Democracy in Russia: Should Russia Be Considered a Democratic State - Essay Example

? Democracy in Russia: Should Russia be considered a Democratic Introduction Democracy is a government of the people by the people, and for the people, this government entails people having a say on how things are run by their leaders and also being able to choose their leaders (Lipset and Lakin 2004). After breaking out of the USSR, Russia was considered to be a democracy or better still was viewed by the international community as being a democracy. This paper will go into depth in assessing the Russian democracy as from 1991 up to date and ultimately establish if Russia is a true democracy. A democracy can broadly be defined as a government that has been set up by the people which essentially means that all people living under that government should be entitled to have their opinion considered in everything that affects their lives. Furthermore, democracy can also be exercised directly or indirectly through which people elect their representatives. In light of this, it is absurd that two decades down the line despite the dissolution of USSR president Yeltsin failed to horn our promise to better democracy and improve the lives of Russian citizens. This just proves that Russia is still categorized as one of the authoritarian states in Europe. As much as most of the leaders have improved the country’s economic status both domestic and international policies it is believed that from the essays “not free” a lot of factors have hindered Russia’s democracy development (Motyl 2005). For the first time power within Kremlin changed through the 2000, election this process not only took place but was conducted according to the constitution more than two thirds of the eligible voters participated. They appeared to be well informed of choices to make. However, up to now Russian political conditions do not meet the criteria of democracy; a political framework must be adopted to understand democracy adequately (Chomsky, et al 2003). Some political analysts such as Joseph Schumpeter describes democracy as an institutional arrangement for arriving at a political decision that help politicians in the acquisition of the power necessary for them to decide by way of their struggling to obtain votes from the citizens (Josephi 2010). Basically his definition may suggest that countries only differ in the degree to which institutional conditions are satisfied. Perhaps that is the reason why president Yeltsin ascended to power and failed to live up to his promises. Most Russians still point out that with the rioting on October 2nd the liberal regime suppressed the angry communists. After a time period of approximately ten years since 23 Russian citizens lost their lives, the Russian government is still expounding on the myth that the crackdown was just to topple Mr. Yeltsin political opponents (Lucas 2009). This left many with the view that Mr. Yeltsin is a democratic hypocrite who never had the people’s interests at heart. All he had was his own vested interests. From that moment, descending from power without going to prison for him was inevitable; perhaps that is why he saw in an inherited presidency system as a scapegoat; perhaps that is why he ensured Mr. Vladimir Putin came to power (Marot 2012). When United Russia party chanced to win a working majority in the 2003 Russian Parliamentary elections, the Russian president Putin was seen to set out and attempt to critically undercut most of the opposition parties that were active in the country. He instigated changes in various electoral policies that allowed the government to effectively manage to shut out a variety of the smaller political parties focusing mainly on those that had been perceived as being key advocates of liberal democracy. Other changes that were made caused it to become extremely difficult for parties to manage to field presidential candidates in a presidential ballot (Ethridge and Handelman 2012). Following the unexpected resignation of President Boris Yeltsin in 2000 Vladimir was assigned to the office by Mr. Yeltsin. Though elections are meant to table a platform for the public to practice their political right, Mr. Yeltsin influenced the election to go his way. Similarly, this happened in 2008; both the opposition as well as the public were aware that the candidate who happened to have been chosen by the president would inevitably hold office. This was why in the 2000 the opposition parties received 37% of the total vote with the majority votes going to Vladimir. Though many Western political analysts argued that Putin would shape the country`s democracy, instead he chose to suppress many democratic principles such as the media freedom. He also ensured that joining interest groups was impossible, and as if that was not enough, he ensured there were no civil liberties at all. His government ensured it had full control of the electoral body. During the elections of governors, there were suspected violations of supporters from other political parties. They also ensured that they sponsored spoiler candidates to ensure divide and rule policy. A strategy was laid down to ensure that people acquired voting certificates more easily, manipulation of such certificates was also partisan and, furthermore, all civil servants and other workers voted in their work place under the eyes of their bosses. This scared them to even vote otherwise (Hesli and Reisinger 2003). The government also strengthened the executive with the removal of regional elections and giving the president power s to appoint them directly; this ensured power is centralized within the Russian state. Such changes kept Putin in a position to challenge any view coming from any part of the region in his country. Media being the chief source of information to the public, Putin was willing to stop at nothing in order to ensure it dance to his tune; he ensured that the national televisions, as well as other national newspapers, were overtaken by small organizations that were Kremlin friendly. Even the few journalists who were government critics, for instance Anne Politkovskaya, were killed and the gap between media diversities widened (Arutunyan 2009). Power separation in Russia Even after the resignation of Yeltsin a party allied to Putin gained popularity and dominated the parliament giving the president support over the legislation; he ensured that opposition parties exist under keen monitoring. Despite coming up with programs based on a vision alternative to that of the Kremlin, which was an indication of breaking away from the status quo, they were slowly assimilated by the Kremlin project (McFaul and Andrei Vilenovich 2005). At the present, the united Russia party holds 64% of the seats in parliament making it the majority party in Russia hence reducing other parties such as the Communists party and the Liberal party to 11.57% and 8.14% respectively. The fusing of both the executive and the legislative arms of government has given Putin an upper hand to control the judiciary too. This was immediately after the removal of straight forward judges such like Alexander Melikov who was never intimidated by the government (Kimer 2007) Consequently the widespread bribery has made judges make decisions based on the financial asymmetry favoring parties with a higher bidder. Such decisions have enabled Putin’s government to control a third of the country’s oil industry. Although the Russian government still adheres to the institutional forms of democracy, the actual democracy content is nowhere to be seen (Henderson 2011). Corruption appears to be present everywhere. Discrimination based on sexuality, religion, gender and ethnicity has been widely noted within Russians state. Many people were denied permits to hold services unless the religion had existed for more than 15 years; this was perhaps to prevent them from coming up against the government in the future. This meant that political and social freedom rights, which are prerequisite to development of democracy, was denied to the Russian citizens. Power and transition have become one of the greatest challenges in the Russian government. This is mainly because Putin’s government has extensively controlled all political institutions hence allowing the concentration of powers in the hands of the party with the majority members. In the long run, this has denied the opposition parties to be influential in the political field. Neither of the two of the opposition parties has the powers to mobilize mass support unlike Putin whose image of being everybody’s man allows him to appeal to everyone in the society (Motyl 2005). The 2000 and 2008 elections were considered rigged, but the outcome ensured that power was unevenly distributed among competing parties that favored all those allied to the government. Putin’s party, which is in control, allows its presidency to even control the legislature. With its control on both arms of the government, he can easily interfere with the judiciary as well as influencing its cases. The media being under control of Putin’s government, the public cannot be guaranteed the alternative sources of both social and political information (Ethridge and Handelman 2012). How to improve Russian democracy The current Russian political system has vested too much power in the presidency as a result of the policies implemented by the former Russian president Yeltsin. The policies oversaw not only the creation of weak political institutions and rampant corruption in government, but also, the weakening of the Russian media and press to levels where it is increasingly becoming difficult for many media houses in the country to be able to generate any profit on their part (Fish 2005). This has led to a situation whereby the media houses are now mostly owned or are dependent on owners who happen to have political motivations on their part (Chomsky, et al 2003). The political motivations and support that the media houses receive is solely responsible for their ability to generate any profits at all (Motyl 2005). Measures to improve on the Russian democracy may include equal terms of which political parties can use the municipal building to hold their campaigns. There must also be live television coverage throughout their campaigns to ensure that they also sell their manifestos to the people and not buy representatives of regional assemblies with the 5% qualification for the political parties seeking seats in the local legislature (Jeffries 2010). The government should ensure that citizens have a free will to vote without being monitored; it should also ensure that citizens register to vote by using the mail-in form developed by each state. Legislation should be passed to ensure that states can easily implement the system of mandated voter registration; this gives the voter a chance to participate in the voting process voluntarily. Furthermore, the democratic values should be transparent and explicit enough (Bourdeaux 1995). The electoral boundaries should be created by ordinary citizens rather than political elites who are affiliated to the government. Democracy can further be achieved in Russia if the state level citizens can meet frequently whereby the citizens should learn about the basics of elections and the political districting before reaching a consensus on the electoral district maps. After all that the recommendations should be approved by the legislature without being altered. Conclusion After looking at the evidence provided, which points to the fact that Russia is not a true democracy, it is seen that even after breaking away from the USSR, Russia failed to democratize itself. This can be seen from the fact that the government still controls the media, opposition parties have no say in the government as most of them are bought into the main political party and also the president has powers to control the judiciary which means that the judiciary is not independent and cannot carry out its obligations impartially. The state should also include that there is a voter registration list with all the conditions required to ensure there are no underground voter registrations. This in itself will minimize rigging of votes. The principal of parliamentary responsibility should be equally recommended for both the provincial and local governments. This principal gives the chief minister the power to exercise the executive power hence the motion of no confidence must ensure that a new leader is put in place to form the next government. In the federal non-competitive government, it is expected that a neutral and provincial leader should provide better public service. This ensures that national democracy is more competitive. Bibliography: Anderson, J. H. et al., 2006. Anticorruption in transition 3: who is succeeding ... and why? Washington, D.C: World Bank. Arutunyan, A., 2009.The media in Russia.Maidenhead, Berkshire, England; New York: Open University Press. Bourdeaux, M., 1995. 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