Why were the Americans unable to prevail in Vietnam whilst the British succeeded in Malaya - Essay Example

American Failure in Vietnam War and British Success in Malayan Emergency The Vietnam War was a long running combat between the nationalist forces and the United States with the alliance of South Vietnam. While the nationalist forces tried to fulfill their objective of unifying the independent country of Vietnam under a communist government, the purpose of the United States was to thwart the proliferation of communism. The war was viewed by the American people as redundant as they were not convinced of any potential danger from the rising communism in the Asian regions. This resulted in the U.S. presidents of the Cold war era losing the votes of the common people in support of the war. Moreover, the war proved to be expensive and the economic repercussions were felt for more than a decade. After the end of the war which happened more because of the agitation among the American people, the final consequences became a learning experience of the U.S. leaders for what strategies to adopt in any future conflicts. The Malayan emergency was a guerrilla war between the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) and the British and Commonwealth forces. The MNLA communists were mainly comprised of the poor Chinese population who were based in jungles. The MNLA and its allies termed the combat as Anti-British National Liberation War. The guerrillas focused on rescuing Malaya from the controlling power of the British colonial administration. The conflict which started on 18 June 1948 was termed as Emergency after three European plantation managers were killed by the guerrillas in the northern state of Perak (“The Malayan Emergency: Background”). The MNLA attacked the rubber plantations and mines. So, the term Emergency was also used instead of War to enable the plantation and mine owners to receive compensations from the insurance companies. During the Malayan Emergency, the British adopted some successful counter-insurgency operations that prove as important lessons even today on how such campaigns should be executed. This paper focuses on the American failure in the Vietnam War and the British success in the Malayan emergency. American participation in Vietnam War In American history, almost all American wars have been preceded by fixed reasons or events that have triggered most American wars. For instance, the Battles of Lexington and Concord in 1775, the capture of Fort Sumter in 1861, the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. Unlike these events, the American war in Vietnam had no concrete reasons nor was there any fixed beginning point. The American participation in the Vietnam War was a result of series of events that occurred during the period between 1950 and 1965. In the month of May 1950, the then American President Harry S. Truman sanctioned to initiate a modest program for helping the French. Truman sanctioned economic and military assistance to the French who were engaged in battles to retain their controlling power of their Indochina colony, including Laos, Cambodia as well as Vietnam. When the Vietminh army which was originally formed to protect Vietnam from the French colonial power defeated the French armed forces at Dienbienphu in 1954, the French were left with no other choice but to create a Communist Vietnam north of the 17th parallel. Then the south of that line remained as a non-Communist region. The United States however did not agree with this kind of arrangement. When Dwight D. Eisenhower became the U.S. president, his administration attempted to take over and build a nation in South Vietnam which was by then holding a fake political entity. The U.S. concocted a government in South Vietnam, subjugated the French army and also sent military advisers to prepare a South Vietnamese army. U.S. also unleashed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order to conduct a psychological warfare against North Vietnam. In early 1961, President John F. Kennedy designed another strategy that contributed towards American involvement in the Vietnam war. Kennedy covertly dispatched 400 Special Operations Forces-trained soldiers to train and prepare the South Vietnamese with the strategies of counterinsurgency war. The South Vietnamese were then provoked to fight against the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam. By the time Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, “there were more than 16,000 U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam, and more than 100 Americans had been killed” (Rotter). The subsequent American President Lyndon B. Johnson acted as the final trigger for American involvement in the war. In the month of August 1964, Johnson fabricated a declaration of war: the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Then in February and March 1965, Johnson authorized the U.S aircrafts to do continuous bombing over the northern regions of the 17th parallel, and finally on 8 March in the same year shipped 3,500 Marines to South Vietnam. After this, the U.S. became formally involved in the war (Rotter). For historians, it is not easy to detect the causes of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War because of the multiple starting dates. However, there are a few reasons that have been considered for U.S. involvement. For every American President, the government of North Vietnam was an enemy as it was led by agents of global communism. For the general Americans, communism represented everything that went against the American democracy like violation of human rights, promotion of military warfare and prohibitions to trade with capitalist countries. America’s apprehension increased when Communist party took control of China in 1949, and from the fear that Vietnam would follow Truman decided to assist the French in fighting the Vietminh (Rotter). America’s failure America has spent most of its past years as a minor player in the international power politics. In spite of this, in the post World War II era America had proved itself as having the strongest military regime in the world. Yet, the irony was that America found that most of its military strength was apparently unusable. America, a nation which is termed as a superpower fought two major wars of which one was a stalemate and another was a loss for America. This has been a constant source of wrath and frustration among the Native Americans. The most bewildering case was the Vietnam War. The consequences of this war put a question mark on the utilities of America’s military strength. America’s effort was reflected in its strategy of showering Indochina with equipments, war advisors, technologies and military men. Thus, even though America was not directly involved in the war, it was American military power that was applied over Vietnam which resulted in weakening the physical attempts of Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. The military strategies of America proved to be successful as numerous victories were achieved. American forces had complete control over air and sea and also could operate in any area with ground forces. There was only one instance where the opponent gave a conventional and a strong fight, the Tet offensive in 1968. But even in this fight the enemy was brutally defeated and could not launch another major battle for four years. In spite of all these military successes, America could not prevail in Vietnam (Drew & Snow, xv-xvi). In the entire history of America, the Vietnam War was the only event which although proved successful in military perspective did not fulfill any of America’s political objectives. Although there was intense commitment from the American combat troops resulting in death of 50,000 American soldiers, the larger picture was that the military success did not culminate into success in the larger war. On the contrary, within the American society there were numerous major anti-war demonstrations and occasional violence. The general Americans lost trust in their military power and political leaders. In addition, the negative economic effect that occurred as result of the war had its repercussions for over a decade. Eventually, the most disgraceful thing was that America abandoned allied terms with South Vietnam, thus making a mockery of the military successes and the loss of 50,000 American lives (Drew & Snow, xvi-xvii). Reasons of American failure The unsuccessful attempt of the administration of Lyndon Johnson to garner public support for the Vietnam War was a revealing moment in the Cold war era. Although the objective of America’s military involvement in the war was to restrain the spread of communism in the world, it nonetheless failed to sustain for long in Vietnam. The lack of public support was more because of the fact that the American people remained unconvinced of the potential threat from the rising communism as the American author Herbert Schandler observed “to the American people, the danger to the national interests of the United States posed by the Communist threat to South Vietnam had not been made evident, and the cost of meeting that threat had become too high.” (Ivie, 121) Although hundreds of reasons have been pointed by the American politicians and the historians behind the failure of America in Vietnam, there are some major reasons that are given in brief here. First, the prime cause has been identified as the inconsistencies in the foreign policies towards Vietnam and the weak strategies of the American presidents in the entire era between 1954 and 1975. Each president had his own philosophical outlook as a result of which objectives differed for each of them. Also, the foreign policies of the presidents did not align with the changing domestic and global situation in the entire phase of the Cold war era. Second, the United States did not want a military victory over Vietnam as a result of which the White House and the Pentagon did not actively participate in formulating strategies to capture North Vietnam, which otherwise could have been an easy task for America. According to many military experts United States followed many strategies in Vietnam one of them being the air offense strategy against North Vietnam. Yet, the armed forces of American “were solely attached to a defensive war strategy throughout the war in varying degrees, low profile to high profile, to defend South Vietnam.” (Duong, 225) This defensive strategy provided North Vietnamese enough time to prepare themselves for revolutionary war. The United States merely enhanced its military activities according to the scale of defensive strategies and wartime activities of Vietnam. The American administration never showed the willingness to win the war. Third, there was a paucity of open and frank discussions between the political, diplomatic and military leaders of the United States and its ally South Vietnam. This is a major drawback between two allied forces when they are defeating a common enemy. This created a huge credibility gap between the war strategies of the United States and South Vietnam. Fourth, the U.S. Army Lt. General Phillip B. Davidson pointed several reasons behind America’s failure in Vietnam. One such reason was the Superior Grand Strategy of North Vietnam that remained consistent in the entire war tenure. This strategy trapped all the aspects of national power to fulfill the primary objective of “independence and unification of Vietnam, and eventually of all of French Indochina.” (Duong, 226) The cleverest strategy was to start a revolutionary war. The American presidents however did not comprehend the importance of this strategy and instead took a half-hearted approach towards the communist revolutionary war. According to Davidson, that was the “confusion of concept, counter-measures, organization, strategy and above all, confusion of American people – the last by far the most critical.” (Duong, 226) Fifth, another reason behind America’s failure in Vietnam was the lack of trust between the U.S. civilian leaders and U.S. commanders. According to the estimates made by the politicians, China would interfere which in turn would turn the regional war into a global war. Because of these estimates, many of which proved to be false later on, the American presidents did not allow the ground forces to attack the communists in North Vietnam. All the strategies that were proposed by the U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy generals that could pave the way for substantial American success were not sanctioned by the American leaders. Thus the communists remained undefeated both in the North and the South. Finally, because of all these combined reasons the war had to be prolonged till the time when the American people became frustrated and withdrew their support from the continuous conflict. Eventually, the civilian leaders had to bow down to the decisions of the American people to end the war (Duong, 226). Malayan Emergency The British colonists held their ruling power over the Malayans for almost a century. Between the years 1948 and 1960, the British were in combat with the communist terrorists of the Malayan communist party. There terrorists were primarily Chinese with a small number of Malayans and Indians (Ahmad, 1). The most significant factor for the British victory over the communist insurgency in Malaya was the “wide range of civil and military programs tied together by unified management into a successful counterinsurgency (C-I) response” (Komer, v). Although there were many flaws in the insurgency during the early years from 1948 to 1952, the United Kingdom and the Government of Malaya eventually exhibited the classic example of long-haul low-cost strategy that were designed according to the existing problems. It was also true that such an approach was made possible by certain disadvantages of the insurgency which was restricted among the ethnic Chinese community of Malaya’s polyglot population. Even this minority group did not give complete support to the insurgency. Also, the MNLA did not receive any kind of external aids. To tackle the insurgency, the U.K and Malayan governments had many favourable elements which they shrewdly utilized. For instance, there was close bonding between the British and the Malayans and also there was a feasible politico-administrative structure. But, between 1948 and 1952, the communists showed equal potential and for some time it seemed as though U.K. and Malaya were losing. By 1954, the insurgency was weakening and the next six years were in favour of the British. The governments of U.K. and Malaya adapted a combination of strategies that included “civil, military, and psychological warfare programs, all within the context of a firm rule of law and steady progress toward self-government and independence, which robbed the insurgency of much political appeal.” (Komer, v) There were times when the police and the paramilitary forces under the British and Malayan control exceeded the number of military men and thus took more lives. One major feature was that there was much cost saving due to low use of airpower and artillery (Komer, v). There were however several minor setbacks and learning from such small failures, the U.K. and Malayan governments focused more on destroying the link of the guerrillas to their popular base. The British and the Malayans carried on offensive small-unit operations to push the guerrilla groups into the dense jungles; such operations proved to be very much effective. In addition, a large quality of British and Malayan resources was used to protect the common people and to curb the flow of food and equipments to the guerrillas. On the other hand, the British and Malayan governments “undertook a variety of political, economic and social measures, accompanied by an information campaign, to win hearts and minds.” (Komer, vi) The term hearts and minds implies that the British employed an approach to counterinsurgency to win the emotional support and confidence of the local population. The major reason of British success in Malaya was that the British army had an organizational culture that was almost like a learning institute. This means that the army constantly coped with the various counter-insurgency conditions and changed strategies accordingly. The British army had undergone a series of operational experiences from limited to total war. This taught the army to adopt a practical approach in its military perspective (Mumford, 33). Comparisons between American failure and British success The huge differences between the political and sovereignty environments of Malaya and Vietnam played an important role in the success of the British in Malay and the failure of America in Vietnam. The colonial power of the British was the only authoritative power over Malaya. The British comprehended the fact that the most effective strategy to secure victory over communism was to separate the people of Malaya from the communist terrorists. The main advantage for the British was that most of the communist terrorists were Chinese, and “the removal of Chinese squatters from jungle fringes into resettlement areas had isolated the communist terrorists from their daily food supplies and information of security forces’ activities” (Ahmad, 5). Vietnam, on the other hand, was an independent country. Therefore, the United States was more a kind of advisory body to an independent government and unlike the British the American leaders had no real controlling power over the Vietnamese. Like the British, the United States also agreed to the notion that to emerge victorious over the communists, it is necessary to separate the Vietnamese population from the communists. For this purpose the Americans implemented the strategic hamlet (Ahmad, 5). It was a population transfer strategy to combat the Vietnamese communists by separating the rural peasants physically and ideologically from the communists to gain the trust and cooperation of the peasants. The peasants in return were promised by the United States of security, democratic government and social and economic development (Langer, 76). However, this strategy failed to show success as it required the native people of the villages where they have stayed on for many generations to leave those villages. The time period and media technology also played a major part for the success of the British in Malay and the failure of America in Vietnam. In Malaya, there were no televisions to show the live coverage of the horrors of the war thus not causing much unrest among the common people. On the contrary, the American population got the opportunity to watch the live television ground coverage from their homes. This caused disillusionment among the American people and eventually it was the pressure from the people that the United States Government was forced to end its involvement in the Vietnam War (Ahmad, 5). Conclusion The primary difference between the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War lies in the nature and scale of the two conflicts. While the MNLA communists were mainly of the impoverished Chinese, the Vietcong insurgency had far wider and popular roots. Also, the Chinese guerrillas in Malay never received any external assistance while the Vietcong insurgents received logistic and personnel help from outside. The major reason for America’s failure in the Vietnam war was the non-cooperation from the American people and also inconsistency in war strategies and objectives of the different American presidents who presided during the war. The British on the other hand adopted more effective strategies to combat the MNLA communists and had the added advantage of alliance with the Malayan government. Works Cited Ahmad, Shari Bin. “Comparison of the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War and application of lessons to solve El Salvador problems and appropriate U.S. military assistance”. May 22, 1987 from: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a182811.pdf Drew, Dennis M. & Donald M. Snow. The eagle’s talons : the American experience at war, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988 Duong, Van Nguyen. The Tragedy of the Vietnam War: A South Vietnamese Officer’s Analysis, North Carolina: McFarland & Co. Inc., 2008 Ivie, Robert L. “Metaphor and Motive in the Johnson Administration’s Vietnam War Rhetoric.” In Texts in Context: Critical Dialogues on Significant Episodes in American Political Rhetoric, edited by Leff, Michael C. & Fred J. Kauffeld, 121-142. California: Hermagoras Press, 1989 Komer, R.W. “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort”. February, 1972 from: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R957.pdf Langer, Howard J. The Vietnam War: An Encyclopedia of Quotations, USA: Greenwood Press, 2005 Mumford, Andrew. The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare, New York: Routledge, 2012 Rotter, Andrew J. “The Causes of the Vietnam War”. Illinois. 1999, January 7, 2013 from: http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/causes.htm “The Malayan Emergency: Background” SE-Asia, n.d., January 7, 2013 from: http://se-asia.commemoration.gov.au/background-to-malayan-emergency/causes-and-description.php Read More