The Origin and Current Situation of the Taiwan Issue and Its Possible Resolutions - Essay Example

Taiwan Issue Part the origin (Time frame since 1949 Introduction Historical background of Taiwan Issue After the defeat of China’s military forces, also known as Kuomintang or KMT, by the CCP – Chinese Communist Party, in 1949, along with the insecurity on the island on which he had restored his base, Chiang Kai-shek, the then KMT’s leader, and his party reformed their government and created a “socialist-based state management” (Cole 3). Refugees in the mainland invaded most factors of governance, the land’s economy, as well as the education system. The alleged “loss of China” in 1949, along with the start of the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 against communist-managed North Korea, as well as its Chinese ally, prompted the United States to assist the Republic of China in Taiwan to turn into a barricade against communism (Cole 3). The United States 7th Fleet was tasked with patrolling the Taiwan Strait to stop a raid of Taiwan. Americans offered military and economic aid, and, in 1954, a joint security agreement was reached with the China’s Republic as part of America’s Cold War strategy of suppression of the Beijing government. However, military and financial aid was restricted to what Taiwan required to defend and finance itself against the People’s Republic of China, but not to hold up Chiang Kai-shek’s vision of “going back to the mainland.” The regime created, in 1949, on Taiwan, had provincial and national levels (Cole 4). The state level, with selected, as well as appointed officials from the mainland, represented itself as the Republic of China in global forums and apparently arranged for a go back to rule the entire mainland. Part 2: the current situation 2. Controversy of sovereignty over Taiwan i) Position of the People's Republic of China (PRC) The position of PRC is that the Republic of China (ROC) stopped being a lawful regime after the founding of PRC on October 1st, 1949 and that they are the successor of ROC as the only lawful regime of China with the right to manage Taiwan with regards to the “succession of states” theory (Bush and O'Hanlon 23). The stand of PRC is that they and ROC are two diverse groups in the Chinese Civil War that never lawfully subsided. Hence, PRC argues that the two groups belong to one sovereign nation, China. Because Taiwan’s independence belongs to China, then PRC’s regime, along with its supporters, deem that the secession of the island should be settled upon by the 1.3 billion citizens of China rather than just the 23 million citizen of ROC who, at the moment, live in Taiwan (Bush and O'Hanlon 23). In addition, PRC states that the UN’s Resolution by its General Assembly recognizes that PRC controls China’s entire terrain including Taiwan. UN further classifies this matter through acknowledging PRC as they only legal representatives of China. Therefore, PRC considers that it is within its lawful capacity to prolong its jurisdiction of Taiwan through any means possible (Bush and O'Hanlon 24). Furthermore, the stand of the People’s Republic of China is that ROC does not fulfill the fourth principle of the Montevideo Convention. PRC argued that the Montevideo Convention was agreed upon by only 19 states at the 17th Global Conference of American States (Bush and O'Hanlon 24). Therefore, the authority of the United Nations and the United States should supersede the Montevideo Convention. ii) Position of the Republic of China (ROC) ROC, on the other hand, claims that it maintains all the traits of a nation and that it was succeeded or replaced by PRC since it is still in existence even after PRC’s establishment. In line with the Montevideo Convention (1933), the mainly consulted source for the meaning of statehood, a nation should possess a defined territory, a permanent population, a regime, as well as a capacity to start relations with other nations (Bush 33). ROC affirms to meet all these principles since it has a government practicing successful jurisdiction over clear territories with more than 23 million permanent citizens and a fully committed international ministry. The stand of ROC had been that Taiwan was a de jure independent state (Bush 33). "ROC," according to its government's definition, went beyond both China’s mainland including Macau and Hong Kong, and the island in tussle, Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s leader from 2000 to 2008 fully endorsed the notion that ROC is a sovereign state, but held the perception that the ROC is Taiwan and that Taiwan does not belong to PRC. This is proposed in his four-stage premise of ROC. However, owing to the importance of avoiding war with the People’s Republic of China, President Chen had kept away from officially declaring Taiwan's sovereignty (Bush 34). Chen has continually declined to support the One China Rule or the suppler 1992 Consensus the People’s Republic of China demands as a forerunner to talks with the People’s Republic of China. During Chen's reign, there was not even a single successful effort to resume negotiations on a semi-official level (Bush 34). 3. Position of other countries and international organizations i) Sino-US relations and the Taiwan Issue Since the very start, the Chinese regime and its supporters have resolutely fought against the United States unlawful invasion of Taiwan, which gave a stern blow to the United States for its determined plan to split Taiwan from Chinese terrain, and defended China's dominion and land integrity (Carpenter 43). The United States President, Nixon, visited China in February, 1972. On the 28th of that month, both the United States and China issued the Shanghai Communique wherein the United States Government declared that they acknowledge that all Chinese on whichever side of the Taiwan Island maintains there is only one China plus that the island in contention is a part of China. The United States Government did not dispute that position (Carpenter 43). The United States Government accepted, in December 1978, the three stand of the Chinese regime on the creation of diplomatic affairs, i.e., the U.S. shall cut its "diplomatic affairs" with Taiwan, repeal "the Joint Defense Treaty" with ROC, and remove its forces from Taiwan. The two nations signed the "Joint Communique", which established diplomatic associations between PRC and the U.S. The American regime stated that they respect the government of PRC as the only lawful regime of China. In this context, the citizens of America will uphold commercial, cultural and other informal affairs with the citizens of Taiwan (Carpenter 44). The United States Government respects the Chinese stand that there is only one China. The two nations established official diplomatic relations on 1st January, 1979. ii) Position of Japan The Taiwan Issue concerned the political foundation of Sino-Japanese affairs. Following the Second World War, Japan returned Penghu and Taiwan islands to China in line with the Cairo Proclamation, as well as the Postsdam Proclamation (Shirk 72). Representatives from China were sent to receive the surrenders in Taipei on 25th October, 1945, who proclaimed the recapture of Taiwan to the world. From then, Japan has acknowledged the Taiwan government. In addition, Japan assumed the “theory of uncertainty,” which had the jurisdiction of Taiwan in mind, as the main regulation of its policy on China (Shirk 72). Moving forward, in 1972, under the “Nixon Shock,” as well as the strong local pressure, Mr. Kakuei Tanaka and other Japanese lawmakers fastened the process of the standardizing of diplomatic affairs between Japan and China in order to keep in conventionality with the ambition of Japanese citizens. The Tanaka Diet defined visibly that they fully comprehended the three policies for restoring diplomatic affairs presented by China, that is, (1) PRC is the only legal regime of China; (2) Taiwan is an unchallengeable fraction of PRC; and (3) The alleged “Peace Treaty” between the Chiang Kaishek authorities and Japan is unlawful and illogical and should be annulled (Shirk 74). Japan’s regime fully understood and respected this position of PRC and firmly confirmed to abide by the regulations under the 8th Article in the Potsdam Proclamation (Shirk 73). China has no opposition to people-to-people relationships between Taiwan and Japan. Nevertheless, China strongly declines any kinds of official relationships between Taiwan and Japan, let alone any proceedings intending to create “two Chinas” or “one Taiwan, one China.” iii) The role of the international organizations like UN and WTO. Under the sustaining pressure from the People’s Republic of China to stop any representation of the Republic of China, which might signify statehood, international organizations have assumed diverse policies towards the issue of Taiwan (Tsang 67). In situations where nearly all United Nations sovereign or member states have taken part, such as WHO – World Health Organization, ROC has been entirely left out, whereas in others such as WTO – World Trade Organization, ROC takes part under strange names such as Chinese Taipei in APEC, IOC and “Separate Customs Body of Taiwan, Matsu, Kimmen and Penghu (just shortened as “Chinese Taipei”) in WTO. The issues of Republic of China’s name came under harsh scrutiny at the 2006 World Baseball Classic (Tsang 67). The team charged with organizing the 16 member tournament planned to refer to Taiwan as Taiwan but changed to Chinese Taipei after facing immense pressure from PRC (Tsang 68). The Republic of China argued against the decision stating that the Word Basketball Classic is not an IOC event, but still they did not succeed. In addition, the ISO directory of names of nations, as well as territories registers Taiwan distinctively from and the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan if given TW and PRC is given CN. However, the ISO considers Taiwan as a province of China rooted in the name used by UN under PRC pressure. Finally, in ISO 3166-2: CN, Taiwan is as coded CN-71 in China, therefore making the island a fraction of China under ISO 3166-1, as well as ISO 3166-2 categories (Tsang 68). Naming problems surrounding Taiwan continue to be a controversial issue in NGOs like the Lions Club, which went through considerable debate naming its Taiwanese subdivision (Tsang 68). Part 3: Impacts and solutions 4. The impact of the Taiwan issue to the international community i) Sino-US relations and the Taiwan Issue With an aim resolving the matter of United States arms sales to Taiwan, the American and Chinese governments held talks for almost 10 months and reached an accord on 17th August, 1982 (Carpenter 45). On that day, 17th August, the two groups issued the China-U.S. (Sino-U.S.) Joint Communique, wherein the United States Government reaffirms that it has no goal to chase a policy of "one Taiwan, one China" or together known as "two Chinas" and it "does not endeavor to perform a long-standing policy of arms sales in Taiwan (Carpenter 45). The United States confirmed that its arms sales to the island in conflict will not exceed in either quantitative or qualitative terms. The U.S.’s stand on Taiwan is also echoed in the Taiwan Relations Act, abbreviated as TRA (Carpenter 45). The United States persists on the serene and peaceful resolution of cross-passage differences and supports dialogue to assist advance such a result. The United States does not hold up Taiwan’s sovereignty (Carpenter 46). The former president of the United States, George W. Bush, affirmed on 9th December, 2003, that the his country does not support any endeavor by either side to unilaterally change the state of affairs in the Taiwan Strait. Whereas the U.S. welcomes fresh exchanges, which improve channels of communication between statesmen in Taipei and Beijing, the United States urges Taipei and Beijing to further improve cross-Strait relations, comprising of direct talks between the lawmakers in Beijing, as well as the elected leaders in Taiwan (Carpenter 46). Keeping diplomatic affairs with the PRC has been acknowledged to be in the long-standing concentration of the U.S. by seven successive leaders, but maintaining a well built relation with Taiwan is a key U.S. endeavor. ii) East Asian countries and the Taiwan Issue Lately, the regimes of Singapore and Australia gave high-status warnings to Taiwan to keep away from actions, which might aggravate Beijing and establish a military crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Tucker 34). The two regimes highlighted that they would not assist Taiwan if they gradually continue with their assertive efforts to merge their de facto sovereignty from China and cause armed conflict. Those remarks reflect the raising concern throughout East Asia that pressure over the Taiwan issue are starting to attain alarming levels. It is clear that Singapore and Australia were sending Taiwan a direct message (Tucker 34). What is unclear, but significant is that they were also conveying a vital message to the United States that do not rely on your allies and friends in the area to help you accomplish your pledge to secure Taiwan. Provided the conduct and statements of the East Asian nations concerning the Taiwan issue over the past 10 years, this did not surprise the United States (Tucker 35). Nearly all of the East Asian regimes made a rigorous effort to distance their regulations from that of the U.S. when the Clinton government dispatched two carriers to the western Pacific to show concern on rising tensions in Taiwan, in 1996. The Philippines and South Korea both highlighted that their “joint” defense agreements with the United States did not cover unforeseen events in Taiwan. Such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia and Thailand, contented themselves with the commonplace response of finding it important to restraint all sides (Tucker 35). In reality, they echoed Beijing’s stand that Taiwan is a traitor province. Even Japan, the main ally of the U.S., only articulated “understanding” of the marine deployment. 5. The possible resolution of Taiwan Issue i) Military Solutions and Interventions Until 1979, both sides planned to settle the conflict militarily. Intermittent clashes took place all through the 50’s and 60’s, with increases including the First, as well as the Second Taiwan Strait conflicts (Tsang 67). In 1979, with the United States amend of diplomatic acknowledgment to PRC, ROC lost its supporter required to recover the mainland. For the time being, the PRC's urge to be accepted in the global community forced it to promote diplomatic amalgamation under what would later be known "two systems, one country" instead of "liberating Taiwan" and to make the island a unique administrative region. The United States warned that military and security developments concerning PRC, in 2011, might cause the use of force to be varied. They have adopted an official declaration of Taiwan sovereignty (Tsang 67). The likelihood of war conspired to make the region one of the most observed focal points of the Pacific. Both sides have opted to have a strong naval existence. Nevertheless, naval methods between both powers significantly shifted in the 80s and 90s, whereas the ROC adopted a more defensive position by buying and building frigates, as well as missile destroyers. PRC, on the other hand, adopted a more aggressive stance through creating long-range cruise missiles, as well as supersonic surface-to-surface missiles (Tsang 68). Even though, the PRC’s Liberation Army Air Force was large, a majority of its fleet comprised of the very old generation J-7 fighters, increasing worries over the PLAAF's capacity to control the airspace of Taiwan in the event of a disagreement. Since mid-90s, the People’s Republic of China has been buying and also confining the SU-27 based fighters (Tsang 68). ii) Peace Negotiations The Chinese government is vigorously and sincerely struggling for peaceful reunification (Shirk 34). In order to achieve this, the regime has demanded repeatedly for cross-Straits negotiations on the grounds of equality, as well as the One-China Principle (Shirk 34). Taking Taiwan's political truth into consideration and out of concern for the Taiwan authorities' appeal for the talks to be held on equal footing, China has suggested a number of proposals (Shirk 34). The negotiations are held between CPC – Communist Party of China – and KMT on a mutual basis and China recognizes that the talks between the two groups might comprise of representatives from all parties and mass institutions of Taiwan. The Chinese regime has also suggested that dialogues might start first and may increasingly move on to bureaucratic consultations for political discussions to solve the topics for discussion (Shirk 35). First, peaceful talks are held and an accord reached to end hostility between the two groups under the policy of one China in order to equally safeguard China's independence and territorial uprightness, as well as work out plans for the growth of the future inter-Straits affairs. In January, 1998, with an aim of seeking and expanding the political basis for affairs between the two groups, the Chinese regime openly suggested to the Taiwan side that prior to the understanding of reunification and in managing affairs about inter-Straits affairs, particularly during the talks between the two groups, the One-China Principle must upheld, specifically that there is just one China in the globe, Taiwan is a province of China and China's independence is not to be split (Shirk 35). The Chinese regime wishes that the two groups will hold consultations on peacefully and talk about national reunification together. iii) Peaceful Reunification The One-China Principle is the founding stone for the Chinese regime’s policy on Taiwan (Gill 94). The Chinese regime has from 1979 adopted the policy of peaceful reunification, as well as gradually evolved the scientific idea of “two systems in one country.” On these grounds, China set the basic rule of peaceful reunification (Gill 94). The main points of this principle, as well as the relevant policies are that China will do its level best to attain diplomatic reunification, but will not entrust itself to prohibit the application of force (Gill 95). China also pledged to enhance people-to-people contacts and cultural and financial exchanges between the two regions of the Taiwan Straits and commence on direct trade, air, postal, as well as shipping services as soon as possible. Following the reunification, the policy of "one country, two systems" was practiced, with the China’s mainland going on with its socialist movement, and Taiwan preserving its capitalist movement. Following the reunification, Taiwan enjoyed a high level of independence and the Central Government did not send administrative personnel or troops to be positioned in Taiwan (Gill 95). Settled of the Taiwan issue was an internal affair of China, which was settled by China, and there was no need for assistance from foreign forces. The abovementioned policies and principles embody the basic spirit and stand of sticking to the One-China Principle, and completely value Taiwan compatriots' desire to administer and govern Taiwan by themselves. Peaceful means were positive to the ordinary growth of the societies on both regions of the Straits, and to the unity and harmony of the nationals across the Straits (Gill 95). 6. The conclusion i) Answer to the thesis statement The Taiwan issue goes back to 1623 when the Dutch people colonized the island (Bush, and O'Hanlon 23). However, the current matter with the Chinese government received international recognition following the Second World War. The matter went to the extent of starting a war, but was managed by some earlier intercessions. From the viewpoint of ROC’s constitution, which the major political parties like the DPP and KMT presently know and respect, altering the ROC's governing status or entirely illuminating Taiwan's political status would best need amending the constitution (Bush, and O'Hanlon 23). In essence, if reunification endorsers need to reunify Taiwan with mainland China in such a manner that would efficiently eliminate the Republic of China or influence ROC's independence, or if sovereignty supporters needed to eliminate the Republic of China and launch a Republic of Taiwan, they would also have to abolish or amend the Republic of China’s constitution and rewrite a new constitution. ii) Bring some new ideas to the topic Unity has, at all times, been the major trend in the growth of the Chinese history. After every separation, the nation was regularly reunified just to be followed in its wake by rapid economic, political, cultural, as well as scientific and technological development (Bush 156). The Chinese Government anticipates that the global community will endorse the policy of one and that the United States will sincerely fulfill all the policies on the Taiwan conflict in the three Sino-US mutual communiques. As the Chinese regime has successively continued the practice of independence over Macao and Hong Kong, the people of China are keen to determine the Taiwan issue as soon as possible and identify the total reunification of the nation. They cannot let the decision of the Taiwan issue to be deferred indefinitely (Bush 156). I strongly consider that the total reunification of this country will be attained through the mutual efforts of Chinese people comprising of compatriots on sides Taiwan and those living in foreign nations. Works Cited Bush, Richard and O'Hanlon, Martin. A War like No Other: the Truth about China’s Challenge to America. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley Press, 2007. Print. Bush, Richard. Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. Print. Carpenter, Thomas. America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Print. Cole, Brian. Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects. New York: Routledge, 2008. Print. Gill, Bill. Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007. Print. Shirk, Sarah. China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print. Tsang, Sang. If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. New York: Routledge, 2006. Print. Tucker, Nathan. Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. Print. Read More