A Dream of One Europe: The European Parliament and the Electoral Democratic System and Power - Term Paper Example

? A Dream of One Europe: The European Parliament and the Electoral Democratic System and Power In the EU, national parties as elected representatives make decisions on a national level. On the EU level, European party groups are elected to the European Parliament (EP). They make decisions with regard to questions concerning the EU. The dominant theoretical political system in the EU is the responsible party system, where parties all have their own agenda, thus providing the voters with a plethora of choices. Voters engage in free and fair elections and choose a party based on its past or future performance. In spite of the responsible party system governing the decisions of European voters, the European party groups are loosely connected like – minded parties with allegiance to own countries (McElroy & Benoit, 2008). Moreover, voters only associate with national parties on the EU level. They observe the performance of national parties with regard to their country. Though political cohesion has increased since 1979, a common European identity needs to be developed. Democratic systems in the EU member countries are based on the responsible party system. Such a system is based on three main conditions: political parties provide a set of different alternatives offered to the voters, voters choose among these alternatives and base their decision on the past performance of the party, or prospects for future success and lastly, elections are free and fair (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.154). Through this mechanism, preferences of the voters and actions of the government are connected. This system is also called “the representation from above” (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.154). Through national governments, the voters can indirectly influence the decisions on the EU level. Elections on the EU level date back to 1979. In 1979, first direct elections to EP commenced (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.4). Parties designed their own manifestos which they in turn offered to the voters as their party platform. Their party platform serves as a guide if elected to EP (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.4). EP decides in the current term “in areas as diverse as financial services, trade, climate change, energy security and immigration” (Brady, 2009). In the 2009 elections, there were seven parties and one non attached group elected to EP. The seven parties are: Christian Democrats (EPP) with 265 seats, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats with 184 seats, Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) with 84 seats, Group of the Greens with 55 seats, European Conservatives and Reformists Group with 54 seats, Confederal of the European United Left with 35 seats, Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group with 32 seats and 27 seats were won by the non attached politicians (EPP, n.d.). EPP won the majority seats in EP, by having won in Hungary, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Romania and Poland (EPP, n.d.). All of these countries have national political parties present in the EPP (EPP, n.d.). Party cohesion is important. New political party group members must adhere to the party platform (McElroy & Benit, 2008, p.4). For example, the Rules of procedure of the ALDE group explicitly state that new members must follow the 10 point program for Europe of the ALDE Group (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.4). MEPs are given voting instructions by party groups. If they deviate from the party line, they are punished by the European party group they belong to (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.4). Demotion or expulsion are some of the tools European party groups use to punish deviators who try to promote national party interests in conflict with the European party group objectives (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.4). According to Hix, Noury and Roland (2007), only 6.6 percent MEPs voted against their own European party group policy platform in the 1999 – 2004 EP (p.170). They also analyzed almost 15,000 recorded votes by individual MEPs in the first five elected Parliaments between 1979 and 2004. Their results were that voting is structured around party politics, instead of nationality (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007, p.1 – 2). McElroy and Benoit (2008) used the result obtained by Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) to argue that there is a high and increasing cohesion of MEP voting (p.4). They also used this data to claim that politicians are in line with the ideology of their European party group (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.4). On the EU level, in theory, functions the same political system as in member countries. Marsh and Norris (1997, p.154) named a few conditions which need to be satisfied in order for the responsible party system to be functioning on the EU level. These are: cohesive and unified parties within the EU system need to exist and they need to offer alternatives to the voters; as in the case of national parties, voters here too must elect parties based on their past performance or prospects for future success; lastly, the outcomes should link voters’ preferences with the policymaking process of the EU (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.154). Theoretically then, the individuals elected to EP are to be bound to the party ideology: individual MEPs are understood to be elected first and foremost as party standard-bearers, bound by collective responsibility and constrained by party discipline. As such, we would expect the European party group of MEPs to be the strongest predictor of their attitudes, values and behavior” (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.155). The system has exhibited some success, as the number of parties joining the system increased within years. According to McElroy and Benoit (2008), seven political groups ran for elections in 2004 (p.3). These parties represented over 180 different national political parties from 25 member states (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.3). McElroy and Benoit (2008) claimed that coherence increased with years (p.3). However, as will be shown, the responsible party system is imperfect in practice on the EU level. First and foremost, these parties are not parties in the traditional sense of the word. According to Pedersen (1996) and Gaffney (1996), these parties are not governing bodies. They are “loosely co-ordinated umbrella organisations linking representatives from like-minded parties, but with few formal structures, no real mechanisms for party discipline, and little internal cohesion (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.155). Marsh and Norris (1997) called them “loose coalitions of national parties” (p.155). Secondly, parties do not offer a wide array of alternatives. According to Marsh and Norris (1997) and Brady (2009), parties competing for EP differ on few points in their plans (p.155). Their manifestos also offer little substance as to what their objectives are (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.155). The voters cannot use party manifestos to predict their future performance. They also cannot see clearly what their stands on the expansion of the EU membership, the European Monetary Union or institutional reforms across the EU might be (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.155). In comparison to the EU party groups, national parties are much more organized and state clearly their objectives with regard to domestic issues (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.155). There is a weak link between the public preferences and constitutional decisions by the Parliament. According to Marsh and Norris (1997), the EU political groups’ ambiguity with regard to their objectives hinders the access of the voters to major political issues in the EU (p.155). For example, the enlargement of the EU cannot be determined by the EU voters on the EU level, as parties do not bring such issues into their objectives during the elections. According to Marsh and Norris (1997), it is the political elites and not the voters who decide on such issues in the EU (p.155). Moreover, the voters have nobody to hold accountable. EP is not like national parliaments, as parties engage in a forum – like discussion (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.156). Thus, it is hard for the voters to hold anyone accountable. According to Brady (2009), expert committees mostly inform EP, so that political theatre is almost nonexistent. EP resembles a technical committee where professionals determine the laws and not voters. Voters find EP matters “technical and dull” (Brady, 2009). The cause of such democratic deficit lies in the voters and the elites. The political elites have their own motivations, as already mentioned by Marsh and Norris (1997, p.155). Voters, on the other hand, have their own objectives. According to some political scientists, EP is a forum, where politicians act as representatives of their specific area (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.156). The theoretical basis for such a system was taken from Miller and Stokes (1963), who argued that delegates should not owe their loyalty to the party, but to the constituency they represent. Esaiasson & Holmberg (1996) called such a system “representation from below.” As a result, claims by McElroy and Benoit (2008) apply: maintaining cohesion is a constant struggle for party groups, however, because their support depends on constituent national parties whose success and survival comes from diverse domestic arenas (p.4). Every politician cares about his (her) constituency. However, in a diverse setting such as the European political party group, presence of different constituencies creates tensions. Moreover, the problem lies in the inadequate level of information that voters possess about the political party groups. According to McElroy and Benoit (2008), “knowledge of the activity of the EP political groups and the behaviour of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) is negligible among the citizenry of Europe” (p.2). Thus, it is not surprising that voters rally around the flag, as they have the information on their parties. McElroy and Benoit (2008) concluded that the political groups organize themselves as they would if they were in their own country. They found that national affiliation matters to the political parties: “driving force behind national party affiliation in EP party groups is policy congruence: National political parties will seek membership in EP party groups whose policy platforms are closest to their own, on their most important national policy dimension (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.2). Though party congruence is important, such a practice creates problems, as the political party groups try to influence their member parties. When the two become incoherent, the national party joins another group (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.2). Marsh and Norris (1997) compared EP to Congress. In the US Congress, Congressmen are accountable to their own constituency. The constituency from a particular area elects the Congressman and has the power to re-elect him (her) or remove them from power if the Congressman’s performance is not satisfactory to the voters. To Marsh and Norris (1997), the way the members of EP (MEPs) function resembles the US Congress. However, the increasing struggle for cohesion leads also to alienation from the median voter in the EU. McElroy and Benoit (2008) used results by previous researchers to indicate that median voters are not represented in EP. Membership in the party group is voluntary (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.5). National parties can leave at any time. As a result: when a national member’s positions drift away from the median position of a party group, it will not be the case, following Black’s classic expectation, that majority rule on single dimensions leads to group positions that are equivalent to the median voter’s most preferred point, because an alienated group member will find it easier simply to leave the group for another whose positions are closer to its own (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.5). Whereas the median voter’s preferences change over time, it is hard to see how political parties can keep up in this type of a system. National parties will respond to these changes in preferences. What the national party will do is that it will join the rival European party group (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.5). The same might occur if a group has become biased toward a member country’s political goals (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.5). New groupings might form in the future too if preferences change so drastically that no old group will be able to represent them. However, according to McElroy and Benoit (2008), for a group to form 19 national parties from at least five member states are needed (p.5). Group switching has been increasing. The UK Conservative Party withdrew from the European People’s Party (EPP), the main centre-right grouping in the European Parliament by 2009 elections (EPP, n.d.). The Conservative Party adopted an anti - federalist policy position on the European Union (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.5). However, EPP was a pro – Federalist party (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.5). German and French national parties dominated EPP (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.5). While the British left, the latter two dominate the EU while representing the interests of their individual countries. Party switching has been frequent, and is subject to national party decisions (McElroy & Benoit, 2008, p.5). Though group switching might increase the link between voters’ preferences and the functioning of EP, so far voters have been disillusioned. European turnout decreased with every election since 1979 (Brady, 2009). In 2004, the voter turnout was 45.6 percent (Brady, 2009). One of the reasons not mentioned previously for such a low turnout is that EP has almost no jurisdiction over issues important to the voters (Brady, 2009). As Brady argued: voters tend to be less interested in arguments such as home versus host regulation of service companies, or the pros and cons of "unbundling" vertically-integrated energy companies, than in the subjects which dominate domestic elections - tax and spending, health and education policy, foreign and defence policy. These are among the issues on which the European parliament has no say (Brady, 2009). Since EP has nothing of substance to offer to the voters, the latter feel alienated from the decision making processes of the EU. Just as in 1997, in the 2009 elections too were the party platforms ambiguous. According to Brady (2009), there is very little difference between EPP, European Socialists and ALDE. Instead, Marsh and Norris (1997) proposed a functional interest representation system (p.158). According to Marsh and Norris (1997), citizens should get organized and mobilized in support of issues they find of value since such a pattern of political behaviour has become an essential component of democracies (p.158). The Economic and Social Committee recognized the role of most important economic sectors already in the 1990’s (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.158). MEPs would see themselves as spokespersons for specific groups such as trade unions, farmers and different types of consumers. According to Marsh and Norris (1997), interest groups would create that missing link between the voters and the EU (p.158). Another prospective system of representation proposed by Marsh and Norris (1997) is service representation. In this system, MEPs would focus on a particular constituency and then deliver public goods to that specific group, which would be located in a specific geographical area. Such a system dominates in the US, the UK, Japan and Ireland (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.158). A disadvantage of this system is that it is viewed by many as outdated (Marsh & Norris, 1997, p.158). In this system, paternalism and rent – seeking can arise easily. Since a politician only relies on one constituency, he (she) can be bought by the group, or buy the group’s votes. The politician can pass a law that violates certain human rights as a result too. Despite its disadvantages, such as system would act as the glue between voters and MEPs. Marsh and Norris (1997) argued that MEPs in such a system would be intermediaries of their voters (p.158). In short, voters are disillusioned. Low turnout rates can be attributed to low information levels about MEPs and the European party groups, as well as the fact that MEPs decide on insignificant issues to the voters. Moreover, the dynamics of voting in EP is highly contested. Whereas national parties increasingly switch groups to move in line with their own voters’ preferences, most recent elections from 2009 indicate that they are far from being successful. Though a different political system might decrease the dichotomy present in the system where MEPs are loyal to their voters but must follow the European party groups, it is hard to see how voters will increase turnouts and think like Europeans. Instead, EP should be given more jurisdictions. During the 2004-09 term, EP decided on a wide array of issues, ranging from climate change, energy, the cross-border provision of services, telecoms regulation and the authorization of chemicals (Brady, 2009). According to Brady, with the Lisbon Treaty being in force, this trend is likely to continue. The Treaty entered into force on 1 November 2009 (Europa, n.d.). The Lisbon Treaty attempts to involve the voters. EP was given authority over budget and international agreements (Europa, n.d.). National parliaments are given the authority to monitor EP so that EP only decides on matters which can be done better on the EU level (Europa). It is through national parliaments and EP that national parties and voters have access to policymaking on the EU. With an increased jurisdiction, voters too should feel more empowered. However, it is hard to see how voters will come closer to each other on issues determining them as Europeans. So far, all of the reforms give voters more authority so that the EU could be more representative and democratic. However, none of these policies imply that voters will stop thinking along national lines. Some European politicians such as Cohn – Bendit envision a borderless Europe. According to Darnstaedt, Schult and Zeber (2011), Cohn Bendit envisions Europe as one country: The Green politician envisions a united Europe organized roughly along the lines of the Federal Republic of Germany: with a government in Brussels, the European Commission, whose members are elected by the European Parliament (EP). The European Council in Brussels would serve as a second governing body next to the parliament, and it would also be involved in writing legislation for Europe. A united Europe's foreign and defense policy, as well as its financial policy and large parts of its economic policy, would be managed in Brussels. In his view, Europe should become a new United States (Darnstaedt, Schult & Zeber, 2011). According to Darnstaedt, Schult and Zeber (2011), other policymakers across the EU share similar views. Erhard Denninger, a constitutional expert, was cited by Darnstaedt, Schult and Zeber (2011). He claimed that respect for human dignity, the individual and democratic law can be found in Europe, and are thus a sign that a united Europe is feasible. The future will show whether invisible borders will be eliminated. Until then, Europeans will vote based on national preferences and European party groups will win accordingly. Without a system of allegiance to the EU, and EP significance to most voters across the union, voters will not have faith in the EU political parties. In turn, politicians will rally their voters around national issues. However, perhaps not for long. According to Darnstaedt, Schult and Zeber (2011), a group of scientists discovered that a democratic discourse works among Europeans if the voters are engaged in a discourse. So far, the discourse is far from where it should be. As Darnstaedt, Schult and Zeber argued, it takes more than just a willing EU body to create a common EU identity, engage its citizens and connect them across issues instead of national lines. The media too play a significant role, but have been quietly refusing to play a role of a connector beyond national lines (Darnstaedt, Schult and Zeber, 2011). Until a common European identity is strengthened, alternative political systems and reforms to make EP more democratic and representative of all voters will show little success. References Brady, H. (2009). Europe’s elections: Why they matter. Retrieved from http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/europe-s-elections-why-they-matter Darnstaedt, T., Schult, C. and Zeber, H. (2011). Hot to forge a common European identity. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,800775,00.html Esaiasson, P. & Holmberg, S. (1996). Representation from above: Members of parliament and representative democracy in Sweden. Aldershot: Dartmouth. European People’s Party (EPP) (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.epp.eu/parliament.asp?z=5C5F Europa (n.d.). Treaty of Lisbon. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm Gaffney, J., ed. (1996). Political parties and the European Union. London: Routledge. Hix, S., Noury, A. and Roland, G. (2007). Democratic politics in the European Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marsh, M. and Norris, P. (1997). Political representation in the European Parliament. European Journal of Political Research 32: 153 – 164. McElroy, G. and Benoit, K. (2008). Party Policy and Group Affiliation in the European Parliament. Retrieved from http://www.tara.tcd.ie/bitstream/2262/39276/1/Policy%20and%20Group%20Affiliation%20in%20the%20European%20Parliament.pdf Miller, W. & Stokes, D. (1963). Constituency influence in Congress, American Political Science Review 57: 45–56. Pedersen, M.N. (1996). Euro-parties and European parties: New arenas, new challenges and new strategies, in: S.S. Andersen & K.A. Eliassen (eds.), The European Union: How democratic is it? London: Sage. Read More