The Efficiency of the Counter Terrorism Program in Saudi Arabia - Thesis Example

? The Efficiency of the Counter Terrorism Program in Saudi Arabia Terrorism has been a major focus of nations across the globe, since the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States and various terrorist attacks throughout the world. Despite the strong desire to curb terrorism, and a ‘war on terror’, there has been no consensus definition of what terrorism entails or the most effective method to stop it. Saudi Arabia is in an unusual position, as it is a highly religious state that follows the Islamic religion, yet condemns terrorism. Although it took Saudi Arabia until 2003 to effectively respond to the terrorist threat, the state has been vigilant in fighting terrorism within its borders and overseas. Saudi Arabia’s approach to terrorism has been to fight it by using a ‘soft’ method, which focuses on the rehabilitation of extremists, their deradicalization and integration back into society. This paper examines the theory behind this approach and early data which suggests the program has the potential to be highly successful and to achieve more in terms of countering terrorism than ‘hard’ approaches can. Table of Contents Abstract 2 Table of Contents 3 I. Introduction 4 II. Literature Review 4 III. Terrorism: Theory and Practice in Saudi Arabia 5 III.I The Definition of Terrorism and Religious Freedom 5 III.II Al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia 8 IV. Saudi Strategy in Fighting Terrorism inside the Kingdom 11 IV.I Three Pronged Strategy 11 IV.II Steps against Terrorist Funding and Activity 12 IV.III The Use of Media 12 IV.IV Reform Program in Prison 13 V. The Saudi Counter Terrorism Model 14 V.I Hard versus Soft Power 14 V.II Benefits of Soft Power 15 V.III Practical Approach 17 VI. Conclusion 17 VII. References 18 I. Introduction The presence of terrorism has become a strong focus of governments and the media since the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. For most European countries finding a way of countering terrorism has been a top priority1 . The attacks were perceived as being immoral and were undertaken by people who were evil and wanted to destroy the way of live and values of the United States. The response was the beginning of a global war that has focused on the eradication of terrorism throughout the world. However, while this approach views terrorism as a recent event, primarily occurring against the United States, the truth is that terrorism has been present for a long time before these acts, in many different countries2. The aim of this paper is to examine the counter terrorism methods that have been and are being used in Saudi Arabia, with particular emphasis on the so-called ‘soft’ model of counter terrorism that has been incorporated. It is argued that Saudi Arabia is dedicated to fighting terrorism both within its own borders and outside of them, and that their approach to combating extremism and terrorism has the potential to be highly effective. II. Literature Review There has been considerable debate in the western world whether Saudi Arabia is a friend or a foe in the so-called ‘War on Terror’. On one hand, many of the extremists who have committed acts of terrorism come from within Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia is Islamic, as are those involved in terrorism. However, Saudi Arabia has also publically renounced terrorism and has been working with western countries to try and stem the rise of terrorism. Studies on Saudi Arabia’s approach to terrorism have varied in whether they consider the country’s efforts to be positive or negative, especially in relation to the way in which people who have been arrested for terrorist affiliations are treated. One report focused on the counter terrorism response of Saudi Arabia from the perspective of human rights. Saudi Arabia’s most prominent mechanism of dealing with those who are suspected of being involved with terrorist activities is their incarceration and religious reeducation. In this report, the authors focused on the fact that many individuals are detained indefinitely and are not given a trial. In 2008, the first trials for incarcerated individuals began, five years since the first people were arrested. The decision to bring the detainees to court has done little to ease concern about the process, because, as the report notes, the trials are not made public and there is little indication of whether the process is fair3. Another report to a similarly negative stance, and examined the way in which the lack of financial restrictions within Saudi Arabia prior to 2001 had a significant effect on the growth of terrorism, enabling a large amount of funding to be available to extremists. The authors note that this problem is complicated by the fact that private and public funding often overlaps and donations are often private4. Some researchers have taken the opposite perspective and argued that the approach which Saudi Arabia takes to terrorism has the potential to be effective, because it has a different focus than other approaches, attempting to reduce the pool of potential extremists and people returning to terrorist activities5. Many authors argue against the concept that the ‘soft’ measures that Saudi Arabia takes towards terrorism are ineffective, focusing on the promising results from Saudi Arabia’s religious reeducation model and the extent of prevention, rehabilitation and care after release6. In addition, approaches have been made to reduce the availability of funding to extremists and to increase the ability of Saudi Arabia to physically combat terrorism7 III. Terrorism: Theory and Practice in Saudi Arabia III.I The Definition of Terrorism and Religious Freedom There is no clear definition of what exactly constitutes terrorism. Understanding and defining the phenomenon is a crucial aspect of determining methods of fighting this, and as a consequence scholars and policy makers continue to seek and evaluate new definitions. A definition needs to define the new term, in this case terrorism, in terms of known elements. One of the difficulties arises with determining which components are relevant to the definition. Three elements that could be considered terrorism are political murder, the killing of innocent people and the use of violence to achieve a political purpose. The authors refer to an early paper they wrote, where a total of 22 word categories were used in 109 definitions. Of these categories the main three were violence or force, political aspects and the use of fear or terror8. One of the most common definitions of terrorism is that it is a form of organized violence that is directed against a state for the purposes of a political objective. However, this definition is somewhat narrow and does not take into account the many incidences of terrorism that are not aimed at the state. For example, some of the most prominent examples of terrorism are that of Hitler, Stalin or Mao, none of which were targeted at the state9. A perception that is often forwarded of terrorism, particularly from the viewpoint of America and the western world is that it is an immoral act and that no form of moral justification can be used to defend it. This is a somewhat self-centered viewpoint, and involves large western countries imposing their viewpoint on others. The religious and moral perceptions of one part of the world differ significantly, so it is difficult to blatantly say that there is no moral validation for terrorism. It can be argued that the definition of terrorism needs to avoid any moral implications, and allow them to be examined on a case-by-case basis It is important that definitions of terrorism do not fall into the trap of considering terrorism to be an act done by terrorists, as this definition can result in a strong perception bias, with people or groups considered to commit terrorist activities, while others are not, even when the activities themselves are very similar10. Terrorism is at its heart an act of violence, but the problem with defining it comes from determining what forms of violence are considered to be terrorism and what other forms of violence are defined as11. One component that is frequently debated in definitions of terrorism is whether the terror that is created is done as an act of symbolism. However, an argument against this aspect of the definition is that groups or individuals may practice terrorism as a method of punishing a specific individual or group of individuals, as opposed to choosing targets on a symbolic basis12. One of the biggest problems in defining terrorism comes from the fact that the term is highly emotionally charged, and the terrorism label is often used as a method of propaganda. The result of this is people believing terrorism is occurring where it may not be, and not perceiving actual terrorism even when it is evident. Different nations, groups and individuals promote varying definitions of what terrorism is, and even the United Nations has failed to come to a consensus definition of the term. It has even been argued that defining the term may be impossible13. Political reasons make defining terrorism difficult, in part due to the perceptions of the term terrorist compared to freedom fighter. Often, a freedom fighter is considered to be a form of legitimate resistance, while a terrorist is considered illegitimate. However, the legitimacy of a cause is strongly determined by who is evaluating it, and their motivations. For example Osama bin Laden and his followers were once considered to be freedom fighters. When they were resisting occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets, they even received backing from Central Intelligence Agency. Yet despite this, they are now considered to be terrorists. A similar example is of Palestinians, who are perceived to be freedom fighters by the United Nations, but terrorists by Israel14.Perhaps the most effective approach to defining terrorism comes from changing the angle that it is viewed. Most definitions of terrorism consider it as an end, with an act of terrorism being an attack such as September 11. However, a different approach is to evaluate terrorism as being a way that groups act, a ‘means to an end’. Under this type of definition, terrorism becomes a method of fighting15. Yet even this is subject to many of the same limitations that other approaches to defining terrorism, as it remains a subjective term. The United Nations has stated that an agreed definition of terrorism is crucial for the development of a convention to fight it. Some issues that have arisen during the debate is that it is important not to associate with associating them with any particular faith, as this would result in dissention and crude targeting and profiling16. The United Nations represents the strongest potential source of a consensus definition of terrorism, as it contains representatives from many different countries, including Saudi Arabia. The United States uses the definition of terrorism as “a premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”17 An interesting part of this definition is that who a noncombatant target is, is never actually defined. In practice, this would make determining when something was or was not an act of terrorism difficult to ascertain in some situations. Additionally, the definition does not consider terrorism can be conducted by state actors, while some debates on the definition of terrorism have stressed that there is no reason why it could not be achieved by state actors18. However, while the United States has an active definition of terrorism, there is currently no internationally agreed upon definition of terrorism by the United Nations. This impasse is strongly linked to the fact that some members of the United Nations want the ‘struggle for liberation’ to remain distinct from the definition of terrorism19. One of the driving reasons for this problem is the Palestinian conflict, which is viewed as either terrorist or freedom fighting, depending on what perspective is taken20, Saudi Arabia is one of these nations21. However, Saudi Arabia has an active definition of terrorism that was developed in 2010. Under this definition, terrorism is defined by the acts that are carried out. The description of terrorism included "targeting public resources, spreading corruption, hijacking planes, and bombing buildings". This decision also criminalizes terrorism, and the council resolved that the definition does not apply only to Saudi Arabia, but to the rest of the world22. It is this approach to defining terrorism that is being used for all subsequent anti-terrorism actions. III.II Al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia is a region that has key strategic importance throughout the world because of the amount of petroleum that is present as well as the religious aspect. From the religious perspective, Saudi Arabia is the location of two of the most revered holy sites in Islam and the annual pilgrimage of Islam occurs in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is currently the largest global power for petroleum and the economy is strongly based on profits made from exporting petroleum. Saudi Arabia has a significant position in the Gulf, and is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which provides a strong force against the threats from Iran and other potential threats23. Following the attacks of September 11, there was initially considerable tension between Saudi Arabia and the United States as people from Saudi Arabia played a significant role in the terrorist attacks. However, this radical component was not encouraged by the government of Saudi Arabia, and a strong collaboration was formed between the two countries for the purposes of combating terrorism24. Saudi Arabia has become a major force in the combat against the Al-Qaeda for two reasons. Firstly, it has strong capability for intelligence and internal security, and additionally, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a religious legitimacy which allows them to combat the Al-Qaeda on an ideological basis. This second aspect is one that the United States and other western nations do not have, and it gives Saudi Arabia considerable strength when dealing with idealists25. The most important threats to Saudi Arabia’s security come from extremists both within and outside of the country. The state has always had issues with people who deviated from the accepted religious practices. However, it was not until the development of Al-Qaeda that there has been a significant threat to the national security of Saudi Arabia. One of the key goals Al-Qaeda and the affiliates of this group is that the current Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is destroyed and a new version of the country is built based on the extremism perspectives26. The Al-Qaeda threat first developed towards the end of the Cold War. As this threat became important, Saudi Arabia responded by attempting to defeat it, and froze the assets of Osama bin Laden as well as removing his citizenship in 1994. Direct attacks on Saudi Arabia by the Al-Qaeda began in 2003, intensified by the actions of Saudi Arabia to combat terrorism27. Al-Qaeda is not the first security threat that Saudi Arabia has experienced from within, and internal extremists have been present since the 1920’s, and were especially serious during the 1950’s and again during the 1970’s as Islam reacted to the wealth and modernization of the country that was occurring. Following the Gulf War, extremist groups became an increasing problem, as they were hostile to the presence of any western military force being present. One factor that led to the growth of the Al-Qaeda was the Saudi Arabian government itself. During the period from 1960 to 1970 members of an extremist group known as the Muslim Brotherhood were removed from many areas including Egypt and Syria, but this group was not excluded from Saudi Arabia. Instead, members of the group became teachers and preachers within Saudi Arabia, ensuring that their viewpoints were effectively passed on to the next generation28. The regulations concerning the transfers of funds also played a significant role in the growth of the Al-Qaeda infrastructure within Saudi Arabia. There was little regulation concerning how money was spent, and individuals had the ability to raise money as they chose and to use it for any cause. Monitoring where these funds ended up was difficult to impossible due to the lack of income tax in Saudi Arabia. The strong dependency that the state has on personal charity meant that there were large amounts of money that directly went into funding extremist activities and infrastructure which the Saudi Arabian government, and even those contributing to the donations, were unaware of29. This allowed the Al-Qaeda to establish a firm foothold in Saudi Arabia. Many young, religious individuals left Saudi Arabia to fight in foreign wars supporting the causes of Islam. For those young soldiers, returning meant coming back to a home where they were not accepted and most could not assimilate into the society that they had left. Most had become highly radicalized and had contact with extremist groups during their time away from home. The effect of this was that there were many cells of ‘sleeper’ agents in Saudi Arabia, who had extremist ideals, and only needed a push to turn these ideals into something more. This began in 1995 and 1996 during the disagreement over whether American Forces should be present of Saudi Arabian soil. The result was the bombing of an American mission which killed six people and injured another 60. In 1996, a truck bomb was used to attack the Al-Khobar towers, were people from the United States military, resulting in 500 injuries and 19 deaths30. When the United States invaded Iraq, many Saudi Arabians questioned whether the country should remain strategically aligned with the United States31 and served to ignite considerable passion in Saudi Arabian extremists, resulting in the kidnapping and killing of many foreigners who were living within Saudi Arabia. Militants also focused on the development of bombs against local and foreign civilians as well as government institutions. Between 2003-2004 there were a series of bombings that injured more than 1,000 people and killed 16432. These events show how strong the development of Al-Qaeda within Saudi Arabia was, and they played a large role in Saudi Arabia’s decision to directly combat terrorism following the bombings of September 11, 2001. Many other issues also resulted in the growing extremist force within Saudi Arabia, and prior to 2001, Saudi Arabia made little effort to stop this threat. The government did not realize the link between young men returning to Saudi Arabia and the exportation of bombs and explosives into the country. Problems from extremists were monitored, but tolerated, and the flow of money into these groups was not observed nor prevented33. IV. Saudi Strategy in Fighting Terrorism inside the Kingdom IV.I Three Pronged Strategy The attacks of 2003 were the first time that terrorism had affected Saudi Arabia directly, and it served as a wakeup call for the state to take a stronger focus on internal security34. Since 2003, Saudi Arabia has launched a three-pronged attack against Al-Qaeda. The first aspect of this was engaging the Al-Qaeda in combat. In these combat engagements the focus has been on the elimination of the threat rather than taking prisoners. The second aspect was the arrest and detainment of people suspected of being involved with or supporting Al-Qaeda. Finally, the third component was a public relations campaign, which publically identified fugitives35. These three components interact with one another, however, in recent years; the strongest focus has been placed on how to deal with the terrorists and suspected terrorists who have been incarcerated as a result of their violent extremism. This has been achieved by the use of unconventional methods of combating the violent extremism found in terrorists, measures that have come to be referred to as ‘soft’ measures by countries outside of Saudi Arabia, although the approach does appear to be having some level of success. The focus of this is three programs that focus on the prevention of terrorism, the rehabilitation of those who have committed terrorism and then their care following release. This approach to tacking that extremism that has grown into terrorist activities is outlined in the state’s Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare (PRAC) strategy. Unlike measures in other countries, such as the United States, the focus is not on punishing those who have committed crimes of terrorism, but instead of reeducating them to become citizens once more. It is likely that the religious legitimacy that Saudi Arabia has (discussed previously) is an influencing factor as to why the program is so successful. Many terrorists are religious extremists and thus Saudi Arabia is in the unusual position of being able to sympathize with some of their motives while at the same time steer them away from extremism36. One aspect of the detainment of prisoners that are suspected terrorists that is often not considered by foreign perspectives is that many of the people detained have remained in custody. Because the majority of these individuals are not convicted, there is no length placed on the sentence. This means that some of those who have been incarcerated have an indefinite sentence37. IV.II Steps against Terrorist Funding and Activity The size of the Saudi Arabian security force has grown considerably each year, with individuals undergoing considerable training both locally, and in joint programs throughout the world. As well as training security forces, Saudi Arabia has also focused on the development of technology that serves to help keeping the state safe. This has included a border patrol containing helicopters, boats and vehicles capable of four-wheel drive, as well as the creation of drones capable of aerial reconnaissance38. This force is capable of reacting directly to extremist threats, and combating them effectively. The presence and development of security within Saudi Arabia shows an increased focus on internal security, a step that is necessary to effectively combat internal and external extremist threats. New regulations for banking and control of finances were developed by 2003, focusing on preventing financial support of extremism and terrorism occurring within Saudi Arabia and outside of it. The Saudi Arabian government did more than instigate regulations and policies; they also took steps to ensure that they were followed. One aspect of this was the creation of training programs for bankers and officials from government agencies and departments. In addition, financial controls were developed for charitable giving. This is a crucial aspect of Islamic beliefs and one that has been traditionally under monitored. Indeed, it is argued that the lack of control of Saudi Arabian donations and charities resulted in a major source of funding for terrorist and extremist groups, and could have directly influenced the September 11, 2011 attacks in the United States39. Direct oversight of charitable organizations has been established through a royal order. Finally, the Saudi Arabian government has initiated method of searching out illegal activities, through the development of security organizations, and working with international agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Internal Revenue Service40. The reduction in financial support for extremist groups makes terrorist activities more difficult to maintain. IV.III The Use of Media Prevention is one of the components of the PRAC strategy and the media plays a significant role in this. Programs focus on education for the public about the dangers that radical Islam and extremism plays, as well as attempting to provide alternatives for those who are considering extremism. This approach does not target extremists, but rather the people that sympathize with them, or consider their actions to be somewhat noble. This is essentially a propaganda campaign, where the government is using programs and media to forward a specific objective. Since 2003, a large-scale public awareness program has been in place with the aim of creating cooperation between members of the public and the goals of the Saudi Arabian government. One component of this program has involved large signs and billboards being placed throughout cities with images of faith and terrorism, proclaiming that terrorist actions have no place in Islam41. IV.IV Reform Program in Prison One of the responses that Saudi Arabia has shown to the acts and threats of terrorism occurring is through detaining large number of suspects and putting these through a program that focuses on religious counseling More than 9,000 individuals have been detained as the result of this approach. The aim of this approach is to rehabilitate the terrorists back into society42. The reform program is available to all people who have offended against the security of Saudi Arabia. After the completion of the program, individuals who have renounced their former beliefs are eligible for release43. The reform program in Saudi Arabian prisons involves the selection of clerics from each region of the state to visit the prisoners and interact with them. The individuals chosen for this role were picked carefully so that they were somewhat distant from the ruling regime of Saudi Arabia and were not happy with the prison system. The selection of these individuals helps to ensure that they are perceived as being legitimate intermediaries who the prisoners can trust, and who are able to bring news to the prisoner’s families that the family might be unlikely to believe from prison officials. For example, many prisoners’ families have been concerned that the prisoners were being mistreated. Through the use of the clerics, the Saudi Arabian government was able to reassure families that this was not the case44. The process of asking a religious man to intercede or communicate with a prisoner is common practice in Saudi Arabia and indeed in many cultures, which helps the practice to feel legitimate to family members and the person in prison, making the process more likely to be accepted. Aftercare programs for prisoners who have been released into society are a significant component of Saudi Arabia’s PRAC strategy. These programs focus on the reintegration and rehabilitation of prisoners, even helping them to be involved in marriages and begin their own businesses45. However, despite the way that this program is promoted as a resounding success, it does have significant limitations. It is only in the last few years that detainees in these prisons have begun to be referred to courts. Little information is available to the public about these trials, and public observers are not allowed. This provides strong indications that the trials may not be fair, and it is likely that many innocent people are incarcerated as a result of Saudi Arabia’s approach to rooting out and reforming terrorists. In fact, the men and women incarcerated in this form of detention have not even been charged with a crime. Under international law, detention for the purposes of reeducation is considered to be a violation of human rights46. While these individuals are theoretically able to go through the program and be released, this process would be painful for individuals who have committed no crime, and may never have followed the extremist beliefs. V. The Saudi Counter Terrorism Model V.I Hard versus Soft Power Traditionally hard power has been the main method used to combat terrorism and to achieve security aims in general. Power can be considered the ability to influence the way that other people behave in order to get the desired outcomes. Hard power is a more violent and destructive approach, it attempts to remove opposition by force, and often involves the use of military means or threatening military action. Alternatively, hard power can involve the use of economic force, where the nation either threatens or uses economic sanctions to force the other group to do as it requires. Finally, hard power can sometimes result in the main nation providing incentives for the other group to behave as desired. The United States has historically relied on hard power to achieve its goals, but recent years have seen a growing understanding that this may not been an effective approach in many situations47. In terms of approaches to terrorism, a hard power perspective tends to involve the use of force, which can result in large numbers of casualties on both sides. Economic approaches are different to achieve, because the terrorists are not a state, but a radical faction within multiple states. An economic approach would have to target many people who were innocent, and would hinder the counter terrorism measures of states like Saudi Arabia. There has been significant backlash against the use of hard approaches to fight terrorism as they have resulted in large ongoing conflicts that appear to have little hope of resolution48. Soft power is an alternative approach that attempts to understand the causes and motivation behind the undesired behavior and to remove it by addressing these causes. Soft methods of countering terrorism include methods such as establishing dialogue, creating alternative opportunities and providing education49. Soft power has the potential to be effective in areas where the targeted population or state has a good opinion or some respect for the one using the power50. This is certainly the case for Saudi Arabia and the extremists, as they represent an alternative interpretation of the same religion and belief system. Analysts of counterterrorism are beginning to agree that methods of security and intelligence (hard power) are not enough to effectively protect the population from terrorism. Instead there needs to be a greater focus on preventing people from becoming radicalized and rehabilitating people who have become extremist. Indeed, if enough people denounce the concepts and beliefs of radical Islam, it may be enough to substantially hinder extremist groups from being able to recruit from within the population51. V.II Benefits of Soft Power Saudi Arabia’s model of counter terrorism, involving the rehabilitation of extremists to the ‘true’ perspectives of Islam has often been argued as a soft approach. Despite arguments against the rehabilitation program of Saudi Arabia, it has been an effective measure of managing extremists. The recidivism rate for the program is ten percent, which is highly successful for a reeducation program. In western nations, reeducation programs generally see a success rate of between 60 and 70 percent. It is too soon to know whether the rehabilitation program will be successful, as it has only been in effect for seven years, but early outcomes are promising52. One of the reasons why Saudi Arabia’s benevolent approach to terrorists has the potential to be successful is that research has shown that most of the participants in the program had little knowledge of Islam and a low level of formal education. These individuals are influenced into joining the extremist perspective from books, videos and internet information posted by extremist individuals. The argument made by Saudi Arabian officials is that the lack of education that the participants had made them highly susceptible to propaganda distributed by extremists53. The Saudi Arabian approach does have one limiting factor that is not generally considered in debates of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ methods. This is the fact that there is a lack of legitimate trials for people, and many people who are part of the program have never been charged with a crime, much less convicted54. This suggests that there is still a significant way to go before Saudi Arabia’s model of counter terrorism can be effective and remains within the human rights parameters. One issue that will determine whether the rehabilitation program will be successful is the way that those released from the program are handled. Additionally, Al-Qaeda has made it clear that the program is a significant threat to its operations, and it is likely that attempts will be made to decrease the effectiveness of the program or stop it entirely55. The so-called ‘soft’ approach that Saudi Arabia promotes for managing people who are arrested for terrorism or terrorist associations is far from proven, however the low recidivism rates suggest that it may be successful in the future. The question remains, what factors influence the long term success of the program, and will these be enough for the approach to withstand opposition both from other countries, who consider the approach ‘soft’, and from the Al-Qaeda, who are concerned at the threat that the program provides. The approach of the Saudi Arabian government is a ‘war on ideas’, where the government is highly focused on the legitimacy of the claims of terrorism, and whether these viewpoints are permitted in Islamic law. The government argues that extremists have been misled and have forgotten their religious doctrine and the importance of authority. As such, they have turned their back on true Islam. The use of this approach stems from the idea of treating the cause rather than the symptom of the problem. Putting a large amount of resources into physically combating terrorism would require extremists to be either kept in custody or killed, punishing them and releasing them would be unlikely to result in them not becoming involved in extremist action again in the future56. One of the greatest threats that terrorism has on the modern world does not like in their ability to attack structures and people, but in how they are able to recruit members from the public. Unless this mechanism is stopped or limited, the combating and restraining of extremists and terrorists will do little to stem the tide57. The ‘soft’ model that Saudi Arabia uses does exactly this. The combination of reeducation for those who have been arrested for terrorist affiliation and public education has the potential to significantly reduce the pool from which extremists can recruit new and previous participants. V.III Practical Approach Fighting terrorism within Saudi Arabia is an approach that has been met with considerable success. The framework of counterterrorism that Saudi Arabia has developed has allowed it to effectively produce a coordinated response to the activities of the Al-Qaeda. This response has been devastating to the Al-Qaeda activities within the region, and the last attack that occurred in Saudi Arabia where a person was killed by the Al-Qaeda occurred in 2006. The attack itself was stopped by security at the location58. The low rate of re-offense from the ‘soft’ approach is a clear indication that the program has potential, but the long term success of this approach has not been examined. The ‘soft’ approach to counterterrorism has the potential to cripple extremist movements in a way that traditional ‘hard’ approaches cannot. The legitimacy of Saudi Arabia certainly plays a significant role here, and there is the potential that Saudi Arabia may be able to undermine the extremist movement enough that it is no longer effective. Soft approaches to combating extremism have been used in many countries including Algeria, Bangladesh and Egypt. Deradicalization has resulted in the decrease of terrorist attacks and combat between warring factions59. Although there have been many approaches to combating terrorism, research indicates that the presence of counterterrorism strategies has done little to reduce the level of terrorism that is occurring. Interestingly, some authors argue that the only method of effectively combating terrorism is to increase the punishment for those who are apprehended or convicted as terrorists, and to use more retaliation or military attacks against terrorist targets60. However, the results observed from soft counter-terrorism and the potential that this has to change the driving issues behind terrorism indicate that this may be a more effective approach. Increasing retaliation and risk for people who are terrorists will not necessarily decrease the level of attacks, as it has no influence on the reason that people are involved in these activities. VI. Conclusion Saudi Arabia has joined with other countries in an attempt to remove the extremism and terrorism that is occurring both inside and outside of its borders. Despite the fact that there is no international consensus definition of terrorism, Saudi Arabia has developed a working definition that focuses on the acts that extremists commit. It is argued that the ‘soft’ approach that Saudi Arabia has to managing terrorism is ineffective, as it involves the captured extremists being treated more as victims than as having committing a crime The ‘soft’ approach to terrorism involves the reintegration of extremists back into society and educating them away from their radical perspectives. The program in Saudi Arabia has only been running for a short amount of time and it is too early to see clear results. However, theoretical perspectives as well as the results that are currently known suggest that this type of reform may be more effective at decreasing the terrorist threat than a ‘hard approach’ and results in fewer casualties. VII. References Al-Saheil, T. (2010, April 14). Saudi Arabia's senior Ulema council criminalizes terrorism Retrieved July 1, 2012, from http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=1&id=20576 Blanchard, C. M., & Prados, A. B. (2007). 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