The Kingdom of Siam and Its Buffer State Status between British Burma and French Indochina - Term Paper Example

Topic: the Kingdom of Siam (Thailand) and its buffer status between British Burma and French Indochina. Background Introduction At the time of King Rama III (1824-1851), known as the “Golden Age of Art”, Siam had developed trade relations with foreign countries like China. By the time King Rama IV took reigns of Siam (Thailand), the neighboring countries like Burma were under siege of England and Indochina was under the impact of France. King Mongkut had worldwide knowledge and applied diplomatic tactics in handling the challenges from the West. He felt the need of implementing a new foreign policy to save Siam from the impending aggression of western powers. King Mongkut started trade with England, inviting its diplomatic corps led by Sir John Bowring and an agreement was made known as “Bowring Treaty. The British gained extraterritorial rights and Siam also changed some tariffs to suit the British trade. It affected the monopoly of Royal Treasury in the sale of rice, which did not exist any more. Such trade and business treaties were made by Siam with other western countries. Such advances in progressing businesses with outside forces made Siam economically strong and prosperous (Thailand History 2008). In earlier history, General Chakkri , the founder of Chakkri dynasty, known as Rama I, ruled Siam till 1809. Siam entered into trade treaties with Great Britain (1826) and the United States (1833). Later, Siam’s physical boundaries came under threat with the Great Britain intruding into Burma and Malaya and France establishing its rule in Indochina. Siam treaded on the diplomatic path of developing good trade and business relations with both Britain and France by different means; it opened its ports for European trade, inviting Western advisers and playing its diplomatic cards provoking clash of interests between Britain and France. The purpose behind was not to let the European powers succeed in colonizing Siam like they have succeeded in neighboring countries like Burma and Indochina. Even then Siam had to compromise when the physical boundaries were identified, forsaking its stake to Laos (1893) and parts of Cambodia (1907) to France and of its dominion over Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu (1909), on the Malay Peninsula to Britain (Thailand 2010). The compromising with the dominion lands to European powers making aggressive moves in Southeast Asia had put Siam on the back foot. France took minor issues as excuse to raise disputes with Siam. In 1893, the French warships encircled the Gulf of Siam. This time, Siam had to compromise its areas to the north and east of the Mekong River, and some parts of Cambodia to France. The southern territories of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terenggany had already gone to England. It was the cost Siam had to pay to not let the European powers – Britain and France to overpower the main land. In return for the above mentioned areas, Britain and France entered into an agreement on Siam as a "buffer state" between the British and French colonies around. Thus, Siam saved itself from becoming a colony of any European country (Thai Consulate 2008). Siam had to surrender its areas to France because the French king wanted to have its stronghold over Indochina. Four times it happened that Siam had to cede its territory to France. Territories ceded to Britain in 1909 were declared protectorates by England. The Siam monarch made visits to Europe to develop friendly relations with them in 1897 and 1907 with the main motive of stopping the colonization of Indochina Although all the ceded territories were not under the physical control of Siam but when Siam was forced to leave its entire stakes on these lands, the Siamese king and the country faced the insult. The king took it to heart and according to historian David K. Wyatt, King Chulalongkorn was ("broken in spirit and health" following the 1893 crisis)) (Dansk Thai Website 2007). The neutral states of Zieng Khuang and Hua Phan had ceded to Siam for protection. These states helped Siam in putting a roadblock against the increasing influence of the French and worked as buffer between Siam and France. But France kept on making advances further by establishing its consulate at Luang Prabang with permission from Siam and very soon persuaded that state for protectorate status. Although monarch of Luang Prabang, Oum Kham became a rogue in the eyes of others by becoming protectorate of France but there was hardly any choice left for him selecting between Siam and France. The French united all the Lao territories to name it Laos as a colony. The physical boundaries of Laos have never been measured before coming in the dominion of France, which were mapped through different joint commissions with China, Britain, and Siam during 1896-97. Importance of Laos was not that crucial to France other than that it worked as a buffer state between British influenced Thailand and British colonized Burma, and economically crucial Annan and Tonkin. France found Mekong of no use for commercial transportation, also no precious metals were found and the terrain was very mountainous to carry on full-fledged plantation (Cummings & Burke 2005, pp. 22-23). Actually, there always remained a crisis in Britain’s Siam policy. Britain’s Siam policy faced the crisis in the 1880s, not deciding whether to protect Siam in the face of increasing aggression of France or allow its partition. Sir Edward Grey, Under-Secretary for foreign affairs in the Lord Rosebery government, remarked while in a memorandum presented to the Foreign Office in August 1894 “It is rather too bitter and personal in parts, but I dont see that the view of the situation is impossible or even improbable: it makes for the partition [by Britain and France] however rather than for guaranteeing the independence of Siam, as the only solution” (Brailey 2007). The Western world was of the views that like Persia and China without the British support, Siam could not carry on with her independence further. The two alternatives presented by Grey were found to be reasonable to be pursued by the British government policy-wise. It had become clearer after the crisis in Franco-Siam relations in 1893, known by the Paknam happening that put Bangkok under the dark clouds (Brailey 2007). There was a third option also, supported by some that Britain should declare its own protectorate over Siam but Lord Salisbury was the lone supporter of the independence of Siam, and still believed that Siam could save its freedom. Such a stance taken by the imperialist Britain was stunning. Salisbury himself had made up his mind on joint guarantee alternative in the Anglo-French Joint Declaration of 15 January 1896. It was set to be finalized in the general colonial pact called as the Entente Cordiale, which resulted in Siam’s freedom in April 1904 (Brailey 2007). The British Prime Minister Salisbury’s reaction over the status of Siam showed the character of Salisbury the man. Developments within Siam were reforming the society and no one could have expected the future happenings -- the impact that Earnest Satow would have, as he had earlier in dissipating crises, first in Morocco in 1893-95, and then in China in 1900-1906. Satow was principally in favor of supporting protectorate to Siam and after bearing the official pressure from London, he had lost the confidence of the British Prime Minister. But by the time, Salisbury also happened to change his stance over Siam’s protectorate; Siamese showed resilience on not agreeing to the idea of protectorate. Salisbury remarks given in 1892 indicate his stance, “Treat Siam gingerly”. With the French interest in the matters of Siam increasing, Salisbury was not in favor of the Siam’s partition as well. When Satow went to Siam in 1884 to serve a temporary assignment, he was not briefed by the seniors in the Foreign Office on the latest developments; he was supposed to carry on the two decades old policy in application from the time of Schomburgk as British Consul, of Siam serving as a buffer state between British India and French Indochina. In the backdrop of a war fought by British Indian government in 1852-53 against Burma, Siam’s neighbor on the western border, Burma’s status was reduced to a buffer state. There was no indication of any further aggression resulting in any issue that would erase Siam from the scene of Indian Northeastern Frontiers. A number of happenings elsewhere had compelled a change in Schomburgk’s Siam policy. Satow could not have a first-hand view of the French interference at Hue, the capital of the old Empire of Annan, from which the French had separated the Mekong delta states during 1862-67. Satow could not succeed in making an assessment of the situation in French Cochinchina because he could not reach Saigon as the ship crew developed symptoms of fever prohibiting taking him to Saigon (Brailey 2007). From French perspective, they faced hardships in controlling Vietnam. Public at large in France had developed distaste for imperial expansion as it was costing France dearly but there was no lack of concern shown by the French Foreign Office and Saigon on the issues related to Siam. Another threat to the Schomburgk Siam buffer-state policy came from the process of British Forward Movement in Malaya; Britain had occupied Burma in 1853 and fought the third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885. This abatement was taken to Malaya reaching to the Straits Settlement in 1825 and moved further during the governorship of Sir Andrew Clarke in the period 1873-75 resulting in the appointment of Resident advisers to the local rulers of the west-coast mainland Malay States of Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan. As a result, the southern neighbors, Johore and Pahang, also came in the range of British impact. British policy even after Clarke had bee of restraining itself especially in the Northern Peninsula. When Satow reached Singapore, Weld in charge since 1880 had made no changes in its policy on Siam. Siam’s relations in the northern Malay Peninsula with the Sultanates had been of receiving help in the form of local products, gold, silver, and military assistance in the wake of war with the third party, which did not have any impact on its part of becoming a buffer-state between the two Western powers. But for the monarch in Bangkok it was an issue of prestige to exhibit its control over its far located dependencies, including also those on the borders of British Burma and French Indochina. Governing these far-away areas through deputies was essential to the security of Siam as a nation. Weld gave the impression to Satow that British policy was to make the Malay Peninsula not less than a “little India”. It was expected that Britain would succeed in its aims in the next two decades with total disregard to Siam’s integrity. British did a lot of development work in Malay, making it a growth economy. Siam’s southern areas also had the same potential for Britain to take them under its protectorate for their potential development (Brailey 2007). Weld put the British claim on territories under Siam in June 1882 to sustain the titles to these lands subservient since 1873. Keeping aside other influences, the French interests in Siam were the issues, which according to Weld, needed to be resolved through Siam’s partition. It was to be done by bringing the peninsular Siam under the British control in bargain to the control of the rest of Siam under France. It would have extended the British influence to the extreme south of British Burma. Weld’s subordinates also had such anti-Siamese feelings of violently capturing parts of Siam. Weld was bent on using force and threatened the Siamese government of the consequences before the arrival of Satow. Satow on the other hand, after reaching Bangkok, became interested in the “emancipating the Siamese people, and raising them up as rivals to the Chinese in agriculture, commerce and manufactures”, which needed sufficient time to avoid criticism from within the Britain. Satow was a great admirer of the people of Middle Kingdom. He remarked: “The Chinese pay but a small capitation tax, and are to a great extent independent of the Siamese Government & the local governors.” On the contrary, the Siamese on their own soil were "either slaves or serfs" at the pity of their rulers. He wanted to reform the legal system also for “the suppression of bribery and the enactment of good civil & criminal codes”, where judges would be paid sufficiently, and sit openly to award quick decisions. The Memorandum was of significant interest in the context of a weak empire like Siam and the expanding imperial powers of that time. In the hindsight, Satow knew that imperial powers bent on capturing the Siamese lands, wanted to extend the extraterritorial system and were seeking opportunities to raise issues of dispute. He pursued a middle path of working independently and at the same time seeking support for the economic growth needed for a free state of Siam (Brailey 2007). Satow made it very clear that he wanted to pursue a policy where Siam’s independence was the top-most priority to other issues. He was not in agreement with Weld over the partition of Siam. He remarked: “The maintenance of the independent Kingdom of Siam between the British dominions on the one hand and the French colony of Saigon with its dependencies of Cambodia, Annam & Tonkin on the other, is the mainspring of our policy here,” and further added: “The maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Siamese realm is of more importance than the extension of the rule of the raja of Perak. Consequently I am not in favour of the views of Sir F. Weld with regard to the question raised between Perak & Raman.” Satow’s remarks made it clear that he was not interested in implementing a policy of exploiting the resources of Siam for colonial interests but in encouraging trade and developing Siam’s agriculture and mineral wealth, which was quite limited. The Memorandum ended with a significant advice to work as the foundation of British policy in Siam: Diplomatic communications to be conducted as far as possible in accordance with the tone & character which characterize [sic] such communications with European & American states, and generally to endeavour to place our relations with Siam on the basis recognized by universal international law, rather than to regard them as necessarily limited by the exceptional conditions arising out of extraterritoriality (Brailey 2007). Satows Pro-Siam Policy Satow corresponded with the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, Charles Bernard, and to the Singapore’s Acting Governor, Cecil Smith, favoring the status of Siam as a buffer state, which got the support of Charles Bernard who suggested the demarcation of frontiers between Burma and Siam. Back in London with the change in government, Satow found reinforced support from the Tories. While annexation of Upper Burma was about to happen, Churchill also supported Satow against Kimberley’s stand on peninsular Siam. Churchill was of the view that France had no right to compensation in independent Burma and Siam needed to be supported. Later in Dec. 1885-March1886 when Satow was out of Bangkok, British India waged the final war on the remaining part of Burma resulting in annexing of Mandalay to British Burma and India. By the same time, Chaophraya Surawong Waiyawat, the only survivor of Siam’s rulers, was on a visit to London to oppose British pressure on the Perak-Rama dispute. While back in Japan, Satow received the letter of Weld explaining the Governor’s view that Siam would be captured by France if Britain did not guarantee its independence. Satow felt that protection needed to be provided to Siam under the British protectorate but feared that later it might extend to interference in their freedom in maintaining foreign relations and in their domestic affairs, which might finally lead to annexation of Siam and dethronement of the king. Later, Prince Thewawong undertook a world tour with the permission of the King and showed inclination that the Royal Council of Princes was ready to reach an agreement on the British border proposal with some additional terms. The king Chulalongkorn and the Prince Thewawong, both were not ready to reach an agreement fearing insecurity in the south and east borders although the agreement was to reinforce Siam’s independence. Finally, in 1899 the final settlement was reached on the Perak-Raman border keeping the status quo intact, which was quoted as “the high water mark” to the British “policy of acknowledging Siam’s authority in the Malay Peninsula.” The Sultan of Trengganu showed his inclination for Bangkok and did not accept the European adviser. In 1904, the Anglo-French pact on Siam’s territorial rights in both the east and south was signed, which was the basis for future colonial treaties. In 1909, another treaty was signed wherein Kelantan, Trengganu besides Kedah and Perlis on the west coast were exchanged through a barter deal of ensuring Siam’s sovereignty over the remaining peninsula besides a loan amounting to 4 million pounds to start railway. Thus, Siam succeeded in diplomatically securing its rule from the European powers – Britain and France. Works Cited Journal Brailey, Nigel. “Protection or Partition: Ernest Satow and the 1880s Crisis in Britains Siam Policy.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. National University of Singapore. 29(1) (1998): 63-85 http://www.jstor.org/stable/20072009 > 25 February 2010 Book Cummings, Joe & Burke, Andrew. Laos, Volume 5. 2005. 25 February 2010 History. Thai-Consulate.org. 25 February 2010 Thailands historie. Dansk-Thai Website. < http://www.dansk-thai.dk/forum/viewthread.php?thread_id=2931> 25 February 2010 Thailand: the building of a modern state. 2010. 25 February 2010 Read More