The Battle of Kursk - Essay Example

?The Battle of Kursk Introduction The Battle of Kursk is considered to be a battle of the Eastern Front during World War II. There are only two well-known battles involving the USSR and Germany during the Second World War, the Battle of Kursk was one of them and Stalingrad was the other. For the most part, however, knowledge on the Battle of Kursk has not been substantial, and has only been filled in recently. Most data on the Second World War have been substantiated in relation to Stalingrad and the Western European advance. To some extent, the significance of the Battle of Kursk has been diminished because of the limited focus given to this battle. Nevertheless, information on the battle has now been substantiated from various sources and battle accounts. This paper will seek to explore the information made available on this battle. It shall discuss the causes of the battle and its relation to the Second World War. It shall discuss the parties involved and the plans of these parties. The operations of this battle will also be considered, from its main operations on the German and the Russian side to the tactical operations carried out by the battling parties. The counterattacks involved will be detailed. The final outcome of the battle, including an analysis of the battle results will also be specified in this paper. These points shall serve as important details in further understanding this battle and its place in our global history. Body Background of the attack The Battle of Stalingrad spanning 1942-1943 was won by USSR. It was a battle which cost the German army dearly with the entire German Sixth Army killed during the battle. This seriously compromised the armed forces of the Axis powers which were being battered from all directions by the Allied troops. During the Battle of Stalingrad, Germany’s position in southern Russia gradually became vulnerable and as their Sixth Army became trapped by the advancing Russian troops, a huge gap in the German defenses was exposed (Mulligan, 1987). Other Soviet forces were eventually able to get through these defenses and as a result posed a threat to the Army Group A in Caucasus. The German Field Marshall Erich von Manstein was forced to resort to extreme measures to secure their stronghold in the war (Dunn, 1997). Various additional divisions for the war were established by pulling troops from non-threatened areas; even non-combat personnel were called into military service (Mulligan, 1987). Tanks in workshops were also commissioned into service. Eventually, the SS Panzer Corps arrived in Stalingrad, other units from the 11th Panzer Division and the 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions arrived and reinforced German armors (Restayn and Moller, 2002). These troops and equipment were set to launch a pincer-style attack against the Russian forces which was led by Armored Group Popov. This attack created a front line from Leningrad in the North to Rostov in the South. Right at the very middle of this line was a 200 kilometer area covered by the Soviets (Glantz, et.al., 1999). This was centered in the town of Kursk, between the German lines near Orel in the North and Belgorod in the South. With the entry of spring, both sides were forced by muddy fighting conditions to settle down and construct their plans for advancement (Glantz, et.al., 1999). German commander Manstein was of the initial belief that the best strategy for Germany would be to assume a defensive strategy using its panzer divisions to counter the Russian forces (Dunn, 1997). He also believed that the Russian army would concentrate its military advance against the Army Group South. He also suggested that their left flank be kept strong while they were retreating to their right on the Dneiper River (Glantz, 1990). He then suggested that a major military attack to the flank of the Russian army advance could follow. His suggestion was not favored by Hitler who was adamant against giving up any of the territory it was already controlling (Manstein, 2000). The German High Command (OKH) led by Colonel General Kurt Zeitler also did not favor Manstein’s recommendations and instead considered their move on the bulge of Kursk (Glantz, 1989). At that time, the Red Army Fronts, the Voronezh, and Central Fronts were hunkered down at the Kursk and its general area. The Germans knew that surrounding the Russians would cause these troops to be trapped. Moreover, cutting off part of the Red army would create a straight line of defense which would also lead to the recapture of Kursk (Glantz, 1989). Kursk was considered strategically important for both the USSR and Germany because it lay on the main north-south railway track from Rostov on to Moscow. And so, both sides were willing to do everything in their power to gain control of the area. The German plans soon took form by March and Walter Model’s 9th Army was set to enter southwards from Orel; Manstein was set to attack from Belgorod, planning to push northwards (Dunn, 1997). These armies were set to meet at Kursk. If any of the armies would be progressing well in their advance, they were also allowed to move forward without having to wait for the other troops. The overall plan was to create a new line of offensive at the Don River (Dunn, 1997). The German leaders who were confident in the success of the attack also believed that the distance they had to cover getting to Kursk would be short, and that their forces would remain strong. In the weeks that followed, the OKH increased their forces, adjusting their German lines in order to reinforce their advance towards Kursk (Dunn, 1997). The actual advance was however delayed many times as the armies waited for weapons to arrive from Germany. Moreover, due to various intelligence reports on Allied advancing troops, Hitler kept postponing the schedule of the attacks. Germany’s idea behind their offensive was based on the traditional double-envelopment which has long been favored by its army. They also placed much credence to their Blitzkreig attacks which were meant to make their strategy even more effective (Glantz, 1989). The Blitzkreig method was based on armor attacks focused on weak points of a line, supported by rapid breakthrough attacks with columns of tanks surging forward and then inward towards each other, thereby pinning the enemy forces within. The control of the air space is important for these attacks order to prevent the tanks from being bombed by enemy planes (Glantz, 1989). As the target is encircled, victory is often seen by cutting off command and supply channels. These breakthroughs were easy to establish when carried out in unexpected areas, as seen in the attack of the Ardennes in 1940, in Kiev in 1941, and in Stalingrad. The German plan on the Kursk salient was known as Operation Citadel or Zitadelle (Restayn and Moller, 2002). From the very start, this plan was already compromised. The USSR already noted that German forces and supplies were being moved into the vicinity of the Kursk (Dunn, 1997). Moreover, various German commanders had their doubts about the German plans; but Hitler was adamant about proceeding with the advance into Kursk. Hitler pulled out all the necessary moves in order to successfully carry out the Kursk advance. He sent fifty German divisions, including 17 Panzer divisions, and other elite divisions in order to gain advantage over Kursk (Glantz, 1997). USSR army plans The Red Army of the USSR also started to build its plan for the battle; and in many ways it bore similarities with the German plans. Initially, Russia was also meaning to set forth attacks on Orel and Kharkov in order to straighten the line and possibly penetrate in the vicinity of the Pripyat Marshes (Restayn and Moller, 2002). However, before these plans could be set in motion, they were abandoned as Moscow was informed of the increase in German troops in the Kursk area. Spy rings intercepting messages in Berlin also revealed some of the German plans (Restayn and Moller, 2002). Intelligence reports implied the importance of USSR preparing for a defensive strategy. Based on their intelligence gathering, the Reds then understood that German troops would cut-off the Kursk salient and surround the Soviet troops. Before the intelligence reports were received by the Reds, there were only 15 tank divisions in the area, which was in sharp contrast to the 17 tank divisions and other tank destroyers deployed by Germany to the area (Restayn and Moller, 2002). Stalin was also informed of the possible German advance and later came to the same conclusion that Germany was indeed trying to get through their defense through Kursk (Kasdorf, 2000). Germany no longer had the advantage of possibly launching a surprise attack because the Red army was already aware of its plans and was making preparations to meet any advance by Germany (Mawdsley, 2007). But USSR was also cautioned to take a more vigilant move in curbing Germany’s plans. The Red Army was also made vigilant and made ready to meet the German army head on. The Reds also planned to let Germany exhaust its resources and then take out its tanks (Mawdsley, 2007). With the many delays on the German advance, the Soviet army had time to prepare its defense. They started to move their soldiers from the outer bulge, and began fortifying their Central and their southern lines. Mine belts and anti-tank ditches were also dug at the front of the lines. The Soviet Army also commissioned their engineers to prepare the battlefield, installing anti-tank mines and anti-personnel mines (Mawdsley, 2007). By the time all the land mines were laid out there was about 1400-2000 mines per kilometer. Anti-tank guns were also hidden in the area to support their infantry, with gunners told to target Panzer IV tanks (Newton, 2003). The Russian mortars and machine guns were also instructed to target German infantry. Independent armored brigades were also deployed with most of these brigades dug into stationary spots (Newton, 2003). The Soviet army was also supported by a reserve army stationed in the Steppe Front. The Soviet army was able to gather substantial troops and equipment to counter the planned German advance (Clark, 1966). All these activities however were also detected by the German army and Hitler was prompted to delay his planned advance in order to redirect more of its Panzer tanks towards the front of their advance (Taylor and Kulish 1974). Most of the Soviet troops have already fought a hard battle in Stalingrad; and the Red Army was also supported by over one million additional troops. This made the Red Army bigger and stronger than the German advance. Before the attack, both parties engaged in acts of deception in order to throw each other off. Mock aircrafts were set in fake airfields and misleading intelligence was communicated down through their radio lines (Clark, 1966). These activities set up a major battle which would affect both parties significantly. Red Air Force In the earlier days of the advance, it was already apparent to both parties that even as the Red Air Force was far more numerous than the German Air Force, their planes had old designs and their pilots did not have adequate training to fly in combat conditions (Zetterling and Frankson, 2000). More training for their pilots was therefore ordered and more modern aircrafts were commissioned. Just before the Battle of Kursk was set to start, the Red Air Force was already fortified (Dunn, 1997). German initial advance forwarded three armies and numerous tanks on the eastern side of the line; on the other hand, the Red Army forwarded via their Army groups with the Central and Voronezh Fronts supported by 12 armies. After four months of waiting, Hitler ordered Manstein, along with his well fortified German army and tanks to advance. At this point, Allied troops in Western Europe were already making a major dent on German lines (Dunn, 1997). The German army also suffered major losses in North Africa, especially with their Luftwaffe down to 40% strength. The planned strong German air support was already compromised; this was bound to be a major issue for Germany considering that the Soviet air force was able to improve and increase its strength (Glantz, et.al., 2004). After so many delays on the German advance, the order was finally given for the troops to prepare and attack on July 5; but the Russian intelligence was able to intercept crucial information on the date of the attack. Initial skirmishes were seen on the 4th of July 1943 in the South with the Panzer Army advancing on Red Army outposts ahead of the main July 5 attacks (Glantz, et.al., 2004). These early attacks were meant to feel out Soviet defenses. The Red Army responded accordingly by bombing German posts at about the same time the Germans were advancing. German dive bombers attacked the northern Soviet lines with more advances made on Soviet posts in Zavidovka (Glantz, et.al., 2004). A German unit also attacked Butovo while occupying a higher post over the town. The German advance however had difficulty getting through the western areas of Butovo. Panzer troops also carried out initial attacks to observe Soviet defenses (Dunn, 1997). They were promptly met with a strong defense line; and after flamethrowers were used, the outposts were soon cleared. The Red Army soon started to seriously push back against their German combatants by pounding them with artillery in their northern and southern lines (Dunn, 1997). The Soviet Army’s artillery barrage depleted about half of their ammunition for the whole operation. But they were firm in their resolve to delay and create confusion in the German plans. In the north, the Red Army was also able to fire back against the German artillery posts and to suppress German advance, weakening their artillery fire (Dunn, 1997). The German advance was disrupted and prompted three various attacks on the 5th of July. To the south, the Red Army concentrated their fire on German infantry and tanks which were still in the assembly areas; and few casualties resulted from this attack. Main attacks (North) German advance Due to the preparations made by the Red Army, the advance of the 9th Army did not meet their goals for July 5, 1943. Instead, the German army was trapped in the minefields and they were forced to deploy their engineering units to clear their paths and to clear these under heavy artillery conditions (Kasdorf, 2000). Although the German army was equipped with remote controlled vehicles to clear their paths of minefields, these vehicles were not successful in clearing their paths because these vehicles did not have marking devices to indicate where the tanks could safely pass. These minefields successfully delayed the German advance and registered major losses for the Germans (Kasdorf, 2000). The tanks hit by the landmines had to be withdrawn for repairs and were easier for the Red Army to bomb and destroy. However, with the German troops advancing, the damaged vehicles and tanks were repaired in record time. The German army was able to advance about 8 kilometers deep after the first day (Bergstrom, 2008). Although the German Army was able to successfully breach through some areas in the Russian line using their tanks, these tanks were useless in the short-term range because these tanks did not have secondary armaments. In the slit trenches, they were heavily vulnerable to Soviet fire (Clark, 1966). On the second day of the attacks, a counterattack in the Central Front was started against the German 9th Army. The Reds launched their offensive with the 2nd tank army and tank corps. This offensive was however too early with the Reds suffering from major losses (Bergstrom, 2008). The Soviet brigade lost about 69 tanks and this prompted the Reds to stop their attack. The Reds then decided to dig in their tanks and to utilize them as stationary anti-tank armory (Keegan, 2006). Heavy fighting on both sides would follow, mostly on the strong point of Ponyri which was considered one of the most heavily defended posts along the northern region (Glantz, 1989). The Germans and the Soviets considered this area as a strategic point; as a result, a major battle ensued in this area. German infantry attacked Ponyri, capturing the town after a major skirmish. The Soviets were quick to launch their counteroffensive, forcing German troops to withdraw temporarily (Glantz, 1989). Various attacks would soon follow with the control of the town changing numerous times. Finally, on the 8th of July, Germany was able to secure most of the town. This area yielded major losses for both sides with the Russian reserves still trying their best to recapture the town (Overy, 1995). Germany then tried to use their new position on Ponyri to advance against Russian troops, however, Soviet lines were able to attack the German 2nd Panzer Army and the outnumbered German army could not cope with the Soviet attack. Moreover, the Soviets were able to deepen their advance into German troops and lines which were already suffering from low supplies. After this Soviet advance, the 9th army was surrounded (Overy, 1995). Northern advance There were various elements which impacted on the failure of the 9th army, mostly being the strong Soviet defense plan, as well as the limited concentration in the German force (Restayn and Moller, 2002). The German armors were not fully committed in their attack mostly because of their limited strength; moreover, the Soviet defense was well prepared and was fully supported by their infantry. Their military leaders were also able to correctly anticipate the areas where German troops would attack, and so were able to adequately fortify these areas (Restayn and Moller, 2006). Model’s units did not have as many tanks as compared to Manstein in the south; moreover, the German 9th army was forced to be spaced out because Model did not want to cover the Bryansk Front. Model concentrated his corps behind the frontline in order to serve as a fire brigade against the Bryansk Front. His decision not to consider the Panzer divisions was seen as the crucial factor in the failure of penetration in the northern areas (Bergstrom, 2008). Eventually, however, the 9th army was finally able to gain some ground with the reinforcement of their infantry units. Main operations: German advance The troops of Von Manstein deployed in the south were better armed than those of Model in the north. The 4th Panzer unit was also armed with tanks and assault equipment; and so was the 9th army (Bergstrom, 2008). The 4th Panzer Army, along with the 48th Panzer corps and the 2nd SS Panzer corps initiated their attack on two points. When the attack was initiated, almost all units were able to slowly advance. Manstein’s tanks were also able to surge through the defenses because he was able to use these tanks well (Bergstrom, 2008). In the South, the Red Army was prompted to spread out their units evenly. The Voronezh Front was however faced with a stronger German unit. The new Panther tanks were not reliable and did not serve the German army well as they were highly defective and had various mechanical defects (Krivosheev, 1997). As these tanks moved forward they were further decimated by anti-tank mines. During the first two days of the attack, the 2nd SS Corp was able to advance 25 km into the Russian lines, eventually taking Jakovlevo (Krivosheev, 1997). Other units, however, including the 48th Tank Corps and the Army Group Kempf were outnumbered by the Red army. Nevertheless, the German Army was slowly but surely gaining ground. Their progress also prompted Russian units to use their strategic reserves. Units were also sent to the southern regions, with operational counterstrikes already conceptualized by the Reds (Krivosheev, 1997). With the failure of the northern counterattacks however, the northern strikes were cancelled. Instead, tanks were dug in and held steady to meet the German advance. The Germans were significantly slowed down in their advance by the silent tanks as they could not find most of these camouflaged tanks. Some Soviet tanks were however also assigned to carry out counterattacks against the Germans, and some of these were actually met by Franz Staudegger’s SS group (Newton, 2003). The tanks slowed down the general German advance, but eventually, their units were able to cross the Psel River. Army Kempf was also later able to advance deeply into Russian defenses (Newton, 2003). A bridge over the Donets was also taken a few days into the advance and the German units were then able to gain Prokhorovka, almost smothering the Russian 69th unit. Manstein was confident at this point that they were able to successfully carry out their goals and was now ready to attack the Russian reserves (Manstein, 2000). In fact, the Russians were actually prompted to move their reserves away from German reach. The Battle of Prokhorovka would soon follow this point of the German advance. At this point of the war, the Russian army did enough damage to the German armory and was able to stop the German advance (Manstein, 2000). After full forces were deployed by either military force in the area, a major battle unfolded and major losses were encountered by both sides. An intense air battle was also fought, with Manstein delivering major blows to the Russians. In the end however, the German advance was held off (Glantz, 1989). It was a significant tactical loss but an operational gain for the Russian army; the German units were not able to accomplish their missions and the Soviets were able to recover their tanks and retrieve their wounded personnel (Healy, 1992). As any German advance was stopped in the north, German advance in the south was still being pushed. They were eventually able to breach two defensive belts, but they had three more lines to conquer (Healy, 1992). This depleted their forces and their reserves and prompted their withdrawal from their starting line. The Germans were also forced to fend off the Russian offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov region (Zetterling and Frankson, 2000). This area was soon conquered by the Russian advancing troops. After this victory, the Soviets considered the Battle of Kursk as their victory. The German troops however were still making steady progress in their advance, however their penetration of Russian defenses often fell short (Berstrom, 2007). When each advance fell short, the advance would often be cancelled. The Reds were able to push the Germans off and were able to inflict major German losses (Bergstrom, 2007). The minefields were able to delay German attacks and their hidden tanks were able to give their reserves a chance to be moved to threatened areas. Soon after major losses were experienced by the German troops, Hitler called off Operation Zitadelle. Although Manstein tried to dissuade him, Hitler ordered the troops to be withdrawn and to be transferred to Italy (Clark, 1966). This withdrawal was criticized by Hitler’s generals as they pointed out that German troops were needed more in Kursk, and would have made a major impact there. While one German division was sent to Italy, the rest of the deployed troops stayed in Kursk to take vigil against Russian forces (Clark, 1966). Results The Battle of Kursk was a crucial point in the Soviet success because for the first time, a major German attack was foiled. Even with their troops and their equipment, German troops were unable to penetrate Soviet defenses (Vazquez, 2008). This was a result which was not expected by the German advance, and it changed their entire approach to their operation. The victory for the Reds however came at a significant cost, with lost troops and major equipment destroyed during the advance (Clark, 1966). A new pattern emerged after this battle because the initiative was shifted to the Reds and the Germans had to be content with a more reactive approach to the war. Moreover, although they both suffered major losses, the Soviets still had the capability to recover from these losses (Clark, 1966). The Germans were never able to recover from their Kursk loss, and this loss dissuaded them from launching any attack in the East. This loss also convinced Hitler that his military leadership was weak and incompetent. This prompted him to take a more active participation in the military operations; he was even involved in tactical operations. The losses that Germany would suffer would be persistent after their loss at the Battle of Kursk (Licari, 2008). Hitler’s attempt to supervise all the military operations did not help matters in any way. Stalin, on the Russian side was having the opposite reaction to Hitler. He was more trusting of his advisors more and took a more hands-off approach to the military operations (Licari, 2008). He also did not make military decisions as much as he used to before the Battle of Kursk was launched. As a result, the Reds were able to enjoy more liberties and became more adept in their skills as military personnel. Analysis on the failure of Operation Zitadelle and the success of the Soviet defense One major reason for the success of the Soviets in the Battle of Kursk is the fact that the Soviets was able to deploy and gather more troops than their German counterparts. The German Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or the OKW did not have sufficient infantry to support their tanks (Licari, 2008). As a result, any advance or gains from tank attacks always fell short because they could not follow through with an infantry advance. They also did not have any operational reserves, while the Russian army had several lines and blocks of reserves that were highly capable of supporting any offensive. The presence of these reserves also made up for the superiority of German tanks which towards the end of the war did not make much impact on the outcome of the battle (Krivosheev, 1997). Another reason for the defeat of the German army was the repeated delays by Hitler who repeatedly called off and postponed the initial attack (Licari, 2008). This gave the Soviets a chance to fortify their defenses and to redirect their tanks and equipment. Manstein recommended a fast and fierce attack to be carried out against the Reds, however, with Hitler’s order to retreat, an attempt to regroup and gain victory over the battle was eventually lost. Historians also discuss that German’s loss in the Battle of Kursk was not a result of Soviet military superiority (Licari, 2008). The main element which was seen during the Battle was the fact that a major change in the Red command, staff, as well as operational techniques was implemented. The Soviet military was already taking cues from its former operations and battles and using these in order to plan their other battles and operations (Taylor and Kulish, 1974). They formed new procedures based on these plans and these changes helped create a victory at Kursk. New military operations and techniques were also formulated by the Soviet Red Army; moreover, they were able to establish a more integrated and combined arms operation in their battles (Clark, 1966). There was a more sophisticated approach to military intelligence as well as anti-tank operations. Other improvements included the combinations in military arms, including combined artillery, tanks, engineers, and infantry (Kasdorf, 2000). Deploying mobile formations were also seen in the Prokhorovka battle, and this soon became a significant detail in Soviet military operations. These operations manifested Soviet capability in meeting the German Panzer units. These operations were also able to reduce casualties and secure major gains against their combatants (Glantz and House, 2004). Defensive operations also improved for the Soviet military, especially with the use of anti-tank mines and artillery. The use of separate tank brigades as well as self-propelled infantry also provided the essential support for the mobile defense system (Glantz, 1990). These operations whittled away at German lines and defenses, eventually providing a major victory for the Reds. These tactical improvements were even further improved in the military operations which followed in 1943 until 1945. By the end of the war, the Soviets were actually able to establish military tactics and operations which would be the subject of university level military studies (Glantz, 1990). The belief about Kursk victory was based on superior numbers for the Reds. However, this was a myth perpetuated by the German army in order to excuse and justify their loss (Mawdsley, 2007). The Soviet army actually relied on tactical skill to win the battle. Although the beginning of the Kursk war saw a Red army which was not yet tactically learned, its operations already had a strong system in place and their difference in German tactical superiority was a lot closer than was being touted by the Germans (Mawdsley, 2007). The Reds were also superior in terms of positioning and deploying mobile tanks, and these advantages allowed the reds to overwhelm their German combatants. The military forces were also more or less considered even with the Reds conceptualizing air-to-ground communications, including radar, depots for fuel reserves. With these operations, the Reds were able to carry out several missions at a time (Clark, 1966). Germany did not have such capabilities and had to suffer through Luftwaffe shortages. The Soviet tanks were also of superior quality; even as some of their tanks were inferior to German tanks, many of these were faster and easier to move and maneuver (Mulligan, 1987). The Panzer tanks also suffered from mechanical defects. The Soviets also carried out attacks in close range in order to ensure that range would not be an issue during their attacks (Newton, 2003). Records reveal that the Soviets were able to gain much ground because they continued to pressure German forces with their tanks and infantry. Finally, Russian intelligence gained in the months leading up to the initial attack helped prepare Russian offensive (Mulligan, 1987). The Russians were able to install a spy at Bletchley Park and as a result, they were able to gain important German intelligence relevant to the Battle and planned military operations and attack. Some analysts declare that without this spy and access to crucial data, Germany would have been able gain access through Kursk and gain control over Russia (Mulligan, 1987). Conclusion Based on the above discussion, it is prudent to note that the Battle of Kursk represents a major victory for USSR during the Second World War. It represented a time where Germany was seeking to expand into Russia, and the Red Army was able successfully fend off such attack by employing strong military tactics and by exhibiting military superiority over Germany. The fact that Germany withdrew after they experienced major defeats during their advance also ensured Soviet victory over Kursk. With major changes in Soviet military tactics and operations, the Reds were able to successfully hold off the German advance and maintain their control over their territories. References Bergstrom, Christer (2007). Kursk — The Air Battle: July 1943. Hersham: Chervron/Ian Allen. Bergstrom, Christer (2008). Bagration to Berlin — The Final Air Battle in the East: 1941–1945. Burgess Hill: Chervron/Ian Allen Clark, Alan (1966). Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941–1945. New York: William Morrow. Dunn, Walter (1997). Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. Glantz, D. & House, J. (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, Kan: University of Kansas Press. Glantz, D. & Orenstein, H. (1999). The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass. Glantz, D. & House, J. 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