Realism: the Role of International Organizations - Essay Example

?………………… ………………… Realism: the Role of International Organizations Introduction Scholars and researchers in the field of International Relations widely agree that realism depicts the international system as a “brutal arena” where states seek to take advantage over each other and have “little reason to trust each other” (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 9). According to that opinion, insofar as the struggle for power is essentially the omnipresent element which determine the very functioning of whole system, each state not only strive to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to make certain that no other state will endanger or achieve that status (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 9). Therefore, even if not a constant state of war, international relations would appear a state of “relentless security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background” (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 9). This paper examines the role of institutions in the system of international relations, most notably their capacity, or alternatively, incapacity to prevent war and foster stability, as perceived by the realist tradition; as well as the degree to which institutions actually contribute to cooperation in a realist world. 2. Realism and International Institutions There are between four and five major assumptions about the international system identified with realism, which actually denote the main lines of realist tradition and form the basis for the development of any hypothesis or theory (Viotti and Kauppi 55; Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 10). These perceive the international system to be an anarchic environment, where the principal actors – states – do possess varying offensive military capability, hence the means of mutual destruction, and are anything but certain about the intentions of other states; furthermore, being overwhelmingly driven by their most basic motive, namely survival, states think strategically “about how to survive in the international system”, hence states are considered “instrumentally rational” (Viotti and Kauppi 55; Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 10). On the other hand, Mearsheimer defines institutions as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other”, prescribing acceptable forms of state’s behavior, as well as the unacceptable ones; while other definitions encompass virtually all of international relations, i.e. from tariff bindings to war (“The False Promise“, 8). According to Young, however, the latter is too broad a definition for a meaningful concept (cited in Mearsheimer 8). Realists, in turn, recognize that states operate – at least sometimes – through institutions (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 13). Insofar as in non-hierarchic political orders each political actor, i.e. state, must count on its own resources to realize its interests, and order is not imposed by a higher authority, but rather arises from the interactions between formally equal political partners, institutions – as understood by Mearsheimer (see above) – inevitably reflect states’ calculations of self-interest (Waltz 107; Donnelly 17; Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 13). Thus, according to realism, the most powerful states in the international system “create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it”; hence institutions largely mirror the distribution of power within the system (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 13). Or in other words, institutions are regarded as “arenas for acting out power relationships” (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 13). Assuming that states are the principal actors in the international system, institutions – as a set of rules defining states’ behavior – are negotiated by states and inevitably entail the mutual acceptance of higher norms, “defined in terms of rights and obligations” (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 8; Viotti and Kauppi 55). As Mearsheimer points out, these rules are formalized in international agreements, being usually embodied in organizations with their own budget and personnel; whereas international organizations, like NATO for example, are composed of separate, independent states which determine what these organizations, or institutions, will do (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 8-9; Viotti and Kauppi 55). On the other hand, according to Mearsheimer, it’s not the organization per se that compels states to follow the higher norms; rather each state decides whether to obey the rules or not (“The False Promise“, 9). Therefore, institutions are not a form of world government, but a call for “the decentralized cooperation of individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of command” (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 9). 3. Realism and Cooperation Although cooperation in a realist world does take place, it’s both difficult to achieve and sustain, being generally inhibited by two factors, as follows – concern about cheating and relative-gains considerations (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 12). As Mearsheimer points out, states that contemplate cooperating with other states must consider the distribution of profits or gains among them; which thinking could be in terms of absolute gains, namely each side to maximize its own profit with a little care about the other side gains or losses, or as alternatively, in terms of relative gains, where each side considers not only its own gains, but also how they are compared to those of the other side (“The False Promise“, 12). According to a realist assumption, in regard to the balance of power, the relative-gains logic has the upper hand when states consider cooperation, which, however, hinders cooperation or at least complicates cooperative efforts (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 12-13). Another major impediment to cooperation is the concern about cheating insofar as states are reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements due to fears that the other side may cheat and gain relative advantage; thus, the shifts in the balance of power in the military realm could create “a window of opportunity” for the cheating state to decisively defeat the other state (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise“, 13). Game theory is used for developing hypotheses about the causes of various international phenomena, including the formation and maintenance of international organizations (Viotti and Kauppi 56). One particular game – as stated by Donnelly – offers a “striking realist paradigm” in regard to cooperation and concerns about cheating, namely the Prisoner’s Dilemma (19). The theory model involves two rational actors each faced with two available choices, or strategies to follow – one fundamentally cooperative and the other essentially competitive (Donnelly 19). A variant of Prisoner’s Dilemma is the so-called “security dilemma”, which is especially applied to international relations, where “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others (Herz 4 and Jervis 169, cited in Donnelly 21-22). Mearsheimer points out that balance-of-power logic more often than not makes states willing to form alliances and thus cooperate against common enemies (“The False Promise“, 13). The formation of alliances – being outer-directed institutions, primarily concerned with deterring, coercing and defeating in war other states, or coalition of states – is not only the security dilemma personified, but is also rather indicative of the way cooperation occurs in an essentially competitive world, where states have enough powerful incentives to take advantage over other states (Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply”, 83; “The False Promise“, 13). On the other hand, rivals could, and do cooperate just as allies, especially when deals, which roughly reflect the distribution of power, are struck to satisfy concerns about cheating; which point is sufficiently illustrated by the various arms control agreements signed by the superpowers during the Cold War (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise”, 13). NATO appears the genuine article of realist thinking about institutions – having played a vital role in deterring the Soviet threat and thus preventing World War III, the alliance was basically a “manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War” (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise”, 13-14; “A Realist Reply”, 83). Thus, it was the balance-of-power logic, but not NATO per se that provided the key to “the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions” (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Mearsheimer, “The False Promise”, 14). The enlargement of NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union denoted the new distribution of power in Europe, which, in actual fact, has substantiated the realist claim that the organization cannot remain “as it was during the Cold War” (see Mearsheimer, “The False Promise”, 14). 4. Conclusion As already stated above, realism do recognize that states – both rivals and allies – sometimes cooperate through institutions despite concerns about cheating and other barriers to cooperation; however, such institutions, or rules – according to Mearsheimer’s view – reflect first and foremost states’ self-interest based on the international distribution, or balance of power (“The False Promise”, 13). Therefore, it’s not the organization, or institution per se that enforces cooperation; hence, the balance of power is considered “the independent variable that explains war, whereas institutions appear merely an intervening variable in the process (Mearsheimer, “The False Promise”, 13). . Works Cited Donnelly, J. Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Print Mearsheimer, John J. “The False Promise of International Institutions”. International Security, Winter 1994/1995 Vol.19 (3), pp. 5 – 49, 1994. Web. 11 December 2013. ---. “A Realist Reply”. International Security, Summer 1995 Vol. 20 (1), pp. 82 – 93, Web. December 12, 2013. < http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0022.pdf> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949. Web. 14 December 2013. Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. International Relations Theory. 5th ed. New Jersey: Pearson, 2011. Print Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics, 1st ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1979. Print Read More