How significant a role did Ideology play in the formation of Soviet foreign policy - Essay Example

? How significant a role did Ideology play in the formation of Soviet foreign policy? (08.01.12) Introduction Soviet analysts have held that the central characteristic of Soviet foreign policy was established through Lenin’s Decree on Peace that was approved in November 1917 by the Second Congress of Soviets. It set forth the two fold objectives of Soviet foreign policy that encompassed both peaceful coexistence and proletarian globalism. On the one side, proletarian globalism is understood as the normal basis for the working classes of all nations that struggled to bring down the bourgeoisie and to introduce communist governments. On the other hand, peaceful coexistence referred to adopting procedures to establish comparatively passive inter government relationships with capitalist nations. Both these policies could be pursued together because Soviet policy makers believed that peaceful coexistence assumes that there will be strong resistance to imperialist aggressions (LaFeber, 1971). It also presupposed the backing for people protecting their radical achievements or fighting external oppressions. This paper will examine how significant a role did Ideology play in the formation of Soviet foreign policy in holding that the Soviet Union adopted the same strategies as other powerful states by following the policy of territorial expansion through incursion or insurrection, by establishing a strong government that controlled all territories and through involvement in the internal policies of its allies such as Afghanistan, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Policy under Lenin Under Lenin, the policy of the Soviet Union can be defined as involving both pragmatism and ideology, which was a part of the dialectical process. Marxist ideology provided a strong basis for the Bolsheviks to act against the material conditions faced by them. Marxism Leninism pertained to the idea of contextualizing Soviet actions relative to the material circumstances that confronted the Bolsheviks and the proletariat during this period. The initial foreign policy decisions taken by the Bolsheviks were about the issue of how the Great War was to be approached. Eventually, the Bolshevik government made a decision to end the involvement of the Tsar with the central powers by accepting the peace terms dictated by Germany. Consequently, the Bolsheviks lost control of several regions that were under Russian control such as Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, which implied the loss of vast areas as well as more than a population of 50 million people, including coal mining, iron production and significant parts of the rail networks. Accepting such severe terms can be understood as a practical approach towards foreign policy because the Soviets wanted to have the best possible bargain under the given circumstances (Goldgejer, 1994). During this time, there were divisions in terms of the relationship between pragmatism and ideology amongst Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin. Lenin felt that the decisions taken were in keeping with the Soviet ideology and Trotsky held that if there was no war, peace could not be established, which meant that a cease fire had to be called for without getting involved in the signing of peace treaties. Bukharin believed that there should be a revolutionary war because he wanted that Russia should continue with the war, which would allow Russia to get support from the Germans who in turn would stop assisting the war initiatives against the Bolsheviks. In this context, communist ideology indicates that Bukharin’s sense of communists was the actual understanding of Marxism because of the element of internationalism (Hoffman et al., 1981). Foreign policy of the Soviet Union is often held responsible with compromising on ideology relative to the need for integrating into the global political identity, which was primarily for economic motives. Soviet pragmatism aimed at gaining trade rights by providing capitalist nations with access to the country’s natural resources (Kull, 1992). This policy was driven by ideology because the Bolshevik leadership felt that commercial relationships will become stronger if Russia was to benefit capitalist nations, which would then have the potential to increase conflicts amongst capitalist states. This would benefit the Soviets because a powerful alliance against the Bolsheviks could not be formed. This kind of capitalist understanding was a component of peaceful coexistence policies being followed by Lenin. This was also in keeping with Lenin’s concept of incomplete socialism, which recognized that global revolution was not likely to happen in the near future because of which Russia would have to endure everything on its own. However, such circumstances sent contradictory messages such as the policy of struggle for peace that corresponded with announcements about the inevitable occurrence of war (Gupta, 2000). Events like the Russian Civil War made ideology more important because the claims relative to the certainty of war were seemingly vindicated by imperialist interventions. This created the concept that anti imperialist struggle was the main element of all policy initiatives. The Bolsheviks considered that the prevailing circumstances had arisen out of necessity and implied that the best option was to get breathing space. This permitted the Bolsheviks to work towards developing socialist practices while concurrently focusing on getting prepared for the predictable war that would be a certainty in the future. The Comintern was the main instrument through which the Russians intended to promote this kind of revolution. It would allow them to partner with communist parties in capitalist countries despite the risks of harming stability in relations with these nations. Comintern had an ideological language that focused on issues such as left opposition, united fronts and right deviation (Erickson, 1995). Ideology in the modern world The Soviet commitments relative to practices in proletarian globalization has lessened after the Soviet state was founded. But this element of ideology continues to have some effects on the present systems of formulating and executing Russian foreign policy. Despite the fact that pragmatism had influenced the Soviet foreign policy, the ideology relative to class struggles continued to play a significant role in putting forth world views and some crude guide lines during the 1980s. Marxist Leninist ideology had strengthened other aspects of politics that created perceptions of conflict and competition with other nations. Generally, the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union were framed and approved at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress held in March 1986 and the main elements of the policy were to ensure positive external conditions in order to develop communism in the state, to remove threats of a world war, disarmament, to strengthen the global socialist structure, to develop equality and cordial relations with third world nations, to coexist peacefully with capitalist states and to develop harmony with communist states (Frederic, 2006). Most of these foreign policy objectives were created by way of priorities but their rankings have changed over time in responding to internal and external circumstances and developments. For example, western analysts assume that following the taking over of power by Gorbachev in 1985, there was a dilution in the Soviet backing to nationalist freedom movements. The ranking in order of importance of priorities relative to foreign policy in the Soviet Union have been changing but the two main objectives of national security and the impact on East Europe have always remained the same. Some analysts believe that during the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet foreign policies have always been framed in keeping with the circumstances relative to its relationships with the US, which is believed by the Soviet leaders to be the major threat to its national security. Another priority area is the nation’s relationship with East Europe, which comprises of nations that are members of the Warsaw Pact, while the policy also focuses upon dealing effectively with nations in West Europe that are members of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Another significant area is the attention being given to nations located south of the country such as North Korea, Mongolia, China, Afghanistan, Iran and Japan. Next in importance are nations in Southeast Asia, South Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. However, Soviet foreign policy has always been apprehensive about relations between the super powers, more specifically amongst members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO (Carlsnaes, 1986). The Soviet Union tried its best to gain recognition in the world by becoming a member of the United Nations after the end of the Second World War. In being a super power at par with the US, the Soviet Union had repeatedly used its veto power in the Security Council, mainly with the objective of serving the interests of global communism. Most of the conflicting situations between the US and Soviet Union had arisen because of the two countries’ needs to effect geopolitical supremacy in the global community. The USA had entered into a number of post war alliances with nations that comprised of the Allied powers during the Second World War and with some third world nations to counter the impact of global communism. Similarly, the Soviet Union formed alliances relative to its World Socialist systems in attempts to repel US power, the capitalist states and the NATO alliances. The two main factors that impacted Soviet ideology and goals during this period that determined its actions globally were its belief in the proletariat globalism and its initiatives for coexisting peacefully in the world. Nevertheless, the foundation of such foreign policy was laid by the Decree of Peace at the instance of Lenin, which was approved in November, 1917 by the Second Congress of Soviets. In this context, proletariat globalism implies the common causes relative to the working classes in the entire world to bring down the bourgeoisie and to set up communist governments (Roberts, 1995). The 27th Party Congress of February 1986 held that the main objective of the Soviet foreign policy was to: Ensure favorable global environment in keeping with the growth of communism in the Soviet Union Eliminate any threats of a future world war Disarmament Strengthen the global socialist systems Develop good relationships with independent third world nations Coexist peacefully with capitalist nations Develop solidarity with communist parties and associations in capitalist countries Policy of Alliances The Soviet Union was characterized with unique ways in forming alliances with different nations and regimes. This policy was based on ideologies that were driven by different factors that determined and supported the Soviet foreign policy and its alliances. The main determinant of Soviet foreign policy was relative to its relationship with the US, which was considered to be the biggest threat to its security. The Soviet Union was much concerned about how it dealt with nations in East Europe that were members of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet foreign policy is seen to be impacted mainly by military alliances that were believed to strengthen its delicate communist framework. Millions of people had died in the 1917 Russian Revolution and in the Second World War. Moreover, the Soviet Union was in the grip of a massive brain drain after the Second World War and the period witnessed severe threats from capitalist states by way of proxy wars and detente. This was the main reason for the Soviet Union to form alliances that aimed at defending the specific interests of the global socialist systems, primarily by supporting its allies through military assistance (Segal, 1992). According to Roberts (2004), the Soviet Union considered East Europe as a buffer zone to defend its western boundaries and to ensure that it controlled the region by making nations in East Europe to become subservient to it. This is evident from the creation of the Warsaw Pact, which was established primarily as a means to counter balance the impacts of the NATO alliances as initiated by the capitalist states. The treaty was officially called the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, whereby members pledged to safeguard each others’ interests in the event of any member being attacked (Roberts, 2005). This treaty also provided that the relationships amongst members were reliant on respecting national sovereignty and non interference in the internal affairs of member nations. Although the Warsaw Pact stated such objectives, the Soviet actions towards Czechoslovakia and Hungary revealed different stores. In 1956, the Soviet army took active part in crushing popular rebellions and uprisings in Budapest in Hungary. Additionally, the Soviet Union used force in 1968 to insubordinate the Czech government with the objective of strengthening the belief that it could safeguard the interests of its Warsaw Pact partners through the use of force, even while supporting such nations with military assistance. In fact, the Warsaw Pact was signed with the objective of countering NATO influence and North West Germany. According to Pozdeeva (1994), the Warsaw Pact empowered the Soviet Union as the supreme head. Its objectives to control East Europe were implemented through military alliances as well as through the formation of an economic bloc that was under domination of the Soviet Union. The Soviet efforts for exerting its influence over several societies and states through the use of economic measures led to the formation of a global system of economic treaties. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was established in 1949 by communist nations under leadership of the Soviet Union, with the objective of serving as a means to cooperate economically. The cooperation was to take effect amongst the Soviet economy and its East European allies. Later, third world nations having economic interests with the Soviet Union also became members of COMECON (Lewis, 1998). In effect, COMECON members remained united through common interests and because of the ideology relative to Marxism Leninism that had mutually acceptable approaches of economic ownerships and management. A mechanism was provided by COMECON whereby the Soviet Union attempted to encourage economic linkage amongst it close military and political allies. This was characterized by situations such as Yugoslavia being the only nation that was given an associate membership, while Mozambique, Nicaragua, Mexico, Iraq and Finland were given memberships despite not being socialist nations. The main objective of COMECON was to incorporate Stalin’s wish to make the Soviet Union to dominate over Central Europe and to pacify some nations that had shown interest in being associated with the Marshall Plan (McCagg, 1978). The Soviet Union decided to mollify these nations because they were being alienated from the conventional markets of West Europe. The fact that COMECON was set up to safeguard the interests of the global socialist systems became evident when Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia wanted to get aid under the Marshall Plan in spite of their need to have market economies and convertible currencies (Agostino, 1998). According to McNeill (1953), the Soviet Union started moving towards autarky domestically, while globally it took the route of the embassy system to directly meddle in the affairs of other nations, instead of adopting a constitutional means to achieve the given objectives. After Stalin died in 1953, COMECO started creating complementary specialty. But uprisings in Hungary and Poland made the Soviet Union to reconsider economic policies under COMECON. These uprisings created a number of economic and social changes such as the introduction of Soviet five year plans. During this time the COMECON administration was struggling to restore their popular support and authority. In 1985, during the Gorbachev regime, the Soviet Union started making several commitments on several fronts thus over heating the economy (Woodby, 1989). This period was the age of the Perestroika, which related to restructuring and was the last effort to revitalize the COMECON economies (Lundestad, 1975). Conclusion During the 1990s, new developments in the Soviet Union created issues relative to the link between ideology and the Cold War. Analysts have clearly placed ideology as the main element of disagreement between the two blocs and argue that it was the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 that literally ensured the Cold War. Russian analysts have argued that ideology occupied a very important role in the Soviet foreign policy and the ensuing Cold War. Nevertheless, Stalin’s ideology was shaped by self interest and Marxist Leninism. Theorists have held that there is a wide gap in terms of foreign policy being impacted by ideology and national security. Some analysts hold that ideology appears to be related with unreasonable and aggressive actions and it is true that the literature has focused more on ideological reasons for the occurrence of the Cold War. As per traditional theorists, the Soviet leaders executed policies on the basis of Marxist Leninism. Revisionists believe that American policies became victims of the siren songs of ideological beliefs. In this regard, the available literature has treated ideology as a means of framing and structuring policies. In fact, national security is mostly assumed as a necessity and as the truth that is always constantly present across time and space. In keeping with this logic, leaders in the two blocs fully understood the hazards and prospects they experienced in almost the same ways. In this context the Soviet foreign policy is mostly understood as having compromised with ideology in the context of the need to integrate itself into the global political identity. 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Segal, Gerals. 1992, Openness and Foreign Policy Reform in Communist States, Routledge. Woodby, Sylvia. 1989, Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy, Westview Press Read More