An International Relations - The Soviet Unions Invasion Case - Essay Example

THE SOVIET UNION’S INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN- AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ANALYSIS Introduction Afghanistan today is at the center of an important conflict in world politics. The success or failure of NATO forces engaged there in a peacebuilding-combat role combined with the actions of a democratically elected government will have a long lasting impact on the global war on terrorism. But world attention is not something new to this country. Thirty years ago it was the subject of an invasion by the Soviet Union, a military action that also serves as a primer in realist international relations theory, and showed how powerful a motive self-interest can be in political and military affairs. This essay will examine the implications of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and discuss what it has to say about realism, and additionally offer some policy recommendations. Afghanistan is a rugged, landlocked country in central Asia; three quarters of it is arid, inhospitable, almost impassable mountains, the most notable of which is the Hindu Kush Mountains, which is the world’s second highest mountain range. It is often regarded as one of the poorest, undeveloped nations in the world and prior to 1979 the UNDP’s Human Development Index had ranked it as the 170th out of 174 countries in terms of national development (Barakat 7). Contributing to Afghanistan’s financial situation is its very fragmented society. Although 99% of its people are Muslims still they are ethnically and linguistically divided with almost 50% of the population belonging to the Pashtun ethnic group. The rest are Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Chahars, Turkmen and Baluchis and each group cling to its own customs, languages and mores (Lye 8). Despite the harshness of its land and its multi ethnic society, it is one of the most historically attractive land for conquest purposes. It had been invaded by armies from Persia, Greece, Macedonia under Alexander the Great, Arab hordes, the Mongols and other warriors from central Asia. In the 19th century, Great Britain and Russia competed for control of Afghanistan with Britain successfully invading it in 1839-42 and in 1878. But it was in late 1979 that a significant event occurred and various countries’ interests in Afghanistan—some overt and some covert—took hold. The situation began on December 27, 1979 with Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan. This was to set off a chain reaction that would involve dozens of other countries, both American and Russian cold war proxies, all motivated by self-interest in a massive power struggle. Afghanistan would effectively become Russia’s Vietnam—but Russia would pay a higher price than the United States. Throughout the war, from 1979 to 1989, countries such as the USA, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, China and Egypt were drawn to the conflict and played the roles of trainees, financiers, arms and aircraft and tank suppliers. Each had its own agenda and vested interests. As such, the war had far-reaching effects not to mention the great number of casualties and destruction. It was such significant event that it was considered to shake “the very foundations of world order” and altering the “climate and indeed, the course of world politics” (Kirkpatrick 250). Each side in this conflict acted out of self-interest. The United States and its allies were slow at first to engage however, seeing an opportunity to weaken their arch enemy, Russia, poured billions of dollars in to support the Afghan mujahideens. Alternatively, Pakistan, Iran, China and Egypt—Russia’s allies—entered the conflict in a supportive manner. These allies all received lots of money from Russia and wanted to keep those funds flowing. They were also ideologically aligned. It is also safe to say that no one in this conflict acted for altruistic purposes. Everyone saw an opportunity and took it. The end result was, in some senses, a triumph for the allies, as the Soviet Union was defeated and soon after collapsed, giving independence to states like Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Kazakstan and the rest of them. However, freedom fighters working with the Mujahideens like Osama Bin Laden were emboldened by their ability to defeat a superpower. A fact that would allow Bin Laden to believe he could continue his holy war against infidels. Summary of the Soviet- Afghan War It has been widely held that the Soviet design to invade Afghanistan was not conceptualized immediately prior to December 1979 but originated with the lustful plan of the Tsarist Russian regime to include Afghanistan in its collection of conquests in central Asia. After Tsarist Russia annexed Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, it was but natural that Afghanistan had to fall in Russian hands so that the unrestrained expansionist march down south had to be orchestrated. But it was stopped in its tracks by the similar expansionist British move to extend further north from India. The competition by both countries to expand its sphere of influence in Afghanistan was termed as the “Great Game” (Singh & Bennett-Jones 26). The stalemate was resolved with the signing of a treaty in 1885 whereby the boundary between Afghanistan and Tajikistan was marked as that of the Pyanzh River and in effect making Afghanistan a buffer zone between the two countries (Stuart 615). Since then, Russia endeared itself to many Afghans with its monetary and military aid and its military training of Afghan officers in Russia. Russia even financed through a $100 million loan the Five Year Economic Development Fund in 1957 and 1962, thus modernizing and igniting the progress of Afghanistan (Kakar 1). Soviet influence was increased in the 1970’s with the emergence of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a socialist party with Marxist-Lenistic ideologies. Led by Taraki and Amin ( Khalq faction) and Karmal ( Parcham faction), the PDPA which enjoyed control on the Afghan army, deposed and massacred the sitting President Daoud and 18 members of his family in April 1978. Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Nur Mohammad Taraki immediately applied Soviet style reforms. The drastic changes did not sit well with the Muslim and traditional Afghans. When Taraki fought the unrest with incarceration and carnage—particularly the execution of 27,000 political prisoners at the Pul-e-Charkhi prison, a rebellion and a civil war ensued which cost the life of Taraki. Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin immediately grabbed power but the rebellion further intensified as the mujahideens waged a lightning-style guerilla warfare. Both Taraki and Amin requested military aid from Russia in the form of Soviet forces, tanks and helicopters. But on December 27, 1979, Russia invaded Afghanistan deploying 80,000 soldiers, 2,000 armoured fighting vehicles and 1,800 tanks via Russian airborne forces landing at Bagram airport and ground forces entering Afghanistan from the north in two ground routes. Immediately Kabul was isolated with the destruction of the central communication system. TV and radio stations and military bases were also controlled as well as the major urban centers and the police force of the Department of Interior while neutralizing all Afghan forces (Olivier 118). The Tajbeg Palace, where President Amin held office was at once shelled with rockets. Amin himself survived the rocket attack but nevertheless met death together with two sons by poisoning as the Soviets prepared for him a poisoned luncheon (Kakar 7). The Russians then installed Babrak Karmal as the new President, who helplessly watched all the carnage as the Soviets employed everything in its means to uproot resistance to the communist regime, including nerve gas, napalm bombs, land mines, booby traps, chemicals, strafing of entire villages from helicopter gunships. Meanwhile ground troops were engaged in retributive, indiscriminate mass killings of both mujahideens and civilians. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was particularly marked by genocide of non-combative civilians and a forcible migration of millions of Afghans to both Pakistan and Iran and the destruction of the Afghans’ means of livelihood (Ruiz 2,3). A case in point was the razing of the village of Tashqurghan in April 1982 resulting to the butchering of all its 2,000 denizens (Laber and Rubin 18). The mass killings were particularly rampant in mid 1980 and the bloody year of 1985. Throughout the 14- year communist regime, an estimated 1.5 to 2 million Afghans were slaughtered by the Soviets and most of these were Pushtuns, who were evidently targeted for ethnic cleansing (Charny 129). The Soviet occupation also saw the greatest exodus of refugees to neighboring lands. In 1984, some 3.2 million Afghans escaped to Pakistan while 850,000 sought refuge in Iran (Amstutz 224). In 1991 a total of 5,670,000 Afghan refugees took haven in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere. Thus Afghan refugees made up the greatest number of refugees in history (Azari 4). Despite all the brutalities and all the employment of the most sophisticated methods of warfare and despite the fact that the Soviet forces were overwhelming in number compared to the mujahideens , the Soviet forces failed to put down the mujahideen resistance. Eventually, feeling the pinch and the financial loss , the Soviets were left with no alternative but give up the fight and withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. On February 15, 1989, the last of Soviet forces departed from Afghan lands as planned by the Geneva Accords wherein USA and Russia also inked an agreement never to intervene in the internal affairs of both Afghanistan and Pakistan (Saikal & Maley 19). Significance and Importance of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a clear attempt to impose a new political ideology, that is, communism, to a country geographically strategically located that could potentially serve as a springboard to the propagation of such socialistic, totalitarian ideology to such countries as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Kashmir part of India, Nepal, Bhutan and the rest of the Persian Gulf countries It was therefore an attempt to disrupt the balance of power and thus affected global stability and world peace. It effectively ended the détente between USA and Russia and stoked the Cold War further to a higher level. It generated danger and raised tensions and anxieties in the region and forced the countries around to adjust to the Russian presence and restructure their domestic political arrangements as well as their international relations with each other. Furthermore, the invasion was an act that violated the United Nations charter which mandates all its members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. The excessive brutalities which showed no concern for human lives especially that of noncombatant civilians, its forcible expulsion of more than 5 million Afghans to neighboring countries, its merciless mass killing of some 2 million Afghans, mostly civilians, which qualify the act as genocide and its singling out of Pashtuns for mass decimation which should be regarded as ethnic cleansing deserve world condemnation and reserve it a place for the world hall of shame together with the Nazi-engineered holocaust. The use of chemical warfare, booby traps, land mines and other anti-personnel weaponry were a clear violation of the Biological Weapon Convention of 1972 as well as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, both of which Russia was a signatory. The outcome of the war which pitted Goliath superpower Russia and ragtag bands of discrete mujahideens showed that a passionate resistance to a foreign invasion by a superpower can bring shame to such superpower. But an analysis showed that the victory was brought about largely because USA, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, entered the fray out of a sense of self-interest, seeing a vulnerable Soviet Union and hoping to shift power to their half of the bipolar world order. Pakistan, Iran, China, Egypt, India and others entered the fray albeit behind the fighting mujahideens, hoping that the Soviet Union would emerge stronger and their collectivist ideology and Soviet aid would continue or strengthen. Thus, historian Steve Coll aptly calls it “the ghost wars”. The war is also historically momentous because it spawned the Taliban warriors and Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda group. Originally starting as ‘Afghan warriors’ out to wage jihad against the communist invaders, these Saudi Arabian ‘protectors’ had mastered the art of terrorism during the war and when it ended, the jihad was continued against perceived enemies of Islam and thus marked them the ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ (Coll 9). This is not simply an interesting historical aside. This shows that even when you act our of self-interest and use military force to try to subjugate or defeat your enemies, as realist theory teaches, there are still many unknowns that may still thwart you. Countries may act out of rational self-interest, but there is still a lot they don’t know—and the consequences can be deadly. International Relations Analysis for the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Political analysts and journalists during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan had a hard time coming up with the analysis of the events because the Soviet regime deliberately shut out all information from leaking to the outside world. The Red Cross, all humanitarian organizations and all objective journalists except those empathizing with the Soviet ideology were banned from entering Afghanistan and those who did, like some French medical personnel were captured, imprisoned and killed (Kirkpatrick 272). Other journalists were either disheartened by threats of death by the regime or found it close to impossible to enter clandestinely what with all the millions of land mines, the effective presence of several Afghan spies called KhAD agents and the mutual hostility among the resistance movements themselves (Charny 133). But the journalists who made use largely of first-hand accounts from refugees came up with tales of horror and analyses of events utilizing largely the realism mode of international relations theory. Although idealism and/or liberalism and constructivism Had been employed to analyze the events, most analysts’ utilized realism. Liberalism is useful because the invasion was not a product of decisions made on the spur of the moment but was historically rooted, going back to the days of the tsarist regimes. The expansionism urge continued despite the Bolshevik Revolution. But then almost all authors were one in saying that Russia’s motives in invading Afghanistan were rooted in self-interests, vested interests, the desire to perpetrate the communist ideology in the whole world, the amassing of more powers that would tilt the balance of power in its favor and against the interests of its Cold War adversary, the United States. In effect, expansionism is the motivating force. All these point to realism as the way to analyze the events of the Soviet-Afghan War for in realism, there is competitiveness between states for power, economic resources and the highest degree of security possible. States value military and economic strength and they are stopped in its tracks only when the level of power of opposition are stronger or just as equal. In the case of Russia, it could have invaded Afghanistan earlier were it not for the overwhelming military might of Britain which engaged it in the rivalry to control Afghanistan. This was termed as “the Great Game” and was settled by the treaty of the Geneva Accord of 1972. In realism, states such as Russia, USA, United Kingdom, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and India are motivated by selfish interests that forced them to be involved in the war. When the question is why such states were inevitably drawn into the war, then realism has to be utilized to analyze the war. Russia had always claimed that they were constrained to enter the war because their aid was sorely needed and requested by both Presidents Taraki and Amin in view of the civil war raging in Afghanistan. This would entail that liberalism instead be employed because in liberalism the goal of a foreign policy might be to help those in need and to snuff out rebellion and thus to restore peace. Thus, cooperation and state interdependence are much valued. But this was struck out by documented testimonies offered by several victims of the tragic war during the Permanent Tribunal of the Peoples in Paris and the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Oslo which detailed harrowing testimonies of needless massacre of civilians, the killing of women and children by bayonets, the razing down of “entire villages, burning harvests, killing livestock and taking cruel reprisals against Afghan civilians” (Kirkpatrick 263). The horror stories were endless, all of them in blatant violation of human rights. Such acts cannot be the acts of a “protector” as the Soviets loved to describe themselves. This cannot involve liberalism. It can be argued that the Soviets decision to invade was made due to national security matters or insecurity with the possible ascendancy of power by the United States in the important Persian Gulf as opposed to just raw hunger for power. The fall of the Shah of Iran in late 1978 and the resulting fears that the USA would exploit the instability of the regime to entrench itself in Middle East(defensive realism) is an example of this thought process. This insecurity of the Soviets was further fueled by the KGB report that President Amin had secret ties with US intelligence services and that as contained in General Andropov’s letter to PM Leonid Brezhnev that Amin had “secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the West” and had made “promises to tribal leaders to shift away from the USSR” (Holland 15). Still because security reasons are the compelling force, then realism has to be employed. Realism also tells us that the real motive of the Soviets in invading Afghanistan was to incorporate Afghanistan as a province of the USSR. All the proofs point to that direction. First, there was the obvious Sovietization of Afghan society and culture. Thousands of young Afghans, “even children aged 6 to 9”, were sent to Russia or its satellite countries for training. Even Kabul University was reformed and restructured with the obvious plan of Sovietizing Afghan education with the “presence of Soviet advisers in all levels of administration and instruction” while primary education curriculum had been restructured to promote “indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist ideology” (Kirkpatrick 284-285). Again, there was the intention to destroy the traditional Pushtuns as well as the middle class and intellectual community – both of which would likely be resistant to Sovietization. By bombing villages and forcing them to flee and thus vacate places ideal for military installations or airports, there was the overt design to get rid of the populace and replace them with Russian –trained youths. It is likely that the US and UK were right all along in that Russia was seeking warm water ports along the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan is the ideal jumping place. As realism analyst Rosanne Klass stated, all the Soviet moves were designed “at creating a strategic base from which to control Iran, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean” and then Russia will then “effectively dominate the vast area from the Horn of Africa to the Strait of Malacca without having fired a shot” (Kirkpatrick 285). The tell-tale signs were already there: the air bases constructed in Afghanistan, the bridge connecting the Amur Darya River, the tight grip of control on the Wakhan Corridor which connects Afghanistan with China and which borders with Pakistan. The fact that the Afghan resistance movement prevailed in the end despite the fact that all the odds were against them could be analyzed by using realism. In the first place, the Pushtuns which comprise more than half of the Afghan populace and the Nuristanis and the Tajiks who reside near the Pakistani border are extremely traditional people who regard honor and personal bravery as utmost qualities of a Pushtun. Tradition has it that outsiders should be regarded with suspicion and to seek revenge is an obligation. They should be keepers of age-old tradition and changes that alter these traditions are evil and modern ideas, whether Western or Communism, constitute threat to the Pushtuns. Moreover, especially with the nomads from the mountains, it is tradition to resort to fighting and to glorify it. We therefore conclude that these people are belligerent to the highest order as conditioned by their traditions and that they were not against communism per se but were bitter about the reforms brought about by communism (CIA Declassification Release us2.pdf). Realism must be applied because the tribes have their primary goal i.e. to preserve their own traditions which are tantamount to their own security and survival. The Soviets were compelled to withdraw because the protracted war had become as Mikhail Gorbachev claimed “a bleeding wound” that distracted the country from serious financial problems and because the war had become unpopular in USSR itself as pockets of social unrest concerning the war kept on gnawing at the social stability while many had become impatient with the Soviet politburo for its failure to end the war. Moreover, USSR had received constant lambasting at the halls of the United Nations, while non-aligned countries and China had expressed tension about Soviet imperialist expansionism and most importantly the cost of the war had been a constant source of worry to everybody. The cost of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan had already started to rise up prohibitively while cost of losses had also gone up. From December 1980 to December 1986, Russia had spent some 15 billion rubles or $48 billion for the direct conduct of the war while 12 billion rubles were incurred for equipment losses, shipping costs, ammunition expenses and out-of-country labor costs (CIA, Directorate of Intelligence us8.pdf) The Soviets in the end were forced to withdraw also because the mujahideens were financially and morally backed by several countries, each having their own agenda. Again, realism was used to analyze as each country had their own vested interests, which were either preservation if not getting an edge in the balance of power, setting their own political ideologies in the region, religious proselytism and security concerns. It is interesting to note that the Soviets failure ignored historical lessons related to the superpowers fighting perceived weaker but, impassioned enemies. First, larger stronger states often do not have the domestic support for prolonged battles that don’t appear to directly affect national security. Second, there is the problem that superpowers often lack the desire and will to fight long and hard. Finally, winning means more to the weaker group. In many respects, this was the case in Vietnam for the United States. Further, it has been widely noted that the Viet Cong were fortified by both Chinese and Russian aid in terms of monetary, arms and ammunition and military training. It is not surprising that the USA provided support for the insurgents. 6 months prior to the to the invasion, US President Jimmy Carter approved the funding for the Afghan insurgents (Javert 76). Meanwhile, the CIA launched the $4 billion Operation Cyclone which aim was to train and arm 35,000 Afghan and Arab fighters to defeat the Russian forces. They were trained ‘the art of assassination’ and the use of car bombs and other terrorist activities. Its base was in Islamabad, Pakistan and it was supported by UK, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Many of these insurgents turned out to become the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters whose leader happened to be Osama bin Laden (Pilger 7). Trained for terrorism, many of them afterwards practiced their skills for Jihad in Chechnya, Bosnia, Yemen, Indonesia, Egypt, Sudan, Algeria and elsewhere where Muslims were needed to fight Jihad (Heck 66). When countries join the fray for selfish interests (offensive realism) or for security purposes (defensive realism), realism have to be employed to analyze their war participation. While the USA poured some $600 million a year to aid the insurgents, UK and Saudi Arabia also gave their share as did Iran. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran were not only concerned with the veiled attempt of USSR to extend its control over the Persian Gulf area and thus control of the rich oil fields in that region, but as devout Muslim countries, both were edgy about the scenario of having a neighbor with atheistic ideologies. Saudi Arabia had also increasingly been made uncomfortable by the presence of either communist or Soviet backed states around them. Its neighbor South Yemen, a communist country had been armed with Soviet missiles, aircraft, armored tanks and cars while Soviet satellite Ethiopia had in its land Soviet forces. Realism is the most plausible way to analyze why states would arm themselves and align with a superpower. Pakistan’s role in the withdrawal of Soviet forces was strategic. The international theory of realism pointed to the strong possibility of a Soviet desire for its Arabian Sea ports especially that in Karachi and the possibility of a Soviet design to strip it of its Muslim faith in lieu of an atheistic, communist ideology. Thus, Pakistan took it upon itself to serve as bulwark of the Muslim faith and as a ‘frontline state’ against Soviet aggression and as springboard for the training and attack of the insurgents and conduit for arms and ammunition. It also provided a haven for some 3 million refugees as well as the mujahideen insurgents. USA, UK, Saudi Arabia responded by funneling their donations to the war through Pakistan PM General Zia. All these donations boosted the economy and more than made up for its costs in providing safe sanctuary to the refugees. Policy Recommendations If we add our understanding of the Soviet Union’s results in Afghanistan to some of Nato’s current problems there, we can see that clear and achievable goals are a vital component of any such invasion. The Soviet Union had unrealistic ambitions for its role in Afghanistan. It wanted to use that country as a launching pad for other conquests, but it did not think through nor did it commit enough materiel or troops to the invasion. It was overly confident. It thought its self-interest justified all and there would be no problem. It also thought it would be greeted as a liberator, but misunderstood that the Afghans had different interests which were incompatible with its own and these would harbor fierce resistance. International Relations theory teaches us that countries don’t act in a vacuum. Yet the Soviet Union behaved as though it did. The government did not think through these issues or consider how others actors on the world stage would respond. It seems quite obvious that it would be in the American’s interest to protect its interest by the use of proxies given the historical lessons of Vietnam. Any invasion would also be roundly criticized internationally and damage the Soviet’s reputation. Once again these things were not considered. Raw self-interest was the guiding principle—the other softer, elements of self-interest such as opening oneself up to vulnerability and international prestige were not considered. This was a serious flaw. Further, the Soviet Union assumed it could act by ignoring the United Nations. While the UN clearly has had limited effectiveness and the Soviets had veto power by its membership in the UN Security Council, completely ignoring it was not just arrogant but, helped to foster intentional outrage. Interestingly, the UN has played a broader role in conflict resolution post Afghanistan. The Soviets invasion of Afghanistan highlights the need to have a clear and consistent foreign policy that: 1) Engages the UN to the fullest extent; 2) Recognizes that unilateral actions will almost always dictate a response whether by force, the use of proxies, financial aid for the opposition and/or an uprising of the general population; 3) Self interest without collaboration and allies greatly increases the risk of failure; 4) The need to fully analyze a potential opponents willingness to engage in long and painful conflicts; 5) Properly analyses the domestic will for any conflict on a long term basis – longer than you expect to be engaged; 6) Recognizes that the financial costs of conflicts are always underestimated. While this paper analyzes the Soviets invasion of Afghanistan, it is worth noting that the long lasting effect of this invasion was to greatly embolden Muslim fundamentalists which , when combined with instability that the fall of the Soviet Union yielded in the world order, has made terrorism and radical insurgencies a global problem. Current and future generations must now carefully look at the policy implications of conducting foreign policy in an environment where people are willing to fight endlessly and die for the sake of a holy war. The most notable implication is that peaceful coexistence with the current leaders of such fundamentalists is all but an impossible task. Developing a policy based on aid and educating the young while avoiding needless conflicts is the most practical policy to make any progress with future generations. Conclusion Other than the historical tsarist interest in Afghanistan and the rivalry between Britain and Russia for Afghanistan in what was termed as the “Great Game” which made use of liberalism to analyze international relations, practically all events of the Soviet invasion can only be analyzed using realism. First, all those involved whether directly or through proxies - Russia, Afghanistan, USA, UK, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan among others are all sovereign states. The war was also basically bloody and anarchic. Each of them had national interests which were either selfish i.e. expansionism, power, religious proselytism (offensive realism) or either they were motivated by security concerns (defensive realism). The questions asked were why each of them acted that way i.e. their reasons for joining the fray or why Russia had to invade and then later on withdraw from Afghanistan. Then monetary considerations were important in order to sustain their participation in the war and thus there was a need to amass resources. Then their relationships with each other were dictated by their military and economic capabilities and thus their level of power vis-à-vis each other. Lastly, there were no universal rules that would guide them to react to each event. . WORKS CONSULTED Barakat, S. Reconstructing War Torn Societies: Afghanistan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Charny, Israel. The Widening Circle of Genocide. Transaction Publishers, 1994. Central Intelligence Agency Declassification Release. The Soviets and the Tribes of SouthwestAsia. us2.pdf, 23 September 1980. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence. The Costs of Soviet Involvement of Afghanistan. Us8.pdf, February 1987 Coll, Steve. The Ghost Wars. Penguin, 2004 Heck, Gene. When Worlds Collide. Rowman and Littlefield, 2007. Holland, Emily. Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. 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