: the war which broke out twenty years later proved failure of the Treaty to secure stable peace in Europe. References Carr, W. (1987). A History of Germany, 1815-1985. London Egerton, G. W. (1978). Britain and the Great Betrayal’: AngIo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920. Historical Journal, 21, 885-911. Fairbanks, C. H. Jr. (1985). Arms Races: The Metaphor and the Facts. Oxford University Press. Fromkin, D. (2004). Europes Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 266-267. Henig, R. (1995). 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The First World War: A New History. Free Press. Read More