Michigan's Responce to the PBB Crisis in the 1970s - Essay Example

?Polybrominated biphenyl crisis in Michigan The PBB (Polybrominated biphenyl) crisis in Michigan is considered one of the worst chemical contaminations of the US. Its impact has been considered extensive and prolonged and to date, its effects are still being felt and its issues unresolved. What started out as a mislabeling in a chemical factory led to a series of events which culminated in this disaster, primarily attributed to the chemical Polybrominated biphenyl or PBBs. PBBs, prior to the 1970s has primarily been considered as a flame retardant1. The Michigan Chemical Corporation in St. Louis, Michigan was the main producer of the FireMaster brand of these PBB flame retardants. The brand FireMaster BP-6 was made out of a mixture of various PBB congeners with 2,2’,4,4’,5,5’-hexabromobiphenyl and 2,2’3,4,4’,5,5’-heptabromobiphenyl as major components based on mass2. Other components of FireMaster products include bromochlorobiphenyls and polybrominated naphthalenes3. These components combined created the unfortunate animal and human health consequences seen in the Michigan chemical disaster. The FireMaster BP-6, in 1973, was accidentally added to livestock feed which was then distributed to various farms in Michigan4. Shortly thereafter, various livestock started dying. About 1.5 million chickens, 30,000 cattle, 5900 pigs, and about 1400 sheep died immediately after being contaminated and their carcasses were managed in landfills in different parts of the state5. About a year would pass before the animals would be culled6. This incident was caused by poor labeling procedures of the company with thousands of pounds of FireMaster being mistakenly labeled as magnesium oxide and delivered to companies manufacturing animal feed. After contamination, most of the animals exhibited mild symptoms like disorientation; others however became very much sick, manifesting internal bleeding and skin lesions. Others died immediately after contamination7. Based on well controlled animal studies, PBBs have been discovered to cause gastrointestinal hemorrhage, liver damage, as well as birth issues including exencephaly which manifests as deformed skull for the offspring8. The farmers were very much concerned about their livestock dying, however, they did not know the actual cause of these deaths and most of them did not perceive that the tainted meat from these livestock would imply a major health threat9. As a result, meat from some of the sick animals was added into the animal feed. This caused further contamination of other animals. Meat from the healthy cows was also sold in the markets for human consumption10. Moreover, chickens which were fed the contaminated feeds lay eggs which were also tainted with PBBs. All in all, thousands of people in Michigan were actually ingesting PBB-contaminated foods and did not even know about it11. Symptoms of PBB poisoning among humans is often based on the amount or level of contamination; mostly it includes stomach problems, abnormal bleeding, loss of balance, skin lesions, and a decreased resistance to diseases12. Many farmers and their families developed health issues attributed to PBB contamination and in general, the long-term impact of PBB among Michigan residents is still persistent because of the long-term impact of the PBBs13. In fact, it would take more years to pass before the full impact of the contamination would ever be known. The disaster also gained much attention for their continued impact on livestock, with nearly all of the large dairy farms in Michigan reporting cattle and other animal deaths14. Many of their cows also started aborting and most of them soon started to look sick, with their coats becoming mangy and hooves overgrowing. Consultants from the Michigan Department of Agriculture launched their investigation of these incidents; however, they too could not establish the cause of these incidents15. Eventually however, investigators uncovered that chemical workers at the Michigan Chemical Corporation mistakenly mixed chemical polybrominated biphenyl (PBB) while making animal feed16. At the time of this discovery, millions of cattle, livestock, and residents in the region have already been ingesting PBB-contaminated meat and milk for about a year. Government officials initially reacted very slowly to this discovery and one of their first actions was the quarantine of all dairy farms which had contaminated cows17. The farmers were significantly affected by the incident, as they were prevented from selling milk or slaughtering the animals for meat18. However, the slaughtering of cows was already carried out to some extent before the cows could be quarantined. This seems to be one of the reasons why the media had difficulties in prompting farmers to openly discuss the incident and what was happening in their farms19. Cows were actually slaughtered in large numbers and the major dairy farms were declaring bankruptcy due to their losses. Aside from revealing this chemical issue in Michigan, the incident also exposed the practice of farmers in Michigan in adding chemical additives to feed. Chemical additives are said to help the cows produce more milk and thereby increase the farmers’ profits20. Farming has been always been considered a business where active competition lurks and looms over farmers on a daily basis, and profits in this business have always been determined based on even the smallest advantage in profits21. The farming industry has felt the pressure throughout the years of producing as much food as possible while still keeping food prices low. These demands led to the Michigan Chemical Corporation’s involvement in the farming business, producing magnesium oxide in order to add into cattle feed. On further investigating the error at the chemical plant, aside from the mislabeling of the bags, the mixing of the chemical with the feed was also assigned to workers who did not have sufficient training in the job, and who did not have technical knowledge of the chemicals they were adding in to the feed. One of the workers who noticed the label was also told that the new label was the new name of magnesium oxide. These events sealed the fate of livestock in Michigan who were inadvertently fed PBB-laced animal feed. The investigation launched on the unexplained deaths and sickness of the cattle was an arduous investigation which eventually led experts to realize that there was something wrong with the feeds being given to the cows22. An investigation was therefore carried out on the Farm Bureau Services in order to ascertain any issues with their animal feeds. Health issues with the cows were soon apparent after feeding these cows with the feeds from the Farm Bureau Services23. The feed company declared that the problem may be attributed to their high-protein feed pellets and they hired researchers to conduct chemical analysis of their feeds, as well as feed trials on calves. The feed problem was however not reported to the government officials and the company actually knew that there may have been a problem with their feeds even before the Department of Agriculture pointed out a possible issue with the feeds24. Persistent tests were carried out to study the relationship of the feeds with the livestock problem. A toxicologist later accidentally found out unexpected high levels of an unidentified chemical in the feeds and recommended mass spectrometry tests. Results were later passed to the Department of Agriculture who identified the compound as PBB25. The Michigan Chemical Corporation first denied that its product FireMaster BP-6 could have been mistaken for magnesium oxide, however, an inspection by the Food and Drug Administration later found a half-used bag of PBB in one of the company’s feed mills26. Various events all contributed to the mix-up at the chemical plant, but the cause of the issue was definitively attributed to the chemical corporation’s error. About 500 to 1000 pounds of the FireMaster BP-6 was estimated to have been added in to the feed27. The company has long identified various health issues in relation to PBB, including skin and eye irritation and private companies later indicated that PBB is too risky for production because of its high level of toxicity on humans and animals28. The Chemical Corporation was one of the few corporations to use PBB in some of its products, and this eventually led to the bigger issue of human and animal chemical contamination. When the chemical contaminant was identified as PBB, the problem became a public issue and soon enough both private and public agencies were implementing measures to manage the contamination29. However, the officials were not fast enough in understanding the overall impact of the issue. The federal and state officials also underestimated the degree of contamination, at some point declaring that only a few farms were affected by the contamination. These officials did not sufficiently recognize the extent of the contamination30. In 1974, as these officials sought to confront the issue, they focused on three issues – which people and animals were “sick;” the levels of PBB contamination which were deemed safe; and how the contaminated goods should be disposed. These three problems became the focus of government officials. At the time of the contamination, not many people were aware of PBB and the Michigan Department of Health, the federal agencies, and the FDA also did not have enough information about this chemical31. There were not enough scientific studies on this chemical in order to determine its impact on animals and humans. Nevertheless, despite the lack of information, the FDA identified PBB as an “action” level contaminant32. This “action” did not require public participation, including quick regulatory actions even with gaps in scientific knowledge on the contaminant. This was the lowest level chosen for the incident and even declared the PBB levels found in the milk as probably safe because the tolerance in the US was at 2.5 ppm, and only 1.0 ppm was seen in the milk33. These same indications were also set for the meat. Quarantine for farms soon encompassed about 30 farms, mostly those who bought their feed from the Farm Bureau Services34. The animals and milk were also deemed healthy by the officials since humans could tolerate the 1.00 ppm levels found in the milk and the meat products. Farmers however were doubtful of such determination35. Still, no specific information about the chemical was available for concerned authorities. The State Department of Health first carried out their screening of 211 farmers and farm workers and the department later concluded that although PBB was detected in some of the farmer’s blood, and some of them manifested medical disorders, no specific medical issue was reported and no specific link to the contaminant was established36. A wider study was designed next covering a control and the exposed group. The results of the study were not released until 1975. The FDA carried out a survey of health issues on the quarantined farm families from May to June 1974 and similar health issues were discovered37. No analysis or publicity for the study was however carried out by the agency. Only after a congressional investigation of the incident were the results revealed to the public. In terms of disposal, at first, the state did not know what to do with the contaminated animals and implemented quarantines as an initial measure to contain contamination while it was deciding what to do about disposal38. Two months after the quarantine, the governor declared the opening of a disposal site for the killing and disposal of the animals. A civil suit against the responsible companies was also declared by the governor. However, state officials decided not to order disposal as they did not want the farmers to file for claims against the state39. The state therefore quarantined the farms and monitored their activities. Farmers were however pressured to dispose of the animals because of their health risks. Most of them eventually had to dispose of their contaminated livestock. People living near the disposal site however were very much opposed to the government plan and soon enough some of the county’s commissioners filed for court orders to cease the disposal40. The state never informed the local officials about the disposal plan and case soon delayed the disposal of the animals for about two months. Veterinarians carrying out studies on the contaminated animals uncovered that contaminated cows had higher rates of mortality, presented with reproductive issues, and some congenital anomalies in their offspring41. The study also supported the speculations of the farmers on the health disorders found in cows exhibiting below 1.0 ppm contamination. Another study also revealed that mice exposed to high doses of PPM manifested with GI bleeding, inflamed livers, and birth defects42. Towards the end of 1974, government officials soon realized that the contamination was a bigger problem than what they initially perceived. Although the contamination was initially caused by the factory mix-up, a second wider contamination was observed, mostly attributed to the use of the machinery which mixed feed and which still passed the PBB to other animal feeds43. The animals which were discovered as unfit for human consumption was killed, but when processed were still added to the feeds. These processed caused a chronic contamination of Michigan farm animals and in their general food chain. A new action level was indicated after discovery of the bigger issue and wider contamination. More animals were declared unfit for human consumption and destroyed44. The site actually became limited in terms of capacity, however since no other site was available, the area housed more destroyed animals than it could actually hold. In the end, the site houses about 30,000 animals. The new action level also impacted on compensation policies45. In 1994, the Farm Bureau Services and the Michigan Chemical Corporation also started to settle farmers’ claims out of court. This issue soon became a political controversy as the issue became more than an agricultural problem; it became a public health problem for Michigan consumers46. This scenario implied the need to implement changes in policy. In 1975, the press also published reports of a human illness which were caused by PBB and soon enough the government officials became concerned about the public panic concerning the contamination. Veterinarians were sent to Michigan in order to assess the health status of the cattle47. Based on their report, there were no significant health issues seen in the surveyed cattle herds. However, there were significant defects in the survey, mostly attributed to the fact that there were only two control herds which tested negative for PBB. The feed used was contaminated with PBB for both control and exposed farms48. In effect, there were issues in the conduct of the research on livestock in Michigan; in effect, the actual results for these studies were not reliable. Farmers became more vocal about their complaints about how the state was handling the incident and pointing out about the persistent health issues which were being suffered by their livestock. At one point, one of the farmers vehemently protested the state’s refusal to assist farmers by burying his herd of 112 cows and calves49. Committee public hearings with the state legislature were held in 1976 in order to secure first-hand stories of their PBB farm issues50. During this hearing it was uncovered that many authorities blamed the farmers for the poor-management of their cattle, not the PBB as the cause for their cattle deaths51. As such, not enough attention on the issue was given by government officials. Farmers also organized a march at their state’s capital, dumping the bodies of their PBB contaminated cattle. The demands of the farmers were simple, and were mostly related to the lowering of the danger levels of PBB, as these farmers were noting how the FDA levels are not sufficient in warning off the farmers on the acceptable and safe levels of the chemical52. Various studies were able to confirm the negative health impact of the contaminant and a possible lowering of the alert level for the contaminant was recommended by various researchers. However, the Michigan Agriculture Commissions still followed the recommendation of the FDA which indicated that the 0.3 ppm indication for PPM was probably safe53. When the executive officials refused to lower the level, the state legislature started to consider a bill and pass it as state law. This law was later passed and reduced the PBB action level from 300 quarts per billion to 20 ppb54. The Department of Agriculture and the Michigan Farm Bureau did not support this bill, however, public outcry forced the approval of the bill. The PBB Action Committee was formed by farmers in order for complaints about the PBB to be entertained and then forwarded to politicians55. The group helped to redefine the information on PBB as a health hazard. Throughout the years, studies were carried out on both cattle and humans which were in the contaminated region and indications of health issues linked with PBB were apparent in various respondents56. Some issues related to joint disorders, fatigue, headaches, dizziness, and unusually long sleep hours57. Contaminated human breast milk was also reported in some women. Increased immunological issues were also seen in some of the farmers58. The Michigan authorities did not manage this issue well. From the very start, they had insufficient information about the contaminant and the bases of their decisions were not based on their more in-depth assessment of the contaminant. Conflicting reports from various researchers on the health impact of the chemical contaminant on both animals and humans did not prompt these officials to establish their own studies on the impact of the contaminants. Instead, their decisions were based on unreliable reports and research studies. Moreover, efforts to downplay the health concerns of the people who were actually affected were apparent in the months and years following the incident. Despite significant health issues reported in the persistent deaths and health issues of the cattle, no definitive government action was taken. Instead, more drastic measures were utilized by the farmers in order to gain the reaction and the attention they were seeking from the government officials. The delays and the lack of firm and suitable actions by the government prolonged the crisis and exacerbated the impact of the chemical contamination. In general, different lessons can be learned from the incident, mostly lessons which relate to the need for government officials to be highly informed about any incident which would likely come within the purview of their government functions. The lack of speedy, accurate, definitive, and well-informed decision on the part of the government officials exacerbated the impact of the incident. The lack of cooperation between the private and the public agencies also prolonged the resolution of the incident. Inadequate information being released to the media and to the public also did not give the people a chance to be properly informed about the issue and to make the proper precautions on the incident. The lack of adequate coordination between the executive and legislative branches of the government also delayed the adequate management of the issue. As such, the people, not just the animals which directly fed on the PBB-contaminated feeds were affected by the incident. With the quick, proper, and adequate actions, the impact of the contamination could have been reduced. Works Cited Anderson, H., Lilis, R., and Selikof, I., Unanticipated prevalence of symptoms among dairy farmers in Michigan and Wisconsin. Environ Health Perspect, 23 (1978): 217-226. Brilliant, L., Wilcox, K., and Van Amburg, G., Breast-milk monitoring to measure Michigan's contamination with polybrominated biphenyls. Lancet 2 (1978): 643-646. Brody, J. Illnesses linked to chemical PBB. The New York Times, 5 January 1977. Buchsbaum, Andrew. ‘To the Ends of the Earth: The Spread of Industrial Poisons.’ The Harvard Crimson, 1978. http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1978/3/8/to-the-ends-of-the-earth/ (accessed 17 November 2012). Budd, M., Hayner, N., and Humphrey, H., Polybrominated biphenyl exposure-Michigan. Morbid Mortal W Rep 27 (1978): 115-116. Carter, Luther. "Michigan's PBB incident: Chemical Mix-Up Leads to Disaster". Science 192, no. 4236 (1976): 240–243. Clark, E. Kalkaska burial site. Lansing: Michigan State House Democratic Staff, 1976. Print. Donahue, James. ‘The Michigan PBB Crisis,’ 2010. http://perdurabo10.tripod.com/mystory/id28.html (accessed 18 November 2012). Dykstra, Susan. "PBB Contamination of Cattle Feed in Michigan, 1973". Department of Earth Resources and Science, University of Michigan-Flint, 2001. http://www.umflint.edu/research/student_programs/MOM/journal/2010/Dykstra.pdf (accessed 18 November 2012). Jackson, T. and Halbert, F. A toxic syndrome associated with the feeding of polybrominated biphenyl-contaminated protein concentrate to dairy cattle. J Amer Vet Med Assoc 165 (1974): 437- 439. Kimbrough, R., Burse, V., and Liddle, J., Toxicity of brominated biphenyls. Lancet 2 (1977): 602-603. Mercer, H., Teske, R., and Condon R., Herd health status of animals exposed to polybrominated biphenyl (PBB). J Toxicol Environ Health 2 (1976): 235-249. Reich, Michael, ‘Environmental Politics and Science: The Case of PBB Contamination in Michigan. Am J Public Health, 73 (1983): 302-313. Ryan, W. Blaming the Victim (rev. ed.). (New York: Vintage Books, 1976.) Safe, S. Kohli, J. and Crawford, A. FireMaster BP-6: Fractionation, Metabolic and Enzyme Induction Studies. Environmental Health Perspectives 23 (1978): 147. Teske, R. and Wagstaff, D. Review of the current status of polybrominated biphenyl (PBB) toxicosis in dairy cattle in Michigan. (Washington, DC: FDA, 1974.) United Nations Environment Programme. "Environmental Health Criteria 152: Polybrominated biphenyls: IPCS International Programme on Chemical Safety". World Health Organization: Geneva, 1994. Web. 18 November 2012. Read More