Information on Russia Using the National Security Model - Speech or Presentation Example

?National Security Affairs Briefing on Russia Introduction a. Greetings: Good afternoon ____________. I am SGM Darrell Allen. b. ification: During the next 15 minutes, I will present an unclassified, national security affairs briefing on Russia. NEXT SLIDE c. Purpose: The purpose of this brief is to provide information on Russia using the national security model. In order, I will cover the following topics concerning Russia: national purpose, ideology, national interests, national power, threats, domestic factors, commitments, military strategy, international strategy and foreign policy, and any possible United States involvement. NEXT SLIDE (TALK ABOUT THE FLAG (VGT) d. Overview: At 6.6 million square miles Russia (also known as the Russian Federation) is the largest nation-state in the world today. It encompasses all of northern Asia and north-eastern Europe. On the south, from west to east it borders on Kazakhstan, Mongolia and China (and furthest east, for a mere 11, miles it borders on North Korea. On the west, from north to south it borders on Norway, Finland, the Baltic States, Belarus and the Ukraine. e. It's national flag is a tricolor with bands of white, blue and red. Officially adopted in the 1890s and again in the 1990s, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the abandonment of the 'hammer and sickle' flag, it has been in use since the 17th century and its origins are shrouded in the mists of history. f. The total population is approximately 142 million and the capital city is Moscow with a population of 8.6 million. NEXT SLIDE In the wake of the Second World War a bi-polar world emerged with the Soviet Union and the United States as the world's two superpowers. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s some analysts suggested that the United States was the world's sole superpower and that the 'Cold War' had ended. Francis Fukuyama went so far as to suggest that capitalism had defeated socialism and history had ended. This proposition has proven to be ridiculously utopian. As is true of every state, Russia's national purpose remains advancement of its international interests, national security and national prosperity. In pursuit of these goals its major adversary remains the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the alliance developed during the Cold War to ensure the security of Europe and link the United States with Canada and the democratic states of western Europe. The Russian Federation's minor adversaries are principally internal. Russia faces threats and terrorist adversaries in Chechnya, the northern Caucasus and throughout the predominantly Muslim south-eastern portion of the country. On January 29, 2011 Reuters reported that the January bombing at Moscow's main airport was an operation carried out by North Caucasus separatist, terrorists. The report also identified the ethnic, religious and economic conflict at the root of the adversarial relationship: “Russia's leaders are struggling to contain a growing Islamist insurgency in the region, a strip of impoverished, mainly Muslim provinces along predominantly Orthodox Christian Russia's southern border.” (Reuters, 2011) Russia and the United States share an opposition to Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism. However, there are also multiple, potential points of conflict with the United States. The United States is committed to global democratization and human rights while the legitimacy of Russian democracy remains questionable. It is widely believed that the current Prime Minister and former President Vladimir Putin moved to the Prime Ministership to maintain control and subvert term limits on the President while remaining the 'power behind the throne'. Additionally, Russian corporations have often used accusations of economic malfeasance and other trumped up charges to take over the assets of foreign investors. These infringements on the rights of individuals and corporations remain potential trouble spots between the United States and the Russian Federation. NEXT SLIDE Ideology: In the 1980s then President Gorbachev introduced changes in the authoritarian ideology that had ruled the Soviet Union since the 1917 revolution. The concepts of Glasnost - “a policy of the Soviet government allowing freer discussion of social problems” - and Perestroika - “an economic policy adopted in the former Soviet Union; intended to increase automation and labor efficiency but it led eventually to the end of central planning in the Russian economy” - entered the lexicon. (Princeton University) However, these initial reforms eventually swelled into the devolution of the Soviet Union itself. Subsequently, according to the CIA these nascent democratic trends have been reversed: “Russia has shifted its post-Soviet democratic ambitions in favor of a centralized semi-authoritarian state whose legitimacy is buttressed, in part, by carefully managed national elections, former President Putin's genuine popularity, and the prudent management of Russia's windfall energy wealth.” (CIA, 2011) 1) Major Adversary: The major ideological adversary of contemporary Russian ideology is the United States and the U.S. led NATO alliance. Their emphasis on human rights, individual liberty, democracy and free enterprise stand in stark contrast to the authoritarian tendencies in Russia. 2) Minor Adversary: The minor adversary of contemporary Russian ideology is the lingering influence of the state socialism and centralized, command economy of the former Soviet Union. Inflation and economic uncertainty since the devolution of the Soviet Union has created a desire amongst segments of the Russian population for a return to the stability of the Soviet-era. 3) United States: The authoritarianism of the current Russian government and nostalgia for the former command economy of the Soviet Union has the potential to conflict with American interests. The American commitment to market reforms and political democratization is directly opposed to both emergent authoritarianism and nostalgia for state socialism. NEXT SLIDE b. National Interests: In the broadest terms Russia's national interest corresponds with the national interests of all states, national security and economic growth. These goals are both internal and external. In terms of security Russia pursues national interest in domestic terms – prevention of secessionist violence – and international terms – protection from external threats. Similarly, economic growth must be viewed in domestic terms – increasing productivity and competitiveness – and international terms – increasing exports and imports and a profitable relationship with global markets. 1) Major Adversary: As a major player in international markets in natural resources and energy the major adversary of Russian national interest is the volatility of the international commodities markets. The commodities markets – from uranium and gold to energy and cotton – can demonstrate extreme volatility. As a major commodities producer the Russian economy is closely linked to international commodities prices. When commodity's prices fall so does Russia's trade balance and economic fortunes. Extreme fluctuations in commodities prices have correspondingly extreme impacts on the Russian economy. Minor Adversary: Other energy producers such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) present a minor adversary. Russia is not a member of OPEC and has no input into its pricing and production decisions. To a certain extent, Russia's economic fortunes are dependent on the policies of external agencies and organizations such as OPEC. This is particularly true because of the link between production and pricing in the commodities markets. Using oil as an example, as oil production increases, oil prices decline. Simply producing more oil does not guarantee any producer increased revenue as prices fall as production increases. Therefore, the international revenue that a state derives from its oil production is a function of both production levels and prices, both internationally and domestically. Russian oil production and global oil prices are determined by a host of factors, many of which are not entirely under Russia's control. The performance of the Russian energy sector is intimately linked to the policies of OPEC and other energy producing states and organizations. This complicated relationship exists in all commodity markets and influences all commodities that Russia produces, not just oil. According to the CIA, “reliance on commodity exports makes Russia vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the highly volatile swings in global commodity prices. (CIA, 2011) 2) United States: There are both positive and negative national interest factors impacting on the United States relationship with Russia. The United States has directed foreign aid to Russia in an attempt to moderate the negative influences of the transition from a command economy to a free enterprise system. The United States has also attempted to develop a cooperative relationship with Russia in dealing with international issues such as arms reduction, international terrorism and economic development. NEXT SLIDE c. National Power: Manifestation of Russia's national power is principally the role of the armed forces – the Ground Forces (the army), the Navy and the Air Force. It also includes their independent military forces the Strategic Rocket Forces, Space Forces and the Airborne. In 2005, 3.9% of Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was directed towards the military. (CIA) To a lesser extent, the Soviet era KGB's successor agency the Federal Security Service (FSB) is an integral aspect of Russian national power in its intelligence role and in its role in combating domestic terrorism, Muslim fundamentalism and separatist movements. 1) Major Adversary: The United States and the U.S. led NATO alliance is the major adversary of Russian national power. While NATO's roles and policies have expanded since its origins over fifty years ago it remains primarily committed to protecting western Europe from Soviet aggression. 2) Minor Adversary: The minor adversaries of Russian national power are both internal and external. Internationally, Russia has been involved in periodic conflicts with Poland for over three centuries. When President Bush was planning a missile defense system in Europe, Poland was to have been the location of key bases. While this plan has been amended by President Obama Poland remains distrustful of Russia based on past history. Internally, Russian national power faces threats from separatist movements and Muslim fundamentalist terrorists in the North Caucasus and Chechnya. 3) United States: Again, the potential for U.S. engagement and involvement in terms of Russian national power remains a double edged sword. On the one hand, Russian national power and U.S. national power offers the potential for cooperation and shared goals in mutual antipathy to Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism. On the other hand, the historic Soviet threat to western Europe and the historic threat of Soviet nuclear attack still hangs over western Europe and influences American responses to Russian expressions of national power. NEXT SLIDE d. Threats: 1) Major Adversary: In Russian perceptions NATO and the United States remain the major national threat as they have been since at least 1945 and, arguably, since the Communist revolution in 1917. Russia perceives NATO as a threat rather than a defensive alliance to protect western Europe from the overwhelming conventional forces of the historic Soviet Union. It is important here to note that threat is a perception. That NATO is a defensive alliance that has never engaged in an offensive or aggressive role does not alter the fact that Russia perceives NATO as a threat. 2) Minor Adversary: Minor threats to Russian national power are presented by separatist movements and Muslim fundamentalist terrorists throughout south-eastern Russia. Conflicts with Chechen rebels, North Caucasus terrorists and Muslim fundamentalists comprise the minor threats to Russia in the contemporary world. 3) United States: The recent decision of President Obama to not pursue a missile defense system based in Europe will help to soften the Russian view that both NATO and American foreign policy are anti-Russian. At the same time the United States needs to strengthen bilateral relations and cooperation particularly as they relate to combating Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. NEXT SLIDE e. Domestic Factors: Economically and socially Russia is still adjusting to the devolution of the Soviet empire and the command economy. Consequently, the domestic system remains changeable and potentially volatile. 1) Business: Russian privatization occurred in less than a free market: Consequently, the state sector remains large – particularly in commodities and defense production – and many individuals became millionaires and 'robber barons' as a result of manipulating the privatization process. Consequently, according to the CIA, “Russia's long-term challenges include a shrinking workforce, a high level of corruption, difficulty in accessing capital for smaller, non-energy companies, and poor infrastructure in need of large investments.” (CIA, 2011) In NSA terms it is difficult to assess the role of business in Russian foreign policy as guidelines specifically state, “by definition, private business is important in a capitalist society” and Russia cannot be considered to be a capitalist society despite recent changes in Russia. Many of the wealthy, and particularly the newly wealthy are intimately linked to the state and do not operate in a truly free market. 2) Interest Groups: Interest groups in Russia are largely stifled. The inhibitions on the free market and the links between the wealthy elite and the administration mean that interest groups in a traditional sense do not exist beyond individual elements of the state that have specific agenda's. For example, the military can be considered an interest group that competes for government funding and attempts to exert an influence over foreign policy. However, it cannot be considered an interest group in the manner that interest groups are defined in a free market and democratic society. 3) Major Adversary: The major domestic threat to the Russian Federation remains terrorism, separatist movements and Muslim fundamentalism. Their goals are autonomy for their respective regions and disruption of Russian national power as expressed by devolution of the Russian state and autonomy for the North Caucasus, Chechnya and other contested regions. 4) Minor Adversary: Minor threats to Russia domestically are presented by international states that fund and support terrorist groups interested in attaining regional autonomy and destroying the Russian state. 5) United States: The United States has no commitment to, or support for, these terrorist and separatist groups. In fact, the shared commitment to opposition to Islamic terrorism of the United States and Russia is one of the strongest grounds for greater Russian and American cooperation. On the other hand, the domestic economy's distance from a truly free economy and the machinations that often affect foreign investors negatively could become a major source of conflict between the United States and Russia. It will also prove a serious barrier to the development of the Russian economy as it discourages foreign investment. NEXT SLIDE g. Commitments: 1) Major Adversary: Russian declaratory commitments have declined substantially since the devolution of the Soviet empire. During the Soviet era the U.S.S.R. had a declaratory commitment to furthering world revolution. Stepping back from doctrinaire communism has also meant that these commitments and the perception of Russia as the 'home base' of world communism has declined. Thus, while Russia may perceive America and NATO as the major adversary of its commitments, and this perception has a major impact on both Russian and American foreign policy it is no longer the basis for a deep-seated across the board opposition to one another in all areas on the basis of a significant and insurmountable ideological conflict. 2) Minor Adversary: Taking national integrity as a state's inherent commitment than the most significant minor adversary of Russian commitments becomes Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalism is committed to the autonomy of Muslim minorities and, by definition, the further devolution of Russia. 3) United States: The risk of American involvement in conflict with Russia has declined significantly since the devolution of the Soviet Empire. Russian commitments to extent their influence globally has declined from an ideological commitment to always support communist revolution to a commitment to pursue a foreign policy that advances Russia's interests not the more amorphous and wider-ranging commitment to spreading global revolution and fostering the global expansion of communism. NEXT SLIDE h. Military Strategy: During the Cold War the Soviet Union was committed to aggression against the United States through client states and surrogates (such as the deployment of military advisers to Egypt and the deployment of Cuban troops in Angola. With the disappearance of the communist concept of world revolution and the U.S.S.R. as the home of global revolution Russian military strategy has contradicted significantly. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is the most apparent and significant evidence of this shift in military strategy. Declining support for Cuba, as the base for revolution in the Western Hemisphere, is also evidence of this contraction of military strategy. 1) Major Adversary: NATO and the United States, are perceived as the greatest threat to Russian military strategy. However, this is largely a hangover from the Soviet era. The principal adversary to Russian military strategy is still interpreted, within Russia, as the minor adversary, namely Islamic fundamentalism. 2) Minor Adversary: The basis of all military strategy is the protection and preservation of the state's territorial integrity. Historically, this has been seen as defense against external threats. However, in the 21st century, in the era of asymmetrical warfare, internal threats can also pose a threat to national military strategy. This is the case in Russia. Internal threats of separatist organizations and terrorists committed to the destruction of the Russia threat are a minor adversary rapidly becoming a major adversary. 3) United States: With the contraction of the Russian effort to export revolution the likelihood of conflict between Russia and the United States has been reduced. In fact, shared opposition to Islamic terrorism provides an opportunity for positive engagement in terms of military strategy between the Untied States and Russia. That said, climate change, the increasing accessibility of the northwest passage and the freeing of Arctic resources as the icepack shrinks have all introduced the Arctic as a potential new theater of operations and conflict between American military strategy and Russian military strategy. NEXT SLIDE i. International Strategy and Foreign Policy: 1) Major Adversary: Islamic fundamentalism is the major adversary of Russian international strategy. The war in Afghanistan may have begun and ended before the Soviet empire devolved into the Russian Federation, but Islamic fundamentalism on the south-eastern borders of Russia remains the principal adversary to Russian policy. 2) Minor Adversary: Relations with the republics that broke away from the former Soviet Union present another challenge to Russian foreign policy. Increasing U.S. cooperation with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is perceived by Russia as a threat. Further, Russia has been involved in a series of energy and economic conflicts with the Ukraine one of the largest breakaway republics. 3) United States: Again, the conflict between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism presents an opportunity for the United States to increase its cooperation with Russia. The issue of American cooperation with breakaway republics is unlikely to lead to a confrontation. Russia may frown on American cooperation with the bordering republics of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, but is highly unlikely that it would act aggressively against these republics to challenge American influence and cooperation with them. NEXT SLIDE Possible U.S. Involvement in Russia: The most interesting and significant fact influencing possible U.S. involvement in Russia is, surprisingly, the potential for cooperation in fighting Islamic fundamentalism and terror. Viewed realistically and with an appropriate dismissal of the fifty years of Cold War conflict, both the United States and Russia are threatened by Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. This shared threat, coupled with the experience Russia gained during its war with Afghanistan, offers fertile ground for cooperation in addressing a common threat and even for the U.S. military to learn from the Russian experience. Many senior Russian military leaders spent the 'sharp end' of their career in combat in Afghanistan and their experience could be invaluable to American officers serving in Afghanistan and Iraq. A forward looking military-strategic policy, and one that is formulated free of historic animosities indicates strongly that there are fundamental grounds for cooperation between the United States and Russia in terms of a shared threat, and the potential to share experience earned confronting that common threat. NEXT SLIDE 3. Summary I have covered Russia’s current state and its political climate. I have also covered in detail its relationship with the United States. Do you have any questions regarding this briefing? Concluding Statement: This brief presents an overview of Russia and the United States current and future involvement in that nation. It provides soldiers with insight on the factors affecting the government, economy, and citizens of Russia. Most importantly, in current circumstances and confronting the common threat that Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism present, it identifies that there are important grounds to believe that future cooperation between the U.S. and Russia is a possibility, even a necessity. I will be followed by CSM/SGM___________________________. References Central Intelligence Agency. (2011). “Russia” The CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html. Fukuyama, Francis. (Summer 1989). "The End of History?" The National Interest 16: 3-17. Princeton University. “Wordnetweb” http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu. Reuters. (January 29, 2011). “Russia says Moscow airport bomber from North Caucasus”. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/29/us-russia-airport-idUSTRE70S1LU20110129. Read More