To What Extent Was Imperial Germany the Main Reason for the Outbreak of WWI - Literature review Example

?To what extent was Imperial Germany the main reason for the outbreak of WWI Background On June 28, 1914, shots from a Serbian assasin’s side arm in Sarajevo instantly killed Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie triggering a war that spanned all oceans in the world and ultimately involved beligerents from every continent (Heyman, 1997). This was the outbreak of the First World War. After the killings, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, followed by Germany declaring war on Russia. Germany then declared war on France and invaded Belgium. France was invaded on 4 August. Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality instigated British to enter the war along with allies France and Russia. Austria-Hungary announced war on Russia as France and Great Britain declared war on Austria-Hungary six days later. Historians and academicians understand the origins of the First World War, or “the Great War” as it is known, as complex, intense and intricate. This write-up presents a literature review on the causes of World War 1 and particularly Imperial Germany’s role in it. The scale of the war was vast as European powers increased their military spending by more than 300% during the war. Overall, thirty-two nations participated in the war, twenty-eight of which were Allied and Associated Powers, whose principal belligerents were the British Empire, France, Italy, Russia, Serbia, and the United States of America. The Central Powers opposing them were Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. 2. Causes of World War I One of the initial writings concerning the causes of war, the summarized revisionist history, “Origins of World War I”, by Sidney Bradshaw Fay discusses the Immediate and Underlying Causes of the war (Fay, 1966). Fay suggests five key reasons behind World War 1: the system of secret alliances, militarism, nationalism, economic imperialism and the newspaper press. Other academicians (Weikart, 1993) have also added social Darwinism to one of the underlying causes of War. Scholars, however, give different weightages to different causes, based on the importance they place on each of the above factors. Author S.R. Williamson takes on a pragmatist perspective by emphasizing that, in the period immediately leading up to World War I, there was a “militarization of attitudes” all across Europe (Samuel R. Williamson, 1988). “Militarism” and “imperialism” were key motivating forces in majority of the European countries to attack each other. Williamson, in his study, however singles out Austria-Hungry as the distruptive force amongst all other nations. The Austria-Hungry Empire was on a verge of disintegration and hence was preparing a realiatory attack on Serbia for the assasination of the archduke. Historian N. Ferguson, in his book, The Pity of War, elaborates further on the “Imperialistic virtues” of Europe, and that all European powers were preparing for the war within the confines of their empires. A naval arms race was gaining momentum between Germany and Britain and both countries wanted to demonstrate their strength as world’s greatest imperial powers (Ferguson, 1999). Each European country was also facing fears and threats to their existence and to their expansion plans. The Austrians dreaded the collapse of their multi-racial Empire if they did not challenge the danger of Serb nationalism and Panslavism. The Germans feared the fall of their closest and only reliable ally, Austria that in turn would have weakened their stance in Europe. The Russians were threatened of a humilating defeat to Austria and their failure to protect Slavs. The French felt the threat of their German neighbours as Germany increased its might in population, economy and military strength. France's primary defence against the threat of German invasion was its alliance with Russia. This it was essential to protect. The British were vulnerable as well, as their global empire was exposed to hostile forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary with modern navy and war equipment. Most of all they feared for the long-standing safekeeping of their Empire if they did not support France and Russia, their chief imperial rivals, whose goodwill they had been diligently fostering for a decade. 3. Germany’s role in World War I German historian, Fritz Fischer, contended that Germany had to accept the major accountability for the outbreak of the war. His three key hypotheses were: 1) that the German government under the Kaiser's authority estimated a European war unavoidable since 1911-1912, equipped for war, and decided to grab the next opportunity to initiate it. 2) that the German government and general staff hastened an intensification of the Austro-Serb crisis so as to launch what they pondered a preventive attack against Russia and France. If war did not erupt, Germany at least expected to weaken the alliance and win a moral triumph that would spread the prestige and stability of Germany and the Habsburg Empire. Bethmann incorporated a calculated risk of escalation; 3) that a long-standing stability existed in German intentions for expansion, possibility of Second World War, an eastern empire and supremacy over Belgium and France (Fischer, 1968). Argument 2) is widely recognized by other historians and scholars, although it would be incorrect to absolve Austria-Hungary and Russia. Argument 1) deficits in proof with regard to war preparations within Germany and Argument 3) needs further description because it makes excessive similarities between German war objectives in the two world wars (such as the racial agenda did not play a noteworthy role in 1914-1918 war). In any case, the German government, as other powers, did not anticipate a war of erosion. Domestic estimations, sometimes mentioned by Fischer, played a restricted role: Bethmann tried to draw Russia into the war as the aggressor so as to overcome the SPD's antiviolence emotion, but no immediate domestic crisis existed from which he would have had to escape. Much more severe domestic crises existed in Russia, Austria, and even in Britain. Most of the author’s agree that the alliance system was crucial in shaping events of World War I (Marshall, 1964) (Colby, 2010) (Kaiser, 1983). M. Howard in his book The First World War, argues that the war would not have become a world war, had Germany not invaded Belgium (Howard, 2003). In that account, Britain would not essentially have supported France and Russia. He does not completely outline what this would have caused though: Would Germany have planned a different strategy than the Schlieffen plan of removing French opposition before the Russian army attacked in the east, or would it not have declared war on France as well? Perhaps a fully blown world war could have been avoided, but most likely, the conflict would still have spread to a European level rather than being confined to the Balkans. Either way, his theory is that Germany is to blame for World War I for committing a strategic error in its military planning. In conclusion, the German government's responsibility for the outbreak of the war was certainly larger than that of the French and British governments, but particularly in the light of aggressive Austro-Hungarian and Russian moves it would be wrong to blame Germany alone. The causes for the war are highly complicated. Earlier crises could have led to a major escalation, and in that sense it has been asked: why did the First World War come only in 1914 and not already in 1905, 1908, or 1911? To me, it seems decisive that fatalism had been growing among European peoples and decision-makers; many believed war to be inevitable and had become tired of the recurring diplomatic crises, which usually worked to the disadvantage of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia. When a new crisis approached in 1914, the governments in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, and St. Petersburg were less willing than before to finding a frustrating compromise. Bibliography Weikart, R., 1993. The origins of social Darwinism in Germany: 1859–1895. Journal of the History of Ideas, 54(3), p.469–489. Colby, 2010. German Responsibility for the Outbreak of the War. [Online] Available at: http://www.colby.edu/personal/r/rmscheck/GermanyC1.html [Accessed April 2012]. Fay, S.B., 1966. The origins of the World War. Free Press. Ferguson, N., 1999. The pity of war. Basic Books. Fischer, F., 1968. Germany's Aims in the First World War. W. W. Norton & Company. Available at: http://www.blacksacademy.net/content/3481.html. Heyman, N.M., 1997. World War 1. Greenwood Publishing Group. Howard, M., 2003. The First World War. Oxford University Press, USA. Kaiser, D., 1983. Germany and the Causes of the First World War. English Historical Review. Marshall, S.L.A., 1964. World War I. American Heritage. Samuel R. Williamson, J., 1988. The Origins of World War I. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18(4), pp.795-818. The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars. Read More