Key Challenges Which Confront Environmental Governance - Article Example

Review Essay Summary This article discusses the key challenges which confront environmental governance. The challenges are caused by the rising connectivity of “resource-use systems” and the growth in “functional interdependencies” of social and ecological systems. In particular, the article takes the case of the “Xingu Indigenous Park” (PIX), which is in Brazil and the agro-industrial region surrounding it. The article asserts that there is no appropriate fixed spatial (or temporal) level for administering ecosystems and their related services in a manner that is sustainable, effective and equitable. It observes the need of recognizing multi-level nature of these challenges and the role played by facilitative instructions on cross level environmental governance. This forms the most essential form of social-capital which is important for the safeguard of ecosystems and the welfare of various populations in the long term. The ecosystems are entrenched in different social organizational levels and are of different kinds of natural capital. Ecosystems subsist at multiple levels and range from small to global. The positive or negative externalities are that are transmitted from an ecosystem impacts on other ecosystems. Similarly, human beings that are affected or use these ecosystems are organized through various kinds of social capital. Policy design that puts its focus on local, national or either international level is inadequate. The growing interdependency in the resource-use systems as a result of economic globalization forces and the change in the global environment intensify the need to look at interlinkages that: Expand the market (global) chains which compete for water and land resources Increase government jurisdictions overlaps, local and regional usage and ownership rights Increase migration between regions and social groups Create trading blocks, transnational conservation areas and multilateral infrastructure Strengthen global climatic change patterns which affect the frequency and distribution of rainfall, temperature change and drought. Representative institutions are engaged in a vertical interplay whereby they cooperate or compete for power over resources. Subtractability is where appropriation of resources to certain institution prevents others from getting the same. Exclusion is the cost incurred in keeping out the potential beneficiaries from resource consumption. The case of PIX illustrates the inefficiencies of local regulation and forms of use of a resource. This is mainly because it is based on customary usage rules and exclusion. It is usually affected and even overcome by use of the resource in another part of the bigger ecosystem. Institutions which facilitate cross-level governing of environment are essential type of social capital. In this article social capital is used to refer to the value of faith which is produced by social networks in order to facilitate individuals and cooperation of a group on common interests and social institution organization at different scales. Principles of institutional design explain the reasons behind the robust arrangements for environmental resources governance at local and regional levels. However, it is a challenge to translate applications of these principles to higher social organizational levels. The challenges are encountered in scaling up the principles of institutional design and social capital building for systems of governance linkages across social organizational levels. They include Fit: there is a mismatch between institutional and environmental boundaries, which poses a challenge of linking units of analysis and spatial scale. Boundaries: it is a challenge to recognize the competing rules of exclusion and Subtractability which operate in various parts of the ecosystem. Authority: it is difficult to recognize a change in jurisdiction and power over resources (including overlaps) at various levels. Sanctions: there is a challenge of complying with the rules and scale as you move from local level to international level. This brings about lack of accountability. Information and knowledge: not all the groups that have the same knowledge systems or information access at various levels. This causes problem of understanding credibility, legitimacy and saliency. Human made capital include human, social and physical forms of capital. They are created when people spend their time and effort in transacting and transforming activities to make assets or tools at the present which will the social welfare of the individual in future. Human made capital have an essential role in creating human welfare and management of ecosystems. Money and human capital are not the same, but rather money is the means by which this capital is obtained. Physical capital refers to the reserve of material resources that are man-made and which are used to generate future income flows. On the other hand, human capital refers to the skills and knowledge that an individual acquires and utilizes them in an activity. Social capital is majorly a characteristic of organization at a society level. It can be used to refer to norms and rules which underlay social order and behavior and which represent certain organizational forms in the society. The social capital plays a critical role in facilitating natural resources management. It provides the required intersection between vertical and horizontal interplay of the arrangement of institutions. This is the case because local networks are a subset of the lager social systems and ecological systems. The outcome of common interests in the management of resources within a level is dependent on the coherence of common interests between levels. The expectations individuals about interaction patterns are demonstrated in their activities at the local or international levels. Therefore, social networks form the medium of conveying the common interests at an individual level, communities and the society at large. Strengths and weaknesses of the article The article has described that the success of protection of the environment will depend on the interests that are shared in common between the social institutions (Brondizio, Elinor and Oran, 2009). This is particularly true because different institutional groups have different tastes and preferences. Every local community has what it regards as beneficial to the community and what does not add value. This depends on the main economic activity within the community. It is observed that if an institution is considered as an individual, economic rationality will demand that they maximize their gains at the possible lowest cost. Notice that since preferences differs from one local community to the other, their gains might be detrimental to the neighbouring community (negative externality). If we go by this proposition the net sum gain by the society at large will be zero or less than zero. This is because each group will be exploiting the environmental resources at the expense of the other. For instance, farmers will cultivate land because of the available opportunities to maximize their welfare. Increased resource usage in this manner will lead to deforestation and encroachment of desert. For effective utilization and protection of the social-ecological systems, there has to be interests which are shared in common between the social organizational levels. In this way, every individual will comply with the set rules and regulations for governance of social-ecological systems. It is stated in the article that compliance level decline from local to global levels. This is the case because there is lack of accountability hence nobody feels obligated to protect social-ecological systems. Rules and regulations are usually set, but unless there is enforcement of such sanctions, they become futile. According to Wirick (1998) the local level is able to uphold the rules and regulations since they share many interests. The jurisdiction of governance is small making the monitoring of social-ecological systems less difficult. It is common to find that the community at the local level engages in the same economic activities hence they share the same norms and behaviours and have similar knowledge system. The information flow at this level is simple making the compliance with rules and regulation effective. Although linking arrangements of environmental governance in different ecosystems can help protect the resources, it cannot prove to protect social-ecological in the long term as stated in the article. This is because such alliances exist as long as they are bound by that contract since it depends on the initial motives of the parties concerned. When the association is broken, no party becomes committed to honour their prior agreements (Obert, 2005). In addition, the economic activities of the society keeps changing with time, which means that if such a change occurred, they will have to adjust their plans to fit in the current situation. This means that the ecosystem will not be pursuing the same objectives as before, which brings about lack of compliance with the regulation and rules. Furthermore, long term protection of social-ecological systems can only be achieved if there is a general agreement with all systems in the larger society. This is in contrast with what the article presupposes since there is possibility of two or more ecosystems linking together, but its motives will be detrimental to the larger society. Therefore, there is need to have international environmental governance, which will oversee the activities of other ecosystem linkages at a regional or local level. The disciplinary measures taken for non-compliance are clear to all parties in the ecosystem, which makes individuals to have the sense of obligation to protect social-ecological system. Refinement and Extension Social-ecological systems are social goods. These are goods which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual-consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual consumption. This is to say, total social good consumed is equal to the quantity consumed by individual A, which is equal to the quantity consumed by individual B. When social-ecological systems are not utilized properly, they get exhausted. Therefore, because of scarcity of these resources, individuals will compete for them leading to their overexploitation (Walter, 1991). Since the usage of social-ecological systems is consumed equally by all, there is no one person who can vary the quantity to be taken. This creates the need for environmental governance in order to ensure efficient allocation of the resource. Externality is something that does not monetarily affect the producer of a resource, but influences the standard of living of society as a whole. A positive externality is beneficial to the society but in such a way that the producer cannot fully benefit from the gains made. For example, environmental cleanup and research may benefit an ecosystem but it does not increase benefits for the social organizational level responsible for it. Likewise, research and new technological developments creates gains to the larger society but not to the specific local level responsible for it. Negative externality is something that cost the local level nothing but is costly to the society in general. An individual or a local group that pollutes the environment loses no money in doing so, but the larger society must pay heavily to take care of the problem caused by the pollution. The problems caused by the pollution are not fully absorbed by the polluting entity since they do not have to subtract these social costs from its benefits. Hence the gains inaccurately portray the action of the polluting individual as positive, which leads to inefficiency in the allocation of social-ecological resources. The presence of externalities in the social-ecological systems suggest that the optimality rules normally assumed to lead to allocative efficiency may not in fact lead to the most socially efficient outcomes. These problems can be solved through mergers of the local levels in the larger society. For instance, if a fishing ecosystem is by the pollution produced by landowners upstream then this problem can be solved by merging the parties involved and internalizing the effect. Another possible solution to these problems is to issue tradable pollution permits. This allows environmental governance to give individuals licences to pollute up to a certain level. In this case, it is in the interests of the individual and the society to pollute as little as possible. In order to have a good coordination of the functional interdependency of social-ecological systems, there must be a good environmental management. When functional interdependencies are not properly coordinated, there will be conflict among them. This is what leads to decline in compliance with regulation and rules governing the use of resources. Proper coordination calls for good policy targeting during the planning of connectivity and governance and implementation process. There has to be effective communication to all levels in the larger society. This will eliminate cases of imperfect information within social-ecological system (Suzanne, et al., 2004). Therefore, individuals will have the necessary information to make the right environmental protection decision, which will prevent emergence of inefficient patterns of resource allocation. References Brondizio, E., Elinor, O. and Oran, Y., (2009). Connectivity and the Governance of Multilevel Social-Ecological Systems: The Role of Social Capital. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 34:253-278. Obert, O. (2005). Organizational Behavior and Industrial Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Suzanne, R. et al., (2004). Information technology and organizational transformation: solving the management puzzle. Butterworth: Heinemann. Walter, N. (1991). Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions. New Delhi: Dryden Press. Wirick, D. (1998). Organizational transformation: ensuring the relevance of public utility commissions. New Jersey: National Regulatory Research Institute. Read More