The Doha Development Round - Essay Example

In recent years WTO negotiations encountered a number of difficulties. How we can identify and asses the economic benefits that might occur as a result of a successful conclusion to the recent trade negotiations at the WTO? By Student Name Course University Date Table of Contents Introduction 3 The WTO Multilateral Trade System: An Overview 4 The Doha Development Round 6 The Doha Development Round: Applying Free Trade Agreement Theories 8 Neo-classical Economic Theory and the Benefits of a Successfully Negotiated Doha Development Round 13 Conclusion 17 Bibliography 20 Introduction The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) multilateral trade negotiations commenced in November of 2001 but have stalled over significant differences among developed and developing countries. The negotiations, known as the Doha Development Round are characterised by two opposing factions. The developing countries including emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India are advocating for agricultural tariff reductions, a reduction of agricultural subsidies in developed countries and for one-sided access to manufacturing markets and for protected services sectors. Developing countries including the US and the EU are seeking greater access to the services and industrial markets of developing countries and for the retention of agricultural subsidies (Fergusson, 2011). In light of the recent global financial crisis of 2007, renewed fears of a new global economic crisis and concerns about food security, the G-20 leaders at the Seoul Summit in 2010 urged the WTO to bring the Doha Development Round to a conclusion (Meltzer, 2012). Researchers have expressed the view that the multilateral trade system is in danger with the Doha Development Round coming to a halt as more and more countries are resorting to Free Trade Agreements and discriminatory trade practices (Schott, 2010; Meltzer, 2012). The G-20 Summit in Seoul in 2010 argued that given the current problems of an impending economic depression, the recent global financial crisis of 2007 and concerns about food security, the multilateral trade system is more important now than ever before (Meltzer, 2012). This is consistent with trade theories that assume that governments engage in trade agreements by identifying problems and determining how a trade agreement can solve those problems and benefit all parties to the trade agreement (Bagwell & Staiger, 2010). This research paper therefore uses theories of trade agreements to identify and access the benefits that might occur if the WTO negotiations are brought to a successful conclusion. Theories of trade agreements will help to identity and access the benefits of the successful conclusion of the WTO negotiations by aiding in the identification of the problems that these negotiations are intended to solve (Bagwell & Staiger, 2002). The neo-classical economic theory will also be used in helping to identity and access the potential benefits of the successful conclusion of the WTO negotiations. The neo-classical economic theory assumes that free trade benefits states in that resources are allocated more efficiently (Perdikis & Read, 2005). Thus while, theories of trade agreements can help to identify the problems that complete WTO negotiations will attempt to resolve, the neo-classical economic theory will help to identify how the negotiations will resolve the problem or problems. This research paper is divided into four main parts. The first part of the paper provides a brief overview of the WTO multilateral trade system. The second part of the paper analyses and discusses the WTO negotiations under the Doha Development Round and its problems. The third part of the paper analyses the problems encountered during the Doha Development Round by reference to theories of trade agreements. The Final part of this paper analyses how the concluded negotiations can be beneficial by reference to neo-classical economic theory. The WTO Multilateral Trade System: An Overview The WTO originated out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 which originated under the International Trade Organization which was never fully implemented. The WTO adopted and modified GATT which was implemented in 1995 and included negotiations and agreements concluded at a new Uruguay Round together with “understandings and decisions” (Lee, 2011, p. 631). Together, these documents form a multilateral framework for trade between approximately 153 member states. The WTO regulates a number of trade areas including, trade in goods, agriculture, the trade aspects of intellectual property, trade related to investments, trade policies, services and dispute resolutions related to international trade. Member states are also required to report state regulated trade subsidies and policies to the WTO who reviews them. When the WTO agreements are breached, a party impacted by the breach can have the matter reviewed and resolved by the WTO dispute resolution body (Lee, 2011). The original idea for the multilateral trade system proposed by the US and known as the International Trade Organization was founded on the belief that protectionism led to the great depression of the 1930s and inevitably the two World Wars (Stern, 2007). The Uruguay Round which was concluded in 1994 and incorporated in GATT 1995 is constructed around the core principles of reciprocity, non-discrimination and the removal/reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. The idea is the harmonisation of trade rules and policies so that states have access to markets on an equal footing (Robertson, 2006). In fact, a study conducted by Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz (2007) which examined trade data since 1946 to 2006 showed that trade increased for member states to the WTO and there was a possible trickle down effect for non-member states as well. Subramanian and Wei (2007) also conducted a study on world trade data and found that the WTO had a significantly positive effect on world trade. The date examined revealed that world trade increased by 120%. However, the data also revealed that the positive impact was not evenly distributed among member states to the WTO. Much depends on how and with whom member states conclude trade agreements with. For example, where developed countries concluded trade agreements with developing countries, trade increase significantly. Moreover, where agreements were concluded between states that equally agreed to liberal trade, trade was greater than between two states where only one agreed to trade liberalisation. Where there were no trade liberalisation, trade did not increase (Subramanian & Wei, 2007). Essentially, the WTO/GATT system was aimed at the reduction and in some cases the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. This was based on a history of world trade where tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade hampered world trade. It was believed that the reduction and/or the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade would help with the improving the standards of living of people all over the world and would especially help developing and least developed countries to improve their economies (Baldwin, McLaren, & Panagariya, 2000). Developing countries have been particularly averse to obligations under the WTO/GATT system. From the perspective of developing countries, the rules-based system is designed to provide businesses from developed countries with an advantage abroad. As Wade (2003) argues, the trade rules contained in GATT “make comprehensively illegal many of the industrial policy instruments used in successful East Asian developers to nurture their own industrial and technological capacities” and at the same time appear to “lock in the position of Western countries at the top of the world hierarchy of wealth” (p. 621). In addition, despite the shared belief that protectionism that leads to “industrialism behind protective walls” is detrimental to competition and the global economy, “it is still pursued widely in a number of countries”(Bora Lloyd, & Pangestu, 2000, p. 543). However, with technological advances and globalization, the need to address persistent protectionism and the concerns of developing countries necessitated the commencement of the Doha Development Round. Thus, the Doha Development Round was commenced in 2001 as a means of reforming the WTO multilateral trade system by further reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and for improving the “trade prospects of developing countries” (World Trade Organization, 2014). The Doha Development Round The Doha Development Round is more than a plan to reform the WTO multilateral trade system. It also represent what might be referred to as unfinished business during the Uruguay Round. Many of the issues currently negotiated remained unresolved, this is particularly so with respect to agricultural subsidies and trade concessions by developing countries (Anderson & Martin, 2005). For the most part, much of the discussion and focus during negotiations have been on agriculture with no signs of movement toward other issues when the primary and overall objective is WTO reforms that are expected to reduce poverty worldwide (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005). The WTO Doha Ministerial Conference agreed in November 2001 to commence a “new round of negotiations” (Finger, 2002, p. 1). The main objective of the Doha Round is to help develop countries. The Uruguay Round was particularly helpful in bringing developing countries into the global trade market. The primary agenda is to reduce poverty and to promote economic growth and development. These goals are expected to be accomplished through removing “distortions to agricultural trade” and “import restrictions on industrial goods” on the part of both developing and developed countries (Finger, 2002, p. 5). The stalemate occurring with respect to the Doha Development Round arises out of concerns expressed by developing countries and developed countries’ refusal to make concessions. Developing countries argue that existing WTO agreements impose unreasonable burdens on them. For example, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement under the WTO is said to have increased the cost of innovation, medicine and technology for consumers in developing countries. In the meantime, the Agreement on Agriculture which allows national subsidies has put farmers in developing countries at an advantage “at the expense of food security and farmers’ livelihood” in developing countries (Khor, 2007, p. 7). With respect to agriculture, the proposals put forward for negotiations include significantly improving market access, reducing and eventually eliminating export subsidies, reducing “trade-distorting domestic support” and promoting “special and differential treatment for developing countries” while taking account of their needs relative to food security and “rural development” (Anania & Bureau, 2005, p. 540). Since the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture has attracted sharp divisions between developing and developed countries, the Doha Development Round has reached a stalemate. Further negotiations on enhancing trade have been put on a shelf until these issues can be sorted out. In the meantime there has been a surge in, preferential, regional and bilateral free trade agreements signalling that the WTO’s multilateral trade system might be falling apart (Hartman, 2013). The length of the negotiations and the fact that an agreement cannot be reached indicates that there is a problem in the market that the Doha Development Round seeks to address. At the same time, there appears to be a problem that further compromises agreement. As it is, neither developing countries nor developed countries are prepared to budge in the negotiations and thus, each side fails to see how they may benefit from concessions to the other side. Theories of free trade agreements will shed more light on the problems from the perspective of each side and further determine how the successful negotiation of the Doha Development ground might address those problems. The Doha Development Round: Applying Free Trade Agreement Theories The traditional theory of free trade agreements can be traced back to Johnson in 1954 who claimed that if trade agreements did not exist, states would use exploitive trade practices in the market by using taxes which could create a “trade war” and would create market inefficiency for all markets worldwide. The trade theory has since been expanded on and now takes the position that states engage in free trade agreements as a means of correcting undesirable or potential undesirable market conditions (Maggi & Rodriguez-Clare, 2005, p. 5). On the other hand, the received theory of trade argues instead that trade agreements are necessary because when a country has “market power” it will see trade barriers as a means of shifting trade “in their favour” and “real income” would rebound to that country “from the rest of the world” (Either, 2006, p. 5). Thus received theory might explain the stalemate in the ongoing and stalling negotiations characterising the Doha Development Round. Both sides may see the value of retaining some flexibility with respect to trade barriers. While each side wants to hold on to their own trade barriers, they want the other side to relinquish their own barriers. A successfully negotiated Doha Development Round would result in both sides relinquishing some of their barriers to trade. For example, the US would be expected to reduce and eventually phase out its agricultural subsidies while developing countries would reduce trade barriers to its manufacturing sectors. Using the expanded version of trade agreement theory it is possible that both sides see competition as a source of problem in the market. Negotiated outcomes may be necessary for developing countries to achieve competition. On the other hand, developed countries are more than likely fearful of the fact that if they were to eliminate agricultural subsidies they could lose their market position and would necessarily harm a sector that it intends to support and promote. Expanding on trade agreement theory, Ossa (2011) demonstrates what should happen in the event negotiations for a trade policy between two or more countries are concluded successfully. According to Ossa (2011), “unilateral” trade tariffs function to increase the price of imported goods to which the tariffs are attached (p. 129). As a result, consumers will purchase goods that are manufactured at the domestic level to avoid the higher costs of imported goods to which unilateral tariffs apply. At this stage, prior to negotiating a trade policy, the market of the state that imposes a unilateral tariff is benefitting from a healthy demand and supply of manufactured goods. However, competing firms that are selling goods in that market may wish to compete and will therefore enter the domestic market with a view to selling more goods in that market by avoiding import tariffs. When foreign manufacturers enter the domestic market, this can have an impact on domestic manufacturers in that the goods may be superior to domestic manufacturers’ goods or may be cheaper to purchase. In any event, domestic manufacturers are going to suffer a significant reduction in sales (Ossa, 2011). According to trade theory, some degree of give and take will be necessary to avoid this kind of practice. All states want to protect domestic markets, but at the same time cannot afford to turn foreign direct investors away. Therefore in order to avoid production relocation in the sense that foreign firms will enter the market and put domestic manufacturers at a disadvantage, states are better off if they negotiate a trade agreement with other states so that they can regulate and control the inflow and outflows of foreign direct investment and at the same time protect domestic manufacturers (Ossa, 2011). For the most part, a trade policy will allow foreign imports to enter the market and foreign companies entering the market will be permitted entry on condition that they contribute to the development of human and cash capital (Ossa, 2011). These outcomes are achieved through the terms-of-trade effect of trade agreements that are negotiated and concluded internationally (Ludema & Mayda, 2013). Essentially, trade agreements are negotiated for the purpose of avoiding the pitfalls of a state adopting what is known as “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies (Baldwin & Evenett, 2012). Beggar-thy-neighbour policies are said to be the case where countries implement policies such as unilateral tariffs that while benefiting the country implementing the policy, harms the markets of other countries. The purpose of these beggar-thy-neighbour policies are generally for the protection of domestic markets (Baldwin & Evenett, 2012). Therefore, if all countries impose unilateral tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade and in turn implement beggar-thy-neighbour policies, then all markets will be harmed by the unilateral conduct of other countries. Thus, the reason for negotiating and concluding a trade agreement such as the one contemplated by the WTO’s Doha Development Round is intended to address what might be seen as beggar-thy-neighbour policies such as subsidies for farmers and protectionism of some domestic markets. Trade agreement theorists generally argue that international trade agreements such as the WTO/GATT are necessary for preventing countries pursuing beggar-thy-neighbour trade policies (Ludema & Mayda, 2013). In particular, trade theorists make two claims based on the terms-of-trade hypothesis. Firstly, trade theorists claim that when states act in a unilateral manner, they have a tendency to exploit the use of tariffs and other non-tariff constraints so that they can transfer protection costs to foreigners by modifying the terms of trade. Secondly, trade theorists claim that trade agreements such as the WTO results in states internalising the terms-of-trade effects related to their respective trade policies and this in turn creates more “efficient policy choices” (Ludema & Mayda, 2013, p. 1838). Trade theories therefore establish that the purpose of trade agreements such as the various agreements contained under the multilateral trade regime of the WTO are intended to manipulate the terms-of-trade effects so that countries share the gains and the losses. This is believed to be favourable to beggar-thy-neighbour policies where countries simply pass the negative terms-of-trade effects to other countries. This can create significant market inefficiency, especially since it invites distortion in the market. When the Doha Development Round is considered in the context of trade theories, the main distortions that bring about unfavourable terms-of-trade are agricultural subsidies which favour the farmers of developed nations at the expense of farmers from developed nations. Another distortion arises out of protectionist policies of developing countries seeking to protect their industrial and manufacturing sectors from the influx of foreign industries and manufacturers. Developing countries are also determined to negotiate the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement. At the same time, developed countries are determined to ensure that intellectual property is protected across borders under the agreement as it now stands. While developed countries are concerned about piracy and counterfeit goods devaluing copyright and patent goods, developed countries are concerned about the price of patented goods such as medicine for their citizens (Fink & Reichenmiller, 2006). Thus pursuant to trade theories the issues that each side are determined to resolved are significant for understanding why the Doha Development Round is important. The negative terms-of-trade effects are important to each side in the negotiations (see Figure 1). Negotiations and more especially, the successful negotiations of these issues under the Doha Development Round are important for preventing countries pursuing beggar-thy-neighbour policies which will come at the expense of other countries (see Figure 2). Figure I: The Issues Dividing Developing and Developed Countries in the Doha Development Round of the WTO Negotiations: Negative Terms-of-Trade Effects Developed Countries Developing Countries Want to have flexibility in subsidising domestic farmers Cannot match the subsidies that developed countries can offer and fear that this will put domestic farmers at a disadvantage and threaten food security in developing countries. Want greater access to industrial and manufacturing industries in developing countries Feel the need to protect their manufacturing and industrial markets for the benefit of local manufacturers and industrialists with a view to catching up with developed countries in economic growth and development Want to maintain the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement with a view to protecting intellectual property from piracy and counterfeit abroad. Want to modify the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement in order to reduce the cost of technology transfer and medicines for economic growth and development and the protection of health Figure 2: Beggar-thy-neighbour Trade Policies that Can Result in Unilateral Trade Tariffs and non-Tariff Restrictions DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Excessive agricultural subsidies with the result that consumers in developed countries and other developed countries will purchase the agricultural goods of farmers in developed countries and thus bring down the value and quality of agricultural goods in developing countries and thus putting those farmers out of work. Developing countries may take retaliatory measures by increasing import tariffs on agricultural imports or may simply ban the import of some or all agricultural goods from developed countries. They may also cut off access by developing countries to important products in their markets. In order to make up for the lack of access to industrial and manufacturers markets in developing countries, developed countries may develop their own markets which might compete with the domestic markets of developing countries and can eventually put industrialists and manufacturers at a disadvantage. Developing countries may form an allegiance as with the Asian countries and can demonstrate economic strength and independence and thus cut off important markets to developed countries. Developed countries may refuse to tranship intellectual property to developing countries or might place excessive tariffs and quantitative restrictions on exports. This might have detrimental consequences in terms of technology transfer and access to medicine in developing countries. Developing countries may simply develop their own goods which are comparable to the intellectual property protected in developed countries and thus cheapen the value of those goods. Neo-classical Economic Theory and the Benefits of a Successfully Negotiated Doha Development Round According to Perdikis and Read (2005) the theoretical basis of the WTO is premised on the neo-classical view of trade theory. Pursuant to the neo-classical economic perspective, “a liberal (free) trade policy is superior to protectionism because of the mutually beneficial impacts of trade” (Perdikis & Read, 2005, p. 8). The neo-classical economic theory originated out of the ideas expressed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo and subsequently enhanced by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. The cumulative impact of these ideas assume that international trade is ideal because it cultivates an international market in which states are able to concentrate on those things that they are best able to produce and therefore have a “comparative advantage” (Perdikis & Read, 2005, p. 8). The expected outcome is that countries will be able to cooperate in the provision of goods and services to one another at a relatively lower cost. According to neo-classical economic theory: This means that economic resources – capital, labour and land – are employed efficiently both within and between countries. Relatively free international trade therefore leads to economies of scale, lower prices, closer to full employment of resources, higher world incomes and a fairer distribution of these incomes than under mercantilism (Perdikis & Read, 2005, p. 8). Neo-classical economic theorist believe that when mercantilism or protectionism is permitted, the well-being of people all over the world is negatively impacted. This is because protectionism involves both tariff and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods and services across borders. These restrictions undermine efficient production and utilisation of resources. As a result mercantilism or protectionism gives rise to reduced income all over the world. Even where countries benefit from increased wealth through protectionism or mercantilism, they negatively impact the wealth of the rest of the world and this will eventually cause economic problems at home (Perdikis & Read, 2005). The neo-classical economic theory has been criticised by observers and economists particularly as it relates to trade liberalisation and trade theory. Critics have argued that the neo-classical underpinnings of the trade theory assumes that all countries are equal. In other words, it is naturally assumed that these countries have the resources and ability to offer reciprocal trade concessions and therefore have an equal footing in terms of negotiations. If not for political reasons, developed countries would not likely want to negotiate with developing countries as they are at liberty to form alliances with other developed countries and therefore trade resources on an equal footing (Dunkley, 2001). This argument however, is flawed because one only has to look at the case of China to see that developing countries can and do have resources comparable to that of developed countries and do not have to make political concessions to secure a trade partnership with developed countries. China has the world’s largest consumer market with a population of 1.3 billion and income growing at unprecedented rates since 1978. In 1978 China opened its market to the world and in 2001 joined the WTO which has helped to fortify its access to other markets and access to its market by other countries. Thus China is described as among the world’s most “coveted markets” (Guo, 2013, p. 20). Therefore China does have something of value to offer developed countries: a large consumer market. In terms of the Doha Development Round negotiations both sides have a comparative advantage that could be resolved for the benefit of both sides under the neo-classical view of trade theory. As it now stands, developed countries have a comparative advantage in the area of agriculture as a result of subsidies allocated to domestic farmers. On the other hand, developing countries have a comparative advantage in services in manufacturing and industries and developed countries can benefit from greater access to those sectors in developing countries. Protectionist policies by developed countries such as agricultural subsidies are believed to be beggar-thy-neighbour policies that contribute to the under-development and slow growth of the economies of developing countries. However, protectionism practices of developing countries in industries and manufacturing is also hampering their own growth and development as it limits the extent to which they can benefit from technology transfer and the development of human resources (Anjaria, Izbal, Kirmani, & Perez, 1982). It would therefore appear that both sides have something to gain from the successful negotiations of the Doha Development Round as both sides have a comparative advantage to offer the other side and a comparative advantage to gain from the other side. From the perspective of developed countries, they not only stand to gain access to specialised services and products in industries and manufacturing sectors, they also have the opportunity to gain access to large consumer markets such as the one in China. In the meantime, developing countries have the opportunity to benefit from technology transfers and in the course of doing so may also benefit from human capital development. This would obviously lead to economic growth and development which will make their consumer markets more attractive to developed markets. Agricultural subsidies are perhaps a the more contentious issue as the benefits of cutting agricultural subsidies are not as obvious nor immediate as the reduction of protectionism practices by developing countries. There are significant benefits, but they will come about in a more indirect way. If developed countries reduce their agricultural subsidies, farmers in developing countries will enjoy greater economic prosperity and this will trickle down to the economic well-being of others in developing countries and will therefore enlarge the consumer market for both developing and developed countries and their respective businesses. The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement is less clear. It is not altogether clear how a reduction in obligations to implement standards of intellectual property protection can provide other sides with a comparative advantage. If standards were lowered to the extent that inventors and owners of intellectual property did not receive the benefit of protection and suffered losses by counterfeiting and piracy, this could be detrimental to innovation and progress. Therefore they may not be any real benefit to successfully negotiating the terms of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement. If the agricultural subsidies provided by developed countries and protectionism imposed by developing countries are successfully negotiated, economic prosperity should necessarily follow from that. In this regard, the problem of obtaining affordable medicine and technology under the current Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property will automatically be resolved (See Figure 3). Figure 3: The Benefits of the Successful Negotiation of the Doha Development Round Developed Countries Developing Countries Reduction for agricultural subsidies would allow farmers in developing countries to compete for a market share of agriculture. This would in turn enrich the lives of farmers in developing countries and rebound to the greater community which will in turn provide developed countries with larger consumer markets with greater spending power. Relaxed protectionism on the part of developing countries in the manufacturers and industrial sectors will allow firms from developed countries to produce and market goods from a destination where the cost of manufacturing and production is lower. This would benefit consumers all over the world and improve the standard of living of all while at the same time improving the profits of businesses. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement amendments that would reduce the level of protection to inventors and owners of intellectual property rights will not benefit developed countries. There is the risk that inventors and owners of intellectual property rights will not want to invest in innovation is they are vulnerable to theft with no consequences or counterfeiting or piracy that reduces the value of their work with no real remedies across borders. Farmers in developing countries will become wealthier through greater access to international markets and this will trickle down to the rest of the community enriching their lives and increasing spending power. Therefore standards of living will increase. Developing countries stand to gain significantly in that they will benefit from foreign direct investment as well as from technology and human capital transfers. Therefore in the long run, relaxed protectionism will eventually allow developing countries to catch up with developed countries in terms of economic growth and development. While developing countries may gain a marginal benefit in terms of the cost of technology developing and the acquisition of medicine at a reduced rate, the long term negative effects are the same as for developed countries. Therefore, the negotiations relative to the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement does not have an appreciable benefit for either developed or developing countries. Conclusion Trade theory informs that in the Doha Development Round of negotiations was implemented with a view to addressing distortions in the market. These distortions were created by beggar-thy-neighour trade policies that deny developed and developing countries the opportunities to capitalise on their comparative advantages (see Figure 4). The successful negotiation of the Doha Development Round should benefit both developing countries and developed countries and in the course of doing so should improve the standard of living of people all over the world. This is particularly important now that there are fears of another global economic depression and increased fears of the threat of food security in developing countries. Thus, according to neo-classical economic theory, the purpose of the Doha Developing Round and the free trade agenda of the WTO is to promote and foster economic co-dependence among and between member states to the WTO. The end result is expected to be the avoidance of tariff and non-tariff restrictions on trade and therefore greater efficiency in the international market. Figure 4: The Theoretical Benefits of the Doha Development Round Bibliography Anania, G. and Bureau, J.-C. 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