Democratisation of Balkan Countries - Case Study Example

DEMOCRATIZATION OF BULGARIA AND ROMANIA AFTER 1989 Balkan countries vary from East Central Europe in terms of political and economic development. Not any of them had preceding experience with independent administration. Nearly all of the Balkan countries are "late-comers to democratization" (Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria), or "semi-protectorates" they are the poorest nations of the Europe. A legitimate democratization in the Balkans started only in the late 1990s. (Attila, 1998) Politically, the Balkan section is "Europe's roughest neighbourhood." Perhaps the Balkan section is one of the most racially, linguistically and loyally complex areas of the world. As the economist argued in 1998, the instant risk to delicate Balkan peace is not so much violence but secession by minorities big enough to mull over statehood, which may irritate a new civil war as the actions in Kosovo have proved thus, maintenance of peace and solidity in the region depends on how Balkan countries treat their minorities. Partially because of these conflicts in the region and partially due to world public opinion's growing consciousness, the defense of minority civil rights became a top main concern in the post-cold war era. (Donald, 1985) This examines the evolution of democratization as an inner development and focuses mainly on the citizenship policies and supporting depiction of minorities in two Balkan states, particularly Bulgaria and Romania. The two states have enhanced their associations with minorities and with their neighbors. The outcomes in these cases represent a variety of potential and models, and thus they provide us with opportunities to study democratization and cultural politics in the area. (Attila, 1998) THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE BALKANS The democratic conversion in the post-communist Balkan states creates challenges for the innovative government in the region. Similarly, they have just restored or gained their self-government and full dominion and look for to build a homogenous nation state, on the other hand, the population within their internationally known borders consists of more than one racial group, all with their own political agendas. In the face of a rising compassion towards minority issues in the world and under the eyes of global organizations, the Balkan states need to set up contemporary civic societies with the rule of law. Since the thought of democracy is now so well-liked in the earth, "there can be no go back of still and passive ethnic minorities," as Agh stated thus, multiethnic Balkan states have to set up a citizenry with political and human rights and with democratic civilization and political culture in civil society. (Emilija, 1997) The states have to make a decision who their citizens are and what kinds of human rights they will award them. Maybe some kinds of patriotism might be necessary for formation and unity of a modern state, but this should be an inclusionary 'civic' patriotism, which is well-matched with the ceremony of individual rights. The key to avoiding further conflicts is to promise equal citizenship rights and to expand a culture of broadmindedness in society. Assessment of constitutional texts and citizenship laws with their completion and judicial understanding may give a universal sympathetic of the citizenship policies of the worried states. In adding up to providing individual rights, democratization also requires credit of collective rights for all kinds of minorities there are many legal and political plans in institutionalizing a agreement democracy and in avoiding ethnic conflicts in international societies, as Arend Lijphart showed. The main subject here is how the minorities are represented in the parliaments. (Donald, 1985) There is a substantial discussion in the relative politics literature on whether expanded representation is good or bad in multiethnic societies. Consociation list school argues that in lieu of groups proportionally fosters the assimilation of subcultures into the political game and creates situation for inter-ethnic co-operation. These scholars favour an electoral scheme based on comparative representation and centralized government. In addition, they maintain that representation in the Parliaments make possible the integration of minority groups into the political organization, which in the end leads them to moderate their demands. They believe that majoritarian formulas are not suitable for the culturally plural societies, because these electoral systems will analytically keep out some groups, which eventually may result in hostility and democratic fall down. (Hugh, 1998) Alternatively, some scholars argue that the introduction of a PR system may lead to the representation of revolutionary or anti-system racial parties, which may cause demolition of early democracies. For example, Donald Horowitz believes that ethnic parties lead to "stable parties, unstable politics." He maintains that, instead of group-based solutions, which lead to ethnic conflicts to solidify, entity competition and independently based organization of demonstration should be favoured. Although there seems to be no agreement on the responsibility of institutional propose and its penalty on the development of ethnic political conflict, exclusionary or inclusionary political systems surely will have an collision on majority and minority relations and the democratic consolidation development. (Donald, 1985) BULGARIA As with the other ex-communist states in the region, Bulgaria began democratization in the early 1990s. As a state communalist country, Bulgaria was the most dependable to the Soviet Union and stayed behind even other socialist countries in political reforms. With the end of the long-run Zhivkov government in November 1989, the privileged initiated discussions that opened the way to a democratic evolution in the country making Bulgaria a likely victor in the Balkans. After long round-table negotiations, the first united elections took place in June 1990 and the newly elected parliament adopted a new constitution. The new constitution (accepted in 1991) provided for equivalent rights for all citizens regardless of their" race, nationality, ethnicity, sex, place of birth, religion, education, beliefs, political affiliation, personal or social position or property status." (Attila, 1998) The Bulgarian Constitution does not comprise a exact section for ethnic Bulgarians living outside the country. The concerns of the political privileged concerning national unity and state security, however, are reflected in the text. For instance, while local self-government is documented, Bulgaria is defined as "an integral state," its "territorial integrity is inviolable," and that no "autonomous territorial formations" may exist. As J. D. Bell points out, these necessities are put in the constitution due to a fear of potential autonomy among the country's ethnic Turks. (Arend, 1984) More significantly, the constitution bans formations of political parties founded on the basis of "ethnic, racial, or religious" lines. In spite of these hostile necessities in the basic texts and a dishonorable record of state-minority associations in the socialist era, cultural Turks rightfully took part in the parliamentary and local elections in the post-communist evolution era. Prior to the new constitution was adopted, The Law on Political Parties and Election Laws were passed in 1990, which carried requirements comparable to the constitution. According to the laws, any group wishing to take part in the elections should be registered as a political party with the Sofia City Court. The Court might decline an application, inter alia, if the group is founded on an ethnic or religious basis. The Court registered all the applications but rejected Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF, an ethnic Turkish party) on the basis that it had an ethnic-religious foundation. The election law established a mixed system for selection of 400 deputies to the parliament, half to be elected from single member districts and half according to a PR formula. The law also established an independent Central Electoral Committee to manage the elections. (Karen, 1997) This organization made a very important choice during the initial election operation by accommodating the candidates of Turkish dominated MRF, which contrasted with the Sofia Court. This choice paved the way for an orderly temporary election in the country and provided a significant rightful opportunity for the Turkish minority to be represented in the countrywide parliament. After the election, the successful Bulgarian Socialist Party brought the case to the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, claiming that the MRF was not a constitutional party. In a historic pronouncement, the court confirmed that the MRFwas a lawful party in the country. Since then the MRF has participated in many national and local elections meeting about 5-to-8 percent of the well-liked vote, and this party even took part in an alliance government in the early 1990s. Partly because of its success in humanizing its associations with ethnic Turkish community, Bulgaria enhanced its mutual associations with Turkey by overcoming mistrust and historical warfare. However, the four percent doorsill in the election law effectively prohibits small marginal groups in the country, such as Macedonians. Lastly, although the Bulgarian and Macedonian governments determined the controversial language matter by agreeing on the use of 'official language' in political interactions, the choice of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court to ban a Macedonian party drew intense condemnation from international human rights organizations. (Karen, 1997) ROMANIA On the contrary to Bulgaria, Romania was the least loyal to the Soviet Union. The escalate outcome of democratization reached Romania in 1989. Since Romania was for years governed by the 'sultanistic' personal regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, the authoritarian system in the country is maintained even after his exclusion from power. The new constitution adopted in 1991 recognized a presidential system that served to sustain dictatorial populist leadership of voted presidents. The biggest minority group (about two million or 10 percent) in the country is Hungarians. An ethnic party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), which represents the welfare of the minority group, has participated in the local and general elections and gained some seats in the parliament in the post-communist period. (Karen, 1997) The new constitution recognizes communal rights of national minorities. Article 4 reads, "Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social origin." in addition Article 6 provides more guaranties: "The State recognizes and guarantees the right of persons belonging to national minorities, to the preservation, development and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity". The actions taken by the Romanian state for the safeguarding, expansion and expression of individuality of persons belonging to national minorities shall be conventional to the principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination in relative to the other Romanian citizens. (Arend, 1984) Marginal parties can be liberally organized and operated as long as they watch national dominion, defensive honesty, the lawful order and the ideology of democracy. Partly because of these requirements, cultural conflicts that marked the early years of democratic conversion in the country did not accomplish a volatile point, although Hungarians still state grievances about the issues of speech and schooling. As A. Liebich states, "The dilemma of the Romanian government is it wants to be seen as meeting international minority protection standards, but it is reluctant to meet them". Even though the Government signed the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, the fear that Romania may be enforced to grant some sort of territorial sovereignty to Hungarians not allowed a positive dialog between the state and the minority. Instead, Romania established a counseling minority council and selected parliamentary seats to a dozen of numerically trivial and politically dormant minorities. However, eventually Hungarians pulled out of the council claiming that the task of the council is only window dressing and it could not be a replacement for the ministry of nationalities they had been challenging. (Karen, 1997) DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION Democratization is an extensive process. No misgiving, the thought of democracy and the notion of human rights are taking root in the Balkans. There are reasons to be hopeful as well as negative concerning the view for a consolidated democracy in the district. Ten years after the fall down of collectivism, almost all the Balkan states adopted new constitutions with requirements providing guarantees to their citizens and to their minorities. Aggressive elections are now established as the only lawful way of governing these countries. Of course, it is logical that these new states are jealous of their newly gained independence and newly formed state individuality. On the other hand, minority groups have lawful concerns but they have to be careful in their demands for more constitutional rights not to exceed legal standards. Of two countries under study, Bulgaria seems to have been more successful in integrating its minority population into the political system. With a PR system and inclusionary citizenship policies, Bulgaria has avoided violent disagreement with the Turkish minority. (Arend, 1984) Romania also, avoided aggressive disagreement by providing representative mechanisms to its Hungarian minority. The fear of nationalist tendencies among the Hungarian inhabitants, on the other hand, hinders extra appeasing steps that otherwise may be taken by the Romanian governments. A true consolidation will be potential only if these states can reach unrestricted allegiance of their minorities to the governmental institutions. (Arend, 1984) In conclusion, even though the Balkan countries have finished the first part of the post-communist conversion era by adopting some forms of democratic institutions that endow with participatory opinionated frameworks, they still need to take significant steps for consolidation. The biggest test to establishing fully-fledged democracy in the region is the incorporation of minority groups into the political structure. As the cases that studied show, diplomat mechanisms and 'inclusionary' policies very much help improve state marginal associations in the section. On the other hand, exclusionary and domineering policies will only lead to new civil wars and national conflicts as the worldwide community have seen in Kosovo. In addition, not only the constitutional texts, but also the reality of an independent judiciary and execution of the new laws are important in the procedure of democratization. (Donald, 1985) To conclude, economic affluence, management, bravery and good practices are important for the upholding of domestic peace in international states. It is undemanding to be an expressive nationalist, but consolidation of democracy requires being a coherent democrat (Attila, 1998) Work Cited Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984. Attila Agh, The Politics of East Central Europe, London, Sage Publications, 1998, Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985 Emilija Simoska, 'Macedonia: a View on the Inter-Ethnic Relations', Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, 2(2), 1997, pp. 93-123. Hugh Poulton, Minorities in Southeast Europe: Inclusion and Exclusion, London, Minority Rights Group International, 1998. Karen, Dawisha et al (eds.), Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in the Southeast Europe, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1997, Read More