Foreign Policy of the United States towards Russia - Essay Example

? Foreign policy of the United s towards Russia Number Department Introduction Russo-American relations took a definitive shape in 1945 when World War II ended, leaving the world with two principal centres of power- the US and Russia. Even after the end of Cold War, Russo-American relations have not improved to the point of attaining sustainable and cordial economic exchanges. This means that Russia and America forego a lot of socioeconomic, political and technological gains, since Russia and America have profound interests in each other. Likewise, the need to analyze and improve Russo-American relations remains inevitable if global security, economic gains and political stability are to be realised in the West, Europe and the rest of the world. Brief history of the foreign relations of the US with Russia Russo-American relations started taking shape during World War I and II when the US and Russia fought alongside each other as Allied Powers, against Central Powers that had coalesced around the belligerent Germany. Prior to World War I and II, Russo-American relations had not taken a definitive shape, since America opted for the Doctrines of Non-Interference and Neutrality, wishing not to be drawn into the affairs and battles of Europe. The conclusion of World War II left the world with Russia and the US as two centers of power which were diametrically opposed to each other, on account of ideology. While Russia opted for socialism and communism as the way of politics and economics, America was committed to perpetuate democracy and capitalism throughout the world. This development sparked this Cold War which lasted from 1945 to 1990 (Brigham, 2010, 600). According to Butler (2011, 420), during this period, Russo-American relations were both belligerent and diplomatic. The belligerent aspect of these relations is underscored by the fact that Cold War was mainly characterised by nuclear arms race, proxy wars (as was seen in Vietnam and parts of Latin America such as Cuba), espionage and propaganda wars. The diplomatic aspect of Russo-American relations was made existent when the two rivals were drawn into Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I and II and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I and II treaties, in an effort to curb nuclear proliferation and to demilitarise the space (Lukacs, 2011, 64). Zakaria (2012, 27) recounts that two decades after the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s relations with America has been neither inimical nor friendlier. Despite the facing out of the Cold War confrontation, America and Russia have not nurtured sustainable bilateral cooperative relations. Russo-American relations only come to the fore when inevitable matters relating to climate change, international relations and nuclear nonproliferation need addressing (Nakajima, 2007, 450). Key Interests that the US has towards Russia Despite the US and Russia having well-known inimical relations especially at the height of the Cold War era, yet, these two countries harbour key interests in each other. Russo-American relations remain important in sustaining and effecting New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which was signed in 2010 and ratified in 2011. The main essence of START is to assuage the quantity of strategic missile launchers by half, and to effect new and more effective inspection regimes. Currently, both President Obama and Putin are committed to global security issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and counterterrorism, in spite of the prevailing differences over Iran’s nuclear program and the BMD program. According to Christopher (2006, 329), America continues to bank on Russia’s military support in Kyrgyzstan, Manas Transit Center, given that Russia is interested in Western and American victory in Afghanistan and the successful withdrawal of American troops therefrom. This form of military support is very sacrosanct since Manas Transit Center is the only American facility in Central Asia and is therefore key to the resupplying and occupying of Afghanistan. In the same vein, Russia promised America, accessibility of Ulyanovsk Airport in Russia to help facilitate the transportation of equipment from Afghanistan, immediately NATO pulls out at a later stage. In terms of geopolitics, Russia remains a very important nation in international relations. Aligning Russia closer to the US goals is poised to herald significant balance of power to the advantage of America. This is because such balance of power will help America contain China’s advancement as a global power. This means that the cost of ignoring Russia can be very hefty, given that Russia has become a member of the UN Security Council and has the potency to influence America’s international interests (Lieven, 2007, 10). Rywkin (2008, 312) explains that Russia also continues to maintain its position as one of the world’s chief energy producers and the top custodian of natural gas reserves. Because of this, Russia continues to produce a substantial role in consolidating and expanding energy supplies. This means that ultimately, Russia helps maintain the stability of global economy and to spur US and global economic growth onwards. As touching the future, things are still looking up in regard to America’s interests in Russia. Studies show that in the past five years, Russia’s real income has shot up by 66%. The same studies divulge that Russia’s middle class is continuing to emerge strongly. The US therefore sees a future stable market for its technology such as television sets, mobile phones and the automobile industry. The technological advancement in Russia, Russia’s role in international relations and the strong support that the rising middle class has continued to show the country underscore America’s need for Russia. Key areas of Tension between Russia and the US It is important to note that the areas of tension between Russia and the US date back to the Cold War era. While the USSR under Russia was communist, America as an ardent believer in democracy and capitalism sought to not only stave off the spread of communism, but to also entrench democracy and capitalism throughout the globe. Because of this, there were instances where Latin American countries such as Chile and Cuba became chief areas of tension between the US and Russia. In Cuba, two incidents the Bay of Pigs Invasion (17-19th April, 1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (16-28th October 1962) marked the denouement of the Russia-US tension which pushed the world to the precipice of World War III. Among many other incidents of US interference in Chile, America in one instance killed president-elect Salvador Allende and Chilean democracy and forcefully installed the Chief General Augusto Pinochet on 4th September, 1970. Other countries such as Vietnam also served as a point of tension between these two countries which engaged in proxy wars to further their ideological standpoints (Paul, 2011, 1390). Lafeber (2011, 263) contends that presently, areas of tension between Russia and the US still abound, with these areas of tension still having their roots in the Cold War era. One of the areas of tension is the politics and enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which was formed with 12 original signatories. Even after the Fall of the Iron Curtain of Berlin in 1989 and the Unification of Germany in 1990 as the hallmarks of the end of Cold War, NATO has coalesced 16 more members around it. The crux of the matter above is that not only is NATO being seen as having eaten into Eastern Europe, but it is also seen as having taken previous members of the Warsaw Pact such as Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Lithuania, Luxemburg and Germany (in its entirety). Since the US is known as the de facto leader of NATO, President Vladimir Putin has always called for the disbandment of NATO or the transformation of NATO into a political unit. The matter is made graver by the fact that states such as Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Lithuania were Russia’s buffer zones since they border Russia. This means that Russia sees NATO’s encroachment into these countries as an affront to its security and an attempt to encircle it and isolate it. NATO is also continuing to woo Georgia and Ukraine to join it, much to Russia’s chagrin. At the same time, Russia is not only feeling betrayed by the contravention of previous plan that after the Cold War, only Germany was to join NATO, but it has also issued stinging warnings to Finland and Georgia against joining NATO or fostering closer ties with NATO (Kupchan, 2010, 111). In another wavelength, Russia is not pleased with the progress in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) initiatives. The BMD program dates back to 2001 and began in earnest in the 2002 Prague Summit. NATO divulged that the program was inclusive of 30 countries which possess ballistic missile technology with the capacity to generate weapons of mass destruction and conventional warheads. This BMD program was to be carried out in the form of a phased implementation which was to incorporate American Aegis battleships that are located in the Mediterranean and US commands and control nodes and missile interceptors and sensors. Even in the face of widespread consensus that the BMD program is aimed at protecting Europe and the US from attacks by North Korea and Iran, Russia continues to see the demilitarisation campaign as a source of security threat. This is because NATO declined the integration of Russia into NATO’s control and command systems because of fears of espionage. NATO and the US also turned down Russia’s propositions that NATO provides a legally binding commitment that the BMD program will not be expended against Russia. Likewise, the proposal that by 2020, 500 interceptor missiles should have been totally integrated into this BMD system is likely to compromise the parity between NATO and Russia’s striking capabilities. It is at this juncture that Russia parts ways with the US and NATO since Russia maintains that it will remain noncommittal, unless NATO and the US enter a legally binding assurance that the BMD program will not be used against Russia. According to Mattox (2011, 112), Georgia also continues to prevail as a source of tension between the two countries, following the events that characterised the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. This was a short war which was triggered by Tbilisi’s attempts to reassert control over all of its breakaway regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) whose security Russia was overseeing. Russia invaded and defeated Georgia in 5 days, recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and sent supplies thereto. America later felt that it had not sufficiently supported an ally that had supported it in the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and up to the moment, continues to arm Georgia. On one hand, not only is Georgia now far stronger than it was five years ago, but the US and Western Europe are also making strong overtures to have Georgia join NATO. On the other hand, Russia deems Georgia as a geopolitical entity which exists within its sphere of influence and thus vehemently opposes the idea of Georgia joining NATO. To send a strong message that Georgia’s cooperation with NATO and the US is unacceptable, Russia has sent its military forces since October 1st 2012. This move was also seen as a move to ostensibly influence Georgia’s October 2012 parliamentary elections. Lieven (2009, 29) charges that Iran also presents another unique point of tension between the US and Russia. Although Russo-Iranian relations are troubled and complex, yet this relationship is inevitable because of mutual interests. Russia uses Iran to curtail America’s influence in Central and South Asia and to consolidate its political and economic interests therein. Iran sees its relations with Russia as a source of protection from the US which is already heavily present in neighbouring countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In contrast to Russia, the US sees Iran as a deviant country that can destabilise the fragile Middle East peace. As America and the West successfully rally international bodies such as the United Nations (UN) to impose sanctions and trade embargoes on Iran, Russian companies exploit the subsequent economic problems in Iran and have thus successfully secured large deals and contracts that range from nuclear power plant, agriculture, telecommunication to agriculture. Iran on the other hand is able to sustain its economy from the ravages of isolation from foreign expertise, courtesy of Russo-Iranian relations. Since Russia is more reliant on Europe and America than Iran, Russia’s diplomatic and economic support of Iran cannot continue to be sufficiently sustained by the construction, agriculture, telecommunication and nuclear power plant projects and Iranian oil. Russia nevertheless continues to oppose further trade embargoes, sanctions and military action against Iran, against the will of the US. The US and the West feel that Russia is watering down efforts to have Iran adhere to the dictates of international law (McFaul, 2000, 58). Policy Recommendations and Conclusion It is good that America acknowledges the indispensible nature of Russo-American relations. For instance, at the moment, Russia is endowed with natural gases in abundance, unwavering support and loyalty from the population, veto power in the United Nations Security Council and nuclear missiles. This means that Russia is both a salient feature in international politics and a factor too important to be ignored by America. To effectively pursue its interests in Russo-American relations, the US should totally embrace negotiations as the way to entrench human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Russia. America should exploit key provisions such as the Bilateral Presidential Commission which support nongovernmental and high-level official contacts on bargaining and negations and other sacrosanct issues such as counterterrorism and the reformation of the criminal justice systems. Alternatives such as unfriendly rhetoric and legislations which impede Russo-American relations are only poised to exacerbate the fluid relations between Russia and America, and thereby hurting the actualisation of these countries’ individual interests. Bibliography Brigham, S. 2010. “The American-Soviet Walks: Large-Scale Citizen Diplomacy at Glasnost’s Outset.” Peace & Change, 35 (4), 594-625. Butler, W. E. 2011. “David Baille Warden and the Development of American Consular Law.” Journal of the History of International Law, 13 (2), 377-424. Christopher, W. 2006. “Recent Foreign Policy Developments.” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 7 (26), 329. Kupchan, C. 2010. "NATO's Final Frontier." Foreign Affairs, 89(3), 100-112. Lafeber, W. 2011. “The Tension between Democracy and Capitalism during the American Century.” Diplomatic History, 23 (2), 263. Lieven, A. 2007. “To Russia with Realism.” American Conservative, 6 (6), 7-11. Interests Lieven, A. (2009) "For a New US Policy toward Russia." Nation, 288 (2), 28-30. Lukacs, J. 2011. “America and Russia, Americans and Russians.” American Heritage, 43 (1), 64. Mattox, G. A. 2011. "Resetting the US-Russian relationship: is 'cooperative engagement' possible?" European Security, 20 (1), 103-116. McFaul, M. 2000. "Getting Russia Right." Foreign Policy, 117, 58. 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