Morality of Motives - Essay Example

Running Head: MORALITY OF MOTIVES (Name) (Course) (University) Date of presentation: Lecturer: Question: What counts as a morally good motive? Do good motives necessarily include sensitivity to moral reasons? If so, what kind of sensitivity (emotional, rational)? Can someone like Huck Finn act from admirable motives even though he lacks moral knowledge? Introduction In everyday lives, people are faced with lots of issues. How they respond to these issues require judgment of the right and wrong. Although the distinction between what is right and wrong is acknowledged by philosophers, it is at times blurred especially when one is faced with issues of morality. As such, most philosophers tend to focus on motives when investigating an issue or problem. Essentially, the motive for doing a certain action can be good or bad. How right or wrong the motive is depends on the perceptions of the doer and the society in general as well as the general principles that govern the conduct of people. When actions spring from morally acceptable motives, they are generally perceived to be good other wise motives can be morally bad. Discussion In everyday lives, people are often confronted with a host of moral issues. Once a person deliberates and forms judgment about what is right and wrong, the judgment takes a marked hold on the person. Although people do not always behave as they think they ought to, their moral judgments motivate them to behave, at least in accordance with the acceptable moral judgments. Many philosophers have regarded the motivating force of judgments as a key feature that makes them moral, thereby distinguishing them from other judgments that a person makes. This distinction makes clear the difference between morally good motives and morally bad motives. According to McAdams (1995) any act is morally acceptable if it springs from a good or virtuous motive. This is to mean that morally good motives result in good acts or at least do not come from inferior motives involving indifference to humanity or malice. According to this researcher, the emphasis on the virtuousness of a motive in determining its morality is fundamental in that it is not based on principles and rules or the good consequences of the motive. A central account in McAdams’argument is the idea of universal care or benevolence. In the backdrop of this perspective, how morally good or bad a motive is depends on not whether it promotes happiness, conforms to principles and results in good consequences, but rather on how well the motive relates to the motive of benevolence. Here, universal benevolence is regarded as the highest motive, a reasoning that is based on the sentiments of unbound love and care for humanity. For Slote (2001) a person of morally good motives does actions which promote love and care for other people. Such a person must believe that what they do is right and must not have a desire to do what is wrong. Just believing that something is right or wrong is not a motive. Moreover, the mere desire to do what is the right thing is not a good motive. If somebody does something because he believes it to be right, it means that the person believed in what he did and wanted to do what is right. But if he does it because he believes it to be his duty, then he has not acted from a morally good motive but from the motive of duty. Hence, the desire to execute one’s duty, even though it is the right is different from doing what is right. Brandt (2001) has noted that any action can be evaluated from two different perspectives. When actions are evaluated from the moral perspectives, they can be considered as morally right or morally wrong. Philosophers think that the two evaluations are independent of each other and that the distinction between morally good and bad things can help remove the perplexities of what motives are morally acceptable. Essentially, the debate on the morality of motives has been met with stiff opposition between deontologists and teleologists (consequentialism). Teleologists argue that the right-making attributes of a motive are its results and consequences on other people. This view is strongly opposed by deontologists who argue that motives can be good or bad in themselves. For instance, if a doctor tells a patient about the bitter truth of his terminal diseases, a teleologist will judge the morality (rightness or wrongness) of the doctor’s motive by referring to the effects of the disclosure on the patient. However, a deontologist will judge the motive to be right because telling the truth is intrinsically right. Nevertheless, doctor may have different reasons for telling the truth. For instance, if the doctor acts out of malice, he may want to plunge the patient into a state of despair, but he may also do so out of good intentions or benevolence (may be to give the patient and his family a chance to prepare for the worst). Despite the apparent disagreement about the rightness of a motive, teleology and deontology do agree that actions are morally wrong if they are motivated by ill intentions and vice versa (John & Gosling, 2000). It is the case that most philosophers consider motives to be an important factor that makes a person’s action morally right or wrong. Apparently, most of these philosophers consider that motives are the main factor that defines an action’s moral worth. Obviously, motives are an essential determinant for the moral goodness or badness of an action. If somebody spends his wealth to help war victims, the motive makes the act to be morally good. But if he dose so with the intention of gaining some profit, the action may still be prudent although it may not be morally praiseworthy. If somebody turns his radio loud with the intention of disturbing his neighbor, he will be blamed for doing something which is not right. However, if he likes loud music, the action will attract less blame although not without moral flaws. John and Gosling (2000) have argued that an action can be morally bad even though its motives are right. For instance, suppose that X does something with the intention of making Y happy. But if X is aware that his action will hurt Z, the act is not morally good even though it is motivated by a good intention. Hence it is plausible to state that motives make an action morally bad or good. The fact that the morality of a motive is not shown only by the intention shows that motives include sensitivity to moral reasons. Sensitivity to moral reasons discerns features and qualities of actions that are relevant to sizing the action morally. This is to say that moral considerations need the backing of certain general principles since situations will always present issues with multiple moral considerations. In addition, moral reasons present information on how to handle situations that require moral consideration. In any account, the fundamental aim of embracing moral reasons in actions is to distinguish relevant considerations from irrelevant ones. It is important to acknowledge that principles play a significant role in moral reasoning. According to Brandt (2001) principles necessarily figure as an important aspect of the basis of moral reasons. Moral particularism, however, gives the view that moral reasons can exist independently of any basis in the general principle. A contrary view is that moral reasons are general because the bases of their justification are general. This is particularly the case when a moral claim is ill-formed or when it contains particularities. Nevertheless, whether moral principles play any significant role in moral reasoning is different from whether the principles play any role in justifying the validity of moral statements. Moral particularism denies the latter role. Since it is not intentions or motives alone which make an action to be morally good or bad, some philosophers think that it is the person’s character which determines the moral worthiness of their actions. While the concept of character is defined differently, there is general agreement that one’s character is motivational since it affects the person’s behavior. For instance, if a person is greedy, the trait will affect the way the person behaves and the person will act in ways that will justify other people to call him greedy. Although there is a relationship between a person’s character and motivation, the two should be clearly distinguished, at least in the context of the morality of motives. This can be easily explained by the fact that a person can have the motivation to do something without necessarily possessing corresponding traits (McAdams, 1995). For instance, people tend to spend a lot of money although they are not necessarily wasteful or extravagant. Similarly, a person can have some character traits without corresponding motivation (it is true that an extravagant person has the passion to save money!). The distinction above shows that there are two ways of explaining the moral worthiness of an action: character explanation and motive explanation. Motive explanation refers to the aim of a person in doing a certain action. On the other hand, character explanation makes no reference to the person’s goals or aim. If one claims that they save money in order to buy a car, the claim is regarded as a motive-explanation. But if one saves money because of economic reasons, that becomes a character explanation. Therefore, a person’s motive should be distinguished from their character (John & Gosling, 2000). If a person has a moral reason to believe that they should do a certain action but fails to do it because something else is more pressing, the action can be morally wrong. For example, if a person believes that she should commit a substantial part of her income on the education of her children but fails because she prefers buying latest fashion, the action is morally reprehensible. The argument here is not that spending money on fashion clothes is morally blameworthy but that the motivation for doing so is immoral. This bears reasonable correspondence to ignorance. It has been noted (Brandt, 2001) that ignorance has a two-fold impact on the morality of motives. From on perspective, ignorance can be a good excuse for the moral choices that individuals make. Therefore, if a motive is based on ignorance, it can be seen as less blameworthy than could have been the case if the person had sufficient facts. In another perspective, doing something out of ignorance can be morally wrong. For instance shooting a game at a populated area has the risk of killing a human being. For this reason, the game hunter ought to have sufficient knowledge that there are no people nearby before firing at the game. This is why characters like Huck Finn cannot be thought to act with admirable motives, even though they lack moral knowledge. In Mark’s book, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Hack fails to overcome the prejudices and pressures of the society and as a result fosters the society’s morals. In the nook, Hacks innocence and untrained nature can not be taken to be a source of honest morals. Lack of moral knowledge gives rise to what is called weakness of the will. Basically, an individual exhibits weakness of the will if they intentionally do what they should not do (Slote, 2001). Such a person does something they believe to be wrong even though they do not want to do it usually because of ignorance and desires that cannot be controlled as in Huck’s case. It is widely acknowledged that emotions are essential for evaluating a person’s motives. A person is judged to have acted morally wrong when they take pleasure in other people’s suffering than when they feel sorry. Conclusion Motives can be morally good or bad. Whether a motive is morally good or bad depends on not only its consequences but also how it conform to the general principles governing the conduct of humanity. Although some motives can be morally good, they can have morally bad consequences and vice versa. In this case, it is important to understand the general intention and character of a person who does a certain act. References Brandt, R. B. (2001). Facts, values, and morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. John, O. P. & Gosling, S. D. (2000). Personality traits. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), Encyclopedia of psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 140–144). Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press. McAdams, D. P. (1995). What do we know when we know a person? Journal of Personality, 63(3), 365–396. Slote, M. (2001). Morals from motives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Read More

Moreover, the mere desire to do what is the right thing is not a good motive. If somebody does something because he believes it to be right, it means that the person believed in what he did and wanted to do what is right. But if he does it because he believes it to be his duty, then he has not acted from a morally good motive but from the motive of duty. Hence, the desire to execute one’s duty, even though it is the right is different from doing what is right. Brandt (2001) has noted that any action can be evaluated from two different perspectives.

When actions are evaluated from the moral perspectives, they can be considered as morally right or morally wrong. Philosophers think that the two evaluations are independent of each other and that the distinction between morally good and bad things can help remove the perplexities of what motives are morally acceptable. Essentially, the debate on the morality of motives has been met with stiff opposition between deontologists and teleologists (consequentialism). Teleologists argue that the right-making attributes of a motive are its results and consequences on other people.

This view is strongly opposed by deontologists who argue that motives can be good or bad in themselves. For instance, if a doctor tells a patient about the bitter truth of his terminal diseases, a teleologist will judge the morality (rightness or wrongness) of the doctor’s motive by referring to the effects of the disclosure on the patient. However, a deontologist will judge the motive to be right because telling the truth is intrinsically right. Nevertheless, doctor may have different reasons for telling the truth.

For instance, if the doctor acts out of malice, he may want to plunge the patient into a state of despair, but he may also do so out of good intentions or benevolence (may be to give the patient and his family a chance to prepare for the worst). Despite the apparent disagreement about the rightness of a motive, teleology and deontology do agree that actions are morally wrong if they are motivated by ill intentions and vice versa (John & Gosling, 2000). It is the case that most philosophers consider motives to be an important factor that makes a person’s action morally right or wrong.

Apparently, most of these philosophers consider that motives are the main factor that defines an action’s moral worth. Obviously, motives are an essential determinant for the moral goodness or badness of an action. If somebody spends his wealth to help war victims, the motive makes the act to be morally good. But if he dose so with the intention of gaining some profit, the action may still be prudent although it may not be morally praiseworthy. If somebody turns his radio loud with the intention of disturbing his neighbor, he will be blamed for doing something which is not right.

However, if he likes loud music, the action will attract less blame although not without moral flaws. John and Gosling (2000) have argued that an action can be morally bad even though its motives are right. For instance, suppose that X does something with the intention of making Y happy. But if X is aware that his action will hurt Z, the act is not morally good even though it is motivated by a good intention. Hence it is plausible to state that motives make an action morally bad or good. The fact that the morality of a motive is not shown only by the intention shows that motives include sensitivity to moral reasons.

Sensitivity to moral reasons discerns features and qualities of actions that are relevant to sizing the action morally. This is to say that moral considerations need the backing of certain general principles since situations will always present issues with multiple moral considerations. In addition, moral reasons present information on how to handle situations that require moral consideration. In any account, the fundamental aim of embracing moral reasons in actions is to distinguish relevant considerations from irrelevant ones.

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