Contextualizing the Effects of the Ruhr Crisis on the Second World War - Essay Example

Contextualizing the Effects of the Ruhr Crisis on the Second World War Central to the problems presented by the repercussions of the Great War for its major participants was the issue of German reparations. The enormity of Germany’s reparation bill and her failure to meet the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the Reparations Commission set up by the Allies became crucial to the state of the European economy and Anglo-French relations. The Occupation of Ruhr by the French triggered a domino effect of failures and problems that indirectly contributed to the inexorability of a second world war. The issue of reparations and the extent of the effects of the Ruhr crisis comprise “an excruciatingly tangled thicket into which only a few intrepid explorers have ventured.”1 However, if one must venture into this tangled thicket, one must plot a course that will show the clearest way to untangle it and take out the unnecessary weeds. In this sense, because the post-war period and the Ruhr crisis involve a lot of events and activities, one must sort through this stream of information and pick out only what is relevant. That is to say that the course exhibited in this paper is not the only explanation as another person may view the events in a different light and may go through a different route. Furthermore, the Ruhr Occupation and World War II are separated by sixteen long years; and so, it is very difficult to say for certain that the former caused the latter. Hence, this paper will attempt to show a complete analysis of the significant chain of events that explains why the Ruhr Crisis made a great contribution to the inevitability of a second world war through a shift or a regression in the European balance of power. France’s failure to achieve her goal of industrial expansion through the Occupation of Ruhr proved to be catastrophic as it not only drove a wedge between Britain and France and diminished her power in Europe, but it also created a chain of events that led to Germany’s reinforced supremacy that tipped the balance of power in her favor and the latter’s thirst for revenge that contributed greatly to the inevitability of World War II. Although it might be said that this is like reading history backwards, sometimes, one has to go back further in history in order to understand the causation and relationship of significant events. “Marx, for one, believed that we could best approach how the past developed into the present by adopting the vantage point of the present to view the conditions that gave rise to it—in other words, if we studied history backward.”2 This paper, then, will attempt to strengthen the aforementioned argument through an analysis of the events that led to the Ruhr Crisis and its aftermath as they relate to the European balance of power. This paper operates under the premise that if France had not occupied Ruhr, hyper-inflation would not have occurred in the manner that it did and the Dawes Plan would not have been created. Hence, Germany would not have been able to recover that easily and reinforce her superiority and she would not have fallen so willingly into Hitler’s ideals of the Aryan race. Furthermore, it would not have weakened Anglo-French relations to the point that France was left alone to cultivate her paranoia about Germany’s rise to power—paranoia that would have served Europe against the threat of German supremacy—that only served to weaken her and cocoon her people under a blanket of false security.3 Ultimately, the Ruhr Crisis led to the failure of the Allies to debilitate Germany as a world power and the European balance of power shifted yet again in favor of Germany after the success of the Dawes Plan and with Hitler’s rise to power. Furthermore, with the Germans already feeling embittered and resentful towards the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the occupation of Ruhr and the resulting hyper-inflation added to extreme nationalistic views that made Hitler’s Nazism gain support. All of these compounded the inevitability of a second world war. The European Balance of Power Throughout history, many nations have attempted to destroy the European balance of power for their own interests. Whether if it was the universal monarchy that France and Spain was accused of trying to establish in the sixteenth century or Napoleon’s desire for the expansion of the French Empire in the nineteenth century, the European balance of power aims to protect Europe from this kind of dominion of one nation.4 After the defeat of Napoleon, Lord Palmerston, an important figure in the promotion of the European balance of power, stated that ‘it was in the interest of the community of nations that no nation should acquire such a preponderance as to endanger the security of the rest.’5 It had happened time and again throughout history that when the balance of power is lost, great wars erupt in order to restore the balance and quell the greed and power of many great nations like France, Russia and Germany. This is the problem continually faced by Great Britain as it views herself as the major proponent of the balance of power in Europe. Reconciling the demands of nations for their freedom to develop themselves and rise above the others is one of the critical problems faced by the European balance of power, especially during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.6 “It was in the name of the balance of power that, faced with a rising Germany, Britain settled her old imperial rivalries with France and Russia in the early twentieth century; it was in the same cause that she went to war with Germany in 1914, despite the fact she had no treaty commitment which bound her to this act. As Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, told the Commons on 3 August 1914, a ‘common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power,’ necessitated a declaration of war.”7 This shows how the First World War was a direct result of the enforcement and preservation of the European balance of power. In order to control Germany and her allies from dominating Europe, the Briton declaration of war became a necessity. After the Great War, the Treaty of Versailles was enacted, not only for reparations and peace, but with the underlying notion of diminishing Germany’s power and influence in order to prevent the destruction of the balance of power—at the event of which another war will become necessary in order to restore the balance of power like what happened during the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. Hence, based on this analysis alone, it could be surmised that once Germany was able to regain her supremacy and tilt the sinews of power, a second world war became likely in order to preserve and restore the European balance of power, which Hitler threatened as he aimed for complete domination of the East. This inevitability of a second world war was exactly what the Treaty of Versailles guarded against and failed to enforce due to France’s intervention in the Ruhr brought about by an ulterior motive that aimed to make France the new Germany. The outcome of the Ruhr Crisis, therefore, produced great contributions to the inevitability of World War II as it facilitated Germany’s “rebirth” as a world power. This was seen as challenging the European balance of power and engendered the vulnerability of the German people towards the concept of Nazism, which facilitated the rise of Hitler and the declaration of war to defeat and control the abomination he caused. The Ruhr Crisis and Its Effects The aftermath of World War I left Germany isolated and alienated from the rest of the world. Through the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forced to admit—at least on paper—her guilt and culpability in the Great War through her acceptance of the consequences of the reparations bill. Consequently, Germany was faced with the loss of her territories and colonies, disarmament, and a reparations bill of such magnitude that was thought to be ridiculous for one nation to fulfill.8 It must be noted that the Germans saw the signing of the treaty as the ultimate sign of defeat and admittance of guilt, for which they did not believe in. Furthermore, German funding for her reparations come in part from taxation. And so, taxes were increased in order for the government to pool the money needed for reparations. This made the population feel that they are paying for the mistakes of the government. Because of this, the people’s confidence in the German administration dwindled and the government gained a reputation for being incompetent and inept. The people’s hostility toward the government made them right for the picking for radical and nationalistic ideas, such as Nazism. Given the disheartenment and rising distrust of the German population in the government after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the Ruhr Occupation proved to be a humiliation that pushed the German citizens to seek a new government and a new leader. Thus, they became vulnerable to the charisma and radical promises of Adolf Hitler and Nazism, which led to global action toward the preservation of the European balance of power signified by Britain and France’s declaration of war against Germany after the latter invaded Poland. France’s Ulterior Motive Germany’s continued failure to meet the reparation terms towards France made the latter start to lobby for the occupation of the Ruhr, Germany’s steel and coal production capital9 and her ‘industrial heartland’10 in 192011 and even presented Germany with an ultimatum12. France had an ulterior motive for wanting to occupy Ruhr. Aside from the fact that France wanted to ensure the delivery of the coal that Germany had promised to her as a part of reparation agreement, France also aimed ‘to defeat Germany’s pre-war economic hegemony on the European continent, to free France from dependency on foreign sources of coal, to make France into Europe’s leading iron and steel producer, and so to form the industrial base of support, over the long term the position of a great power in international politics—all at the pretext of avoiding another world war.13 In short, France wanted to prevent Germany’s “rebirth” by controlling Germany’s industrial capital and the Allies, especially Great Britain, wanted no part of it.14 As French historian Bariety stated: One senses, to speak truthfully, a vast project, aiming to brake, even to curtail, German industrial expansion, and to facilitate, on the contrary, the industrial expansion of France, of Belgium, of Italy and of Poland. At the end of the scheme, the ambition seems to be for a profound change in the ratio of industrial forces on the European continent.15 It can be seen here how France desired to tilt the balance of power in Europe towards her end; so much so that she jumped at the chance to execute this plan, even though occupying Ruhr would entail violating the Treaty of Paris.16 As can be expected, Germany viewed France’s impending occupation of Ruhr negatively and with resentment. Moreover, Alanson B. Houghton, the US ambassador to Germany, stated that in the event that France pushed through with her planned occupation, then Germany will have no choice but to stop paying reparations.17 Anglo-French Relations As France occupied the Ruhr, passive resistance was encouraged by the German government through worker strikes.18 Soon, coal production was curtailed and France did not get even a significant amount to help her. But France would not back off as Poincaré realized that this was their last stand in gaining economic superiority and political power; and if she is defeated, then all hope is lost for France to claim European supremacy. She was inherently weaker than Germany and had already failed to enforce delivery of alleged war criminals, to obtain German compliance with the military clauses of the treaty, or to gain any effective German participation in the costly French reconstruction of the devastated provinces. If Germany did not pay reparations and remove some of the burden from France, her innate economic superiority, together with further progressive crumbling of the peace treaty, would soon tip the balance altogether.19 Hence, the stand-off in Ruhr continued for 8 long months. And this proved to be disastrous, not only for both parties involved, but for the world, as well. As the next sections will substantiate, the failure of France’s selfish plan was the catalyst that set up the prime condition for Germany’s rise as an industrial and military power, the merging support and power of national socialists20— ‘who by giving a racial definition to nationality prepared the way for discrimination and exclusion before the second world war21—and her susceptibility toward the extremist ideas of Hitler. Not only that, but France’s decision to occupy the Ruhr also alienated Great Britain as the latter did not approve of the former’s methods. Anglo-French relations weakened as Britain showed her disapproval of France’s actions and decisions though non-participation in French affairs. Consequently, it had been said that France was left alone to guard against German threat in Europe. And most European countries viewed this perceived threat as just that—something that was brought about by France’s paranoia about a revived German threat. This paranoia is evidenced by the Maginot Line, a line of fortifications that had installed a ‘false sense of security’ and invulnerability among the French.22 Hence, Maginot-mindedness came to be known as an attitude that contributed to the fall of France as it “infected French military leaders as well as politicians and opinion leaders throughout the 1930s, so seeped into the national psyche that it instilled a false sense of security.”23 The bottom line is that without the devastation inflicted on the German economy by the Ruhr Crisis, there would have been less opportunity for the national socialists and their ideas to reach a national stage and Anglo-French relations would not have been so weakened that they were not able to collaborate against the German threat early on. Hitler would not have risen in power with a grandiose plan that was seen as a big threat to the European balance of power and war would not have been declared in order to preserve the balance—and if Hitler did rose to power as he did, Britain and France’s strong alliance had the capacity to prevent war. But instead, Anglo-French’s weakened relations only served to “help[ed] Hitler rebuild Germanys military strength more rapidly, until it was too late to stop him.”24  Indeed, even though there were many causes of the Second World War, like “the Allied Powers breaking of the preliminary agreement based on Wilsons Fourteen Points; the refusal of the right of self-determination and of equality of rights for the German people; the creation of the eastern frontier and the "Polish Corridor"; the treaties paragraphs on war guilt and war criminals, and impossible financial and economic claims,”25 the consensus still lies in the fact that one of the major causes—if not the major cause—lies within the breadth of power and influence that Adolf Hitler had. France’s occupation of the Ruhr contributed greatly to how the German people received Hitler’s Nazi ideals. The subsequent sections will discuss the ramifications of the Ruhr Occupation and how they contributed to the inevitability of World War II. Hyper-Inflation In order to sustain the passive resistance of the residents of the Ruhr that ultimately hoped to expel the French and reclaim Germany’s industrial capital, the German government subsidized the resistance by printing more money as the residents have to be paid when their source of income was taken from them.26 The printing of a great amount of money proved to be disastrous as it caused inflation at a rate so fast that the mark became a worthless currency. It must be noted, however, that due to reparations, the Ruhr crisis only made it much, much worse. The Germans ‘resented the national banking policies that enhanced the entrepreneurs’ ability to speculate at the expense of other groups’ as these entrepreneurs ‘enjoyed a large share of national income than they would have under stable prices.’27 In short, the entrepreneurs, especially those who have access to foreign currencies, took advantage of the inflation to grow their businesses. Although the economy was given a temporary respite from inflation and the currency was stabilized through the creation of the Rentenmark, matters worsened in 1924 because of the bankruptcy of 6,033 companies and businesses; however, the more stable businesses remained, which did little to alleviate the unemployment problem.28 It was because of this that the economic and industrial power of Germany after the hyper-inflation rested within the private sector and not the government. This enraged the German public. Anti-Semitism started to grow as the Germans began to resent capitalists, financiers—many of them Jews—and others who benefited from the inflation while the German masses were starving. In effect, the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) grew in number around the country.29 Hitler’s eloquence and charisma, coupled with the economically depressing situation in Germany and the German public’s dislike of the Weimar Republic, captured the interest and support of the people and Anti-Semitic feelings took hold. The stand-off in Ruhr came to an end on the 27th of September, 1923 when Stresemann ordered the stoppage of passive resistance and a moratorium on reparation payments as the Weimar Republic was ‘confronted with the breakdown of resistance in the occupied territories and of the collaboration of trade unions and big business which formed the political basis for that resistance, as well as the loss of even verbal British support.’30 This was viewed with much dissatisfaction by the German population and taken as another defeat caused by the incompetent administration. It augmented the discontent toward the Weimar Republic and opened up the doors for the views of extreme national socialists, like Hitler, to take center stage. This is due to the fact that the hyper-inflation perpetuated the rise of corporatism ‘that parceled out political functions to the economically powerful.’31 This prevented the German government from taking complete authority over Munich32 and the resentment of the Germans toward the Jews, as many of them became known as successful businessmen during that time, grew steadily. The situation brought about by the Ruhr Crisis enabled Hitler and his extreme national socialist ideas to be heard and supported. U.S. Intervention: The Dawes Plan The resulting hyper-inflation speeded up the downfall of the German economy. The rapid decline of the mark both at home and in the world market perpetrated fears, which were mainly centered toward the inability of Germany to pay reparations to the Allies, who in turn also need to pay their debts to the United States. Stresemann proposed the concept of mutual self-interest in that stabilizing German economy would prove to be helpful, not only to Germany, but to the other countries involved, as well. ‘An economic paralysis of Germany would hurt them as well. “One must have so great a debt that the creditor sees his own existence threatened in the event of the economic catastrophe of the debtor.”’33 Hence, the ‘Americans realized that that continents prosperity was intertwined with her political tranquility’ and drafted the Dawes Plan.34 Consequently, the United States became Germany’s creditor and a considerable loan was provided to Germany immediately and a bank be created in order to stabilize the economy.35 In this way, Germany could pay off the first bulk of reparations and sustain the appreciation of the mark and the stabilization of her economy through a reorganization of the taxation and banking systems.36 The plan also included the stipulation that France would vacate the Ruhr, to which France had no other choice but to comply.37 President Coolidge, in a speech made to American businessmen, eloquently encouraged American capitalists for their help and clearly stated the benefits that America tends to gain from her assistance in European affairs.38 In this sense, with the full support of the United States and the Triple Entente, the Dawes Plan steadily and successfully restored Germany’s prosperity from 1924-1928.39 It also improved German foreign relations and Germany, once again, established herself as a significant player in world politics. However, Germany’s dependency on the United States abruptly came to an end during the Great Depression, causing the former’s economy to plummet, yet again.40 The implications of this were not only economic, but more importantly, it perpetuated serious consequences for Germany’s democracy that ultimately resulted in the Second World War. As the German population was again faced with an economic crisis, the blame was placed on the government and its leaders. The people felt that a change was in order and Hitler was the one to put that change into effect. With his growing popularity and the support that Nazism gained due to the susceptibility of the people to cling on to something new, so tired were they in being punished repeatedly for the mistakes of the government. Anti-Semitic feelings spread among the population as the people saw Jewish financiers living a good life and hardly being affected by the unstable economy.41 The people were embittered and demoralized and they were looking for someone to blame. They began to blame the Jews and adopt an extremist view of German superiority, which turned into complete support for Hitler and Nazism. Conclusion The road towards the contributions made by the Ruhr Occupation towards the inevitability of the Second World War is relatively simple. The European balance of power was something that has been enforced and fiercely guarded throughout history, with great nations bonding together in order to preserve it and wars being declared because of it. Hitler’s rise to power because of the opportunities presented to him by the circumstances created by the Ruhr Crisis was seen as a violation of the European balance of power that can lead to the concept’s total destruction. In order to defend and uphold the European balance of power, war became inevitable. Although there are ten years between the Ruhr Occupation and Hitler’s rise to power and sixteen years before the declaration of World War II, the Ruhr Occupation is a significant event that led to other major events (like the Dawes Plan and the rising discontent of the German population with the government) that contributed to the inevitability of a Second World War. The Ruhr Crisis pushed Germany to the brink of Nazi rule in that it only took one nudge—like the unprecedented Great Depression—for them to completely fall into Hitler’s hands. The dissatisfaction and skepticism of the German population toward the government, made much worse by the Ruhr Crisis, engendered a national condition that presented the opportunity for Hitler to take hold of the country. In addition to this, France’s decision to invade the Ruhr drove a wedge between her relationship with Britain, which left France alone to man Europe against a German “rebirth.” Anglo-French relations suffered to the point that Britain even sided with the U.S. in the enactment of the Dawes Plan—which eventually led to Germany’s economic and industrial revival and German supremacy. In order to prevent the destruction of the European balance of power, an alliance (The Allied Powers) was formed that made a declaration of war compulsory and inevitable; and the rest, as they say, is history. References Causes of World War II. (n.d.). The Root Causes of World War 2. Retrieved from http://www.2worldwar2.com/causes-of-world-war-2.htm Charmley, J. (1999). Balance of power. New Perspectives, 6(1). Retrieved from http://www.history-ontheweb.co.uk/concepts/balanceofpower61.htm Costigliola, F. (1976, Winter). The United States and the reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s. 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