To what extent was the Cold War global in nature - Essay Example

?To what extent was the Cold War global in nature? The Cold War is undoubtedly a global phenomenon. It is an intricate hodgepodge of control and competition defined by unrelenting ideologies, strategies, and struggles across the globe. Hence, there are several specific factors to point to the global nature of the Cold War. First is the issue of spheres of influence. Spheres of influence have usually offered a tactic of control against immense power struggles by, establishing a defence ring of geographic territories around the lands of superpowers (Feste 1992). Certainly, throughout the Cold War the great powers formulated ideals concerning spheres of influence that were somewhat vital. In the initial stages of fierce Cold War struggle, the fight between the Soviet Union and the United States ensued over concerns of the external and internal direction of European countries, which is quite localized in nature. Yet, the regime supported by each of the great power appeared to create “a credible philosophical and organisational substitute for the old order of European politics” (Feste 1992, 15). The struggle hence becomes globalised. When the aforementioned part of the struggle weakened due to the military standoff and the recovery of Europe, the emphasis of the conflict moved to the developing or colonial nations. At this point, dissimilar from the European condition, the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States seldom involved political or military domination (Westad 2005). More importantly, it involved the demands of the particular political and social paradigms introduced by the Soviet Union and the United States to the emerging countries. This struggle between the great powers had a major global impact on political reforms in developing and underdeveloped countries. Among other things, it increased the emphasis on social change, on economic progress, and nation building, which the Soviet Union and the United States recognised as the core rationale for these nations in their affairs with either of the great powers (Feste 1992). The global nature of the Cold War, in relation to this great power conflict, is precisely described by Paul Seabury (as cited in Feste 1992,16): Classical great-power competition had stressed principally the respective force capabilities of states: their command of military power; their ability to build, sustain and manipulate alliances; the reach of their economic and commercial influence. Yet, Soviet-American competition added to this a further element: since both systems claimed to be based upon and legitimated by certain universally valid socioeconomic principles, so their respective performances were then to be judged by supposedly universal norms. The touchstone of performance was thus not merely to be seen in direct matters of power and effective influence when both systems impinged on each other, but in the operational vitality of the principles themselves, both within and outside their respective national and hegemonic realms. Hence the strength of American supremacy stemmed from specific normative ideals not simply assessed in terms of domestic influence and authority. Furthermore, ideology was indispensable as well for the Soviet Union to preserve its position globally, which necessitated support for radical campaigns (Westad 2005). The Cold War had created a particular cluster of organised, global interconnections that held an impression of order and formed a new world balance (Westad 2005). These circumstances depended on a unified group of principles that offered a justification for the interferences of the great powers throughout the Cold War period. Aside from the sphere of influence factor, strategic geographical positioning and ideology made the Cold War a global affair. William Bundy (1989) describes the global nature of the Cold War in terms of ‘balance of power’, arguing that it is difficult to overstate the level of the global supremacy by the Soviet Union and the United States in the initial decades of the post-war period. In terms of power, the manner each superpower had surfaced from the war guaranteed their superiority, even though their power foundations varied significantly. U.S. supremacy was economic and military in nature, whereas Soviet power stemmed mainly from the strength of its military system (Feste 1992). Bundy (1989) argues that the Cold War period saw substantially slight adjustment in either the basic aspects that characterise the central superpower global objectives or the wide-ranging policy decisions made by the Soviet Union and the United States to safeguard and reinforce those motives. At the peak of the bipolar period, which is the 1950s, two global powers ruled the Cold War. This was omnipresent in the position and orientation of large numbers of local governments, and frequently produced political struggle within countries and in global affairs (Westad 2005). The power struggle during the 1950s also implicated Asian nations and the Middle East. The United States and the Soviet Union was not able to dominate the global arena as they had in the initial phases of the Cold War, yet they remained significantly powerful military entities and fundamental in important systems of alliance until the conclusion of the Cold War (Westad 2005). Bundy (1989) thus identified two major bodies in the global power system, that is, East and West. However, according to Feste (1992), the global implication of this bipolarity and its effect on other countries was minimised by the autonomy and increasing influence and power of a number of other nations, as well as by the significantly larger comparative military potential and economic strength of countries and territories once nearly defenceless. Although the concern of the Cold War was power balance, it diverged from the Cold structure of global affairs. It concerned a more complex and fragile equilibrium, comprising a cluster of balances that integrated local politics all over the developed world, that, according to Gardner (1991), “both enlisted and sought to overcome ideology, and that was precariously perched on a narrow band of common interests between the industrialised world and the great raw materials-producing areas, former European colonies and emerging nations” (p. 144). From this concise analysis of the global nature of the Cold War, it becomes quite apparent that great power interference has served a major function in shaping policies and issues for several nations. Therefore, the relevance of sphere of influence, or geopolitics, balance of power, and ideology, as points of reference for analysing national conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States has tendered a connection between national concerns and global politics. References Bundy, W. (1989) “The 1950s versus the 1990s” In Edward K. Hamilton (ed)., America’s Global Interests: A New Agenda. London: W.W. Norton. Feste, K. (1992) Expanding the Frontiers: Superpower Intervention in the Cold War. New York: Praeger Publishers. Gardner, L. (1991) “Old Wine in New Bottles: How the Cold War Became Long Peace” In Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.), The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections. New York: Harper Collins, 1991. Westad, O. (2005) The Global Cod War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. In what ways did the United States benefit from the Sino-Soviet split? The disgrace of the United States in Vietnam overlapped with large-scale changes to the bipolar structure that had prevailed since 1945 (Ellison 1982). Although the Cold War definitely persisted during the 1970s and 1980s, there were adjustments to the basic system of global relations that resulted in an extensive and hence more intricate global structure. The way in which the Soviet Union and the United States had equally structured and governed endured new and major changes (Ellison 1982). For instance, President Nixon appealed to the idea of a new world order, which would later on benefit from the Sino-Soviet split. In the 1950s the Sino-Soviet split started and turned out to be a global political dispute between China headed at that time by Mao Tse-tung and the Soviet Union by Joseph Stalin (Ellison 1982). The People’s Republic of China (PRC), according to Lampton (2002), throughout the 1950s, collaborated with numerous Soviet consultants who persuaded the leaders of China to adopt the Russian framework of expansion and growth with a focus on industrial development financially supported by duties and taxes from the masses while focusing less on consumer products and services. The Sino-Soviet split had gave advantages to and opportunities for the diplomatic status of the United States that the Nixon government had enjoyed, for its potential effect on the unrelenting Vietnam embarrassment and for its broader international repercussions in the enduring Cold War. Countries in the Asia-Pacific were evidently critical to this ideological, political and, from time to time, intensely military encounter between the two great powers, and the approach of Nixon towards China were aimed at acquiring benefits for the United States by producing a Sino-American agreement that could not overlook the Soviet Union (Lampton 2002). The outcome was to encourage Moscow to implement a more collaborative approach towards the United States that resulted in reconciliation between the two great powers through stabilisation of European frontiers and arms control strategy (Dallek 1984). According to Klare (1975), it also permitted Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon to operate slowly to transform the profound shared aggression that had shrouded China and the United States since 1949. Hence, it implies that within the perspective of the global scheme of the United States, the Sino-Soviet split was certainly a blessing to the American government. The disparities between China and the Soviet Union had been more than a theoretical disagreement between competing scholars in Beijing and Moscow (Hudson, Lowenthal & MacFarguhar 1961). Rather than simply analysing unclear statements of Marxist principle on the appropriate way in which to form radical movements in underdeveloped nations, the Sino-Soviet split was a fierce rivalry for control and influence over which government was best able to deal with the global Communist campaign and how its operation should be carried out. In the process China would steadily advance from the margins of regional relations to a higher status and greater power as both the Soviet Union and the United States re-evaluated their past aggression (Ellison 1982) towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC). First, the administrations of Carter and Nixon exerted great efforts to exercise the ‘China card’ in their relationship and dealings with the Soviet Union. The regime of Nixon exercised it in a constrained, yet in a somewhat effective way in trying to promote reconciliation with the Soviet Union (Lampton 2002). The government of Carter accomplished an important mission with regard to China and gave considerable value to the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union in the suppression of the latter (Klare 1975). Certainly, it is not an embellishment to argue that the primary representatives of the Carter government regarded the exercise of the ‘China card’ to be their main accomplishment in the global sphere. It could be that the use of the China card in the suppression of the expansionist operations of the Soviet Union is quite limited. The decisive fact is that the China card cannot be exercised as an alternate for the power and influence of the United States (MacMillan 2007). It is mainly American influence, together with NATO’s power and American capacity to convince its European partners to thwart the expansionist interests of the Soviet Union on a global level, that can be successful in repressing the Soviet Union (MacMillan 2007). Devoid of the expansion of American influence and the restoration of power equilibrium, as stated by Nolan (1993), even the minor function of the China card will weaken it, if only due to the Chinese disappointment with U.S. strategy. Second, international relations scholars and U.S. legislators occasionally are in fierce debate over whether American policy toward the PRC and Soviet Union should be fair or should be biased. This issue can be resolved by the fact that there is no rationale for the United States to be fair in its affairs with the Soviet Union and the PRC (Lampton 2002). The former is the major foe of the United States in the global sphere: the objectives and interests of the Soviet Union and the United States are in stark disagreement. Obviously, the American government should initiate every attempt to prevent direct encounter with the USSR (Nolan 1993). In addition, the United States should look for opportunities for joint detente, for instance, on the critical issue of arms control, more intensely than that of the Carter government. However, the key attempt in relation to the Soviet Union should be aimed at its suppression (Nolan 1993). Such an attempt should be founded on the assumption that if the damages sustained by Soviet expansionism are taken advantage by the American government (MacMillan 2007), then it is possible that eventually the Soviet Union will abandon its expansionist mission and be eager to take part in the establishment of a transformed world order. Because of the current development phase of China, the country and the United States have an overlap of motives, both in repressing the USSR and in strengthening domains of global conflict that give the Soviet Union favourable aims. The mechanisms presented to China and the United States in this attempt complement each other (MacMillan 2007). A more powerful and secured China is hence in the best interest of the United States. Any assistance that the American government and its partners can offer to the PRC in the cultural, intellectual, and economic sectors (MacMillan 2007) benefits the United States. One has to differentiate between the Sino-Soviet split as a way of benefiting American foreign policies and the opportunities presented to the American government of taking advantage of the split as a ‘card’ in its rivalry with the USSR. While involved in a global rivalry with the USSR, the United States should also try to look for opportunities for overlap of motives, just like in the area of arms control (Klare 1975). In contending with the USSR, the possibilities of a military cooperation between the United States and China may serve as a favourable catalyst to moderate Soviet global activities and push concessions. However the actual development of such a partnership would drain the value of the ‘China card’ (Lampton 2002). A Sino-American military cooperation could harden Soviet opposition, encourage the Soviet Union to behave more aggressively (Lampton 2002), and frustrate concessions where the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States overlap. Ultimately, it is not known what would be the brink of a likely military reaction of the Soviet Union to an arms mobilisation of the China by the American government. A military collaboration could be the breaking point that drives the USSR toward armed defensive strategy against the PRC (Ellison 1982). In a world inundated with threats, the American government should abstain from carrying out decisions that needlessly worsen conflicts, the outcomes of which cannot be measured. Nixon’s attempt to open up China, frequently regarded as the grandest diplomatic achievement of his term, was a daring, perilous political decision that drastically altered the power equilibrium in Asia to the advantage of the United States. The perils of such an action initially seemed immense, globally and nationally, but the partnership of Nixon and Kissinger discovered a tactical prospect, and grabbed it (Klare 1975). Years of fighting between China and the United States rendered Nixon an illogical option to promote reconciliation. However in a remarkable approach typical of the Nixon-Kissinger global strategy, a new connection was built between the PRC and the United States (MacMillan 2007). It would transform the global power equilibrium. In terms of national security, Nixon may take advantage of the strengthened relationship between China and the United States to force the USSR into restraining its activities. This could be the opportunity Nixon required to obtain definite conciliations from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, if conflicts could be diminished with the PRC, several of the military demands on the United States could be moderated in Asia (MacMillan 2007). Building a novel and more advantageous strategic and military equilibrium in Asia and taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split offered a wide array of favourable alternatives and opportunities for the American government (Nolan 1993). Reconciliation was hence profoundly anchored in the Nixon-Kissinger idea of international relations and their attempts to alter the global power balance. After years of comparative global seclusion, China was prepared as well for more regularized affairs. Driven mainly by the collapsing Sino-Soviet relations, China tried to get nearer to the United States in an attempt to detach itself from the Soviet Union and to destabilise the power of the Soviet Union in Asia (MacMillan 2007). The decision making approach in China was characteristic of the most important measures of the Nixon government. Doubting the system of government, Nixon enviously protected his policy programmes and tried to conceal them (Lampton 2002). Evidently Nixon was the major initiator of the reconciliation between China and the United States. Nixon, in an editorial in Foreign Affairs in 1967, even gave nuances to such measures, stating that “we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations” (Lampton 2002, 67). If reconciliation between the United States and the USSR made China anxious, reconciliation between the United States and the PRC would have a similar effect in USSR (Hudson et al. 1961). It was a strategy-driven political game. As with the meetings of Nixon in Moscow, the convention in Beijing was thoroughly and carefully prepared from the 21st to the 28th of February 1972, Nixon talked to the leaders of China (MacMillan 2007). It was an impressive diplomatic and political affair. It was the very first time an American leader visited the PRC. Nixon stated, in his meeting with Mao Tse-tung, “What brings us together is recognition of a new situation in the world and recognition on our part that what is important is not a nation’s internal philosophy. What is important is its policy toward the rest of the world and toward us” (Nolan 1993, 128). Nixon eventually informed Chou En-lai, “We know you believe deeply in your principles, and we believe deeply in our principles. We do not ask you to compromise your principles, just as you would not ask us to compromise ours” (Dallek 1984, 236). Nixon further proclaimed in a formal meal: “So let us start a long march together, not in lockstep, but on different roads leading to the same goal, the goal of building a world structure of peace and justice” (MacMillan 2007, 158). Hence the visit to China was a forthright success for the Nixon-Kissinger administration. Eventually, Nixon’s attempt to take advantage of the conflict between the Soviet Union and China, and the subsequent reconciliation between China and the United States, was to become one of the lasting achievements of the Nixon-Kissinger global strategy. References Dallek, R. (1984) The American style of foreign policy: cultural politics and foreign affairs. New York: New American Library. Ellison, H. (1982) The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Hudson, G., Lowenthal, R. & MacFarguhar, R. (1961) The Sino-Soviet Dispute. New York: Praeger. Klare, M. (1975) “The Nixon/Kissinger Doctrine and America’s Pacific Basin Strategy” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 7(2), 3. Lampton, D. (2002) Same Bed, Different Dreams: ManagingU.S.- China Relations, 1989- 2000. London: University of California Press. MacMillan, M. (2007) Nixon and Mao: the week that changed the world. The University of Michigan: Random House. Nolan, C. (1993) Principled Democracy: Security and Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Read More