Rising China and Asia-Pacific Regional Stability - Essay Example

Due The Rising China and the Asia-Pacific Regional Stability Political power is in itself a multifaceted concept, defined in many ways according to political orientation, background, and/or the realities of observable evidence on the ground. In the very definitions, the ability to bind others into a submissive authority line via material threats/rewards to condition behavior seems to vary in extents, with the most extreme tending towards authoritarian state of nature; defined in levels of coerciveness. Noteworthy from the very beginning, this ability, known in the realms of academia as “hard power”, combines a command of indicators that not only include measurable wealth (GDP) and military spending, but a host of factors that basically defines a state’s reflective position beyond its borders. That the Asia-Pacific is undergoing tectonic shifts in terms of the elements of hard power in now a forgone conclusion; China overtook Japan in 2010 to become Asia’s largest economy, only second to the United States globally in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), and in the process, taking advantage of the latters’ woes in the wake of a deadly financial crisis to extend its influence in the neighboring nations’ growth momentum. The increasing influence of China in this region, not to mention its strategic positioning as a major international actor, coupled with its gradual move towards greater power status, a puzzle widely theorized as the “China Threat” with uncertain predictions, none of which has ever materialized, forms the basis of response herein. All nations pursue their interests of security and prosperity within a context of political diplomacy that ropes in economic, and, if need be, military forces as directed by a history that underpins national ethos and the existing relationships with states in question (Lemke, Douglas, and Suzanne Warner 237). In the mix between the national ethos and political history are the personalities of leaders in power and their respective abilities to further the two elements to certain commensurate heights. As the adage goes, nations only have permanent interests. Accordingly, friendly nations may turn hostile to a neighbor with weird interests, bringing together former enemies to secure a common interest; a grim picture captured in literary analysis in the context of an increasingly influential China in the Asian power politics during the past quarter century (Kaplan 3). Indeed as expected, the collapse of the Soviet Empire, marking the end of the cold war, heralded an era of fractured global power structure, hitherto bipolar, subsequently heightening the prospects of a number of countries into filling the void left behind by an equal supremo to the United States in world affairs. Aided by a relatively stable international environment that has, no doubt, enabled the implementation of an open-door policy, China has remarkably reaped the benefits of modernization, managing to scale up the living standards of its huge population, which by western standards is still below par. Besides the extraordinary economic growth momentum over the last three decades, China has invested heavily in modernizing its military capabilities, signaling, at least according to literary analysis, a more assertive China that is likely to be a security threat to the established political order of East Asia (Ye 56). Contrary to the pessimists’ expectations, China’s emergence as the most powerful state in the Asia Pacific has been characterized with more stabilization that has benefited the region as a block. Even though no state is completely allied with China in the face of a wide spectrum of colored relations between the U.S. and China that seem quite obvious, neighbors, though in varied degrees, have accommodated the rise. In fact, none has heeded the alarming calls to balance against China in preparation for the mostly exaggerated future contingencies (Kang (a) 58; Ikenberry 353-54). Rarely touched in the “China Threat” analysis is the link between China’s rise atop the apex of hierarchic leadership developing in East Asia and the information detailing its capabilities and intents to the immediate neighbors and beyond. To be fair enough, and unlike Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear spillover intentions that is now all over in the press, China has provided every explanation that has more than assuaged its neighbors and the larger international community over its intentions, with the latter quick in certain instances to follow such information with appropriate criticisms and pressure to the regime in Beijing to conform to internationally approved conduct or face sanctions, whichever fitting for the grievances leveled (Kand (b) 6). More importantly, the East Asian states have all welcomed China’s economic ascendancy, and to greater extents, overcome any fear to reap the benefits from the China’s rise. The neo-realist paradigm that support the “China Threat” arguments often fronts the Power Structure Theory, incorrectly extrapolating the traditional power dynamics without due attention to the many strides walked between the two world wars right to the demise of the Soviet Republic in the 1990s to the current 21st century engagements at the international stage (Ye 56). According to the theory, the acquisition of wealth atomically gives a country the clout to wield regional, and to certain extents international, influence with the capability of destabilizing the power structures hitherto inexistence at will. And that as such power-aggregates expands, such a country becomes more than capable of furthering its national interests within certain geopolitical contexts, even at the expense of peace; a scenario that has traditionally provoked established powers to act in defense of the status quo and/or sovereignty. Indeed, history seems to bolter such arguments with rising powers dissatisfied with secondary status confronting their immediate worlds as well as the would-be existing dominant powers to further objectives commensurate with their wealth. Just like Germany in the late 19th century and in between the two world wars and Japan of the 1930s, whose aspirations both led to two world wars and the Pacific War respectively, China seems to have been wired in the logic with aspirations that seeks to alter the status quo first in the East Asian region before embarking on a titanic battle of dethroning the United States of its current world status. Further, China assertiveness, its historical control of domestic affairs [numerously termed as authoritarian state in literature], a bitter memory of past greatness coupled with a painful legacy of a century of national humiliation, particularly by the next door neighbor - Japan, and a distant, gigantic desire to reinvent the traditional Sino-Centric world order of super-ordination and subordination both politically and economically, all seems to glorify the threat perspective with some sense of credibility (Ye 55-56). Scrutinized against a world order that has by far shifted from the traditional sense, the “China threat” proponents seem to neglect the role of the globalization phenomenon in their analysis; a fundamental facet that that has not only pushed the threat to near reality but is the very background that China’s economic, and to some extent its military, build-up rests (Friedman 110). It is also worth mentioning that though the aspect of sovereignty remains supreme, globalization has to a greater extent clipped the wings of the nation state as the principal actor at the international stage and that the power of the state is actually in decline as we move into the future. Unlike before the 20th century when national interests were not effectively wired into the international working dynamics, the 21st century nation-state cannot determine national issues of international magnitude in total disregard of established international law and/or agreements. In effect, globalization has re-shaped, directly or indirectly, the traditional notions of power structure, reorienting the nation-state’s foreign relations, big or small, towards a more cooperation path away from the expansionist ideals of the past. Accordingly, the projection of the power structure analysis to the future prospects of China as a rising power without due attention to the fundamental changes in the current international system appears less persuasive. As alluded above, the Chinese economic wealth accumulation has been driven in part by the solid foreign policy founded on the principles of a “peaceful rise” envisioned by Deng Xiaoping. Indeed, Beijing has been very hesitant on taking direct confrontation, and has rather opted more often than not for conciliatory approaches to solving disputes of international magnitude; a tactical move that has not only enabled a regional but a global environment secure and conducive enough for its wealth creation. Deng’s engineered principles of governance remains the guiding framework for the Chinese leadership (Wang 34). No wonder, therefore, that the recent policy proposals that include the 1993 Jiang Zemin’s, 2007 Qin Gang’s and 2011 Yang Jiechi’s policy initiatives of enhanced trust, reduced friction and increased cooperation, all redirects foreign relations away from combative engagements (Washington Times par 3).  A harmonious working relations devoid of outright confrontations has been key to China’s gravitational prospects towards a potential global economic powerhouse. China has spared no effort to incorporate operational flexibility and accommodation in courting natural resource-rich countries to its fold, however rouge, cold or skeptical such states are to China relations; a policy that has so far boosted bilateral trade agreements with countries in Southeast Asia, Africa and the vast American continents by over 600 percent in the last decade alone (Economy 146). Contrary to the constant charges of maneuvered involvements of the Chinese government in the entrepreneurial affairs of its firms for its strategic global standing, China’s “respect for sovereignty” even with lesser influential countries in the developing world has been paramount; always limiting its ties purely for business purposes (Hanson par 1). The indicators of a more cooperative China even in the face of controversies in northeast Asia are several. The country over the years has adopted a “smile strategy,” incorporating the interests of neighboring countries in a vast network of trade and investment while projecting forth a less threatening military stance even with Taiwan, a country whose split from China is still under a lot of questions; investments worth approximately $60 to $100 billion in the coastal regions of China alone are from Taiwan. South Korea’s trade ties with China have developed in recent times a great deal surpassing that with the United States with some sizeable margins. Demand offered by the Chinese huge population has played a key role in Japan’s economic recovery after the financial crisis. More importantly and touching on securities matters of the region, China has featured prominently in the multilateral security mechanisms, which includes engagement with ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in securing regional interests as a block as well as the recent Six-Party Talks solving the North Korea’s Nuclear Program crisis; moves that more than short-circuits the China Threat dilemma (Ye 41). Just to mention, one of the initial tasks of ARF was to arbitrate on the South China Sea territorial disputes, of which China’s participation more than indicates its commitment to enhanced cooperation on security issues of the region. That China is a rising power and the regional hierarch in the Asian pacific is not in doubt (Kang (b) 4). However, whether China’s national power has risen to the extent of becoming a security threat to the entire region, and the world by extension is doubtful in every sense. Realistically, the materialization of China Threat is pegged on “hard power,” which, in essence, goes beyond the military and economic strengths to incorporate political goodwill. While it is true that some of the elements of China’s hard power indicators have been on the rise [militarily and economically], its China GDP per head averages at $6,188 in 2013, way below the world’s average standing at $12,500 as well as those of the developed countries such Canada, the UK and even the next door neighbor, Japan with 49,965 (world bank par 1). Much like it is elsewhere, globalization has widened the gap between the haves and the have-nots in China, heightening the challenges that Beijing has to deal with administratively. than embarking on a strategy that is clearly detrimental to its fragile rise, which, in effect, is modest in the light of the statistics just mentioned. That China is facing some form of hidden crisis of governance, which includes sticky unemployment rates, seems obscure to the proponents of the “China Threat.” In spite of the speculations that more than borders pervasive, hollow propaganda, one thing seems clear: the elements of China’s hard power is far from strong enough to be labeled “threatening” to the neighbors and the world; a reality that the ruling elites know with absolute surety not to provoke regional as well as global hostility to redirect the forces of globalization that so far caries the hopes of China, like those of other nations, into the future. Work cited Ateba, Bertrand. 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