The reform of Security Council sanctions - Coursework Example

?The Reform of Security Council Sanctions Introduction “Chief responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security lies with the Security Council. It is therefore essential to its legitimacy that its membership reflect the state of the world.” French President Chirac’s address to the United Nations General Assembly The United Nations is by far the largest and most popular international government organization. The existence of the United Nations owes itself to years behind the Second World War. It should be noted that even before the United States came into the Second World War, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt had consented in the eighth point of the Atlantic Charter that a “permanent system of general security” ought to go operational after the war. In 1943, the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers established that a new international organization should be put into place to regulate issues after the war. From them, delegates of 50 countries assembled in San Francisco in the months of April and May 1945 and laid groundwork for what we can now call the United Nations1. Therefore and from all intents and objects, the United Nations was a result of the mayhem that resulted from the wars. The main explanation for the existence of the United Nations was to foster a common world order in which mutual cooperation and understanding between nations would ensure world peace. Since June 1946 when the first United Nations Charter was officialised, membership into the organization has prided itself with rising membership and it can now boast of 191 members. What was a herald to the United Nations was the unfortunate League of Nations that saw it incompetent to face one of the world’s greatest challenges – world peace. Since 1945, world order has altered and there exist varying perspectives of what is construed by peace, law and order. These challenges have been taken up by the Security Council, but it has proven that there is an extensive fissure between practice and reality. Constituting itself as a unified system of governments, the United Nations has attempted to bring all member states under one covering of understanding, though the vest differentiation in international perspectives and outlooks signals opposing views with regards to the issue of acting as a unified whole. In an attempt to ensure world security, the Security Council has been given the mandate of responsibility in accordance with the United Nations Charter for the upholding of international peace and security. All 191 members of the United Nations are bound by the charter to accept and implement the decisions of the Security Council. Therefore, the Security Council is an adjudicating body, while the member states are subjects to laws adjudicated by the Security Council. The activities of the Security Council have not been very smooth. The first paralysis was the commotions from the cold war, leading to the polarity of most of the member states. Currently comprising 15 United Nation Member States, with 5 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), having veto powers, which has cost the Security Council much more than what the cold war did. Keep in mind that the veto power is often upheld as a tool to obstruct the actions of other veto members. The 10 remaining members act with no veto powers and their membership is allocated as follows: two seats each to Asia, Latin America, Western Europe; one seat to Eastern Europe and three seats to Africa. Thus, the Security Council wants and equal representation and participation of all the various regions of the world. What Is Liability Of The Security Council? The main objective of the Security Council is to foster peace and security. In an attempt to ensure that this turns out to be what the member states seek for, the Security Council makes use of mediation, peacekeeping in addition to enforcement with regards to Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Since the Second World War, many peacekeeping missions, mediation as well as enforcement missions have been carried out. Most of these measures can be implemented on behalf of and against member states2 and this can be through peaceful measures or military force. In most cases, members states that are not members to the Security Council are often not contented in the approach and manner in which these measures are carried out. This is equally the case of members within the Security Council. This has prompted some sort of cold war within and outside of the Security Council reforms with some member states contemplating a reform of the UN Security Council before reforms of sanctions can be achieved. This if solely because views vary as to what can be termed legitimate intervention as well as what we can rightly called sanctions. Restructuring or Reforming the United Nations Security Council So many instances account for a call to reform the Security Council. A clear and recent example is the invasion of Iraq in which the Security Council was circumvented. This was substantiated in the speech of Jacques Chirac, addressing the UN General Assembly. He articulated that “the war, embarked on without Security Council approval, has undermined the multilateral system.”3 The thawing of the United Nation’s authority was taken note of by the then secretary general and he remarked that “in a way, Iraq has more or less driven home to leaders around the world that the United Nations is a precious instrument, the United Nations is important…There are lots of issues that no one country, no matter how powerful, can deal with alone.”4 With particular attention on the Iraq invasion, Koffi Annan noted that “I know that we have the British and American scientists looking for weapons in Iraq. They may find them, they may not find them. But even if they find them would they be credible?”5 This position was again upheld by Chirac that “multilateralism is the key, for it ensures the participation of all in the management of world affairs. It is a guarantee of legitimacy and democracy, especially in matters regarding the use of force or laying down universal norms.”6 Such recent crises as well as other subsequent to these are the sole reason why reforming the UN Security Council should be a matter of extreme urgency before we can begin talking of reforming the sanctions. But then, how can change or reform be done on the UN Security Council? As far as record will hold, there has been little reform in the Security Council. The only reform that was significant was in 1965 when the seats for nonpermanent members were enlarged from six to ten. This was an optimistic transformation. But is such transformation satisfactory? An appropriate answer cannot be in the confirmatory. The international community needs reforms on the size, works as well as the composition of the Security Council if sanctions have to achieve their effects. Kofi Annan’s espousal of resolution 48/26 in 19937 sets pace for the institutionalization of the Open-ended Working Group with the aim of rethinking reforms with regards to composition and size. Although this is still to be transformed from theory to reality, it should be noted that more work is being done on what reforms should incorporate, how should permanent members be decided and who should have veto powers over others. Membership and composition will set pace for transparent and international acquiescence Security Council reforms. Proposals for reforms have not had a warm welcome. A good example is the entry of Japan and Germany into the permanent seats of the Security Council. Arguments on this almost disrupted the efforts of the reforms which those against such reforms fearing that there would be an imbalance or unfair representation of the various sections of the world. Are There Any Justifications For Reforms To Be Stated By Reforming The Security Council? 1. A Case For An Enlargement Of The Security Council Many reforms put forward for an inclusive enlargement of the Security Council. Reformist base their argument of the fact that it may be irrational for the general Assembly to experience a change from 51 to 191; yet, the Security Council stays behind the notion of change. If enlargement of the General assembly is in a steady progress, an enlargement of the Security Council should follow a steady progress and security sanctions will be better understood and implemented. It is suggested that membership of the Security Council could amount to 10 and number of permanent seats could be raised to 15. Issues contained in these proposals are of least contention. What is highly debatable are matters relating to geographic composition, permanency of seats and voting through regional groupings. It is worth taking note of such variances in the following passages: James Paul, director of the Global Policy Forum holds that “If you add another five permanent members, all of them casting vetoes, forget about anything being accomplished…It’s not just casting a veto, but the threat of casting a veto that keeps the whole issue off the agenda. A lot of council members wanted to act regarding Chechnya, but the Russians wouldn’t even allow any discussion, much less action.”8 2. A Case For Limiting The Veto Power What makes the five permanent members think they ought to have veto powers above others? What was the source of their veto powers? These five permanent members and their veto powers evolved from the setting of the United Nations subsequent to the Second World War. At the time, they considered themselves as the financial as well as moral safeguards of the United Nations. Today, this may no longer hold true. Even in cases where this can be taken as authenticity, a new world order has seen many interrelatedness and religious, tribal or ethnic boundaries cannot be easy to demarcate. Therefore, the good judgment behind the veto power will be ready to receive more questioning from a greater part of the world. 3. A Case For Transparency At The Center Of Sanctions Deliberations The Security Council operates like a guild of coalition members with their deliberations behind closed doors. Is it not sensible that deliberations should be made open or communicated to the General Assembly? The Security Council ought to have regular sittings with the General Assembly where it has to give an account of its activities and in particular, argues its case for the imposition of sanctions. Issues relating to transparency is what the world needs from the UN as a whole and the Security Council in particular 4. A Case For Dissolution This is yet, another daring proposal that calls for the Security Council to be totally wiped out and in its place, there should be an assembly of elected states representing various regions. Reformers hold that having an institution with permanent members at all time is akin to having heads of states for interminable tenures of office. This proposal for reform may be improbable to become a reality. But at least, principles of fairness and equality have it that making an enlarged assembly of permanent members or members with veto powers will mean a fair representation of all regions. From the foregoing, we realize that there is just no way can states advocate for reforming the sanctions of the Security Council without first of all, effectuating reforms of the Security Council itself. But, What Is Standing On The Way Of Reforming The Security Council? – Variation on Perceptive Of Reformers Even within the UN General Assembly as well as the Security Council, member states uphold the view that reforms of the Security Council and its eventual sanctions is an urgent necessity. Still, there are differences in perspectives, not only on how reforms should be implemented, but on how the United Nations ought to function and how various member states regards each other. To begin with, it is necessary at this point to examine the variations in perspectives of the five permanent members and some other member states who have become key players in the United Nations. 1. The United States A leading Japanese foreign minister once commented that “Whether progress will be made on the council reform issue depends on the U.S.”9 The United States is an obligatory member of the Security Council. This view is accepted by the rest of member states on the General Assembly as well as the Security Council with the United States evermore unwilling to think of limiting veto powers. Perhaps, the US has much to say because it wields a lot of persuasion in almost every aspect of civilization on the rest of the world. The US has advocated for expansion with an inclusion of Japan and Germany.10 Most states rely on US influence on the rest of the world and, perhaps, they believe that limiting the US’s influence on the Security Council would see a return of the US isolationist tendencies, would diminish US influence on the overall United Nations system and eventually, US influence on individual member sates with regards to the functionality of Security Council sanctions. 2. The United Kingdom The position of the United Kingdom has always been in support for Security Council reforms. In 1997, Robin Cook acting in the capacity as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, advocated for expansion when he addressed the UN general Assembly fighting that: “the Security Council must move on if it is not to lose its legitimacy. Japan and Germany should be included in an expanded permanent membership, and there should be a new balance between developed and developing countries in a modernized Security Council. We are all agreed on the need for change; we have been discussing it for four years. It is time that we agreed that a proposal for change which has the backing of the vast majority of Members is better than a status quo which has the backing of none.”11 Britain has equally wielded support for an inclusion of India into the Security Council. 3. France France, through Mr. Chirac has always advocated for Security Council reforms. The French believe an inclusion of more members will add more worldwide authority. France’s former president, Jacques Chirac had made it clear that right from the conceptualization of the United Nations and the Security Council “there are countries that were unknown that have become very important for political reasons, demographic reasons, and economic reasons.”12 It should be noted that he has always been at the forefront of an inclusion of more members into the Security Council such as Japan and Germany as well as other African, Latin American and Asian states. Particularly stressing on the member of India, he states that “it’s very hard to imagine how one could exclude India from the possibility of having a permanent seat in Security Council given its characteristics.”13 But just like Britain and the US, France wants to enjoy the pride of being a permanent veto member of the Security Council. 4. China China does not think much about reforming the Security Council. Perhaps, she already prides herself of being a permanent member for life. Reacting to the issue of veto power, the Chinese delegate to the Security Council, Ambassador Shen Goufang made it unequivocal to the United Nations Working Group on Security Council of Reform in 1998, that the veto issue “was formed on the basis of lessons drawn from the experience of the League of Nations. Its existence is a historical necessity as well as an objective reality. Therefore, in our view, the mechanism of veto has both historical and practical rationality.”14 On the issue of how reforms ought to be good enough and of benefit to all, Mr Goufang states that china wants a democratic and all-encompassing operational system that is exclusive of any sweeping expansion policy. He further states that “the Council’s relationship with the General Assembly and the vast number of Member States…so that decisions and actions taken by the Council will be able to reflect the will of the overwhelming majority of Member States.”15 Mr. Goufang believes that as a replacement for the loss of veto power, “Permanent Members of the Security Council should exercise caution”16 when considering the use of their veto. 5. Russia Russia does not look at reforms as a main concern. Russia wants to equally enjoy a veto power. Therefore, so far as the dissolution of veto power is concerned, Russia has nothing to talk about reforms. Russia seems to be a barren ground of thoughts from outsiders as well as Russians. Russian representative to the Working Group on Security Council Reform made mention in 1999 that the veto is “crucial to the current Council’s ability to function effectively and to arrive at balanced and sustainable decisions.”17 Russia wants the veto power to be maintained so as to deter states from the idea of trying to take control over decisions of the Security Council. Though, thinking of permanent membership expansion as a probable reform, Russia doubts that affording new members the power to veto is yet, one more concern that “should be given substantial consideration after the composition…has been agreed upon.”18 Are There Varying Perspectives From Potential Members? 6. Japan If expansion of the Security Council becomes practical, it is evident that Japan will be given a permanent seat. Japan has always advocated for Security Council reforms. Stated amongst other things as follows: “1. It is absolutely necessary to expand the permanent membership with the addition of both developed and developing countries which possess the ability and will to assume global responsibility for international peace and security. Japan is prepared to assume greater responsibilities as a permanent member of the reformed Security Council. … 3. In order to maintain both effectiveness and representativeness, the appropriate size of the expanded Security Council should be twenty-four members, with the addition of two developed and three developing countries to the permanent membership and four non-permanent members. … 5. Concerning the veto, as a matter of principle, there should be no differentiation between new and old permanent members. In Japan’s view, the resolution of this issue will require the political judgment of all nations at the final states of negotiation. 6. The Security Council’s work methods should be improved to increase transparency and accountability.”19 Japan also believes that by providing the largest donation to the UN, it ought to be given a place at the Security Council20. However, such reforms from Japan may be good, but these are receiving censure from both the UN and within Japan, with Japanese wanting to steer clear of what might thrust Japan into conflicts and what will in due course, build its militarism, a thing Japanese will on no account what to make mention of21. 7. Germany If expansion of the Security Council become practical, it is evident that Germany will be also be given a permanent seat. This is supported by most member states, with the exception of Italy, who is still reminiscent of history of German militarism22. There are equally domestic disapprovals of Germany being a member to the Security Council. 8. Brazil As a potent runner for a seat in the Security Council, Brazil believes the absence of a Latin American state and a developing state will boost its bid. Brazil thinks that reforms should consider “the emergence of countries – developed and developing alike – that are capable and willing to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Permanent membership would entail additional responsibilities and costs.”23 But it is considered that the inclusion of Brazil cannot amount to a fair representation of Latin America because Brazil is Portuguese-speaking, rather than Spanish-speaking – the language of a majority of Latin American states. 9. India India equally yells for Security Council reforms. India believes a representative Security Council should include developing countries. India’s craving for a Security Council seat has been backed by Russia, Britain and France. A number of developing states in Africa are also vying for positions at the Security Council if changes become probable. Examples include Nigeria and South Africa. The variations in perspectives only help to compound the issue of the likelihood of reforming the security sanctions; especially those that require veto powers. Beyond The Reformation of Veto and Membership – Reforming Sanctions of the Security Council Why Security Council Sanction Reforms Won’t Work 1. Conflict Of Interest To begin with, the UN as a whole is influenced by the US and to a certain extent, members states rely solely on the US for the implementation of Security Council actions. This corroborates Brierly in his assertion believes that: “the international system has no central organ for the enforcement of international legal rights as such, and the creation of any such general scheme of sanctions is for the present a very distant prospect…each state remains free…to take such action as it thinks fit to enforce its own rights. This does not mean that international law has no sanctions, if that word is used in its proper sense for securing observance of the law; but it is true that the sanctions which it possesses are not systematic or centrally directed, and that accordingly, they are precarious in their operations. This lack of system is obviously unsatisfactory, particularly to those states which are less able than other to asset their own rights effectively.”24 We have already gathered from what becomes apparent in the United Nations Security Council that there is no universal point of perceptual departure with regards to sanctions. Put more simply, different individuals see the same event of situation in different ways. Russell believes “we cannot escape from perceptions with all its personal limitations… Individual precepts are the basis of our knowledge, and no method exists by which we can begin with data which are public to many observers.”25Therefore, a perception is a relative concept, determined by previous experience, present expectations, current fears or desires, and the influences of other; two other factors are so undoubtedly involved. The key point is the realization that another person’s interpretation of a situation may be different from one’s own. It may be “determined by a different frame of reference or shape by other sets of values and presuppositions”26 Anatol Rapaport states this in a different way, that: “Thus, without falsifying a single fact, entirely contradictory can and are given or persons, situations, social orders, etc…, by selecting (often unconsciously) only the features which support preconceived notions…Controversial issues tend to be polarised not only because commitments have been made, but also because certain perceptions are actively excluded from consciousness if they do not fit the chosen world image”27 Over the years, Security Council sanctions have becoming illusionary. This is perhaps mainly due to the divided nature at which the issue if reforms can be approached as well as the fact that member states have diverse economic and political interests. This again makes it difficult for them to arrive at an all-inclusive approach towards reforms. The United State’s presence in the world is greater than any other country28. US interest worldwide may be back by economic interests. But it becomes difficult for member states of the Security Council to restrain this interest. For example, representative at UN have quite collectively explained the argument relating to the withdrawn decision ahead of Iraq invasion as “a referendum not on the means of disarming Iraq but on the American use of power.”29 Reforming the Security Council sanctions therefore becomes a sheer commotion. It is sometimes difficult to tell between a state’s authority and its capacity to implement sanctions. Security Council sanctions may therefore conflict with US foreign policies or interests. If the Security Council continues to see US imperialism as a menace to Security Council sanctions, then the UN will once again, be relegated to the position of the League of Nations. President George W. Bush commented at the UN General Assembly that: “We created the United Nations Security Council, so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes.”30 But this was again contradicted when his government stated that: “We will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require.”31 2. Evolutionary, Not Radical Reforms The Security Council sanctions need evolutionary reforms. Although approaches to reforms have conflicted with each other, there is evidence that there is more transparency in decisions makings at the Security Council32 and a good measure of strategies have been done to make sure that transparency in the implementation and application of decisions leading to sanctions are considered33. 3. Security Council Sanctions Are Fashioned In New York, But Implemented In Washington The UN has a primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. “The key issue for the council is whether it can engage the United States, modulate its exercise of power, and discipline its impulses.”34 Morality has survived every feature of American interest in the United Nations and Security Council deliberation or interventions. Official American post-war policy eloquently articulated this perspective: “International security was regarded as the supreme objective, but at the same time the subcommittee held that the attainment of security must square with principles of justice in order to be actual and enduring…the vital interest of the United States lay in following a ‘diplomatic principle’ – of moral disinterestedness instead of power politics.”35 Morality has frequently become a catchphrase for intervention throughout the American approach towards military sanctions. For example, Theodore Roosevelt fearing European intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean put forward the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in May 1904, which nicely linked morality, finance and American interest: “If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political maters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference from the United States. Brutal wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilised society, may finally require intervention by some civilised nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States might act as a policeman, at least in the Caribbean regions.”36 4. Impotence Of Economic Sanction Economic sanctions have sometimes been advanced as opposed to the use of force. However, economic sanctions have not proved their worth in most cases. The sentence sculpt fixates on the economic force of sanctions, identifying cumulative income lost to be the serious measure of the force of these sanctions37. It should be recalled that economic sanctions have culminated in severe disruptions in the normal lives of the people that the UN seeks to protect. For example, economic sanctions imposed on Iraq went far to disrupt it medical infrastructure, one of the best in the world, as well as disrupted the flow of potable water to the populace.38 The problem with such sanctions is the nature of their implementation. It is conventional for sanctions to serve as incitement of the population against repressive regimes. But the severe and harsh humanitarian effects sanctions weigh on the population renders them on shaky grounds. Sanctions as a form of punitive measure therefore wield little or no pressure on governments. Sanctions are thus used as an advantage where repressive regimes with bad leaders often enrich themselves at the expense of the populace. This was the case in Yugoslavia where sanctions were employed by powerful militiamen to foster their smuggling businesses.39 Conclusion To leap into a conclusion that Security Council reforms are the causes of inherent weaknesses in the Security Council will be not too irrelevant and not to far from the truth. Many of further breaches in international law as well as disregard for Security Council sanctions have arisen from insufficiency of Security Council sanctions to acts as deterrence. Perhaps, Security Council sanctions may never work because of the inherent divergence of views with regards the reformation and implementation of sanctions in the Security Council. But this should not encourage states that look at Security Council sanctions as a means to foster their geo-political objectives. It is true that Security Council sanctions can set out parameters for negotiating peace among states. Again, economic sanctions alone will not work. There has to be some coercive features, maybe, just maybe, the presence of the US. However, the unilateral use of force on the part of the US can be costly if it is not regulated by the Security Council. The US should work collectively with the Security Council to make sure that Security Council sanctions are more than mere processes to looking at a new world order. Keep in mind that economic and military might such as the US are needed to liaise with the Security Council so that global risks and burdens should be issues of shared responsibility. For example, US interest can be more appealing through a multilateral decision-making at the UN. Security Council sanctions have gone far and will need jubilant acclamation backed by international acquiescence. 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