American Foreign Relations 1964-1968 with China - Research Paper Example

?The US Foreign Relations with China, during the period 1964-1968, have been fraught with mistrust and hostilities between the two nations. The majorissues and debates that surfaced between the US and China in this short span of time, as disclosed by The US Department of State Office of the Historian, include: 1) U.S. anticipation of the first Chinese nuclear explosion and the U.S. reaction when it took place in October 1964; 2) the attempts of U.S. policymakers to deal with the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations; 3) U.S. relations with the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan, especially the question of possible Nationalist operations against the mainland; 4) the ambassadorial meetings at Warsaw; 5) proposals to liberalize U.S. restrictions on travel to and trade with the China mainland; 6) the U.S. response to French recognition of the People's Republic of China; and 7) U.S. policy concerning Tibet.1 Lyndon B. Johnson was the president of the United States during the above-stated period and the official policy towards the Peoples Republic of China was a continuation of the policies of the previous governments. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The US had not yet recognized the Communist government in China and it was instead supporting the Nationalist government run by Chiang Kai-shek which was stationed in Taiwan. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 A ban was imposed by the US on its citizen from travelling to and trading with the Peoples Republic of China. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 America was also giving support to the Chiang kai-shek government to retain its seat in the United Nations. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 But at this juncture, it was becoming evident that the US will have to recognize the new communist government in China in the near future as the communists had been consolidating their influence over the country. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 On October 16, 1964, when China carried out its first nuclear explosion, it was a great matter of concern for the US. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The US did not see China yet militarily as a nuclear threat but the very fact that China had entered the nuclear group of nations was quite alarming for the US. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The US went on a busy mission to convince its public as well as its allies that Chinese nuclear tests were not a potential threat. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The then US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk had even recommended prior to Chinese nuclear test that “should China test, the United States should consider providing India and Japan with nuclear weapons.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 Meanwhile, in the US diplomatic circles, a demand for change was felt regarding the US opposition to the UN recognition of Peoples Republic of China. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 In 1964, the US General Assembly concluded with a tie vote regarding the issue and a resolution stating that China’s inclusion into the UN needs to be a decision with two-thirds majority was passed only with a very nominal margin of votes. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 Giving recognition to both the Peoples Republic of China as well as the Chiang Kai-shek government was considered as a viable option by the US but Chiang was not yet ready to give any room to the communist rebels. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 Soon the US changed its policy and supported the appointment of a UN study committee to resolve the issue but meanwhile the chaos that the Cultural Revolution of Mao Zedong sparked off in China, slowed down the process of the UN accepting the communist government of China. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The Cultural Revolution in China also raised the US hopes that preoccupation with that would reduce Chinese interest and intervention in Northern Vietnam. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 In 1965, the US gave permission for physicians and public health specialists to travel to China, yet another tracking back from the previous stand. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 By 1968, Cultural Revolution was contained, though with great human cost and resentment in China. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The recognition of the Peoples Republic of China by France was a backlash that the US policy suffered at this time. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 In a telegraphic communication between the US Department of State and the Embassy in France, concern is expressed over the French decision and stated that the “basic problem is containing communist China.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 But it was also becoming clear that the Nationalist government run by Chiang Kai-shek will not be able to regain control of the Chinese mainland by any means. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 Meanwhile, a total number of sixteen ambassador-level talks were carried out between the US and China in the period, 1964-68. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The US decision to relax the hostilities with Chinese communist government was also influenced by the support that the new independent nations in Asia gave to China. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 One major matter of contention between the two nations was the US occupation of Taiwan. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek had grabbed Taiwan and made it their centre of their operations taking advantage of the turmoil caused by Korean War. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The US had supported them to build a military force and US also could garner domestic support inside America in favor of the Chinese Nationalist government. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 In this way Taiwan had become the base for operations for the US containment policy against China. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 But what China demanded as a precondition to build normal diplomatic relations with the US was the total withdrawal of the US from Taiwan and handing over of that territory to China. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 In 1965, the US got involved in the Vietnam conflict and once again the view that China was a threat, surfaced strongly. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 It was the defeat of US-supported French military in Indochina in the first half of 1950s that prompted the US to get involved in Vietnam. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 Vietnam was located at an important location as far as global power equations were concerned and also it was a resource rich nation in the Asian region. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The cold war was about to begin and Vietnam was to become the pivotal point at which this war would be initially waged. The apprehensions about Chinese intentions were escalating as is indicated by a State Defense Study that came out in 1966 suggesting that “Chinese objectives …(were)…regional hegemony and world revolution.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 This study had also prescribed “three options for dealing with the Chinese.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The options were “disengagement, containment, and showdown… (and)… the middle option was recommended.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The US had meanwhile turned down a proposal from Chiang Kai-shek’s group to launch an attack on the Chinese mainland with the support of US military because America was too aware of the consequences of a direct confrontation on the Chinese mainland. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The US had rightly judged that a war on Chinese mainland would have ““incalculable consequences for the people of Asia and the world” and it had also told this to Chiang Kai-shek in clear words.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The US also refused to give Chiang Kai-shek, the fighter jets that he asked for. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 All the same, the US used Taiwan as an intermediary air space in its engagements with Vietnam but also communicated with China to tell the Chinese government that US involvement in Vietnam was not a threat to China. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 But China continued to support the Vietnamese communist government and was very loud and critical of the US intervention in Vietnam. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 A National Intelligence Estimate carried out by the US in 1964 had suggested that “China's direct military threat to the West will remain limited, but China will continue to be a major force in Asia, and a crucial menace to its Asian neighbors and to Western interests in the area.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 But another National Intelligence Estimate in 1968 has a more moderate tone and says that Chinese foreign policy though remaining “revolutionary in tone” is becoming “cautious and prudent in deeds.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 Also in 1968, a humorous quote from a Memorandum from Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) reads that in China, the “situation is excellent, but not hopeless.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 During the period, 1964-1968, a gradual shift in the US policy towards accepting China as a communist regime that cannot be removed from the picture through wishful thinking, can be seen emerging. The US policy is compelled to grow up to accept that Asian realities could be different from what the US wanted them to be. Interestingly, in a communication from Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant, Rostow, it is observed that “all we can do is, at a minimum, somewhat exacerbate the policy struggle, and, at a maximum, provide a bit of ammunition for those who may be somewhat less inimical to us than the full-fledged Maoists.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 It is this kind of sobering down of the aggressive anti-communist policy that becomes evident in the US foreign policy regarding China, during the period, 1964-1968. And the ground was made for the eventual withdrawal of US troops “from around China’s periphery in Asia.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 This decision was made by the newly elected president of the US, Richard Nixon. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 Such a decision was made possible also by the decision of China to resume ambassador-level talks with the newly elected US government. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 It was the failure of Mao’s vision along with the shift in US understanding about the strategic importance of friendship with China that created an atmosphere for improving the US-China relations in this period. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 Regarding Tibet and Mongolia, the US had a different approach which resulted in Johnson administration continuing the existing American policy of providing “assistance to Tibetan refugees in India and limited support for the Tibetan resistance.” BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 CIA has been funding the Tibetan resistance against China throughout the period, 1964-68. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 The US government, during the period, 1964-68, also considered the option of giving recognition to Mongolia but did not take any important decisions in this regard. BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 An action memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the US Secretary of State Rusk had recommended that the US recognition of Mongolia would be helpful to: Deflect(…) charges of racialism by recognizing for the first time a non-white Communist regime…(and)… (This small point may be useful in our efforts to counter the Chinese Communists' drive to polarize feelings between the white and non-white worlds.) BIBLIOGRAPHY \l 1033 In this manner, though US dislike of communism was persistent during the period, 1964-1968, America had not totally written off the chances to forge alliances of convenience with the communist countries in view of the strategic importance of such partnerships. Works Cited Conley, Jerome M., Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Lessons and Options for U.S. Policy in South Asia, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2001. Print. Lawrence, Mark Atwood, “The Vietnam War: A Concise International History”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Print. Sutter, Robert G., “U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present”, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefeld, 2010. Print. US Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of The United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, n.d. web. 12 November 2009, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30 Read More