Successes, Failures and Politicization of Aid in Somalia 1991-2012 - Dissertation Example

?Success and Failures of Aid in Somalia Discuss in 1000 words the different theoretical aspect of ‘What the successes and failures of AID in Somalia 1991-2012 are? The successes and failures of aid in Somalia from 1991 to 2012 can be viewed based on the objectivist theory which indicates that economic and political structures often lead to conflicts. In this case, failures in the political structures in Somalia brought about the failures of aid from 1991 to 2012. These political structures include the lack of permanent ruling government power in the country, mostly as a by-product of the civil strife which broke out during the early 1990s in the country (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). Due to the politics involved, the response to the needs of the people was very much delayed. Limited public interest in the crisis also led to issues in the distribution of aid. There has been much politicking in the UN agencies on the distribution of aid in Somalia (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). The UN processes were also ineffective as they were more process focused, not results focused. The strong competition with the NGOs also made things complicated. Risk adversity also became the principle of the humanitarian agencies. A contributing issue is accountability, where donors held the organizations responsible for what they did, and not carrying out sufficient crisis response measures for this issue (Warsame, 2012). The intense media scrutiny also presented problems and the aid agencies were delayed in their aid. Institutional interests were also given more importance than beneficiaries. The release of aid is still an industry; as proof small organizations which used to engage in aid are not multinational organizations with vast influence and budgets (Wiles, et.al., 2004). Through such changes, the need to protect the reputation of the company seems to take more importance. With the professionalization of the aid industry, the people manning such activities have also become professionalized. Careers have now been borne from such industry and the hiring of experienced personnel has become more important (Wiles, et.al., 2004). In some instances, lack of accountability was observed. With the gaps in the integrity of the system, the lack of soul-searching in the humanitarian community following the Somalia famine was unexpected. This may have been credited to the shortcomings in the system, alongside limited public and media interests which allowed the humanitarian community to persist with limited considerations made on their impact on Somalia (Wiles, et.al., 2004). A semblance of success in securing humanitarian aid in Somalia can be attributed to support gained from the civil society. However, even as civil society has a significant role to play in supporting unarmed civilians, civil society often suffers from limited support (IRIN News, 2009). In a 2009 appeal made by concerned civilian agencies seeking humanitarian aid in Somalia, their appeal amounted to $919 million, indicating increasing needs with allocations also requested for air transportation. The limits of the aid are based on the capacity and resources of the international community and there is a need to secure a partnership to fill in the gaps (IRIN News, 2009). The civil society has already paid significantly for their assistance to the poor. Access to south-central Somalia where the humanitarian needs are significant, much conflict has been seen especially with the abduction of aid workers (IRIN News, 2009). The security situation has not improved much for aid workers in the country. Two major NGOs have temporarily suspended their operations in the country and aid agencies have also been conflicted with the problem of piracy (IRIN News, 2009). Most times, humanitarian access has become unpredictable, and despite such issue, successful aid groups have still responded to the crisis. These agencies have understood that their responsibility to respond should be given as much credit as their responsibility to protect (IRIN News, 2009). These agencies understand that Somalia must not be dismissed like the situation is already the normal and accepted way of doing things. Success for aid groups have also been credited to the effective prioritization of aid for those needing aid (Harvard University, 2012). At present, majority of aid allocations are for food aid. Such priority is unavoidable. Aside from such concern, these aid organizations also understand that the country is suffering an economic crisis. Helping manage the economic crisis is a significant burden for these aid groups especially as success would mean a greater independence for the country (Harvard University, 2012). So far, efforts of aid agencies have not been successful in the stabilisation of Somali economy. Nevertheless, much success in aid and in the country can potentially be secured if their economic crisis would be managed. Failures in humanitarian aid in Somalia is also based on the negative experience which recipients have gone through, mostly in relation to aid agencies also seeking political ends and leverage for their group or their country (Weir, 2009). This situation has not been localized to Somalia alone, but has also been seen in other countries where the rendering of aid has been politicized by the aid groups. History notes the assistance given by the US to Iran during the reign of Pahlavi with the US being a major influence for the executive decisions of Pahlavi in exchange for foreign assistance (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000). Other instances in the politicisation of aid were also noted in other countries including Zimbabwe, Pakistan, and Rwanda. In these countries, aid has often been politicized, with warlords being knowingly or unknowingly supported by these aid groups. In the case of Somalia, the civilians have become recipients of failures in aid, with various political groups, subversives, and other organizations interfering in the pathways of aid. In the end, the people who actually need the aid are not getting the help they need while their country is persistently plunged into an economic and political crisis. 2. Discuss in 2000 words “What factors caused the Politicization of Aid in Somalia 1991-2012” Humanitarian assistance is based on the principles of neutrality and the general perception that assistance must be delivered strictly, based on need. However, such aid can sometimes be subject to political and strategic manipulation (Harvard University, 2012). Large stocks of food and other supplies have significant financial value, especially in areas which have seen much conflict and where there is widespread deprivation. Aid can have a legitimizing impact, establishing political power for individuals and organizations which are intermediaries for aid organizations and the population in need (Harvard University, 2012). This is hardly a new issue because as long as aid has been distributed, issues on manipulation have been heard. However, these issues further gained notice in the 1990s when news of armed groups siphoning aid from aid agencies were observed (Warsame, 2012). This was seen in Somalia and in Rwanda, following the genocide. The political impact of aid has been noted by international political actors in order to facilitate peace building, and as a means of gaining popular support for various governments. Aid is often used as a political incentive or a polarizing resource (Warsame, 2012). It violates the concept of impartiality, often offering aid to further political goals and depriving the civilians in need. It also often endangers aid workers, especially as they may often look like they are working to support a group’s initiatives. In Somalia, this politicisation of aid has reemerged. The Special Representative of the Secretary General declared specific expectations on aid organizations and UN agencies falling in line with political goals (Gartenstein-Ross, 2009). The Representative also declared that agencies would have to stop delivering aid to areas which are opposed to the Transitional Federal Government. As such, this declaration condemned civilians in the non TFG regions to suffer economic hardships. Some humanitarian groups have not supported this declaration (Harvard University, 2012). For these agencies, the humanitarians in Somalia have not been willing to accept that their aid has political effects. These groups admit that they would likely make deals with the devil in order to deliver aid, however, humanitarians recognize much care in mitigating the possible harmful impact of their aid. Most aid groups seek the same ends – safety and security for the Somalis (Gartenstein-Ross, 2009). However, short-term and long-term activities and strategies cannot be sacrificed at the expense of the other. The limited trust between the humanitarians and politicians has further broken down. In the end, the most appropriate means to manage the situation refers to the strengthening of the TFG and legitimizing it in order to secure internal and external security; the TFG can also secure improved conditions for the people within normal parameters (Menkhaus, 2007). For now, the work done must be constructive, without compromising both humanitarian and political goals. One of the issues in the management of humanitarian aid in Somalia is the Shabaad interference. The Al-Shabaab are an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union determined to replace the TFG (Harvard University, 2012). They have persistently interfered with humanitarian activities to Somalia by preventing access using various methods, including the imposition of taxes on organizations trying to deliver aid to the country. They have been known to kidnap and sometimes have killed some aid workers (US Department of State, 2011). Based on reports from the OCHA, the Shabaad also called for humanitarian agencies to register and then pay $3000 fee for security protection in the Hiraan region (OCHA Somalia, 2009). The Al-Shabaab has also demanded that the humanitarian agencies register and submit the list of their staff (OCHA Somalia, 2010). At some point in 2011, Al-Shabaab members blocked international aid agency Medecins Sans Frontieres from leaving one of the Somali towns (MSF, 2011). At about the same time, the OCHA also noted that in the Marka area, the Al-Shabaab called for NGO staff in the district to pay tax from their salaries to the administration. They justified tax collection for allocations to support communities affected by drought in the area (OCHA Somalia, 2011). This group has also banned the entry of the various UN agencies, including the UNICEF, the UNHCR, and the WHO, especially in the areas they were controlling. They claim that these agencies have been carrying out illegal activities and various acts of misconduct in these areas (IRIN, 2011). In 2012, the Al-Shabaab also prevented entry of the International Committee of the Red Cross, especially in areas they controlled after they claimed that the organization distributed expired food to the beneficiaries. In 2010, the Monitoring Group also reported collusion between the World Food Programme (WFP) ground transporters and the implementing staff which then caused misallocation of about 50% of food assistance intended for beneficiaries. The Al-Shabaab in this case apparently received 5-10% of aid in regions they were controlling. The WFP strongly rejected these claims, however the report gained much attention from the media and the public; the fact that the report itself, including the WFP’s response was later leaked heightened the awareness and sensitivity to the issue of aid in Somalia (Harvard University). Another factor in the politicisation of Somali aid can be referred to the lack of clarity about their laws. The Al-Shabaab control of humanitarian access and aid has made relief workers unsure about the legality of their dealings with the Al-Shabaab, mostly because there is an uncertainty on whether these actions can be classified as counterterrorism (Margon, 2011). Different US authorities have sought to provide clarifications on options which are available to humanitarian organizations; still, confusion is prevalent. The Office of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in 2011 submitted a report on the relief efforts in Somalia (2011). The report sought to provide answers to the public on the donations they want to make to the country. However, the Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) interlocutors who were carrying out aid operations in Somalia declare that the OFAC report is still significantly lacking in answers (Harvard University, 2012). The OFAC document seems to apply only to the State Department and the USAID grantees, and is not applicable to other organizations, including European organizations. Moreover, the report indicates that some activities would not be sanctioned by the OFAC, and that their sanctions only apply to specific activities, mostly instances where humanitarian agencies unintentionally pay taxes to the Al-Shabaab (Harvard University, 2012). Incidentally, the intentional payment of taxes is still a main focus for the OFAC. Third, the criminal provision negating support for terrorist organizations is still very much in full force. Humanitarian agencies in Somalia are hardly clear on the situation and the legal consequences are very much difficult to unravel considering the limitations of the Somali legal system (Harvard University, 2012). The international community has also expressed a significant commitment in funding assistance for Somalia. From 2006 to 2010 alone, contributions reached about $2.4 billion (Financial Tracking Service, 2011). The international community also committed about $1.3 billion in aid to Somalia as of June 2012 with an additional pledge of about $6 million. These significant amounts however indicate decreased funding from major donors, based on reports from DARA (DARA, 2010). The DARA declares that donations from the US, the UK, Japan, Italy, and France for Somalia decreased in 2009. The reason for such decrease is undetermined, however, reports indicate that the donors concerns about misappropriation of funds may have heightened their concern about the allocation of aid (Harvard University, 2012). Moreover, some donors have also expressed the need for compliance requisites to prevent the misallocation of their aid. Humanitarian workers from different organizations have indicated their concerns on compliance requisites, including documentation, latitude and longitude coordinates have become very much burdensome requisites (Draper, 2009). The HPCR discussions with main interlocutors indicate that the local and international NGOs have struggled to manage the increase of project reporting, specifically in terms of decreased funding (Draper, 2009). Some humanitarian workers have also expressed issues on data collected for compliance measures, and how these may sometimes be used for counterterrorism activities. Due to these concerns, some international agencies have chosen not to consider funding from other donors including the USAID (Silva, 2009). Issues in the compliance of requirements are made difficult by the fact that due to security issues, humanitarian organizations which used to function in south and central Somalia have withdrawn and changed their focus towards the support of local organizations (Menkhaus, 2009). Some of these organizations have also managed to secure limited presence in affected areas after relinquishing international staff who remotely managed local staff. These activities are considered essential by humanitarians for the end purpose of protecting aid workers; however, these can also lead to the loss of accountability and the possible diversion of aid (Menkhaus, 2009). Al-Qaida members distributing aid to Somalia may be an unexpected picture for most people; however for those who have been displaced by the wars and by the famine, al-Qaida is “as good as anyone else giving them something to eat” (Osman, 2011). Since a famine was declared in the country in July 2011, various aid groups have entered Somalia. Al-Qaida seems to be the latest group to join in the aid industry in Somalia. Al-Qaida is ally to the Al-Shabaab group and as such, the group has further earned the ire of the international community for its complicity with the Al-Qaida (Osman, 2011). Various international organizations are still working towards supporting those who have been affected by the problem, by managing work in government-controlled areas or partnering with other organizations. However, Al-Shabaab has also accepted contributions from Muslim charities from the Middle East, so it is confusing why the Al-Shabaab is banning some groups and inviting the Al-Qaida into the aid industry in Somalia (Le Sage, 2009). Most Somalis are suspicious of western aid groups. They fear that these aid groups often support warlords and specific political groups and influential families. Following the end of the Siad Barre regime, major agencies set up an aid system in Somalia and to date, these major aid groups are still present (Osman, 2011). Although most Somalis are happy for their support, they are also not comfortable with their role in the Somali conflict. Osman (2011) discussed his observations on aid corruption in Somalia and attest to the issues relating to its prevalence in Somali society. Osman (2011) also cites the UN report unveiling issues in the work of the WFP. This incident implies that the link to aid organizations and warlords or subversive groups is a very apparent link. As a result, most Somalis believe that these aid organizations and warlords are helping prolong the war. As a result, the concept of blood aid has been considered for Somalia. Staying neutral is also another huge issue being faced by the aid groups in Somalia. Although some groups dislike the Al-Shabaab, the group argues that they are preventing some agencies from entering the aid industry of Somalia because they claim that these groups are also supporting what they consider as their enemies (Chothia, 2011). For instance, the African Union soldiers which are defending the Somali transition government is being funded by the UN. The UN even established a trust fund for Somalia in order to support the African Union goals for Somalia and to assist in the training of Somali security forces (Osman, 2011). For the Al-Shabaab, they believe that, if a group is funding their enemy, then the group would be considered an enemy as well. Recent aid groups from the Muslim community, including Kimse Yok Mu from Turkey and the Humanitarian Relief Foundations, as well as the International Islamic Charitable Organizaion and the Islamic Relief of UK seem to be more practical in their approach (Osman, 2011). These groups have chosen to avoid Somali politics, carefully selecting their partners, avoiding any affiliation with warlords and recruiting staff with reputable track records. These groups are actually able to function in Somalia without the fear of being killed or kidnapped, especially as Somalis perceive them to be genuine in their desire to help (Rollins, 2010). Foreign aid agencies also do not understand the complex nature of the Somali society. Their failure to understand the Somali situation will continue to push them out of the aid industry in Somalia. Word goes around fast in the country on which organizations are funding political groups and this makes these groups targets for attacks. Where the humanitarian community has a genuine desire to help, there is a need to redefine their role and impact in Somali society (Rollins, 2010). A non-political and non-partisan work with non-corrupt actors must be considered in order to prevent groups like Al-Qaida from trying to fill the void created by these aid groups. References Chothia, F., 2011. Could Somali famine deal a fatal blow to al-Shabab? [online]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14373264 [Accessed 13 April 2013]. DARA, 2010. Somalia crisis report 2010 [online]. 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