Russia Responsibility for the July Crisis - Research Paper Example

?To What Extent was Russia Responsible for the July Crisis in 1914? Before World War I, Europe was a continent in which a handful of powers exercisedcontrol over a large number of subordinate peoples; it was predictable that reactions between all should be infused with suspicion and rivalry. There was a strong and matching military rivalry between the continental powers. Since the triumph of Prussia’s army of conscripts and reservists over the Austrians in 1866 and the French in 1870, all leading European states had accepted the necessity of submitting their young men to military training in early manhood an of requiring them, once trained, to remain at the state’s disposition, as reservists. In the Germany army, model for all others, a conscript spent the first two years of fill adulthood in uniform, effectively imprisoned in barracks. The French organized into twenty military districts, comprising four or five departments. The Germans also divided into twenty-one Corps Districts. The Russian military organization resembled Germany’s, as did that of Austria-Hungry who produced Europe’s most complex army. There was central uniformity to each of their organization. Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungry all felt its position threatened in some way or other. The three great European empires, German, Austrian, and Russian, felt threatened by the national dissatisfactions of their minorities. The Germans deeply resented their lack of colonies, sought to extend the few they had acquired in Africa and the Pacific and were ready to quarrel, particularly with France, over influence in the few remaining areas not yet subject to European rule.1 All European armies by 1904 had military plans, notable in most cases for their inflexibility. The First World War was the true turning point of the twentieth century. It brought down dynasties and empires. It made The Second World War inevitable and the set the stage for the Cold War. In hind-sight the events that led to World War I seem foolish misunderstandings yet, while there were some moderating voices on the continent, most were not ready to listen to reason. Above all, it was national pride, a genuine lack of understanding of each other’s national positions and miscalculations that caused World War I. The mood in each of the major countries at the time was quite different. Pre-war Germany was bursting with vigor and bulging with material success. Over all reined the Army with its discipline and high standards of professional conduct.2 The German people felt they needed and deserved an acknowledged supremacy like that of the British. The French yearned for the regaining of the Alsace-Lorraine region, lost after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Many believed the army was the means of restoring the national glory.3 In European forums, Russia would listen to the arguments on behalf of the balance of power but did not always abide by agreements made. Russia expected Europe to look the other way and felt hurt when it did not.4 England had no choice but to resist Germany who was already in possession of the strongest army in Europe and who began aiming for parity with Great Britain on the seas.5 By 1914 Austria-Hungary main foreign policy goals were to gain land in the Balkans at the expense of Turkey and to prevent the growth of South Slav nationalism undermining her Empire.6 In some degree, each of the major powers had something to gain from war. For Germany and Austria-Hungary there was a lot to be gained by war. The establishment of a position on the Continent that would enable them to compete on equal terms with England and attain the status of world power was perhaps Germany’s top goal.7 Austria saw it a way to gain territory and to stop her decline. In Russia, the ambitions for Balkan expansion and the recovery of Constantinople loomed great. As for France, a successful war would certainly remove a major threat to their security.8 Britain came to two conclusions though. The first was that if France and Russia defeated Germany unaided, the two victors would regard Britain with hostility and contempt. The second was that if Germany won and established Continental control, Britain would face a threat to her security unknown since the days of Napoleon.9 The Great Powers were facing each other across a gulf of growing mutual distrust. The balance of power had degenerated into hostile coalitions whose inflexibility was matched by reckless disregard for consequence. The mood in Europe was of war. Everyone talked about the inevitability of it and soldiers sang about it. Many felt that war was a fine heroic thing, were gentlemen prove their worth.10 Each country at the time was caught up in national pride and national positioning. While the Great Powers could see no way of turning back from war, Russia may have wittingly or unwittingly caused the July Crisis in 1914 that eventually lead to the start of the World War I. In order to understand Russia’s culpability for the July Crisis, it is important to first examine the evolution of their leader’s thinking since the Crimean War. Russia’s poor performance in the Crimean War (1853-1856) and Emperor Nicholas I’s death marked the end of an era with regard to Russian military thinking. It became obvious to Russian military thinkers after the Crimean War that the military balance in Europe had shifted. Russia no longer enjoyed advantages it once held. Changes in the way soldiers would be mobilized transported to war and how the army would be organized challenged the planners. The powers in Europe were developing modern methods of moving their armies and training them. The ability to conscript of peasants had been the Russian advantage to date. Russian leadership now had to deal with modern organizational methods, education, and railroad movement. These factors now enabled Germany, France, and Austria to train its soldiers and move them on a short notice. This represented the basic strategic problem that Russian military planners had to confront in the post Crimean period.11 After the death of Nicholas I a group of reformers initiated many projects that were called the “Era of the Great Reforms.” Serfdom was eliminated and became a centerpiece of the reforms. Additional goal of the Great Reform programs were to improve the organizational structure of the military the education of all soldiers. By the mid 1870s, Russia had put in place the basic elements of a modern army. How to make it all work was now the problem.12 With the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1905-1905) a great deal of discussion took place on how to modernize the military. Russia suffered 400,000 casualties in the Russo-Japanese War, lost two of its three fleets, and had seen its army repeatedly bloodied at the hands of “Asiatic inferiors.” Former Finance Minister Witte concluded in 1907 that the war had “completely destroyed the entire economic organism of the country.” From the point of view of national security, the most serious casualty was Russia’s finances, and with the loss of that, its ability to repair and modernize its defenses.13 The officers who led the General Staff after the Russo-Japanese War were divided between two groups. On one side were seeing Germany and Austria-Hungary as the only serious security threat. On the other were officers who directed their attention toward Asia, who believed that Japan posed a more serious threat than any European power. Naturally, senior officers with responsibility for Russia’s East Asian security joined those “westerners” in the officer corps who were converted to an eastern disposition by the recent humiliation in Manchuria. These tensions were not finally resolved until the strategic reorientation of 1911–12 and the military rebuilding programs of 1912–14. The two orientations demanded quite different military tools. An active eastern policy required a large, modern, effective blue-water navy that would have to be able to face the Imperial Japanese Navy and squadrons from Germany, the United States, and Britain. Such an orientation would necessarily have run counter to Great Britain’s and Japan’s interests and would have brought Russia and the Central Powers onto better terms. The traditional western orientation, on the other hand, would demand a massive program of replacement and modernization of equipment, reorganization of field units, rapid and dense development of strategic railroad lines, and modernization of the citadel fortresses along the Vistula. In 1906 Russia’s fundamental international alignments and relationships predicated only the latter, with Russia allied to France for confrontation with Germany. Each strategy had its price and the combined cost of reconstruction along both lines – new fleets and army rearmament –was beyond the capacity of the Russian state, economy, and people.14 In September 1908 Foreign Minister A. P. Izvolskii was informed that Austria intended to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. At a secret meeting with his Austrian counterpart, Count Alois Aehrenthal, Izvolskii demanded as a quid pro quo that Austria-Hungary support Russia in revocation of the clauses of the 1878 Berlin Treaty, by which the Turkish Straits were closed to warships. But the plan blew up in October when Aehrenthal prematurely announced the annexation. Izvolskii now faced domestic outrage over his duplicitous dealings. In the Council of Ministers, the ministers of war, marine, finance, and interior denounced his initiative. A Russian threat of war to prevent the Austrian annexation was out of the question. And when Berlin cast its lot with Vienna, St. Petersburg lost whatever hopes it may have had of bullying its way into a graceful exit. Russia accepted Austria’s new annexations. This humiliation was a by-product of dysfunctional government. Perhaps if Izvolskii had vetted his plan with council colleagues, he might have learned sooner of the army’s precarious condition and the considerable risks his demarche entailed. Moreover, the Bosnian draw back reduced Russia’s European policy alternatives to two. It could recognize German preeminence and come to terms with Berlin at the expense of its French alliance. Or it could lean more closely to France and Britain in the expectation of nudging their policies toward the Balkans closer to its own. Petersburg explored first the Berlin course, and then swung back to its alliance orientation.15 The basic dilemma of Russian military planners was whether to concentrate against Japan or against Austria-Hungary and Germany. Until about 1911, Russia’s relations with France evolved little from the perspective of the two states’ conventions. But when viewed through the reporting of Colonel V. P. Lazarev, the military attache in Paris, a fundamental reorientation of Russia’s strategic perspective was taking shape. As early as summer 1907, Lazarev reported “stubborn” French positions on various Baltic issues of interest to Russia. On July 16, 1912, two agreements formalizing French-Russian military and naval cooperation and coordination were instituted. The next month French military negotiators made their priority clear to the Russian side. They wanted strategic railroad construction from the Russian interior to the army’s assembly points along the German frontier. French-British “coordination” in a war with Germany was virtually an accomplished fact. They presumed a combined Russian-French-British alliance in the event of general war on the Continent and began reworking Russia’s mobilization plans accordingly.16 By 1910, a new plan, Mobilization Schedule Number 19, placed greater emphasis on depth of deployment in the West and transferred some 150,000 troops and almost 400 additional artillery pieces from Siberian military districts to the West. Mobilization in any future war with the Central Powers would occur in the Russian heartland and forces would then be transported for concentration and battle. This strategy could not satisfy France’s persistent demand for Russian offensive action against Germany within two weeks of mobilization because Russia did not have the railroads to carry it out quickly. Russian statesmen soon felt the stinging rebuff of the French press, politicians, and staff officers for their alleged appeasement of Germany and neglect of alliance obligations. In early 1912, naively encouraging an anti-Austrian defensive league among the Bulgarians, Serbs and later Greeks, Russia discovered that the alliance it had encouraged – the Balkan League – possessed aggressive appetites it could satisfy without reference to its sponsor. The League’s members turned their military might against the Turks in October 1912 with great success in the First Balkan War. Unhappy with the division of spoils among themselves, Bulgaria turned on Serbia and Greece. Turkey and Romania then entered against Bulgaria and now, in the Second Balkan War, each took a piece of Sofia’s recent gains.17 These developments brought threats from Austria, not least against Serbia whose forces had demonstrated vitality and capability on the battlefield. Austria shifted five army corps to its border with Serbia in early 1913, prompting Sazonov and the General Staff to be concerned with Vienna’s threatening attitude towards its neighbor, Serbia. Moreover, the arrival in October 1913 of a German military mission to Turkey led by General Otto Liman von Sanders greatly troubled Petersburg. These developments, linked with Russia’s economic recovery, resulted in a modest program of rearmament that allocated additional spending to the army and navy. In the course of secret staff talks in 1912 and again in 1913, the Russians promised to attack Germany fifteen days into a general mobilization. The Franco-Russian military accord was the only one of its kind in effect in Europe in 1914. In March 1913 Nicholas II agreed to immediate defense expenditures for artillery. In July he approved a five-year program just for artillery modernization and reorganization. Early in 1914 military reform received the infusion it needed for vast modernization called “The Great Program.” It consisted of funding 500,000 additional men, reorganization of unit mobilizations, a large-scale investment in artillery and a systematic investment in aviation.18 Berlin’s seemingly aggressive behavior and Britain’s quiet commitment to intervention convinced most Russian planners that they had little choice but to operate within the structure of their French obligations. The Russian Council of Ministers under Premier Goremykin was well apprised of the unfolding crisis in the wake of the Sarajevo assassination on June 28, 1914 and settled on Russia’s response at an early stage. From the start, the Council saw war as the “inevitable outcome.” The moment had come when Russia, faced with the annihilation of Serbia, would lose all her authority if she did not declare herself the defender of a Slavonic nation threatened by powerful neighbors. Many concluded that if Russia failed to fulfill her historic mission she would be considered a decadent State and would henceforth have to take second place among the powers.19 Krivoshein, the influential conservative minister of agriculture, declared that public and parliamentary opinion would accept nothing short of bold action. Russian statesmen felt that their sovereign, Nicholas II, could now face the Germanic powers if Russia’s vital interests demanded a showdown. Finally, the stability of Russia’s internal order, its restive urban proletariat and the revolutionary cadres at work within it, would not be a threat to the regime in the event of war, thanks to a generally improving economy from 1910 onward. Three days later, Sazonov departed for his estate for a brief rest before the arrival in the Russian capital of France’s President and Premier, expected on July 20. The Balkan crisis was apparently low on the agenda of points that the French intended to discuss. Nevertheless, by the end of the visit Sazonov and the French delegation shared what they euphemistically termed a “perfect community of views” on the maintenance of peace in Europe. That nebulous expression in all likelihood meant that they had decided to take action against Vienna in case of a Habsburg attack on Serbia. Most importantly, the two powers solemnly affirmed the mutual obligations imposed by their alliance: France would stand by Russia against Austria-Hungary in the Balkan crisis.20 Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia was delivered on July 23, just after France’s leaders departed Petersburg. The July Crisis was now an urgent concern, but Russia’s leaders were poorly positioned for the development of an effective response toward Austria-Hungary and Germany. Key diplomats, including the ambassadors to Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Belgrade, on whose diplomatic reports, intelligence collection activities, and foreign liaison the Foreign Ministry relied, were away from their posts on summer vacation. The chief of the General Staff’s operations section, Quartermaster-General Danilov, and the Foreign Ministry’s chief of the Near Eastern desk, Prince G. N. Trubetskoi, were also away from the Russian capital. Foreign Minister Sazonov, hastily returned from his estate, was not surprised when the Habsburg ambassador presented him the formal text of the ultimatum Austria had dispatched to Belgrade at 10 a.m. on July 24. During the twenty-four hours preceding Austria’s demands, Sazonov had received six warning indicators about the turn Austrian policy was about to take.21 From Russia’s diplomatic agents in other capitals, Sazonov acquired alarming news. His charge in Vienna reported circulation there of a “sharp note” to be presented in Belgrade that day. From the Italian ambassador in Petersburg, Sazonov heard that Austria intended to present Serbia with “an unpleasant ultimatum” that very day. By cable that evening, from the Russian charge in Belgrade, he learned that Vienna had, in fact, presented Belgrade with an ultimatum having a forty-eight hour deadline. Count V. N. Strandtmann in the Serbian capital cabled Petersburg that the Austrian minister had not only delivered the ultimatum, but had also verbally informed the Serbs that the Austro-Hungarian Empire intended to break off diplomatic relations if Serbia did not meet its demands within the mandated time. Russia’s principal foreign policy decision-maker and the tsar’s closest adviser were well informed from a variety of sources about the events precipitating the crisis.22 When Sazonov was informed by the Habsburg ambassador of the ultimatum’s terms, Sazonov declared, “It’s the European war!” not because it came unexpectedly, but because the brash, undiplomatic bellicosity of Vienna’s address to Belgrade signaled to him the extremity of Austria’s position in the crisis. Sazonov understood that the ultimatum involved an enormous risk, one that Vienna was inexplicably willing to undertake. “You want to go to war with Serbia,” he declared to the Habsburg ambassador. In unusually forthright terms for a diplomat, he continued, “I see what is going on. The German papers are adding fuel to the fire! You are setting fire to Europe. It is a great responsibility you are assuming, you will see what sort of an impression you will make in London and in Paris and perhaps elsewhere. It will be considered an unjustified aggression.” The Foreign Ministry hurriedly recalled all members of its chancellery and the Near East desk, while Sazonov began a cycle of meetings with the Ambassadors of Great Britain and France. He knew that Russia was scarcely in a position to act militarily against Austria, even in response to aggression against Serbia. In the immediate term, Russia had little opportunity to begin preparations for a military crisis.23 The state’s long-term plans for military modernization and rearmament remained years from completion, and the large-scale strategic railroad expansion would not approach completion until 1918. Sazonov hoped that if the crisis could be drawn out, if Austrian action could be delayed, the other European powers might defuse the tensions. His goal was to achieve sufficient unity among the other powers to dissuade Vienna from pressing ahead with its demands in Belgrade. He made this clear to the foreign ambassadors in Petersburg, appealing directly to the British Ambassador to activate Britain’s influence in Berlin and Vienna for moderation of the Austrian ultimatum, and, foremost, to extend the deadline. Although Sazonov said that the Russian government had yet to consider whether an Austrian invasion of Serbia constituted a reason for war, the British Ambassador sensed that France and Russia together intended to stay the course – with or without Britain’s cooperation. Russia was prepared to block with military means any Habsburg offensive against Serbia while France prepared to meet the expected German attack.24 In St. Petersburg, the Council of Ministers met for two hours that Friday afternoon, July 24. Nicholas II personally led the Council in full session to advise him and to discuss Russia’s response. The Council of Ministers under Goremykin proposed five resolutions for Nicholas’ consideration, to defuse the crisis and to protect Russia’s interests: 1. That the great powers be involved in examination of the conspiracy surrounding the assassination at Sarajevo; 2. That Serbia’s fate be entrusted to the great powers; 3. That Nicholas II authorize declaration of mobilization in four military districts and the Baltic, based on the subsequent unfolding of events; 4. That the War Ministry builds up material stockpiles in preparation for a possible mobilization; and 5. That Russia take steps immediately to reduce its sums of exchange on deposit in Germany and Austria-Hungary.25 According to the minutes of the meeting, the partial mobilization, against Austria-Hungary, would achieve two objectives. First, it would send an unmistakable signal to Vienna that Russia’s “verbal protest” would be backed with steel. Second, it would send conciliatory signals to Berlin because Russian reservists would not be mobilized within any military district adjacent to Germany. Nicholas approved the preparations for this partial mobilization and directed his military staff to begin those the next day. The tsar also had the resolutions transmitted to the Serbian ambassador for relay immediately to Belgrade. Shortly before noon on Saturday, July 25, Nicholas approved the Council of Ministers’ proposal for partial mobilization, affecting 1.1 million men in the Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan military districts and in the Black and Baltic Sea fleets. He also declared that, if Austro-Hungarian troops violated Serbia’s borders, Russia would declare mobilization and war preparations would begin. He stated it would proceed only in the districts adjacent to Austria. Russia would in any case enter the “period preparatory to war” during the night of July 25-26. All troops would return to winter quarter from leave or furlough, and all fortresses on the western frontier would transition to a war footing. Plans were activated for the transition to “the period prior to mobilization,” a military phase of the “period preparatory to war.” This required officers to return to their regiments from leave and instantly converted all “probationary” General Staff officers to permanent status. Next, a draft declaration of partial mobilization was prepared for the tsar’s signature.26 Neither the war minister nor his chief of General Staff had any background in the details of mobilization planning. Neither was familiar with the intricacies of Russia’s mobilization schedule or the assumptions on which it had developed. Neither understood the relative inflexibility of Russia’s mobilization plan and thus the limitations on their choices in ordering partial mobilization. Neither anticipated the roughness of the professional staff’s technical arguments against partial mobilization when it learned of their recommendation to the tsar. In fact, the mobilization experts in the General Staff greeted the tsar’s order for the extemporization of a partial effort with horror. General Danilov, head of mobilization planning, had viewed war with the Dual Monarchy as the trigger for German mobilization. Thus, partial mobilization, regardless of any usefulness it might serve as a “diplomatic telegraph,” threatened to paralyze Russia’s war fighting ability when or if Germany declared mobilization. The revived Schedule Number 19 comprised a single, integrated, general mobilization; parts could not be pried off and jettisoned. To carry out Nicholas’ order would have required the preparation of an entirely new schedule that addressed only select military districts – and with no assurance that the partial measure would fit with the new Schedule Number 19, should Germany subsequently take offense and the tsar have to declare general mobilization. The final act of the drama began on July 28 when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.27 The General Staff technicians believed general mobilization was essential, and thus the urgency of advising Nicholas of the implications of a partial mobilization became acute. The following day, July 29, Petersburg learned that Austria’s gunboats had bombarded Belgrade. The German ambassador to Petersburg warned that if Russia did not cease and reverse all military activity immediately, Germany would mobilize. Sazonov, already doubting the wisdom of partial mobilization before that threat, wrote: “As we cannot fulfill Germany’s desires, it remains for us to speed up our armament and count on the true inevitability of war.” On July 30, Sazonov and the General Staff agreed to urge Nicholas unequivocally to declare general mobilization. Nicholas sustained the hope that through direct communications with his German cousin, Wilhelm II, the emperors together could eliminate the disagreements into which their respective governments had seemingly locked them. Even at that crucial moment, Sazonov, and others believed that even general mobilization by no means implied war with both Vienna and Berlin. The slow pace of Russia’s shift to a wartime footing – twelve to sixteen weeks – in their view offered extensive room for maneuver and negotiation. The prevailing thought was that, in principle, a declaration of general mobilization affected only the empire’s ability to defend itself and to place its forces in readiness.28 Powerful as the military imperative for mobilization might have appeared, it did not convince Nicholas II on July 30, when, in a series of meetings with Sazonov and others, he labored long over the decision. Nicholas refused to take any of the urgent telephone calls from the General Staff that morning as he mulled over a telegram from his cousin. The German Kaiser declared that the decision for European war rested solely on Nicholas’ shoulders. Wilhelm II assured him that he would not be able to hold back events if Nicholas’ government took unilateral military steps. That afternoon, Nicholas’ ministers urged him to act. Sazonov noted that Berlin had demanded “from us a capitulation to the Central Powers, for which Russia would never forgive the Sovereign, and which would cover the good name of the Russian people with shame.” The tsar’s advisors argued that Russia was not the weakened state of 1908, but could again assert itself with confidence as a great power. Sazonov knew of Berlin’s diplomatic threats to Paris of the previous day and communicated this news to Nicholas. When confronted with this, his German cousin’s apparent deception, Nicholas II agreed to order general mobilization. Sazonov immediately called the Chief of General Staff with the imperial order, and told him to smash his telephone, to forestall any imperial second thoughts. The order went into effect on July 31. Germany declared war the following day.29 It was Russia that drew France and her ally, England, into the war. It was Austria who drew Germany into the war. It is certainly arguable that Russia’s leaders did not have a realistic grasp of the implications of their mobilization. It is equally debatable that they did not comprehend the nature of Germany’s policy sufficiently clearly to choose the best course for Imperial Russia? Was Russia responsible for the July Crisis of 1914 that lead to World War I? An important distinction should be noted. Russia mobilized and Germany declared war. Sazonov and others in the Russian government were enthusiastic for war and calculated that Russia would have time to properly arm and prepare. The maneuvering on the part of the Russian government coupled with the diplomatic maneuvers by the Great Powers certainly contributed to the misunderstandings and to the miscalculations on the part of all the governments involved. The general appetite for war through the power circles on Europe at the time fostered the belief that war could be waged and won and that it was inevitable. The diplomatic and political decisions made by Russia up to and including the July Crisis of 1914, if nothing else, were the impetus for war. Bibliography Colton, Joel, Kramer, Lloyd, Palmer, R.R. The History of the Modern World, Ninth Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004. Cowley, Robert ed., The Great War: Perspectives on the First World War. New York: Random House, 2003. Keegan, John. The First World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1998 Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994. Hamilton, Richard F. and Herwig, Holger H. Decisions for War, 1914-1917. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004 Parket, Peter. Makers of Modern Strategy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986. Roberts, J.M. New History of the World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York: The Penguin Group, 2003. Tuchman, Barbara. The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890-1914. New York: The Macmilian Company, 1962. 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