Role of Islam in Egypt and in Morocco - Thesis Example

Task The Use and Role of Islam as an Instrument of Power by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Indifference in the Role of Islam in the Solidification of Political Power by the Monarchy in Morocco Introduction Islam has transformed from being exclusively a religion into being an ideology that offers the total framework for all aspects of social, economic, cultural and political standing for the Muslim communities (Pack & Roslington, p 150). In Egypt, Islam is the recognized state religion since the 1980s. The Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 as an Islamist religious, social and political movement, by Hassan al-Banna in conjunction with other six workers of the Suez Canal Company. It was established in Ismalia, in Egypt, and spread to other Muslim countries. The Muslim Brotherhood was aimed at promoting the implementation of Islamic sharia law and social revolution, in opposition to the political and social injustices. The Muslim Brotherhood was legalized in 2011 after the Revolution, where it launched a political party (Freedom and Justice Party) to contest in the 2011 Egyptian elections. The political power and social influence held by the Muslim Brotherhood results from the failure of the Egyptian government to support its people. The movement has the support of the people, who join the movement for the pursuit of Islamism due to the dissatisfaction by the government (Pack & Roslington, p 151). The Muslim Brothers believe in reforming themselves, in hearts and souls through joining them to God, and organizing the Muslim society to be fit for righteous community that commands the good and forbids evil doing (Pack & Roslington, p 151). Initially, as a movement, the Muslim Brotherhood is objected at the reform of both the individual and the society at large, in the terms of morality (Willis, p 46). The goals of the movement later grew overwhelmingly in the terms of support and numbers to be able to challenge the secular leadership practiced by the Egyptian leadership. The Muslim Brotherhood believe that Islam is a comprehensive ideology for both private and public life, and hence believed in the provision of basic services to the communities, with a consistency in the teachings of faith. They called for a return to the Quran and the Sunna for the practice and establishment of an Islamic government system through the preaching of the unity of the state and religion (Willis, p 56). The Muslim Brotherhood displays the fitting of Islam into the daily life through the creation of organizations such as hospitals, cultural associations, and charitable groups. The principles of Muslim Brotherhood outline that there is no distinction between religious and secular law, believers and the citizens, for the establishment of a single state governed by Islam (Willis, p 94). The movement gave the people a direction and platform for political expression in addition to social advancement through Islam. Al-Banna believed that the liberalization and Western rule did not help in the achievement of humanity ideals. Mubarak’s government got huge support from Islamic brotherhood on several occasions; ranging from links with investment companies of Islamic origin which economically contributed to its growth and stability. They voiced about abolishment of laws that limited peoples’ freedom calling for implementation of Islamic sharia as part of reforms from authorities. They were of the view that government policies should have incorporated people sharing the same ideologies through ensuring that they got recognition as an entity. IB was a popular revolution and though the movement faced challenges such as being sent underground for five years by Nasir administration through exclusion from political participation in Egypt’s political transition. The Muslim Brotherhood is capable of carrying out terrorism episodes but had long been incapable of overthrowing the government. Additionally, a cross-examination of the Egyptian Islamist group reveals multiple divisions and conflict, and hence there is a lot of constraint in the terms of taking over and use of the national power, and hence the high unlikelihood of power take over from the reigning leadership in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood has declared and established a reform strategy due to the past severe occurrence of repression in Egypt. There is also an existing underground group that seeks violent revolution, known as the jama’at and jam’iyat (a campus neighborhood association). According to research, the non-Muslims in Egypt are considered as anti-Muslim forces, whereas the fundamentalists are focused more on internal affairs despite being far much against the foreign policy issues and the Westernization. The main complaint for the fundamentalist s is the presence of the United States in Egypt, especially the high profile Americans and the alleged government control. Though the Muslim Brotherhood criticizes the use of violence, revolutionaries tend to claim that only armed and violent struggle can bring revolution and change in Egypt. The Mubarak government acted on the divisions between the revolutionaries through the promotion of the moderate clergy and the legalization of the opposition to act as per the set limits. The fundamentalists bank their strength on the supposition that the religion is strong as both an ideology and a belief system. They believe that Islam is perfect and right, and hence that the Egyptian laws should be based on the sharia law. Additionally, they believe that Islamic values are perfect and more traditional than the Western and imported ones. However, the fundamentalists believe in Egypt’s sovereignty for the maintenance and control of Islam, though they are opposed to nationalism. Criticizing of current regime and the existing order, by the fundamentalists, makes sense to the many people who believe that Islam is the perfect answer to the Egyptian socioeconomic and political woes. According to the Muslim Brotherhood leader, Shaykah Salah, Egypt has long been living on promises since the 1952 revolution and has suffered disappointment. He also blames the economic hardships and social unrest to the absence of the sharia law. Government repression has characterized the wave of the establishment of Islamist fundamentalist groups in Egypt, mostly through social incompetence and limited public support. The Egyptian fundamentalists and revolutionaries were semi-neutralized by the Nasir regime through repression, social reform, mass mobilization and his powerful personality. This led to the replacement of Islamic fundamentalism by Arab nationalism, and hence the Muslim Brotherhood was restrained from attempting to compete with the Nasir regime, in the terms of the offered social reforms and spiritual enthusiasm. Religion and Politics in the Arab Transition According to research, religion can be hardly excluded from politics in the Arab world, and hence the role of religion in the Arab politics is greatly determined by the region’s people (Hamden, p 50). There is no clarity in the differentiation of religion and ethnicity, in addition to culture and tradition. Though religion is a personal identity, the subsequent ideologies serve the political agenda. The Arab transition has been highly characterized by religion, such as the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood with several Salafist parties to form a two thirds majority in the legislative assembly, in Egypt. However, the presence of a Muslim majority does not guarantee the embracement of Islamism rule, or the rejection of the secularism rules. The support of faith-based movements has resulted from the need for seeking alternative leaders to replaced ousted regimes (Hamden, p 55). The lack of strong opposition stands for the liberal and secular parties in the Arab world has led to the loss of liberalism and secularism (Hamden, p 55). As per the public imagination, religion has long become a trademark of sociopolitical movements that have the bid to challenging the reigning authorities. This has led to massive persecution due to fear. The defiance of the sociopolitical movements in the Arab world, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, in addition to their social and charitable works brought fame and embracement. The charitable works served as the gap-fillers of spaces left or neglected by the government. There is still a highly existent tension between the liberals and the secularists in the terms of the Islamic democratic commitment, whereas the Islamists have been on the assurance urge of their democratic credentials to the international communities and their domestic opponents. There are efforts to establish a new governance framework in Egypt, where the Muslim Brothers control the parliamentary committees for external affairs, and the Salafis head the committees for economy, education and religious affairs. This is a likely move towards an Islamist sociopolitical life, that has rules that are more conservative. Libya is also on the receiving end due to the move by the National Transitional Council (NTC) to insisting on the scrapping of sharia in the country. Constitutional transition establishes new authority structures and helps in the determination of the degree influence that religion has on a country’s future, in the terms of social, political and legal systems. New constitutional provisions are bound to comply with international law, in addition to Islamist laws to allow for a break with ousted authoritarian laws and the enactment of democracy in-line with Islamic values and rules (Pack & Roslington, p 151). On a lighter note, the social issues in the secular regimes were also previously based on the rules of Islam. These included the family codes, minority rights, inheritance and polygamy. The current burning issues in the Arab world are the selling of beer and other alcoholic beverages, suspension of activities during prayers, respect for the freedom of belief, and religious instructions. According to Westernization, there is a strict separation between religion and state, which serves as a necessity for democracy in the political system. In the Middle East, there is an existing illusion in the relationship between the faith-based and the secular political figures due to the lack of isolation from religious beliefs by the progressive and secular parties (Brisson & Krontiris, p 123). The Arab uprising has brought about a high indifference in the terms of past experiences since it brings about its lessons of the balancing of the democratic rule with religious norms and traditions. As a matter of fact, modernization can easily result from the process of transition into democracy, though secularization is not a core factor to modernization. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croats were automatically referred to as Catholics, Bosnians as Muslims, and the Serbs as Orthodox. On the other hand, the degree to which a society is religious is also likely to influence the role of religion in democratic transition, and hence the authoritarian regimes in the Arab states tended to abolish ideological trends along religious divides. However, a healthily democratic regime is bound to allow for diverse views on religion and beliefs. The higher the level or degree of religionist prevalence, the higher the number of parties that hold platforms based on religion, during the transition. However, the success of parties that are based on religious perspectives is higher in more religious or conservative countries. This is clearly indicated by the duration taken for Turkey to have a religious-based party take over power. Attempts by minorities to achieve political gains during transition may easily lead to segregation into the already religiously defined communities, which can easily spark community and religious tension. The risk of segregation tends to be high if the communities or minorities are based on religion, language or ethnicity. There is still an existent struggle for rights by the Turkish Kurds, with the Turkish government barring their demands for recognition, in the terms of their ethnicity. According to research, politics is closely related to religious issues. Some of the Arab countries provide financial support to religious institutions for the enhancement of the regime’s rule on these minority groups and their activities. Additionally, the determination of culture and religion is still a myth in the Arab world, whereby no religion or belief is capable of favoring a peaceful transition to democracy. The level of democratization is not an indication of the accomplishment of secularism. There is also an uncertainty between democracy and pluralism due to the complexity and natural incompatibility of Islamism. In this view, political parties that are not based on religion or beliefs are not opposed to liberalism, wealth, or the free market (Maddy-Weitzman, p 87). Religion plays a critical role in the Arab uprising, whereby the leaders use religion to influence and dominate the people. In fact there is a typical practice in Tunisia and Egypt, with the Moroccan elections confirming the acceptance and ascendance of Islamist leadership (Brisson & Krontiris, p 123). Democratization and Political Struggle in Morocco The organization of the Moroccan government did not constitute political traditions in the terms of Islam, and hence there was is familiarity in the constitutional and government representation (Maddy-Weitzman, p 90). The Moroccan government is monarchical, and is hence different than its Egyptian counterpart. The monarchical government in Morocco follows the principle of popular sovereignty as its foundation of government legitimacy, representation and elections. The political institutions are regulated by laid down laws that are guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, and the secularity of the Moroccan state is composed of independent autonomous groups and organizations that are intensely unfamiliar to the Muslim political tradition. The role of Islam in the power struggle is, therefore, likely to play out differently for the monarchical Moroccan regime due to the organization of the government structure, in addition to the laid down rules. Revolutionary groups and associations tend to be unfamiliar with the Muslim political traditions, unlike in the Egyptian revolution that is characterized by Islamism. This is likely to produce a different power struggle, in the terms of the role of Islam and he political elites. According to scholars, Islam has downplayed and ruled power struggles in the Middle East as well as in North Africa, and accounts for the lack of democracy and subsequent democratic development in the Arab world at large. The Moroccan Islamic organizations and opposition are neutral, moderate and accommodative to the democratization process (Sanchez, p 86). Democracy demands the conducting of free and fair elections, in addition to the guarantee of the basic civil rights. The logic of democratic transition, the behavior of groups and individuals within a regime cannot be deduced from structural factors, and hence democratization is bound to result from splits within a reigning regime and/or the organization for mobilization by autonomous groups. However, the speed of change is indifferent and is usually initiated and facilitated by popular mobilization (Sanchez, p 89). Reformers and other autonomous must closely evaluate their preferred outcomes of the democratization process, in addition to anticipating the preferences of other actors in the democratization process. Therefore the actors are ranked into status quo dictatorship that experiences no change in the regime, broadened dictatorship that incorporates multiple democracy actors, narrower dictatorship that expunges one or more actors from the regime into the opposition, insurrection that unites the civil society and the opposition, and transition that experiences reforms and democratization in the regime as per the core democratic principles (Maddy-Weitzman, p 90). The first seventeen years of Moroccan independence were highly characterized by rough struggles and political dynamics that culminated to constitutional amendments. Between 1956 and 1962, the Moroccan political struggle was characterized by power struggle between the leading party of the independence movement (The Parti Istiqlal), and the King. The party was on a mission to counter the efforts of the King in the institutionalization of a competitive party system. The power struggle in Morocco was indifferent in that the King was the undoubted leader, and hence the struggle lied on whether to allow Istiqlal and other autonomous parties participate in the governing of Morocco, in the second powers struggle phase between 1962 and 1972. The King changed his strategies to repression and absolute power in the monarchy. Though the King was interested in the democratization of political elections, he was not in support of a possible diminished role of the monarchy in the Moroccan sociopolitical life (El Sherif & Ashraf, p 678). The attainment of the Moroccan independence was highly placed on King Mohammed V and the Istiqlal, though a struggle ensued between the King and the party after independence due to the sociopolitical organization of post-independence Morocco (Saad Addin, p 206). The King hand a higher hand after the independence due to his role in the struggle for independence, especially his defiance of the French protectorate (Saad Addin, p 207). He was a strong and powerful political actor, in addition to being a symbol of national unity. On the other hand, Istiqlal had to share the glory with other parties that were part of the independence struggle movement, and hence was weak after independence. Additionally, Istiqlal emerged from the independence struggle as a divided and weak party due to internal conflict and splits between the radical left wing (led by Barka) that was supported by student organizations and trade unions, and the right wing that comprised of conservative government officials under el-Fassi’s leadership. Istiqlal continued to struggle for the popular support of the Moroccans and had only the urban middle class as its supportive principal element of the Moroccan society, and started losing the support and confidence of many Moroccans who preferred it to other parties. The King had declared his commitment in ensuring the creation of a constitution, though he prioritized on the police and armed forces to establish a coercive institution of power (Saad Addin, p 209). This was pushed by the presence and popularity of the Youth of Order (Shabab Nizam), which was an unofficial police that was established by Istiqlal and consisted of militiamen from the party. The King further created a national police force and the Royal Armed Forces to ensure and enforce loyalty to the monarchy rather than to the Istiqlal (Saad Addin, p 209). The appointment of the Istiqlal’s most important sponsor as the director of national security and head of police was a major setback for Istiqlal, whose power was facing multiple challenges in addition to internal conflict within the party. The persistence of conflict within the Istiqlal party led to the development of the Popular Movement (MP) by el-Khatib and Aherdane, which was highly criticized by the leadership. The resigning of prime minister of the Bekkai government in protest of the delay in the legalization of the Popular Movement party led to severe repression, and the Istiqlal take over. After taking over the government, Istiqlal avoided the introduction of a dynamic political system to bar the MP party from active contestation in politics. Istiqlal was desperate and willing to violate basic rights and liberties in addition to sacrificing democratization, in order to maintain its political stand and dominance. As a matter of fact, Istiqlal only focused on the future of the party rather than the introduction of democracy through reforms in the political system (El Sherif & Ashraf, p 675). By the 1972, the king had eliminated the use of authority in the monarchy and shared out power to political parties due to unpopularity with many Moroccans. This led to an unlikely revolution where the King tried to woo the political parties into the political power domain, though this did not really change the dynamics of power. King Hassan was determined to wooing political parties for integration into the political power domain, and hence the integration of the opposition into the regime. This was later followed by the announcement of municipal elections that were followed by parliamentary elections in 1983. However, both of the elections were highly manipulated and both the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) and Istiqlal party declined to integrate into the government and retreated back to the opposition instead. The focus shifted to socioeconomic and institutional reforms. The third phase of the political struggle (1972 to 1990) saw the gradual phasing out of repression through the reintroduction of popular rule, and the reintegration of political parties into the political system. There was a change in the political field and the political issues were peacefully dealt with without the use of coercive force. However, the democratic path did not last for Morocco, though it did happen especially through the reforms in the political system (El Sherif & Ashraf, p 678). The role of Islam in Egypt The political revolution in the Arab world has been sparked by the endorsement of Islam and integration into the political systems. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has been playing quite a divisive role along religious lines for the formation of a new democratic and secular Egyptian state. The stabilization and power consolidation in Egypt has been resultant from the role of Islam, as it has been promulgated by the Muslim Brotherhood, in inconsistency and power revolution. Islam has undergone evolution in the Middle East and the North of Africa, and hence the resultant recent Arab uprising that has sparked in Arab countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia (Hachana, p 3). Though the Muslim Brotherhood was not involved in the revolution that led to the ousting of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, it has primarily benefited from the uprising. The Brotherhood operated as a legal entity through the uprising, under the operational Freedom and Justice Party. The party won majority parliamentary seats in addition to winning the presidency through Muhammad Mursi, who has shown commitment towards the elimination of coercive power towards the use of Brotherhood principles (Hachana, p 4). There are existing generational divides in the terms of the MB youths who were at the forefront transitional struggle but have been marginalized after the political transition and the society at large. The struggle to transition by the revolutionaries involved many youth who were maimed or killed, and now suffer a high rate of unemployment and disappointment in expected decision making processes that were expected after the revolutionary transition (Hachana, p 4). This has made the Muslim Brotherhood more vulnerable to the grievances of the youth and other participating actors in the transitional revolution. The revolution involved uncouth and firm Islamic principles, such as Jihad that tends to portray Islam as a bad practice and influence. In Morocco, the revolutionary transition is unlikely to be marred by violence due to the dynamics in the political system and the presence of the monarchy system that acts as a symbol of national unity. The practices and principles of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as the principle of listen and obey used during the uprising, tend to be exploiting and misusing the youth through their seniors, instead of helping them to focus on their lives (Sanchez, p 90). The affiliation of the Brotherhood with the youth and young children is likely to interfere with the educational system through the diversion of attention to its activities instead of the learning curricula (Sanchez, p 90). On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood relies on the youth to conduct its missionary and charitable activities, in addition to political activities and manning demonstrations. The reconciliation of the Brotherhood missions has led to internal conflicts due to the lack of a clear separation of the religious issues from the political ones. Additionally, there are social issues and the issue of minority rights protection and gender imbalance. There is also an indifference between the changes desired by the youth and the aspirational changes being pursues by their leaders, in addition to the strict hierarchy of the Brotherhood that tends to marginalize the voices of the youths of the Muslim Brotherhood (Sanchez, p 91). The MB youths played a critical role in the ousting of Mubarak through persistent and well- organized demonstrations in Tahir Square, which maybe a potential loophole for conflict between the youth and their senior leaders in the terms of dynamic evolution. The socioeconomic structure of the Arab regimes has been significant in the revolutions and transition and success of democratization in the Arab uprising. The presence of the Muslim Brotherhood facilitated the mobilization of people, with the use of Islamic religion as the driving power for revolution and change. Islam has evolved and transformed into a reform strategy in the Arab political systems. The Muslim Brotherhood acted as the middle class drive and catalyst for change in Egypt through the principle of religion for better living and rights. According to research, many citizens of Islamic countries believe that Islam plays significant roles in the political life of their respective countries. Criticizing of the current regime and the existing order, by the fundamentalists, makes sense to the many people who believe that Islam is the perfect answer to the Egyptian socioeconomic and political woes. In the Arab world, politics is greatly determined by the region’s people. There is no clarity in the differentiation of religion and ethnicity, in addition to culture and tradition. Though religion is a personal identity, the subsequent ideologies serve the political agenda. The Arab transition has been highly characterized by religion, such as the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood with several Salafist parties to form a two thirds majority in the legislative assembly, in Egypt. The Likely Situation in a Moroccan The Moroccan government focused on the increasing tension on the modernization of Islamism, Islamic teachings and culture, in addition to the changing role of women in the society (Desrues, p 420). This was after the 2003 Casablanca bombings that led to the training of more moderate Islamic clerics and the expansion of the Moroccan educational system through the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs. Additionally, there was the push for a reform in the family code by King Mohammed VI to counter mass demonstrations and conservative opposition in 2004 (Desrues, p 421). He also facilitated this by resigning his religious authority as the Commander of the Faithful. The subsequent legislation limited polygamy and raised the minimum marriage age to 18 years, and provided for the presence of joint rights for parents over their children. The Moroccan regime also aggressively countered the influence of ultra-conservative Muslim clerics who were opposing the efforts of the government to modernize the Islamic infrastructure in Morocco, and improve its religious teachings. It is clear that there are ample measures to counter Jihadism or any other violent activities that follow the Islamic religion, in addition to the implementation of ample reforms in the Islamic infrastructure and teachings (Desrues, p 420). The issuance of a highly provocative fatwa that legitimized the marriage of underage women, by Sheikh Mohammed, led to the Moroccan government’s order of immediate closure of 60 Koranic schools that were under Sheikh’s control. This also led to the installation of a modernization program for the Moroccan Islamic institutions, by the King (El Mansour, p 70). There was the modernization of more than three thousand mosques, and the subsequent training of thirty three imams to oversee the Islamic teachings and examine the competency of imams. The failed 2007 terrorist attack compromised and slowed down King Mohammed’s reform agenda, especially the reforms on women rights and the judiciary (Guessous, p 528). Additionally, the King decided to quit playing an activist role in the Middle East diplomacy, following the rising terrorist threats (El Mansour, p 70). The Moroccan regime has been allowing the participation of un-extremist and non-violent parties in the elections, with the Moroccan authorities and forces being extra vigilant against any jihadist movements that posed terrorist threats after the Casablanca bombings. The crackdown on jihadists and prosecution of senior leaders helped the Moroccan government achieve its principle of divide and conquer the Islamic challenge, in addition to the deployment of grassroots police for intelligence on jihadists (El Mansour, p 68). The Moroccan government also established a social development program, known as the National Initiative for Human Development, to help in the generation of employment, infrastructure improvement, and the fight against poverty. The infrastructure development was implemented in both the sprawling slums and the urban centers to eliminate susceptibility to Islamic charities and organizations that had the motive of nurturing revolution and radicalism (Dalmasso, p 230). Additionally, there was the introduction of health, educational and social welfare programs that helped in the relocation of many families to new affordable houses (Guessous, p 530). Conclusion In conclusion, there is a likely different situation in the case of an uprising in Morocco as compared to the uprising in Egypt. This is fundamentally due to the presence of ample measures to counter Islamism and associated jihadist by the Moroccan regime (Dalmasso, p 219). Infrastructure development in Morocco also sealed some of the influential loopholes that can be easily used by Islamic revolutionists through charity work (Dalmasso, p 227). The Moroccan regime also aggressively countered the influence of ultra-conservative Muslim clerics who were opposing the efforts of the government to modernize the Islamic infrastructure in Morocco, and improve its religious teachings. This has helped in the development and reform of the Islamic infrastructure and culture, and the regulation of the Islamic teachings that has installed some level of morality and respect for human and civil rights amongst the Moroccan communities (Dalmasso, p 231). It is also sound to conclude that Islam has transformed from being exclusively a religion into being an ideology that offers the total framework for all aspects of social, economic, cultural and political standing for the Muslim communities. This has sparked fearless revolutionary demonstrations, such as the Egypt revolution that ousted President Hosni Mubarak, due to the massive support of Islamism. However, the Muslim Brotherhood uses extreme principles, such as jihad, which need to be regulated and closely monitored to eliminate the subsequent terrorism associated with jihadists (Guessous, p 530). The crackdown on jihadists and prosecution of senior leaders helped the Moroccan government achieve its principle of divide and conquer the Islamic challenge. Reformers and other autonomous must closely evaluate their preferred outcomes of the democratization process. As a movement, the Muslim Brotherhood is objected at the individual as well as the societal reform at large, in the terms of morality. The growth in support and numbers enabled it to challenge the secular leadership practiced by the Egyptian leadership. The Muslim Brotherhood believe that Islam is a comprehensive ideology for both private and public life, and hence believed in the provision of basic services to the communities, with a consistency in the teachings of faith. Moroccan government has worked towards the achievement of Islam as a religion and not a political front, which has in turn enhance the improvement of the Islamic teachings, and the subsequent improvement of the social morality (Desrues, p 420). The monarchical government in Morocco follows the principle of popular sovereignty as its foundation of government legitimacy, representation and elections. The political institutions are regulated by laid down laws that are guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, and the secularity of the Moroccan state is composed of independent autonomous groups and organizations that are intensely unfamiliar to the Muslim political tradition. The role of Islam in the power struggle is, therefore, likely to play out differently for the monarchical Moroccan regime due to the organization of the government structure (Desrues, p 419). Works Cited Brisson, Zack & Krontiris, Kate. “Tunisia: from revolutions to institutions,” The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. 2012. 123. Dalmasso Emanuela. “Surfing the Democratic Tsunami in Morocco: Apolitical Society and the Reconfiguration of a Sustainable Authoritarian Regime,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 17 Issue 2, (July 2012): 217-232. 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