Do Revolutions and Armed Conflicts Come or are They Made - Essay Example

Consequently, one group arises against the other with a common aim of redeeming itself. Conflicts are caused by different factors such as the struggle to control and access of natural resources such as water source, control of oil fields or a mining site. Harsh economic conditions lead to intra-state revolutions while oppressive political systems are prone to initiate a revolution. Moreover, ethnic diversity is also seen as a cause of armed conflicts since parties to conflicts may be described by their ethnic identities.

Goodwin (2001, p. 8) argues revolution occur due to social and economic inequalities with the majority claiming that equality has been denied against them or the minority claiming superiority. Revolutions occur as a group seeks to profit itself, achieve honor or in an attempt to prevent dishonor. In the 1960s there were revolutions in New York by civil rights activists demanding for equal rights for the African -Americans who were opposed to social and economic exclusion. This paper presents a discussion of various causes of conflicts to support the argument that armed conflicts and revolution are actually made and do not just come. . 8), the political organization of any state can be categorized into three dimensions.

These dimensions include the type of state organization that is, whether the nation is bureaucratic or patrimonial. Political organization also includes the type of political regime adopted in the state; that is whether the system is inclusive/liberal or exclusive/repressive. Moreover, the third political structure dimension is based on the infrastructural power in the country; is it strong or weak. Goodwin (2001, p. 30) argues that a political system which is repressive and infrastructurally weak works to incubate revolution in both a bureaucratic and patrimonial regime.

In addition, he observes that revolutions are more likely to succeed against patrimonial regimes than in bureaucratic systems. Goodwin (2001, p. 30) notes that patrimonial states do not facilitate the implementation of initiatives that can successfully oppose a popular revolution. Goodwin (2001, p. 11-12) describes that in bureaucratic structure appointments to positions are made based on achievement in a particular specialized training while in a patrimonial system; appointments are based on political loyalty, kinship or ethnicity.

He observes that in contrast to bureaucratic regimes, patrimonial systems are inefficient. Furthermore, Goodwin (2001, p.50) asserts that patrimonial regimes strengthen revolutionary movement by weakening other counterrevolutionary elites who are viewed as their chief opponents. This supports the argument that revolutions are actually made by the political system. Goodwin lists various patrimonial regimes including; Diaz in Mexico, Ceausescu in Romania and the Shah in Iran. Goodwin (2001, p.123) supports the argument that political system incubate conflicts by presenting