The UN Response to the Crisis in Darfur - Essay Example

? U. N RESPONSE ON DARFUR CRISIS Task: Outline I. Introduction II. The of the Darfur Conflict III. The UN and Darfur Situation IV. The UN Actions V. Conclusion VI. Reference List U. N Response on Darfur Crisis Introduction Darfur crisis started with the civil wars between the Christian and the Arabic groups. The laxity of the Sudan government in countering the conflicts made the condition dire; thus, attracting international awareness. The Janjaweed from the North brutally evicted the blacks in the South Sudan. According to Mamdani (2009), this eviction process was characterized by massacres, rape and embezzlement. However, there was an observation that the Sudan government failed to defuse and prosecute the Arab mercenaries. According to De Waal (2005), the UN considered engaging in the crisis by observing that the condition presented violated Article VII of the U.N Charter. Therefore, in the year 2004, the UN resolved to address the Darfur crisis. The UN designed a multifaceted response to the crisis with the sole aim of curbing the situation. Therefore, this paper critically examines the UN response on the Darfur crisis. The State of the Darfur Conflict Sudan has constantly struggled with the civil wars presented by the Arab-Christians conflicts. The Arabs who comprise the overriding group have exploited the southerners. These conflicts became grave in the year 2003 with emergence of “Sudan Liberation Army” (SLA) and “Justice Equality Movement” (JEM). These two groups attacked the government since the Arabs who promoted oppression of the blacks (De Waal 2005) dominated the governance process. The Sudan government retaliated by executing attacks against the civilians in the South. Subsequently, there emerged an Arabic based group called Janjaweed, which furthered the attacks. Investigations provide that the Sudan government financed Janjaweed activities; however, administrators have maintained that the group is illegal (Moore & Pubantz 2008). Initially, UN ventured in the Darfur crisis by chairing a peace agreement between the Sudan government and SLA in the year 2003. However, the partisans to the peace agreement installed by the UN challenged the process and failed to follow it comprehensively. Consequently, conflicts progressed as characterized by deaths and destruction of property. Hopper (2010), observes that Janjaweed’s activities led to death of about 30 000 blacks in Sudan. Importantly, the conflict has led to eviction of over a million Africans from their lands. The UN observed that the crises had presented a pathetic condition in the ground with its policy makers claiming that more than two million Sudanese need care. According to Mamdani (2009), the UN policy makers observed that the Darfur case clustered among the worst global humanitarian crises hence the body observed that there was need of executing the necessary response. The UN initiated instituted investigative bodies that found stern violation of the human rights (Hopper 2010). This was against the policies of the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Right” (ICCPR) and “International Criminal Court” (ICC) to which the Sudan government holds the membership. Therefore, the UN could successfully challenge the government’s activities legally (Steidle & Wallace 2007). Consequently, the UN subscribed actively to the Darfur activities. There is a concern among some UN policy makers that the Darfur situation demands a declaration that quantifies as a genocide case; however, this continues to elicit debates (Totten and Markusen 2006). The UN and Darfur Situation The UN engaged in the Darfur conflicts initially due to the disinclination of Sudan government in countering the crisis. Humanitarian advocates who observed that the concern needed critical attention raised the matter to the UN panel in the year 2003. The UN’s humanitarian docket claimed that situation poses a serious humanity concern since by then the crisis had displaced about 600, 000 people (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond 2009). However, the UN failed to regard the matter an active response since the union felt that the matter posed minimal threats. Consequently, the UN remained docile since it provided insignificant assistance. Importantly, the Humanitarian body fueled the battle solely with other bodies of the UN failing to avail any kind of support. Therefore, the early UN response was very weak hence could not impose a significant effect. This led to proliferation of the situation with the union missing early opportunities of countering the menace (Burr & Collins 2006). Darfur concerns continued to emerge in the UN forums that cited the brutality of the Janjaweed activities. In fact, the humanitarian groups failed to surrender and extended considerable pressures that demanded involvement of UN into the Sudan affairs. Additionally, resource rivalry between the Northern and Southern Sudan augmented hence intensifying the situation (Cheadle & Prendergast 2007). The need for the UN involvement was apparent; however, by then the body thought that observing slow move was the ideal approach to address the matter since harsh policies would compromise development of the agreement between the rival parties. However, adopting a silent prose was a failure since the Sudan government cooperated poorly. By the year 2004, the Sudan situation was highly wanting hence attracted wide media coverage with extensive public opinions emerging. With the media pressures, the UN could no more dissociate its activities from Darfur’s case. Consequently, the body had to take a central role in eradicating the presented human tragedy (Totten 2006). The UN Actions With the adoption of the prime role in the Darfur crisis, the UN initiated numerous strategies to overcome the challenge. An active response started with the UN’s secretary general delivering a speech that challenged the violators of the human right. He cited the case of the Rwandan genocide and asserted that the world can never stand to witness such a case in future (De Waal 2007). Of concern to the commission was that the Darfur case presented high potentials of worsening. He therefore, endorsed the UN’s actions on the Sudanese case observing that failure to develop critical measures would be detrimental. The commission sent an investigation team to the country to access the matter and present the details to the commission immediately. However, Sudan invited tactical skills that delayed the activities of the team as it convinced the African members of the UN to present scrip that was in their favor (Steidle, & Wallace 2007). Additionally, the position of the Arab members who also compromised with Sudan’s activities challenged UN’s activities hence the body could not avail an effective response. Surprisingly, the UN presented claims later that separated them with Darfur situation. The body based its claims on the African Union (AU), an organization established few years earlier; by starting that, the UN was not to interfere with the AU’s activities. The Sudan government realized that it could successfully hide under the AU’s umbrella hence it entered in agreement with the AU were the body that was to adopt the position of an observer (Hassan & Ray 2009). Therefore, the UN observed that the AU should address the crisis and the blame falls on the body if it failed to counter the condition. Additionally, the Commission claimed that it was overwhelmed with the peace missions in other parts like Iraq and Afghanistan hence could not extend its activities to Darfur (Cheadle & Prendergast 2007). This asserted another laxity on the UN’s response to the crisis. The commission was able to rationalize it response towards the Darfur crisis since it claimed that it was to support AU actions accordingly. With the position, AU was to bear the heavy burden of settling Sudan crisis solely (Prunier, p. 36 2007). However, the matter had attained a critical stage and the body could not address the matter accordingly. Indeed, Sudan could influence the activities of AU since it had established good relations with most of the AU members. Therefore, the AU could not achieve much in shaping the case Darfur case (Kahn 2007). However, the Darfur concern never ceased haunting the UN. The commission continued to receive the claims on the violence in the country. Observers noted cases of burning houses, forced displacements and massacre of innocent people. In the mid of the year 2004, the UN General Assembly proposed immediate actions against the crisis (Prunier 2007). Consequently, the body established an International Commission that was to examine if Darfur crisis propagated genocide or humanity crimes. This response was considerably effective hence minimized the scenario in the ground. The scheme invited ICC into the Darfur case by the year 2005 to determine cases against humanity (Flint 2007). Subsequently, the court prosecuted numerous Sudan leaders. Importantly, in the year 2009 the Court accused the Sudanese president of committing humanity crimes. The UN hence responded to the situation by recommending for the arrest of the Sudan president and imposed considerable sanctions on the country. Imposing sanctions was a bold and effective response. However, the move raised concerns among the union members. The union members embraced the idea that crimes were committed at Darfur universally. Nevertheless, a controversy emerged on the ideal method of curbing or punishing the Sudan government. This rested on the virtue that some union members had made considerably investments in the country hence felt that imposing sanctions would affect their activities (Cheadle & Prendergast 2007). Subsequently, this created a scenario of un-harmonized implementation of the scheme. Later the political forces overtook the matter and the concern shifted to the establishment two separate governments, one observing jurisdiction over the South and the other over the North. The AU played a prime role in ensuring peaceful splint of the Sudan governance and was able to impose this successful. Creation of the separate governance addressed the Darfur crises considerably. However, the ground is not fully calm since there are rivalries of resources between North and South Sudan. Conclusion The UN response to the Darfur crises is not appropriate since the commission failed to handle the matter with the attention that it deserves. UN’s action of providing compromised support to the crises has weakened the procedure. A strong concern could have curbed the situation at it early stages, a move that could have been effective in salvaging the lives and property. Notably, the UN needs to monitor the Darfur situation keenly to counter future re-emergence. Reference List Burr, J, & Collins, R 2006, Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster, Markus Wiener Publishers, New York Cheadle, D., & Prendergast, J 2007, Not on our watch: the mission to end genocide in Darfur and beyond, Hyperion, New York De Waal, A, 2005, Famine that kills: Darfur, Sudan, Oxford University Press, Oxford De Waal, A 2007, War in Darfur and the search for peace Global Equity Initiative, Harvard Univ, Massachusetts Flint, J, & De Waal, A 2008, Darfur: a new history of a long war, Cengage, London Hagan, J, & Rymond-Richmond, W 2009, Darfur and the crime of genocide, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Hassan, S. M., & Ray, C 2009, Darfur and the crisis of governance in Sudan: a critical reader. [Amsterdam], Prince Claus Fund Library Kahn, L 2007, Darfur twenty years of war and genocide in Sudan, PowerHouse Books, Broklyn Mamdani, M, 2009, Saviors and survivors: Darfur, politics, and the War on terror, Pantheon Books, New York Moore, J. 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