Justifying Demands of France during the Two World Wars - Essay Example

Justifying France's Demands during the Two World Wars It is only customary in the international system for s to meet and draft treaties to re-establish a state of peace after a war. Treaties are binding and should be observed by all contracting parties. Hence, states involved in drafting them are careful, yet aggressive, in ensuring that their interests are protected, and their demands, as much as possible, are met. France is no exception. By the 1900, France has built for herself a strong empire, enabling her to become one of the great superpowers at the time. However, with the advent of the 20th Century, the occurrence of two world wars devastated the whole of Europe, contributing to the decline in France's empire not only in terms of territorial and military power, but in prestige as well. Given her diminished state, France's demands in treaties following each of the two world wars in the 20th century is of no surprise. Thus, as this essay will argue, France's demands during World War I and World War II are essentially similar, and based on similar justifications - the fear of a German threat, worsened by the concern that her allies will not come to her aid, and the inevitable need to embark on economic reconstruction after the war - all of which shaped France's stance during post-war negotiations. In January 1919, the victorious powers after World War I, led by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, Premier Georges Clemenceau of France, and Britain's Prime Minister Lloyd George began negotiations for what will later be known as the "Treaty of Versailles." The main goal of the treaty is, at the very least, to ensure the stability of the international system after the war (Treaty of Versailles, Article 1). During negotiations, France insisted on the following demands: control over the left bank of the Rhine, the occupation and status of Saar under French control, the organization of the League of Nations to aid France in case of a German attack, reparations from Germany, and promised guarantees of French security, and the return of territories to France (Florinsky 1934: 335). All these demands had one goal in mind - to ensure France's security against the German threat. In addition, variations of these demands were also echoed even after the Second War. Thus, what justifications did France have for such demands First, it is of no surprise that France, after both World War I and World War II will demand guarantees for its security justified by the fear of a possible German attack. In the case of World War I under the Treaty of Versailles, this fear is based on the fact that towards the end of the war, France is in no position to defend itself from an attack, be it Germany or another country because of the massive destruction left by the war rendering France defenceless. As Pitman Potter points out, "in case of a German attack, there can be no doubt of the reality that of the fear of such an attack on the part of the French" (1919: 666). In addition, with regard to the territorial arrangements along the Rhine, France's fear is justified because Rhine is a strategic location for France against a German invasion (Finch 1933: 727). However, what is unique about France's fear of Germany, at least after World War I is based on France's historical experience. As Potter notes, Though the need for French fear of a repeated German attack seem slight from this distance, the state of feeling in France - even in Government circles - is determined more by the facts of 1870-1914 than by the facts of 1918-1919. (Potter 1919: 665) Where during such time, France has experienced, and is still experiencing, a significant decline in its population compared to Germany. According to a census comparing French and German military manpower, the military manpower of the two countries began to display a steadily widening gap after 1870, despite the increasing rate of immigration in France such that by 1911, there existed a 3 million gap between the two countries in favour of France (Population Index 1946: 75). The situation worsened further after World War I causing France to experience population deficit, justifying the fear of a German attack (Population Index 1946: 77). With the case of World War II, the demand for a guarantee of French security, was once again an integral element of French treaties. After the war, Europe, and particularly France, was once again laid defenceless against a possible attack. Like the previous war, France was once again experiencing a population deficit. In addition to the population deficit, however, the security guarantee is justified also because of the fear of an attack against France. This fear is further supported by public opinion both in France and Europe, at large, regarding the possible effects of the Marshall Plan and the proposed Atlantic Treaty. According to Raymond Aron: The Atlantic Treaty would be looked on by Russia as provocative. It would give us no protection in case of war. It would involve us in heavy future rearmament, including German rearmament. It would risk dragging us into a war between the two great Powers which did not concern us. (Aron 1951: 2) The Atlantic Treaty policy, inevitable as it may be, is not regarded with affection, particularly since the French know that if war came there would be no victory for them, even if the Western coalition are victorious (1951: 8). Thus, based on the French point of view, these two treaties pose the risk of rearming French's enemy -Germany - and plunging France into a possible war. Another justification for the demands of France lie in its historical experience, with regard to engaging in treaties. It is evident that in both World War I and World War II, France has been rigid in terms of defining and determining the extent of the security guarantees accorded by the United States and the United Kingdom. Some may even regard its rigidity as a form of paranoia. As Young and Conner notes, The former allies came to regard France as a perennial malcontent obsessed with exaggerated German threats. (Young and Conner 1998: 148). This fear of a German threat and explicit demand for a security guarantee however is not paranoia. Instead, it is a valid fear based on France's experience with treaties dating back to the Treaty of 1778. According to the treaty, the Americans pledged aid to France in the event that France gets into a war with Great Britain (Treaty of 1778, Article 1). However, French history would tell us that when France went into war with Great Britain in 1793, the aid stipulated in the Treaty did not materialize because of a technicality under the treaty, which rendered the United States free from its obligation to France (Potter 1919: 668). Thus, this justifies not only France's demands for a security guarantee after World War I, but also its demand for a clearer and more explicit definition of the terms for such security guarantee. With regard to World War II, France's historical experienced justifies a different demand. Under the Treaty of Versailles, France made generous concessions to the United States: In framing the Treaty of Versailles, France made important concessions to the United States - in the Saar question, the control of the left bank of the Rhine, the organization of the League of Nations - and had done this in exchange for promised guarantees of French security. (Florinsky 1934: 335) These sacrifices had proved in vain because not only did the security pact fail to materialize, but the United States Senate also failed to ratify the treaty (Ambrosius 1972: 341-352). Because of the failure of the United States to comply with its obligations under the treaty, France therefore justifies reviving its claim in the Rhine. Thus, after World War II, "De Gaulle was determined to act in such a way that, on this occasion, that the Rhineland would be detached from the German state and permanently occupied by French troops" (Fontaine 1970: 467). With regard to its reparations, France justified its demands on the basis of economic reconstruction. According to Sally Marks, reparations are the "primary battlefield" of the post-war "continuation of war by other means" (Boemeke et al. 1998: 338). With this in regard, France has demanded the payment of reparations from Germany to help alleviate France of her large loans from the United States. After the First World War, France was in a state of financial and economic crisis. Her national debt reached almost half of her national assets, her sources of fuel were either damaged or taken by Germany, and her colonial territories declined by 11% and were still continuously occupied by Germany (Bell 1946: 59). The demand for reparations is therefore not only justified, but also owed to France. With regard to World War II, the justification for these reparations are intensified because while the Second World War merits a new sum for reparations from Germany; the fact that reparations from the previous war have not yet been paid is already justification in itself. Thus France's demands under the two world wars - control over the left bank of the Rhine, aid for France in case of a German attack, reparations from Germany, and promised guarantees of French security are rightly justified. These justifications include: the reality of a German threat, at least from the point of view of France, the unfortunate experience of having its perceived allies back out on its obligations, the threat of a declining French population vis--vis Germany, the strength of Frenchmen's public opinion, and the need for economic recovery. What is interesting to note, however, is that the similarity between aforementioned justifications and demands under both world wars implicates the continuity between the wars, justifying the critique that there exists a "continuity between the two world wars which seem immediate and direct: the second world war broke out as a result of the failure to restore an equilibrium after the violence, cost, and passion of the first world war" (Mosse 1986: 491). It illustrates that since the justifications for France's demands vary by no large extent, it is plausible to conclude that the demands for the Second World War is only an extension of demands, which were not met in the previous war. This is true, at the very least for the experience of France and Germany. Furthermore, evidence can be seen in the premium that France places in its historical experience in contracting treaties and alliances. The fact that France has been failed by treaties in the past, not to mention her inability to defend herself from aggressors, only show that she has the right to fear attacks from Germany, if not from another aggressor. Such historical evidence, if viewed from the perspective of France explains her obsession with the German threat. Works Cited Ambrosius, L. E. (1972). Wilson, the Republicans, and French Security after World War I. The Journal of American History, 59(2), 341-352. Aron, R. (1952). French Public Opinion and the Atlantic Treaty. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 28(1), 1-8. Bell, J. F. (1946). Problems of Economic Reconstruction in France. Economic Geography, 22(1), 54-66. Boemeke, M. F., Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, Eds. (1998). The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and The German Historical Institute. Finch, G. A. (1933). A Pact of Non-Aggression. The American Journal of International Law, 27(4), 725-732. Florinsky, M. T. (1934). France and the War Debts. Political Science Quarterly, 49(3), 321-346. Fontaine, A. (1970). Potsdam: A French View. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-,) 46(3), 466-474. Mosse, G. L. (1986). Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience. Journal of Contemporary History, 21(4), 491-513. No Author. (1946). War, Migration, and the Demographic Decline of France Population Index, 12(2), 73-81. Potter, P. B. (1919). The Treaty Providing for American Assistance to France in Case of Unprovoked Aggression by Germany Against the Latter. The American Journal of International Law, 13(4), 651-668. Young, R. J. and Conner, T. (1998). [Review of the book France and the Origins of the Second World War]. The French Review, 72(1), 147-149. Read More