The Toolbox of the UN for Peace Missions - Coursework Example

Toolbox of the UN for Peace Missions Nature of Peacekeeping Missions Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement Peacekeeping implies the deployment of forces (national or multinational) with the aim of controlling and resolving a potential or actual armed conflict within or between member states. Often, the peacekeeping operations are commenced after the United Nations (UN) authorization, and are led by the UN. However, regional organizations also have the authority to conduct peacekeeping missions (Bellamy et al. 2010, p.48). Normally, peacekeeping forces are deployed after the parties in a conflict have consented and support a truce or any peace measures agreed upon. Therefore, peacekeeping forces are normally lightly armed or completely unarmed and utilize the least necessary force. Peace enforcement is whereby the UN uses the assets of the military to enforce peace on conflicting parties against the will of the parties, for illustration, when a truce has failed (Bellamy et al. 2010, p.48). Peace enforcement surpasses the peacekeeping forces’ capacity and is therefore perfectly executed through use of heavily armed forces. According to Durch and England (2009), no formal doctrine exists for UN peacekeeping. Instead, the peacekeeping principles emerge from the reflections on practice. While the 2008 “Capstone Doctrine” of the UN is no official document, it is a representation of an effort to codify the principles. The basic principles of the UN peacekeeping include minimum application of force, consent, and impartiality. Consent ensures that the UN gains the cooperation of the conflicting parties. Lack of consent makes it difficult for the UN to ensure peace since peacekeeping forces are never equipped for peace enforcement. However, withdrawal of consent is possible or it may not attain all authority levels (strategic, tactical, and political), particularly situations that involve irregular forces, which renders its maintenance indecisive. Impartiality implies that application of the peacekeeping mandate should be done without prejudice or favor to any party. It however does not imply the even-handedness or neutrality of peacekeepers rather; the peacekeepers must strictly adhere to their mandate’s terms and not be prejudiced. The use of no force (unless in self-defense and in the mandate’s defense) reveals the reality that peacekeepers are operating with the conflicting parties consent and thus must not employ force in their operations. In case force is employed, then it must be precise and calibrated and in agreement with International Humanitarian Law (Piotrowicz, 2011, p.186). Jacques and Essis (2012) assert that over the years, the demands adopted for peacekeeping operations have undergone changes; the principles that support them have been put through shifting interpretations and emphases. For illustration, “minimum application of force,” for its implication has extended to constituting of the mandate’s defense and not merely the peacekeepers. This is a necessary flexibility when tackling varied and dynamic conflict environments. It has however created confusion regarding how the application of the principles should be ensured and has resulted to a blurring line between peace enforcement and peacekeeping. In addition, debates exist on whether additional principles should be added to help in guiding the peacekeeping. For instance, the Australian Defense Force apart from using the three main principles has added other eight principles which include respect for sovereignty, mutual respect, legitimacy, interoperability, credible force composition and structure, freedom of movement, transparency and unity of command (Findlay, 2009, p.87). The peacekeeping practice expansion and the debate it has impelled have created one of the most important peacekeeping developments since the foundation of the UN. While great burdens to the UN have resulted from this expansion, possibly it has made the UN more indispensable in the preservation of international security and peace. These debates that surrounded expansion of the peacekeeping operations, in 2006, impelled the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) to instigate a process that, in 2008, resulted to the formulation of a “Capstone Doctrine” purposely for the peacekeeping operations. The document offers an articulation of the UN peacekeeping principles meant to inform the operations of trainers, practitioners, and planners incase a formal doctrine of peacekeeping is absent. An analysis of the resolutions of the General Assembly and key Security Council; UN’s internal rules, guidelines, and policies; high-level panel’s relevant findings; and evolving practice acted as the origin of the “Capstone Doctrine” (Bellamy et al. 2010, p.56). In addition, in recent years, similar proposals have been embraced by security organizations like AU as well as NATO. Terence and Rees (2013) assert that the growing significance of peace enforcement and peacekeeping regional organizations in post-Cold War period is another noteworthy trend. Deployment of regional forces has been an authorization of either the UN and in favor of the UN’s peacekeeping missions or has been a representation of unilateral programs. Regional forces may act as a valuable complement to the UN peacekeeping, particularly because the UN is unwilling or unable to position peacekeeping forces in all places where need arises. Additionally, the Charter indeed foresees a responsibility for regional arrangements in maintenance of peace (Ch. VIII). Regional organizations and countries within them will however in most instances have their own peacekeeping outlooks and practices that might depict more narrow-minded considerations. For instance, in some situations, regional organizations undertaking a peacekeeping mission have been blamed to be pursuing personal strategic interests first. Even in situations whereby a country’s forces operate as the UN peacekeepers, problems crop up when these forces’ commanders become more receptive to their country’s capitals than to UN. Global labor division is another matter of distress that, in recent years, has featured a lot in UN peacekeeping. Previously, developed nations played a significant role in contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping operations. However, increasingly these nations become averse to the peacekeeping risks and thus developing nations now offer a greater majority of the UN peacekeepers (police and troops) (Piotrowicz, 2011, p.155). Despite the reality that developing nations always have the greatest peacekeeping interventions, it is also a reality that developing nations are usually not well equipped to meet these needs. A key approach favored is the strengthening of the capacity of the regional peacekeeping; however elevated burden-sharing can also be a necessity if in case peacekeeping is to effectively deal with certain difficult problems it is expected to tackle. Peacemaking Peacemaking is a term that has been applied in various ways. Peacemaking, according to the UN, is an action geared towards bringing into agreement hostile parties, fundamentally through peaceful means such as the kinds foreseen in the UN Charter, Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes. With regards to this perspective peacemaking is regarded a diplomatic effort anticipated to convert a violent conflict into a nonviolent dialogue, that accommodates settling of differences via representative political institutions (DPKO, 2012, P.49). Therefore, the key objective of peacemaking is to conclude violence amid contending parties. Generally, negotiation, arbitration, mediation and conciliation and some methods used to ensure peacemaking. In addition, the international law presents another method via the international courts. Peacemaking has moral obligations, which are usually nations that form part of the UN and the Geneva Conventions. The UN Charter implies obligations that can be used as intervention if cases such as genocide, human devastation, or international peace disturbances arise. These obligations are however not legally binding. For instance, in the UN Charter, Article 33 states that in case the conflict of two parties is likely to endanger international security or peace, then the conflicting parties must first of all solve their conflict through negotiation, arbitration, mediation and conciliation, or resort to regional organizations of their choice. It also mentions that when it is supposed necessary, the Security Council must ask the conflicting parties to consider settling their dispute through any of the peacemaking techniques (DPKO, 2012, P.49). Related clauses are included in the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions. Unfortunately, restrictions often overshadow obligations in most state leaders’ minds. However, when a state signs these treaties, then they have accepted that they will adhere to an inherent moral obligation to intercede. In fact, as much as the obligation may appear to be weak, it is still viewed as a motivating factor for most the international interventions taking place today. The Toolbox The toolbox often uses multimedia and data visualization methods with the aim of presenting an argument for strengthening and expanding social protection in an interactive and user-friendly fashion. The toolbox offers its users a departure point for navigation of the rather fragmented and complex characteristic of the social protection policymaking. It uses a good practices database and a social protection experts’ network to aid South-South teamwork and the development of a consensus in accelerating toward more robust and broader coverage (Australian Civil Military Center, 2015). Generally, the social protection toolbox is unique because it purposes to envelope the gaps that exist in the analysis and promotion of social protection. By doing this, the toolbox offers an efficient support platform for knowledge sharing firmly based on experience and practice. Other available databases from the system of the UN and international organization center on technical financing, analysis, and assistance of individual schemes. For instance, the Global Extension, International Labor Office (ILO), and Social Security database offers a perfect analysis of select information and schemes on financing. The Global Social Security Association offers a wide-range of nation documents and profiles for technical support. This toolbox was designed in such a way that it cannot overlap with the databases. Mechanisms of Peacekeeping Missions Some of the main factors that the UN uses to ensure its peacekeeping missions include: UN Internal Structure The internal structure of the UN comprises of, General Assembly Security Council Economic and Social Council International Court of Justice The Secretariat These six parts of the UN work together to ensure that international peace is maintained. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for instance, acts as the main judicial body and the UN must always abide by its decisions (Browne, 2011, p.167). This co-operation helps in easy maintenance of international peace. Member States Resources The member nations of the UN also assist in peacekeeping missions by providing the UN with the resources needed to carry out the peacekeeping missions. For instance, the member nations assist the UN through providing troops or police to assist in peacekeeping since the UN does not have its own military force. International Courts In the Agenda for Peace, according to Browne (2011), the International Court of Justice is considered an effective tool that the UN can use to ensure a peaceful adjudication of a conflict. When situations such as interstate threats or wars arise, the ICJ acts an efficient unit for settling conflicts. However, two problems exist: first, at the ICJ, it is only countries that can be party to conflicts. Therefore, civil wars within a nation cannot be adjudicated by the ICJ. Also, ICJ lacks effective mechanisms for enforcement. Therefore, most nations are likely to ignore some of the decisions made by the ICJ. In addition, other international courts are also in existence but unfortunately they have a more limited jurisdiction. An example of such a court includes the European Court of Justice. Since international courts lack mechanisms of enforcement, effectual peacemaking strategies ought to depend on the force of threat, in case other negotiating plans fail. Mediation, arbitration, and negotiation are still considered first option for third parties in conflicts (even armed); however, the threat of force is always ignored. Application of Force or Threat The UN considers peacemaking to be diplomatic efforts made to conclude a conflict, whereas it considers peace enforcement an active application of force. In this context, peace enforcement is a separate but auxiliary notion within peacemaking. Therefore, it is always relevant to consider tools of peace enforcement when discussing the module of peacemaking. Some of the tools that may be included in the category of peace-enforcement are military interventions, sanctions, and blockades. Issues/Challenges in Peacekeeping Missions UN’s Bureaucratic nature For UN Peacekeeping, success is never assured since the definition of peacekeeping goes to environment deemed politically and physically difficult. Some of the major peacekeeping issues/challenges and how they can be tackled include: Protection of Civilians Peacekeeping activities have undergone several immeasurable challenges in attempting to implement this exceptionally complex, but significant mandate (Durch & England, 2009, p.26): Often the UN protects civilians during harsh conditions using insufficient or limited resources, or with partners who at times lack the capacity and will to tackle their part. The deployment of peacekeeping operations often happen amidst the impracticable expectation that the UN will be at the capacity to protect every civilian. The vibrant nature of the situations and places in which the UN personnel operates implies that the security situation is bound to change anytime. Therefore, it is of significance to understand that civilians’ protection is not an exclusively responsibility of the Peacekeeping operations of the UN. It is like a systemic attempt which comprises: The Security Council purposing to offer protection of civilians. DFS and DPKO planning to manage peacekeeping operations through deployment. The military and the police contributing nations that offers the UN with personnel for operations (Schaefer, 2015). The peacekeepers deployed to implement the protection mandate obligated to them. Most significantly, the host government must acknowledge that protecting its citizens is its primary responsibility. Civil Affairs In the past years, the desire to ensure the stability of weak nations has emerged more strongly as a vital requirement in ensuring peacekeeping. Therefore, this area has received much focus, whereby Civil Affairs Officers have engaged themselves more through supporting state institution and practices depicting good governance at sub-national category (Piotrowicz, 2011, p.188). Rule of Law Piotrowicz (2011) believes that the UN considers establishment of respect for rule of law a basis to attaining durable peace in the outcome of conflict. The assistance of the rule of law is founded on the standards of the UN, which depict appropriate global humanitarian law, global human rights law, global refugee law, and global criminal law. Restoration of the rule of law may be a long-term process; therefore DPKO is making efforts to develop the expertise capable of quickly deploying peacekeeping and peacemaking environments around the globe. Human Rights The UN implements the mandates related to human rights and they ensure the mainstreaming of human rights in every mission operation. Teams dealing with human rights cooperate and coordinate with other uniformed and civilian elements of peace operations particularly with regards to (Simic, 2012, p.55): Civilian protection; Addressing disputes related to child violation and sexual violence; Escalating the respect for the rule of law and human rights through security sector, judicial and legal reform, and prison reform system. Security Sector Reform (SSR) The SSR is supported by the UN so as to ensure affordable, accountable, efficient, and effective development of security institutions. The DPKO envelopes the SSR Unit and acts as the technical resource capacity and focal point for the SSR for international partners and the UN system. The SSR Unit specifically supports the rapid field Missions expansion range involved in helping SSR efforts both at the regional and national level, primarily at SSR’s sector-wide level (Bellamy et al. 2010, p.34). No standing army Only with the authorization from the resolution of the UN Security Council, can the UN deploy military personnel in any conflicting member state. The Security Council mentions the number of military personnel needed followed by liaise between the UN Headquarters and the member nations to identify and deploy military personnel. This always takes time, probably a period of six months or more after the resolution date (Jacques & Essis, 2012, p.201). Securing the finances It is also a task for when the UN has to extensively utilize lots of resources in areas that are worst hit and require a lot of finances, resources as well as personnel to contain the situation. This poses as yet another hindrance to the UN’s operations. KOSOVO CASE STUDY Background Kosovo exists in Serbia’s Southern segment and comprises of a blended populace whereby most of them are Albanians. This area up to 1989 operated with heightened autonomy inside the former Yugoslavia. However, in the 1989, Slobodan Milosevic came along and interfered with the autonomy that prevailed and made the area come under Belgrade, which was Serbia’s capital. This move, stirred a lot of resistance amongst the Albanian Kosovo’s, which led an eruption of unrest in the region. In 1998, fights amongst the Serbian military as well as the police and the Kosovo Albanian military culminated to the demise of more than 1500 Kosovo people and about 400, 000 became displaced from their stays (NATO, 1999). The fight stirred heavy concerns among the international society owing to its escalation, consequences on humanity as well as the risk of stretching out to other countries. The president’s, Milosevic’s, refusal for diplomatic intervention that was geared towards containing the crisis as well as suppressing the militants from the Albanian Kosovo front were also of concern. What followed was the deployment of NATO into the area to contain the situation and its objects were peace promotion as well as instilling security in the bordering states. The deteriorated state of affairs compelled the NATO Council to opt for air strikes. The utilisation of airstrikes was geared towards ceasing the unrest as well as making it safe for refugees to resume to their homes. Following heavy diplomatic engagements, Milosevic promised compliance and the airstrikes were done away with. Tools the UN used in this peacekeeping operation UN adopted a diplomatic approach to containing the unrest. United Nation expressed a lot of dissatisfaction with the excessive application of force to tame the situation through UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1199. The resolution was majorly angered by the much utilisation of force by the Yugoslavia as well as Serbian armies and advocated for cease fire by the two fronts with regards to the crisis. In accordance with the resolution, various confines were reached on the number of Serbian militants in Kosovo as well as the range of their actions. Through UN Security Council Resolution 1203, what followed was the setting up of Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) that would oversee compliance in Kosovo and ascertain that NATO comes up with a surveillance mission (NATO, 1999). However, regardless of the many steps undertaken to ensuring peace, the situation worsened at the wake of 1999 because of the intensified utilisation of force by the Serbian army as well as the special police. The verification mission faced removal in the area because their operations were greatly hindered by the Serbian militants. It is then that US Ambassador went on to Belgrade in pursuit of urging Milosevic to cease the unrest or be subjected to instant NATO Air strikes, of which he never adhered to and airstrikes were started in march 1999 yet again. The airstrikes however became suspended in June again subsequent to talks with the North Atlantic Council and Clark that Yugoslavia would stop their actions in Kosovo. It was after the suspension of the air strikes that NATO secretary General made it known that he had written to Kofi Annan making him aware of the stopped air strikes. It is on June that there was adoption of Resolution 1244 by the UN Security Council that took note of the Yugoslavia’s agreement to stopping the crisis and removing its forces. The resolution made it clear that the Security Council was determined towards bringing forth civil as well as security aid in Kosovo. The Security Council resolved that end to the unrest would be based upon the following principles: Ending the Kosovo unrest Withdrawal of the Federal republic’s militants Deploying security to Kosovo Coming up with an ad-hoc administration Amicable refugee return A mechanism laying forth self governance Developing the hit area economically. Legitimacy of the intervention The intervention by NATO in this case has since stimulated varied reactions in international front. The excessive bombing or rather utilization of force has been at the middle of a heated debate on whether their actions were legitimate. One of the reasons levelled to say that it was a legitimate discourse is the fact that all that was because of the Responsibility to protect that culminated to intervention to curb the situation at hand. However, this justification has been under deep criticism with respect to the principles of state sovereignty as well as self-determination (Hafkin, 2010. p, 232). These principles articulate that it is mandatory to respect the autonomy of a state and thus it is very gross to interfere with its affairs as stipulated under international law. In addition, the excessive force utilisation was actually not geared towards a humanitarian approach and was thus contrary to international law tenets. UN intervention helped calm the situation through diplomatic attempts to ending the cease fire. GEORGIAN CASE STUDY Background The conflict occurred in Abkhazia, in northern Georgian sphere, whereby the local authorities were trying to ceased form the Republic. The fights intensified and this saw the Georgian government sent 2,000 officers to contain the situation and in that respect there were 200 deaths as well as a hundred injured people (United Nations, 2009). Abkhaz leadership left and relocated to Gudauta. Russia’s intervention was heavily recognised in the region as it chipped in to fight in support of Abkhaz. In 1992, the month of September, an agreement was reached in the Moscow soils amongst Georgian republic, the Abkhazia leadership as well as Russian Federation. The agreement articulated inter-alia, the fact that Georgian’s sovereignty was paramount and needed observance and that unwarranted troops would be disarmed. Unfortunately, the agreement never got full implementation and the two warring sections kept casting blame on each other for violating the agreement. The fights resumed again compelling a multitude of people to escape their homes. Tools the UN used in this peacekeeping operation UN in the Georgian case took up to reviving diplomatic relations comprising of consultations with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It is with that approach that there was setting up of an office in Georgia to integrate peace keeping operations in the area, in November 1992. In 1993, there was an appointment of a special envoy in Georgia by the UN. His presence was an acknowledgement that the various fronts had decided to take up peaceful measures to ending the violence. The same year, 1993, the warring fronts entered a consensus that they would terminate the cease fire and it then that there was selection of observers to oversee the situation. The UN resolution 858 of 1993 was geared towards appointing an observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to ascertain compliance (United Nations, 2009). However, there continued to heightened fights which saw the UNOMIG get suspended from the area. With the fights, there were many displacements and injuries experienced. UNOMIG later resumed and had its mandate renewed as well as extended via various UN resolutions up to 2009 when it collapsed, with no peace agreement reached as yet. Legitimacy of the intervention Russia’s interventions in Georgia have as well raised lots of concern on just how legitimate their actions were. In fact, claims demonstrate that the intervention contravened standards of the UN with regards to peace keeping. The first contention is that Russia acted impartially in the unrest by deciding to fight on the Abkhaz side (Wieser, 2015). In addition, Russia is to blame for the escalated unrest in the area. In addition, the fact that it escalated the unrest may be termed an illegitimate utilization of force although that cannot be fully ascertained. Therefore, although Russia justified their involvement as peace keeping, this also raises concerns with regards to territorial sovereignty as well as self determination characteristics attached to a particular state. In addition, although UN tried to bring along diplomatic measures into the Georgian war, with no reconciliations at the end, it helped contain the situation all the while. UN Sanctions When they work In regards to UN sanctions, to date varied diplomats as well as researchers have relayed contradicting arguments on how their effectiveness. This by pinpointing numerous case studies both in developing and developed states that have confirmed ineffectiveness of UN’s sanctions. Effectiveness in this case scholars contend its measurement ought to be in such a way only the targeted individuals suffer the blunt of the intended sanctions instead of a given state’s civilians. This is according the Interlaken Process in quest of shunning such worse incidents experienced by Iraq Society during Saddam’s reign and Zimbabweans. However, in conducting a successful sanctions it entails proper procedures whereby the core intention encompasses targeting only the specific individuals and their aides (Wallensteen, Staibano & Eriksson, 2003). This is in such a way sanctions will not yield to worsening lives of citizens in any targeted state. According to Wallensteen, Staibano and Eriksson (2003), for any intended sanction to work effectively and realize its set goals or targets, initiators ought to draft a clear design. Mostly, this encompasses an explicit outline that will draw support from its member states especially those who may be dealing with the target country. Hence, unite all the entire international community from the onset by informing them the goals and concrete reasons why a given state’s leaders ought to be served with a sanction (Guijarro-Usobiaga, 2013). Equipped with this information, member states will support the actions and decisions of the officials they have tasked with the mandate of initiating sanctions. Since, without their support no sanction will ever take place. This implies sanctions normally work effectively once the member states with common agenda establishes an authoritative committee that has specific reporting mechanism. Hence, manage to inform its members the effect of a certain sanction, which is only via making close follow up as advocated by Stockholm process (Wallensteen, Staibano & Eriksson, 2003). Follow up in this case encompasses having an expert committee whose core role encompasses measuring the effectiveness of any calculated sanction towards a given state. In addition, unity among members in support of both UN secretariat and the tasked committee will only emerge once the leading officials informs members respective rationale why they ought to result to punishing a certain state. This is to shun any defiant state more so bordering state from choosing not to comply in offering support to the sanctioned state. For instance, a defiant of this nature is quite evident with China with Russia and also Zimbabwe supported by other states like S. Africa (Vines, 2012, p. 868). This is despite according to Interlaken process advocating sanctions ought to be aimed at certain individuals in such a way they are not free to travel as well as their assets frozen especially in developed states (Wallensteen & Grusell, 2012). Individuals in this case include leaders and their close aides who normally ensure their leading remain in power while in return benefit in varied ways including acquisition of assets at the expense of the suffering subjects. When they do not work However, sanctions based on studies so far conducted up to date have utterly failed despite UN through its respective authorities effecting them in quest to deal with defiant characters globally. Hence, prompting allies of the targeted states end up defying the common decision of other UN members. This is by not ceasing to trade with the sanctioned state as it was evident with Burma and Russia sanctions, which did not materialize due to unceasing support availed then by China (Vines, 2012, p. 877). Hence, this turning out as flag conduct, which numerous states especially from the same bloc result to embracing thinking the UN is out to realize own interests. This is especially the bordering states with the targeted state rely on each other. Since, the latter contended sanctions’ impacts were worse on the innocent natives instead of protecting them, which has been a key characteristic with any sanction that UN has ever initiated (United Nations, 2013). Studies so far conducted have pinpointed varied impacts that confirm how these sanctions turn out to be severe or blunt weapons towards citizens. For instance, in the case of Iraq whereby UN targeted Saddam but the latter used it as a retaliation tactic to oppress the native citizens. In conclusion, sanctions ought to adopt proper and well calculated procedures as cited by Stockholm, Interlaken, and Berlin/Bonn processes. This is by targeting individuals but in such a way sanctions’ impact would not affect citizens. Proper procedures in this case encompass first establishing an expert committee, which will come up with an acceptable rationale to the member states and make a follow up once a sanction commences. References Australian Civil Military Center. 2015. The Prevention Toolbox: Systematizing Policy Tools for the Prevention of Mass Atrocities. Oxford University Press. Bellamy, A., Williams, P. D., and Griffith S. 2010. Understanding Peacekeeping. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press. Browne, M. 2011. United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress. New York, NY: Houndmills Basingstoke DPKO. 2012. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support: Civil Affairs Handbook. New York, NY. Durch, W. J., and England, M. L. 2009. ‘The Purposes of Peace Operations,’ in Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Findlay, T. 2009. The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Guijarro-Usobiaga, B 2013. Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why do they Work? Political Studies Review, 11, 3, pp. 408-409. Hafkin, G.2010. The Russo-Georgian War Of 2008: Developing The Law Of Unauthorized humanitarian intervention After Kosovo. [Pdf]. Online. Available at: [Accessed 12th May 2015] Jacques, L. K., and Essis, E. J. 2012. Determinants of Success in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. 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Security Council Report. [Pdf] Online. Available at: [Accessed 11Th May 2015] Vines, A 2012, The effectiveness of UN and EU sanctions: lessons for the twenty-first century, International Affairs, 88, 4, pp. 867-877. Wallensteen, P, & Grusell, H 2012, Targeting the Right Targets? The UN Use of Individual Sanctions, Global Governance, 18, 2, pp. 207-230. Wallensteen, P., Staibano, C. & Eriksson, M. 2003. Making Targeted Sanctions Effective Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy Options. Results from the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions. [Accessed 11Th May 2015] Wieser.S.J.2015. “Peacekeeping” and Russia’s interventions in the post-Soviet space.[ Online]. Available at:< http://www.quorum-blog.ch/2015/04/peacekeeping-and-russias-intervention-in-the-post-soviet-space/>[Accessed 12th May 2015] Read More