Does the international community have the responsibility to protect - Essay Example

?Does The International Community Have The Responsibility To Protect? Should They Have Implemented This in Africa in The 1990s? R2P in Africa in The 1990s In the continent of Africa, the efforts of the international community to assist in the maintenance of internal security and peace have suffered several setbacks. A case in point was the Rwanda genocide in which there was an exceptional scale of devastation. The situation in the present Somalia, and Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s demonstrates the difficulties that the peace efforts have faced in particular regions and the extensive human suffering that armed conflicts have brought in their wake. In 2005, world leaders at the UN Summit backed the Responsibility to Protect principle, which ascertains the mandate of the states to protect their populations against war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide (International Business Publications 2007, p210; Shukla 2008, p8). In most parts of Africa, a lot has to be done before the principle is put into practice as indicated by the Sudan Darfur’s humanitarian disaster (International Business Publications 2007, p210). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty first presented the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2001 to the international community. This came out of the desire to alleviate preventable tragedies like those in Rwanda and Bosnia, which made headlines in the world during the 1990s. With the R2P doctrine, the international community has started to conceptualize and recognize its mandate to intervene in circumstances where the states are unwilling or incapable to protect civilians, and stop or prevent massive human rights abuses in their borders. R2P has offered a basis for discussions concerning the creation of African security architecture. Core to R2P is the requirement by the third parties to have the ability for effective and timely intervention in crises (Besada 2010, p xviii). Case Study on Two African States in The 1990s Burundi Introduction After ten years of civil war and several years of post-independence fighting, Burundi is making progress in post-conflict peace building and recovery. The circumstances in Burundi did not get to full-scale genocide, and this is mainly attributed in part, “to early and long-term involvement on the part of regional and international actors including UN, African state governments, and NGOs” (Human Rights Center 2007, p89). The international and regional responses to the Burundi crisis are a clear indication of how R2P has been used before to alleviate, and respond to major ethnic violence and reconstruct societies in its outcome (Human Rights Center 2007, p89). Background to the Conflict Burundi has a long and a sophisticated history concerning its violent conflict. The most recent cycle of violence happened in 1993 when Melchior Ndadaye was murdered by Tutsi-dominated army leading to open warfare between the military and the Hutu rebels. Melchior Ndadaye was the leader of FRODEBU (Hutu Front pour la Democratie au Burundi) and the first president to be elected democratically in Burundi. The resulting ethno-political violence claimed the lives of approximately 300,000 Burundians (civilians were the majority) and displaced millions. Several African leaders including Nelson Mandela (former South African President), Julius Nyerere (former Tanzanian President), and Jacob Nzuma (the current South African President) have sought a lasting solution to the conflict. The efforts to end to the conflict began in 2000 Arusha Agreement, which was signed by the government, the National Assembly, and17 Burundian political leaders. However, the main rebel groups, PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu – Forces Nationales de Liberation), and CNDD-FDD (Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democraite – Forces pour la Defense de la Democraite) did not sign the agreement. The agreement also failed to offer ceasefire agreements, which were consequently negotiated between the Burundi government and other signatories in Arusha in October and December 2002 (Powell 2005, p25). In November of 2003, after intense negotiations, CNDD-FDD agreed to sign a ceasefire agreement and later joined the transitional government. However, at the time of writing, FNL (the Rwasa faction comprising of close to 2000 combatants) had not signed the ceasefire agreement and they were still launching attacks on the interim government (Powell 2005, p25). In April 1994, the president of Rwanda and the newly elected president of Hutu were assassinated in a plane crash. The assassination sparked the Rwandan genocide and it further aggravated Burundi’s armed conflict through incitation of additional massacres of the Tutsi (Human Rights Center 2007, p90). In October of 2004, the transitional government 3-year tenure developed in the Arusha agreement was extended by another six months and elections, which were scheduled to happen in November, were postponed. It is important to note that an interim constitution was passed peacefully in February 2005 in preparation for elections in July, August, and September 2005 (Powell 2005, p25). The International Responses to the Burundi Conflict The African Union/Organization of African Unity has been actively involved in efforts to end and bring solutions to the Burundi conflict since 1993. The pan-African organization has been in the forefront in the on-going negotiations spearheaded by the regional powers. The pan-African union is also a co-signatory to all the main political agreements. The African Union established its first keeping mission in April 2003 to give support to the Burundi peace process. The 2000 Arusha Agreement initially requested the United Nations peacekeeping operation to help with the peace agreement implementation. However, the United Nations would only authorize a mission in the presence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement (Powell 2005, p25). The international community including the European Union, France, and the United States agreed to withdraw development aid to Burundi steps toward the Peace Accords were taken, and a ceasefire was reached. The Burundian economy, state infrastructure, and the people suffered from ten years of fighting, three years of drought, 66% percent decrease in international aid and economic sanctions. The combination of the mentioned stressors helped persuade the Buyoya government to stay at the negotiating table during the period of peace talks (Human Rights Center 2007, p91). Thus, the regional leaders, the Burundian parties, and the African Union agreed to the establishment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to function under the African Union support. In its full capacity, AMIB was composed of close to 3,335 troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa with extra military observers from Gabon, Togo, Tunisia, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The main objective of AMIB was to make conditions satisfactorily stable for the United Nations Security Council to approve a United Nations intervention. AMIB was established on the based on the understanding that the United Nations would take over the peacekeeping mission in Burundi after a period of twelve months. It constituted a hybrid mission, in that AMIB was deployed for peacekeeping though in the absence of a complete ceasefire, but lacked the civilian roles that generally form part of such sophisticated peace operations (Powell 2005, p26). AMIB offered the security dimension of the political mission of United Nations in Burundi. AMIB was officially associated with the rest of the United Nations system through this political mission. It is worth noting that the mission was not offered an explicit function to protect civilians. However, after a number of months on the ground, rules of engagement (ROEs) were drafted by the senior AMIB officials. The ROEs were to permit their troops to utilize force to offer protection to civilians in imminent danger of death or serious injury. According to these rules of engagement, troops could intervene or act (with force) to guard civilians in cases of mass killings and genocide along ethnic lines. However, the troops required prior authorization from civilian and military officers (Powell 2005, p26). In 2004, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping mission or operation in Burundi. A month later, AMIB was officially absorbed and taken over by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB, a French acronym) (Powell 2005, p27). Evaluation of International Responses to the Conflict AMIB deployment is a representation of an important moment for the creation of all-encompassing security architecture in the entire continent of Africa. Sustainable peace in Burundi is critical for managing the spread of violent conflict in the volatile Great Lakes area. The performance of AMIB in Burundi can offer an early indication of the AU contribution in promoting security and peace on the African continent and the protection of civilians. Furthermore, the capacity and willingness of the African Union to implement the PSC Protocol provisions could have important implications of the organization’s future and could affect the African leaders, donors, and civil society’s willingness to support the new security architecture for Africa (Powell 2005, p27). AMIB has received considerable international attention, and it is thought to be the possible model for the African solutions in solving African problems, an approach to security and peace on the continent. For instance, in November 2003, the African Union and the regional leaders suggested in the Communique of the 20th Summit of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi that AMIB serves as the model and a shining example of African solutions to the security challenges facing the continent. AMIB played a critical role in Burundi because it assisted in the stabilization of various parts of the nation. The mission assisted in the protection of particular cantonment sites, and it was successful in repelling an attack on the CNDD-FDD part. AMIB contributed to the creation of conditions satisfactorily stable for the UN mission; the mission was deployed after the signing of ceasefire between the government and CNDD-FDD. However, violations of the ceasefire persisted under the watch of AMIB, and fighting went on between the FDD, Palipehutu-FNL, and the Burundian army. Additionally, AMIB was incapable of fully supporting demobilization, reintegration, and demobilization of former combatants as per its functions. Furthermore, all the sides targeted civilians even in regions where there was the presence of AMIB (Powell 2005, p27). There are a number of factors that led to AMIB’s inability to fulfil its mandate and the failure to deliver on its ROEs (for the protection of civilians). First, the assignment given to AMIB was nearly impossible. AMIB had less than 3,500 personnel, and there was a lack of a comprehensive ceasefire. Thus, AMIB was left with the task of quartering 25,000 combatants and the assigning of other 45,000 to the barracks. Second, AMIB did not have the necessary financial resources to effect such a mandate in the face of continued insecurity. Though it was able to get some of the required financial resources from European Union, delays in EU decision-making and AU and AMIB headquarters’ lack of absorption capacity led to the release of the funds (€25 million) a year after the deployment of AMIB. Third, the lack of capacity hampered AMIB. For instance, the Peace and Security Directorate and Peace and Security Council, “which were only coming into being when AMIB was deployed, did not have the institutional capacity to organize the financing or deployment” (Powell 2005, p28). Somalia Background to the Conflict Since 1991, when President Siad Barre was overthrown, Somalia has lacked an effective national government. The tragedies that faced Somalia early in the 1990s are well documented, and they persist to the present day though in differing political forms. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a fundamentalist Islamic rebel movement, attempted to take control of the nation. However, ICU was overthrown from power by the Ethiopian troops with the support of the United States. Since then, the group has splintered. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (the former leader of ICU) is the current president of a government based in Djibouti by the name Western-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The other factions include Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab (designated as a terrorist group by the United States). These groups frequently get involved in violent clashes, and they are also attempting to overthrow TFG (Nash 2010, p47). International Response to the Somalia Conflict The Somalia situation most definitely represents a position envisaged under the concept of responsibility to protect. There is strong evidence of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and massive humanitarian suffering. On his visit to the United States, President Sharif indicated that Somalia was not receiving sufficient help from the international community. A donor conference in Brussels on April 2009 netted aid pledges amounting to $213 million. However, a few months later, only a portion of the aid pledge reached Somalia. Sharif was quick to note that the international community was not ready to help Somalia, and the United States support was lacking (Nash 2010, p48). In relation to Somalia, little has been to salvage the current situation. There has been little responsibility to protect talk, the African Union and the United Nations have proven unwilling to act in a decisive manner, and the West is focusing more on the external situations (links to Islamist terrorism and piracy) than the dimension of civilian protection. Such an attitude is apparent in the United Security Council resolutions (Ercan 2011, p226). The international community lack of response to the imminent humanitarian crisis in Somalia is due to a number of reasons. First, the Somalia situation evidently qualifies as a circumstance envisaged under R2P. The general principle as indicated by the ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) is that when a population suffers from serious harm because of insurgency, state failure, the state is not able or willing or to avert or halt it, repression, or internal war, the non-intervention principle gives way to the international responsibility to protect. For a long time, Somalia as a state has been a total failure (it has remained a failed state [Puley 2005, p35]) with the ongoing civil for close to 20 years. It is important to note that over half of the Somalia population requires humanitarian assistance to survive (Nash 2010, p48). Second, from a theoretical perspective, it would be simpler for the international community to alleviate suffering in Somalia if chose to act. For many years, Somalia has lacked a government that is capable of governing or even controlling huge sections of its territory (Nash 2010, p48). TFG, which is based in Djibouti, is most likely to accept international intervention to help them in taking control of the Somali territory and the unnecessary debates over sovereignty would be avoided. A few years ago, the international community has intervened in Somalia. The IGAD Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) was proposed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the year 2005. However, the IGASOM idea did not get much footing until 2006 when the ICU took control of Mogadishu and started combining the power within the territory of Somalia. A number of nations in the region and the international community saw the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) as a threat to their important interests due to the fundamentalist Islamic views of the ICU (Nash 2010, p49). Somalia was invaded in August 2006 by the Ethiopian troops to create a buffer zone between eastern Ethiopia and the ICU forces. IGASOM approval was done in September 2006 by the AU and in December 2006 by the UN Security Council. It was extremely challenging to raise troop contributions, funds for the IGAD sponsored mission, and thus, the Security Council and the AU Peace in January 2007 suggested an AU Mission that was to be offered support by the United Nations. AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia) was mandated to offer help to TFG in their attempts to stabilize Somalia, to support the humanitarian assistance provision, and assist in the creation of conditions suitable for long-term reconstruction and stabilizations. In particular, AMISOM would offer protection infrastructure and key TFG personnel to allow them to carry out their government roles and assist to re-establish training programs for security forces in Somalia (Nash 2010, p49). Despite the AMISOM’s approval from the region and the international community, it has difficulty getting the needed resources to fulfil its obligations. The envisaged AMISOM troop strength was 8,000. However, the African Union failed to get pledges for that number of troops from its member states. AMISOM was established and deployed with slight hope of getting the resources required to fulfil its obligations. AU peacekeepers were thrown into a severely violent and unstable situation without enough support, and “the international community failed to live up to its commitment to muster a follow-on UN force that might have had the capacity to make a tangible difference in helping to stabilize Somalia and bring relief to the civilian populations” (Nash 2010, p50). It is important to note that the AMISOM deployment resulted in the increase of insecurity due to the fact the mission lacked enough resources to fulfil its obligations and the lack of trust from the population (Nash 2010, p51). Evaluation of International Responses to the Conflict The African Union did not play a significant role in dealing with the state collapse in Somalia. More than fifteen peaces initiatives have been formed in view of creating a functioning central government. However, the African Union sponsored none of these initiatives. Consequently, it is safe to indicate that the African Union was not the leading actor in Somalia issues until recently. It is important to note that it has been limited in implementing the decisions and initiatives taken by IGAD and the UN (and member states) respectively. AMISOM, on the other hand, has been struggling with the Somali affairs since its deployment. It has been under constant attack by the insurgents. AMISOM’s recognition with the Ethiopians and the TFG has made it a continuous target of attacks (Mulugeta 2009, p46). A major concern for the AMISOM is the lack of political progress in Somalia. A number of people argue that the “deployment of any peacekeeping force should be preceded by an inclusive peace agreement and consensus among major parties to the conflict, which, unfortunately, is not the case for AMISOM” (Mulugeta 2009, p46). The AMISOM mission suffers from the absence sufficient resources and staff. Despite the criticism made against AMISOM and its shortcomings, the troops in AMISOM have taken the risk where particularly the West has neglected for a very long; and thus, it should be recognized (Mulugeta 2009, p47). References Besada, H. (2010) Crafting an African security architecture: Addressing regional peace and conflict in the 21st century, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Ercan, M. P. G. (2011) Undertaking the responsibility: International community, states, R2P and humanitarian intervention, Thesis (PhD), University of Trento. Human Rights Center (2007) The responsibility to protect (R2P): Moving the campaign forward, Berkeley: International Human Rights Law Clinic. International Business Publications. (2007) Sweden country study guide, Washington, DC: International Business Publications. Mulugeta, K. (2009) The role of regional and international organizations in resolving the Somali conflict: The case of IGAD, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Nash, K. L. (2010) Responsibility to protect: Evolution and viability, Thesis (Masters), Georgetown University. Powell, K. (2005) The African Union’s emerging peace and security regime: Opportunities and challenges for delivering on the responsibility to protect, The North-South Institute. Pulley, G. (2005) The responsibility to protect: East, west, and southern African perspectives on preventing and responding to humanitarian crises, Waterloo: Project Ploughshares. Shukla, K. (2008) The international community’s responsibility to protect. Burma’s Displaced People, 30, pp7-9. Read More