The Greatest Enemy of the Mighty Roman Legionnaires - Term Paper Example

Hannibal: The Greatest Enemy of the Mighty Roman Legionnaires Introduction The Battle of Cannae is truly considered one of the greatest battles in military history. It is regarded as one of the great successes of battle stratagem. The battle strategies of Hannibal have gained much attention among military scholars all over the world. At Cannae, the powerful Roman army attacked the outnumbered Hannibal. The events that followed were a tour de force of battle strategies. The Romans were unexpectedly defeated. This essay attempts to prove that Hannibal’s victory at the Battle of Cannae should be attributed to the Carthaginian general’s tactical brilliance, and not to mere luck (i.e. the Roman army was seriously weakened by earlier battles). If Hannibal had exploited his triumph by attacking Rome, the Roman historian Livy believes, the Romans would have been obliged to bring peace claims. However, Hannibal decided not to attack Rome at the moment. Livy believes that this judgment was the ‘salvation of the Roman state.’1 The Battle of Cannae In 217 BC, Hannibal based his army near the Adriatic coast and kept on destroying villages in southern Italy.2 Polybius recounts that Hannibal was deeply informed of the problems posed by the Italian invasion and was aware that his main predicament would be resources.3 Rome was very weak at the time because of the massive losses it sustained the year prior. Still, Rome assigned Quintus Fabius Maximus as the new leader. Because Hannibal has a mightier cavalry, Fabius rested his army in the hills in order to reverse this advantage, resorting to the attack-retreat strategy. This was shrewd and successful given the changing balance of power after the defeats at Trasimeno and Trebia4: “The Romans hovered in the vicinity of the Carthaginians, cut off stragglers and foragers, and prevented them from founding a permanent base. The strategy avoided Roman defeat and dimmed Hannibal’s glory. It successfully kept Rome’s allies from declaring for Carthage, but it aroused great opposition among Romans themselves, for their state had thrived on a tradition of offensive warfare.”5 However, this was only a brief success. Fabius tried fearlessly to attack the Carthaginians in Falernia. He made sure that Hannibal was caught off guard. That moment, seeing his position as hopeless, Hannibal brought together all the animals in his encampment. He attached flares to each of them and made them attack the Roman encampment. Fear and bewilderment followed. Masked in darkness, with terror raging in the Roman encampment, Hannibal withdrew his whole army of 70,000 soldiers without any fatality on his side.6 Fabius had successfully held back Hannibal for six months, but the Senate decided to end his tenure as commanding officer and assigned two ambassadors, Varro and Paulus. They had realized that to confront Hannibal with not enough advantage would lead to a definite tragedy. Hence, they amassed a huge army: “Rome assembled the largest army they had ever placed in the field, eighty thousand infantry, and seven thousand cavalry.”7 Hannibal passed through the Aufidus River. The river was actually a barricade in case of defeat. Hannibal planned to take advantage of this positioning to tempt the Roman army to attack. Another lure, even though unintended, was that all of the elephants of Hannibal had been wiped out. It would be a war between two remarkably trained armed forces, the Carthaginians being outnumbered by the Roman army.8 Both the Roman and Carthaginian armies were organized in traditional order, the cavalry on both flanks and the infantry in the middle. However, Hannibal placed his less reliable Spanish and Gauls foot soldiers at the forefront, while keeping his powerful African infantry on both flanks. This worked as bait for the attacking Roman army, who attacked the Spaniards and Gauls, pushing them, just like what Hannibal had planned. As a result, the U-shaped Carthaginian formation became bowl-shaped, drooping threateningly inward.9 The Roman army, delighted with their obvious triumph, huddled into this gap thinking they were destroying Hannibal’s front. At this instant Hannibal signaled his African troops to attack inward from the flanks, attacking the Roman side and enclosing them into a compactly crammed mass. In the meantime the strong cavalry of Hannibal on the left side had infiltrated the helpless Roman cavalry. Hannibal’s strong cavalry made the ultimate attack by infiltrating the back of the Roman army, already overwhelmed and cornered on three flanks the Romans were not able to retaliate or even defend themselves. Of the 87,000 Roman soldiers that fought at the Battle of Cannae, only 6,000 went home alive to bear witness to one of the greatest failures of the Roman Empire. Hannibal merely lost roughly 6,000 soldiers.10 Hannibal’s Battle Strategy at Cannae Hannibal emerged victorious at the Battle of Cannae by enclosing and exterminating the whole Roman defense force in southern Italy. Hannibal confronted the first lethal Roman army straight out. Cannae was in fact a surprising abandonment of the traditional Western military framework: Carthaginians were the aggressors— outnumbered, depending mostly on the expertise of their general and the obedience of the army, facing a numerically bigger but weakly governed Roman army. Hannibal employed battle strategies largely unknown to the Romans. His talent to outwit his adversary, while outnumbered by an expertly trained, advanced army, made him one of the greatest innovative battle strategists. It also forced the Roman army to remodel and restructure their military leadership. The general strategy of Hannibal was to carry an army to Italy, passing through the Alps, to force the Romans to leave the Carthaginians alone. His exact tactic was to outwit on the battlefield. Suffering from two defeats against Hannibal prior to the Battle of Cannae, the Romans were forced to form the biggest army they had ever built. Hannibal had 10,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry, compared to the 6,000 cavalry and 70,000 infantry of Rome, at the Battle of Cannae.11 Hannibal emerged victorious at the Battle of Cannae because the commanding officer of the Roman army was totally unaware of the formation and composition of the Carthaginian army. According to the prominent military theorist, Clausewitz, numerical advantage was constantly “the most decisive factor in battle”.12 The Roman commander greatly relied on the huge advantage of his army. In his statement prior to the battle, the Roman leader expressed absolute certainty of his imminent success. He planned to conquer the outnumbered Carthaginian forces in the traditional Roman tactic, by a strong frontal offensive. Terentius Varro was taken aback when Hannibal loosened his forefront and risked the chance of enveloping his much greater enemy despite their outnumbered position. The earlier battles of the Trebia and the Ticinus had been successful because of the triumphs of the Carthaginian cavalry over the Roman cavalry.13 Hannibal also employed the barricade or encirclement strategy in his earlier battles. Afterward he isolated for the attack against the flanks of the opponent only a few but agile troops and cavalry which allowed the Roman army to infiltrate his center and to enclose a huge part of their army. Carthaginian success at Cannae was already certain when the cavalry of Hannibal assaulted the Roman rear. But the unique and thus astonishing aspect of this battle was the decision of Hannibal to position his finest soldiers, not at the forefront or center, but on both wings, where throughout the initial stages of the battle he concealed them at the back of his mounted soldiers. When the right time came, these soldiers attacked the Roman army’s flanks. It was merely this offensive against the Roman army’s flanks that facilitated the complete destruction of the adversary. Hannibal was definitely outnumbered, but through his untraditional or unique battle strategies, particularly his positioning, he produced relative advantage at the critical moment. When the unaware Roman leader eventually recognized the plan of his enemy, it was already too late to escape defeat. The Battle of Cannae obviously proves that crucial victory is not only the outcome of an ingenious strategy. Triumph is also determined by the mindset of the opponent leader, who should be totally unaware of the real plan of his enemy until it is already too late for him to hit back or defend himself. The ultimate attack should come suddenly and without warning; strength should be faced by weakness if total destruction of the enemy is aimed for. The Battle of Cannae itself was not merely a strategic success; it was also an episode of horrible massacre and massive chaos. Almost 50,000 Roman soldiers were killed in only a few hours, a phenomenal feat of organized massacre, where almost 600 Roman soldiers were killed minute per minute until nightfall hindered the bloodshed.14 Conclusions The assumption that by pure tactical excellence a whole army may be enveloped and exterminated has received massive recognition from later Western strategists who pursued their own Cannae. But even though Hannibal’s military strategies after the Battle of Cannae has been condemned, it is quite easy to overlook the tactical brilliance and absolute power of character that must have largely contributed to Hannibal’s military exploits. In spite of Roman testimonies, it is evident that Hannibal did not lose any important battle until he was overpowered at Zama. However, even though suffering defeat he immediately takes action, and afterward recovered and this is his trademark as a military leader—he did not let his opponent stop him, never wasted his manpower, never attempted to recklessly attack an obstacle, but always kept an open mind. Works Cited Livy. The History of Rome, Volume 1. Thomas Arnold. New York: New York Public Library, 1845. Print. O’Leary, Jeff. The Centurion Principles: Battlefield Lessons for Frontline Leaders. Colorado Springs, CO: Thomas Nelson Inc., 2008. Print. Polybius. The History of Polybius the Megalopolitan: containing a general account of the transactions of the world, and principally of the Roman people, during the first and second Punick wars, &c, Volume 1. John Dryden. Printed for S. Briscoe, 1693. Print. Von Leeb, Ritter & Waldemar Erfurth. Roots of Strategy: 3 Military Classics. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1991. Print. Read More