Did the West Really Win the Cold War - Essay Example

?The Winner of the Cold War Introduction ‘Winning the Cold War’ is a very debatable principle since it can be understood as a moral excuse for all the defence and foreign policies of the Western administrations — for instance, military involvement in Nicaragua during Reagan’s term, a tactic which foresaw perhaps combating and winning a major war and unparalleled budgets for peacetime military (Painter 1999). The concept of ‘winning’ also seems to justify the rules of aiming for military supremacy and arbitrations from strength, which may be catastrophic as shown. Even as their exists a broad array of factors involved in the Cold War, this essay attempts to develop a perspective on the issue through examining the extent that the West, specifically European nations, can be said to have won the Cold War. Did the West Really Win the Cold War? It has to be explained first what was involved in the end of the Cold War, by determining the major components in the strategy of Gorbachev after 1985 and the unforeseen results of the course of internal and external reform. The policy reforms of Gorbachev occurred in four major domains; in each instance the policy acquired impetus and became more revolutionary commencing around 1987 (Geoffrey 2008). Primarily, the Soviet administration commenced after 1985 to reform features of its military strategy viewed as particularly hostile by the West, and at the same time to alter its method of arms control (Suri 2002). Gorbachev embarked on reassessing military principle, pioneering the notion of ‘reasonable sufficiency at the nuclear level’ (Juviler & Kimura 2009, 139) which indicates that ‘lower nuclear weapons levels would be required’ (ibid, 139) and advancing toward ‘defensive defence at the conventional level’ (Juviler & Kimura 2009, 140), in an effort to suppress the apprehensions of the West about surprise assault. Subsequently, Gorbachev indicated a reform in the ideological scope and proclaimed objectives of Soviet foreign policy, distancing from an idea of global class conflict toward a more broad-minded idea of peace and alliance. Propaganda about peace had contributed in Soviet policy beforehand, but Gorbachev placed a new emphasis on the essence of the United Nations and on ‘human values’ (Keohane, Nye, & Hoffman 1997). The Soviet Union escorted a new ideological approach with actual hints of a real policy reform, for instance, fulfilling its financial obligations to UN peacekeeping activities and collaborating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (Keohane et al. 1997). The last and most remarkable decision by Gorbachev was to modify Soviet policy toward the nations of East Europe (Phillips 2001). In his address in the UN in 1988 he declared that the Brezhnev Doctrine, stating the privilege of the Soviet Union to occupy Eastern Europe within the flag of socialist internationalism, had been discarded (Suri 2002). At some point in 1989 Solidarity made a compromise with the Polish United Workers’ party and adhered to the regime in August; a new multiparty elections and constitution in Hungary were declared in September (Suri 2002). In these two instances the deviation from the rule of the Communist Party was the outcome of an extended course of internal tension and the rise of strong party leaders, but reform was apparently permitted by the Soviet Union (Leffler & Westad 2010). Gorbachev tried to affect the more unruly administration of the German Democratic Republic (Geoffrey 2008). The Brezhnev Doctrine was officially abandoned by the Warsaw Pact when in the 1989 convention foreign ministers highlighted the right of each nation to be independent (Juviler & Kimura 2009). In spite of the recommendation of Gorbachev of large-scale reform in Eastern Europe, it is questionable if he expected, or aimed for, the disintegration of the coalition which took place after the revolutions in 1989 (Juviler & Kimura 2009). The concluding phase in the ending of the Cold War, the steady collapse of the USSR itself and the abandonment of the rule of the Communist party after the 1991 unsuccessful coup, was evidently a completely unintentional outcome of a reform course which had become wayward (Smith & Davis 2005). The administration of Reagan may have been actually accountable for the foremost three regions of policy reform which signified the ending of the Cold War (Summy & Salla 1995): ‘Gorbachev’s rethinking of military, ideological, and Third World goals and strategies’ (ibid, p. 24). Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, appealed in 1981 for the reconstruction of political and economic institutions, and the restructuring of military forces with the intention of guaranteeing better military success (Geoffrey 2008). His commentary in Kommunist in 1981 has been extensively mentioned by Western scholars (Smith & Davis 2005). It is hence questionable that only the extended stagnancy of the Brezhnev regime, and the ensuing poor health of Andropov and Chernenko (Cohen 1995), postponed reforms in internal policy. Gorbachev took over a policy and aimed to construct a global environment beneficial to his internal changes. Given the essence of the quarrel between superpowers in the Cold War, it does, yet, appear more likely that the West had some actual influence. One explanation why it is possible that the administration of Reagan provoked Gorbachev’s re-evaluation of defence and foreign strategy is the timing (Summy & Salla 1995). The agenda of the Soviet administration after 1995 may be an immediate reaction to the preliminary Western policy (Summy & Salla 1995): Post hoc is not necessarily propter hoc, but there is a prima facie case that the Western leaders forced the Soviet leadership to confront internal weaknesses and narrowed the options open to them. The Reagan administration, when it came to power, openly proclaimed it was altering the rules of the game with the Soviet Union after a decade of detente (ibid, p. 27). The policy of the West toward the Soviet Union had been becoming increasingly uncompromising in the 1970s, in part because of domestic right-wing tensions and in part because of concerns over the Soviet threat, particularly after the occupation of Afghanistan (Juviler & Kimura 2009). It can hence be assumed that the West compelled a reassessment of the former Brezhnev policy, which merged the aim for military equality, embedded in arms control compromises, and of technological and economic assistance from the West by means of detente with an involved effort to expand Soviet influence in developing countries (Painter 1999). Brezhnev himself acknowledged in 1982 that the United States had “launched a political, economic and ideological offensive” (Painter 1999, 114) against the USSR and had initiated an “unprecedented arms race” (ibid, p. 114). Another questionable issue is precisely how the strategy of the West affected the Soviet Union. An assumption about the features of arms race would indicate that Moscow was probable to react to the rhetoric and military agenda of the West by becoming increasingly uncompromising and enlarging its own arsenal (Juviler & Kimura 2009); certainly, there was several proofs of this reaction, particularly in 1984 (ibid, p. 104). Thus the diplomacy of Gorbachev might require an explanation not as an outcome of the decisions of the White House, but regardless of them. A recognised effort to interpret and verify an accurate hypothesis has been carried out by Fred Chernoff. He studies the argument made by Dan Quayle and other scholars that the brisk development of the armed forces provoked the Kremlin to react by enlarged military budget (Summy & Salla 1995). Consequently, the USSR, it is argued, experienced such major economic problems that it had to surrender the war and make significant arms control agreements. It is quite difficult to find trustworthy data on the military expenditures of the Soviet Union, but by making use of CIA approximations Chernoff shows that there is no believable support that the Soviet military spending boosted in response to the military budget of the United States (Summy & Salla 1995). The intricacies of the actual process of decision making in the USSR bring in a group of issues which have to be cited about the theory that influenced the character of Gorbachev’s reaction. This theory is sensible only if it is believed there was a sound policy. There are several clear doubts which can arise about this idea. One counterargument is that no government can actually aim for a strong strategy because of the incompatible demands of the Congress and pressure groups and especially due to the domestic bureaucratic conflict which goes before any formal policy actions (Cohen 1995). Where the head of the state assumes a dynamic role these difficulties can be lessened, but the West was known for its indifference towards details and ignorance of major concerns, for instance, nuclear tactics (Cohen 1995). However, it can be claimed that the general approach of Western tactics were evident enough. The objective was to strengthen the military might of the United States to acquire clear dominance over the USSR, to discard the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) approach towards arms control, and to destabilise the USSR by preventing its access to the economic or technological assistance of the West (Painter 1999). A basic difficulty in finding strength in the strategy of the West is the change in policy between his initial and subsequent regimes. Reagan, the foe of the so-called ‘evil empire’ (Summy & Salla 1995, 27), the advocate of the Western armed forces, and the enemy of arms control, talked about at Reykjavik the likelihood of removing every nuclear weapon and start to negotiate critically on reducing the weaponry of the US (Summy & Salla 1995). It is not important at this point to address the issue of whether the West had a sensibly definite set of objectives. In 1985, when Gorbachev rose to power, he embarked on pointing out to the public that in spite of the treacherous military agenda of several extreme factions in the West, there were also other positive indications from the government (Phillips 2001). Gorbachev pursued the favourable effect of the peace movements in the West and claimed that Soviet peacekeeping may influence Western policy (Geoffrey 2008). While supporters of the ‘Reagan triumph’ (Summy & Salla 1995, 27) view a victorious Washington which had impressed its idea on domestic enemies and may possibly enforce it upon the Kremlin, the belief from Moscow was more unclear. Conclusions This paper has agreed with scholars who argue that the Soviet Union was coming close to a technological and economic decline by the 1980s, and that sustaining the strength of its military and global aspirations was critically straining its limited resources. This discussion was also the source of the new outlook of Gorbachev. It has also recognised that the strategy of the initial Reagan regime did enlarge demands on the Soviet leadership and hence inclined to promote a reassessment of the Brezhnev doctrine. Lastly, this paper has refuted ideas that the arms strengthening of the economic demands on the Soviet Union actually affected the feature of the policies of Gorbachev, for instance, the new arms control model of the Soviet Union. There is much proof that Gorbachev basically reassessed the military strategy of the Soviet Union and, in the INF situation, identified the intermediate-range weaponry as needless and inefficient. The rules for the thinking of Gorbachev were completely contradictory to those the initial Western policies, and were actually not grasped by Gorbachev as mere surrender to dominant power. References BBC News (1999) World NATO’s Cold War roots [Online]. [Available at]: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/325388.stm [Accessed: 3 February 2011] Cohen, W., (1995). The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Volume 4, America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991. UK: Cambridge University Press. Geoffrey, R., (2008). Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953. Journal of Cold War Studies. 10 (3). p.179-181 Juviler, P. & Kimura, H., (2009). The Gorbachev Regime: Consolidation to Reform. Transaction Publishers. Keohane, R., Nye, J., Hoffmann, S., (1997). 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