Euthanasia: Leo Viscos - Case Study Example

Running Head: CASE STUDY Case Study. Institution: Abstract. Leo Visco’s shooting of Eva Visco cannot categorically be proved to have been done with her consent. His failure to follow through with the murder-suicide pact and to explore all available medical options for improving the quality of her life, leave his motives open to question. As this case cannot unequivocally be accepted as a mercy death, Leo Visco’s position is not morally defensible. Case Study. Euthanasia is a term derived from the Greek ‘eu,’ or well and ‘thanatos,’ or death and connotes ‘a good death.’ It is the intentional killing, by act or by omission, of a dependent human being for his or her alleged benefit. Euthanasia can be voluntary: when the person requests it (mercy death); non-voluntary: when the person is unable to give consent, as when in a coma (allowing someone to die); involuntary: when the persons’ consent has not been secured (mercy killing). Voluntary euthanasia, or mercy death, is termed assisted suicide when the individual is given help by another person (Euthanasia, n. d.). Assisted suicide involves “direct action taken to terminate someone’s life at his or her request” (Thiroux and Krasemann, ). The Case Study under discussion is apparently, on the surface, an instance of assisted suicide. However, Leo Visco’s rejection of any medical help to alleviate Eva’s chronic symptoms, the absence of written directives and Leo’s failure to adhere to the murder-suicide pact call into question the morality of his action. The medical examiners’ unequivocal statement that Eva’s medical condition did not “warrant an execution,” and was not a terminal illness, makes it difficult to justify Leo’s argument that the mercy death was carried out to save his wife from a continuing unpleasant existence. Even when Visco’s attorney’s depiction of Eva’s condition of chronic pain, incontinence and degenerating sight and hearing is corroborated by her children and the neighbors, the fact that it was not terminal makes it open to two pertinent questions: was a doctor consulted to explore all available avenues, including hospice care, to improve Eva’s quality of life? Was Leo better qualified than a medical professional to make the subjective judgment on the quality of Eva’s life? When chronic pain can be treated and managed with medication and the often accompanying clinical depression can be lessened with psychological counseling, Leo’s failure to consult a doctor on ways to alleviate Eva’s pain leaves his motives open to question (Maine Right to Life, 2006). Leo’s moral justification of killing Eva to save her from an unpleasant existence can be accepted only in the light of conclusive medical evidence that there was no hope of improvement in her condition, no medication to alleviate her pain and no possibility of a cure. In the absence of such evidence, Leo Visco is not morally justified in killing Eva Visco. The distinction between terminal illness and chronic ailments is definitely relevant in this case. The morality of Visco’s action is further undermined by the absence of any written directive or living will from Eva. Even in cases where there are convincing arguments in favor of mercy death, the institution of safeguards is considered essential, in the form of permissive laws, written requests, waiting periods, proof of absence of coercion and counseling. In this case, none of the above safeguards have been in place and we have only Leo’s word in support of the murder-suicide pact. Even when his devotion to his wife, as vouched for by his neighbors, is accepted, in the absence of corroboration to support his claim that his wife wanted to die, it is difficult to morally justify his action as mercy death. In fact, in the absence of evidence of Eva’s “explicit request or permission to perform the act” (Thiroux and Krasemann, ), Leo’s action can be construed to be mercy killing, or even murder, and not mercy death. Leo’s choice of a revolver to kill Eva, instead of some other painless, non-violent, gentle means, again weakens his moral stand, as his action resulted in a lingering death for Eva. A lingering death from a gun shot wound certainly does not qualify as allowing a person to die with dignity, which is the moral justification for mercy death. The circumstances of this case cast a doubt on the contention that it is an assisted suicide and bring in the possibilities of mercy killing and murder, neither of which is morally justified. The breaking of the murder-suicide pact definitely has a bearing on Leo Visco’s moral standing. When we accept Eva’s right to the freedom of individual choice, Leo’s failure to commit suicide brings up the troubling question: Would Eva have chosen this mercy death if it entailed leaving behind a grief-stricken, guilt-laden husband as a survivor? In the context of mutual devotion between Leo and Eva, her decision to opt for assisted suicide would definitely have been influenced by the belief that Leo’s immediate suicide would save him from any negative repercussions from the act of taking her life. She would categorically have rejected the injustice of making Leo live with his burden of guilt and the risk of making him vulnerable to conviction for murder. Eva would definitely not have consented to being killed by Leo, without the promise of his subsequent suicide. Another pertinent factor here is that it is explicitly stated by the medical examiner, the neighbors and the children that Eva had limited mobility and was “nearly” bedridden – not completely immobilized. In such a scenario, Eva was presumably capable of taking her own life, without subjecting her husband to the ordeal of killing her and then living to face the consequences. A suicide pact would be more morally acceptable than a murder-suicide pact: especially a broken one. Leo’s failure to follow through with the murder-suicide pact definitely impinges negatively on his moral position. In the light of the ethical theories, again the morality of Leo Visco’s action is debatable. There is no clear-cut evidence that Eva was the person who took the decision to end her life rationally in her self-interest, as advocated by Ethical Egoism or by the Principle of Individual Freedom. Even if Leo Visco’s uncorroborated version of the murder-suicide pact is true, his failure to commit suicide leaves him as a guilt-laden survivor and a murder accused in the eyes of the law, which is against the position taken by Utilitarianism and against the Principle of Justice. If, on the other hand, Leo acted without Eva’s consent, from ulterior motives of economic gain or relief from the burden of caring for her, it becomes mercy killing or murder, both of which violate the Divine Command Theory and the Value of Life Principle. Similarly, Leo’s actions cannot be condoned by Ross’ Prima Facie Duties, as Leo did not explore the options available to improve Eva’s condition. His action is also against Virtue Ethics, as Eva was not suffering from a terminal illness and could have developed in virtue through the experiences of her continued existence. In conclusion, Leo Visco’s position is morally indefensible. The clear absence of a terminal illness, the lack of conclusive evidence that Eva consented to a mercy death, Leo’s failure to show that all available options for medical treatment had been explored before the decision to end her life was reached and his breaking of the murder-suicide pact all leave his motives open to question. This case cannot categorically be said to be one of mercy death: the possibility of mercy killing or murder are too high for them to be eliminated from the scene and for Leo Visco’s actions to be condoned as morally right. References. Euthanasia (n.d.) National Right to Life. Retrieved on 21 February 2007, from http://www.nrlc.org/euthanasia/index.html Maine Right to Life Committee (2006). Euthanasia. Retrieved on 21 February 2007, from http://www.mainerighttolife.com/euthanasia.php Thiroux, J.P. and Krasemann, K.W. ( ) Ethics Theory and Practice. Ninth edition. Read More