The Impact of the Soviet and American Policies on the Middle East - Case Study Example

Impact of Soviet and American policies on the Middle East Traditionally, the Middle East has been a region ofgreat significance to global powers, many of which have evidently expressed significant interest in the region over the years. Countries of the Middle East have common properties and unifying characteristics including low levels of democratization versus high levels of authoritarianism, in addition to low economic liberalization, and are predominantly Arab/Islamic states; these factors make them easily distinguishable as a unit (Fawcett 2013, p.4). The United States of America and the Soviet Union went to history books as two of the major external powers that had significant influence in the Middle East, from the period preceding the end of World War II. The US’s and Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle Eastern countries was felt immensely from the second half of the 1950s, after the withdrawal of Britain and France from the region. The Middle East became a crucial venue for the US-Soviet rivalry and competition immediately after the Cold War began (Pipes, 1984); throughout the course of nearly four decades of the Cold War era, international relations were greatly defined by the US-Soviet rivalry and competition in the Middle East (Reich & Gotowicki, 1994). This paper explores the impact of the Soviet and American policies on the Middle East. The US has been a key player in the Middle East power politics by use of its diplomatic, economic and military power in support of its national interests, which involved fighting the Communist influence, guaranteeing a steady supply of oil while ensuring that no single power dominated the region (Shlaim 1988, p.15; Campbell, 1970). In the last half of the 1940s, the US government extended its support for governments it considered potential unwavering allies such as the Saudi royal family, as well as the Israeli and Egyptian governments. America’s impact in the Middle East dates back to the 20th century, when subsequent US administrations outlined new American strategies in the region; for instance, President Dwight Eisenhower’s famous Eisenhower Doctrine (Beauchamp, 2014). Through this strategy, the US officially took up the role of policing the Middle East and declared its willingness to support the independence of the freedom and peace-loving nations of the region. Subsequent US administrations have singled out the Middle East as an important area of focus in their foreign policy statements (Migdal 2014, p.3); the most significant and comprehensive US policy statements regarding the Middle East were formulated in the aftermath of World War II. Truman’s Doctrine of 1947 represents the first significant US policy statement regarding the Middle East; in this statement, the US assumes the responsibility of protecting Greece, Turkey and Iran from what it perceives as a Soviet and Communist threat. The Soviet threat having been established as a crucial challenge and there being no other nation that was up to that challenge, the US naturally assumed the responsibility of restricting Soviet’s actions in the region (Shlaim 1988, p.15). This established a precedence that has been observed with striking consistency over the years, with the US going to the extremes, including invoking military action, to deal with emerging challenges in the Middle East region. Coming after the Truman’s policy, the Eisenhower’s policy regarding the Middle East was focused on the Arab-Israeli region (Reich & Gotowicki, 1994). The US’s renewed interest in the Persian Gulf of the Middle East was informed by the continued realization of the crucial American interests and the potential Soviet threat in the region (Gause 2009, p.6). Furthermore, the British Withdrawal from the region necessitated a re-evaluation of the US’s policy as well as the assumption of new commitments and obligations for the Middle East region. Consequently, these led to the promulgation of what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, which was a response to the combined effect of the increase in Soviet activities in other regions and the deteriorating American desire to police the rest of the world. Nixon’s policy towards the Middle East inspired the adoption of a Persian Gulf policy, which further aimed to establish and support America’s allies in the Middle East, with the intention of strengthening and solidifying the region. Both the Nixon Doctrine and the Persian Gulf policy primarily focused on two key countries namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, as a response to the potential threat of the Soviet Union and its allies. The Nixon Doctrine enabled Iran to build its military capacity through the acquisition of the US’s military equipment with the sole purpose of ensuring stability and security in the Gulf region (BBC News Middle East, 2013). The Nixon Doctrine lasted through the Ford administration up to the initial years of the Carter regime, which had initially focused its policies regarding the Middle East towards resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Due to its keen focus on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict before it degenerates into a full-blown warfare, the Carter administration paid very little attention to the Persian Gulf and the Northern Tier. The Carter administration initially perceived the role of the Soviet Union in a unique perspective, unlike previous administrations; consequently, the Carter administration opted to cooperate with the Soviet Union because it perceived it as a benign power genuinely interested in promoting development of the Middle East region. The highlight of the American-Soviet collaboration in the Middle East during the Carter administration was in 1977, when the two powers issued a joint statement stressing the need to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict quickly. The Carter administration later abandoned its twin pillar policy and the Nixon Doctrine in favour of the Sadat initiative as an operative approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict after a series of devastating events that compelled the US to re-evaluate its policy. The Iranian revolution and removal of the Shah in addition to invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, among other assaults instigated a shift in Carter’s secondary focus on the Persian Gulf (Reich & Gotowicki, 1994). Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan instigated a major crisis in Carter’s policy in the Middle East while significantly altering Carter’s perspective of the Soviet Union and its intentions in the region. Given that Afghanistan had not received any significant attention in the past, the country had been ignored by all previous US administrations; invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union highlighted the potential Soviet threat not just to the Persian Gulf, but also to the Arabian Peninsula. Consequently, the Carter administration woke up to the reality that the Soviet Union was a hostile country that sought regional hegemony rather than a benign country that was genuinely interested in developing the Middle East region. Consequently, in bid to counter and possibly quell the potential Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, the Carter administration promulgated the Carter Doctrine, which followed earlier US statements regarding the region. The Carter Doctrine stressed that the Persian Gulf was of strategic importance both to the US and its allies and that all necessary action, including use of military force, would be taken to protect the region from the potential influence of the Soviet threat. The Soviet Union’s policies towards the Middle East prior to 1953 were mostly directed towards establishing local Communist Parties and opposing all regional governments that were under the western influence (Kurt 1974, p.95). Two of the most dramatic Soviet interventions in the Middle East took place in 1945 and they include the failed attempts to form a Communist regime in Northern Iran and to extend territorial claims against Turkey. These Soviet strategies in the Middle East region were akin to the 19th Century policies, which were designed to seize territory or to form sympathetic regimes in neighbouring countries. Following the failure of these approaches, the Soviet Union relapsed to the traditional propaganda campaigns against the west and indigenous regimes in addition to verbal support for leaders of the approved Middle Eastern Communist Parties from 1946 to 1953. Georgi Malenkov, Stalin’s successor in 1953, made the first ever-crucial Soviet policy towards the Middle East in his 1953 speech, when he gave special recognition to established Middle Eastern governments as potential allies to the Soviet Union. In the year that followed, the Soviet Union discussed trade and economic ties with Egypt, which was regarded as the most promising anti-west state in the Middle East. From this early Soviet Union attempt to offer economic aid and propaganda support for a nationalist and anti-western Arab state, it can be inferred that the Soviet Union had purposed to exploit the Arab and Middle East nationalism as a weapon against the west. These early interventions also set precedence for the future Soviet policies regarding the Middle East, which was the use of economic weapon to influence the regional governments’ perspective of the Soviet Union and siding with the more numerous and potentially anti-western Arabs against Israelis that were largely influenced by the Americans. Beyond its economic and political drive in the Middle East, strategic factors also began to play a significant impact on the Soviet’s thinking on the region, when the west started establishing an anti-Soviet military alliance along the southern border of the Soviet Union. Initial anti-Soviet western strategies in the region took the form of the Baghdad Pact of 1954, which linked Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran to Britain, and to the US and NATO by extension (Kurt 1974, p.95). The Soviet Union responded by outflanking the pact through interventions to weaken it from the south while establishing some form of Soviet military influence in a rival area in the region. Soviet Union exploited the traditional interstate rivalries between Egypt and Iraq for supremacy in the Arab world to diffuse western strategies in the Middle East; for instance, Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad pact naturally pushed Egypt into the opposition. The Soviet Union moved fast to offer military aid to Egypt and to affect a Soviet military presence in the region that had been dominated by the western military, when certain western governments refused to supply Egypt with arms due to political reasons. The use of military aid in its policies in the Middle East instigated the process of building the Military capacity of the regional governments, besides establishing a Soviet Union’s military presence in the region. Use of military aid in its policies also demonstrated Soviet’s readiness to arm non-communist countries in which the local communist party was actually outlawed. Consequently, the Middle Eastern states quickly recognized Soviet’s intentions in the region, which was the desire to weaken western influence in the region through economic and military interventions and supported propaganda that is laced with strong strategic overtones. Furthermore, countries that were ready and willing to align towards the Soviet Union were helped by the Soviet Union in their interstate relations with other states in the region. The Soviet Union readily exploited the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Iraqi revolution of 1958, which resulted to Iraqi’s withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, to extend and consolidate its influence in the Middle East (Kurt 1974, p.97). In the context of the Soviet’s economic and military support, the number of Middle Eastern countries that were willing to accept Soviet’s aid and influence continued to grow in the 1950s. Soviet’s two tactical anti-western tactics in the Middle East were close fitting; economic aid established a supporting environment for the acceptance of Soviet policies in the anti-western group of nations. Similarly, soviet’s economic aid strengthened the economies of these countries and linked them economically to the Soviet Union; on the other hand, military aid influenced the countries’ armed forces and instigated some level of political influence to bear on the anti-western governments. Overall, both the Soviet and American policies through diplomatic, economic and military interventions in the Middle East have had a significant and long lasting impact on the regional development, security, unity, stability as well as interstate relations in the region. Generally, the influx of material, money and other resources from the Soviet Union and the US have had both a stabilizing and destabilizing impact on the Middle Eastern economies and governments. The Soviet Union pursued active foreign policies in the Middle East, which led to the establishment of Soviet economic and military investment in the region; the Middle Eastern countries that accepted Soviet’s military and economic aid experienced enormous levels of prosperity. The US’s extended support and protectionism policies towards Middle Eastern countries viewed as allies such as Egypt, Israel and Iran greatly promoted the security and stability of the region. The Middle Eastern governments have exploited both the Soviet and American need for political access and in some instances military facilities, to their own advantage. Evidently, Middle Eastern governments have played the Soviet Union against the West for their own national interests; while accepting Military and economic aid from the west, these countries also tried to win Soviet’s support for their case in regional disputes. References BBC News Middle East. 2013, History of Mid-East peace talks. [Online] 29 July Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11103745 [accessed 07/01/2015]. Beauchamp, Z., 2014, How America Lost the Middle East. Vox: [Online] Available at: http://www.vox.com/2014/8/13/5991047/how-america-lost-the-middle-east [accessed 07/01/2015]. Campbell, J.C., 1970. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An American Policy. Foreign affairs. [Online] Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24201/john-c-campbell/the-arab-israeli-conflict-an-american-policy [accessed 07/01/2015]. Fawcett, L., 2013. International Relations of the Middle East. (3rd Ed), Oxford: OUP. Gause, F. G., 2009. 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